DemocracyThe God That Failed (42 page)

I do not want to further analyze or defend the libertarian theory of justice at this point. Let me only confess that I believe the theory to be true, indeed to be irrefutably true.
¹⁷
Rather, I want to turn to the question
of the relationship between libertarianism and conservatism (the belief in a natural social order based and centered on families). Some superficial commentators, mostly from the conservative side, such as Russell
Kirk, have characterized libertarianism and conservatism as incompatible, hostile, or even antagonistic ideologies.
¹⁸
In fact, this view is entirely mistaken. The relationship between libertarianism and conservatism is one of praxeological compatibility, sociological complementarity, and reciprocal reinforcement.

¹⁷
See Rothbard,
The
Ethics
of
Liberty;
Hans-Hermann Hoppe,
The
Economics
and
Ethics
of
Private
Property
(Boston: Kluwer, 1993). Briefly, two central arguments have been advanced in defense of this claim. The first, initially outlined by Rothbard, proceeds via an
argumentuma
contrario.
If, contrary to the principle of first or original appropriation, a person A were
not
considered the owner of his visibly (demonstrably, and intersubjectively ascertainably) appropriated body and the standing room and places originally (prior to everyone else) appropriated through him by means of his body, then only two alternative arrangements exist. Either
another
later-coming person B must be recognized as the owner of A's body and the places originally appropriated by A, or both
Aand
B must be considered equal co-owners of all bodies and places. (The third conceivable alternative, that
no
one
should own
any
body and originally appropriated place, can be ruled out as an impossibility. Acting
requires
a body and standing room and we cannot
not
act; hence, to adopt this alternative would imply the instant death of all of mankind.) In the first case, A would be
reduced to the rank of B's slave and subject of exploitation. B is the owner of the body and places originally appropriated by A, but A in turn is not the owner of the body and places so appropriated by B. Under this ruling, two categorically distinct classes of persons are constituted: slaves or
Untermenschen
such as A and masters or
Uber
menschen
such as B, to whom different "laws" apply. Hence, while such a ruling is certainly
possible,
it must be discarded from the outset as a human ethic, equally and universally applicable for everyone
qua
human being (rational animal). For a rule to aspire to the rank of a law—a
just
rule—it is necessary that it apply equally and universally to everyone. The rule under consideration manifestly does not fulfill this universalization requirement. Alternatively, in the second case of universal and equal co-ownership the universalization requirement is apparently fulfilled. However, this alternative suffers from another, even more severe deficiency, because if it were adopted all of mankind would perish immediately, for every action of a person requires the use of scarce means (at least his body and its standing room). However, if all goods were co-owned by everyone, then no one at any time or place would be allowed to do anything unless he had previously secured everyone else's consent to do so. Yet how could anyone grant such consent if he were not the exclusive owner of his own body (including its vocal chords) by means of which this consent would be expressed? Indeed, he would first need others' consent in order to be allowed to express his own, but these others could not give their consent without first having his, etc. Thus, only the first alternative—the principle of original appropriation—is left. It fulfills the universalization requirement and it is praxeologically possible.

The second argument, first advanced by this author and yielding essentially the same conclusion, has the form of an impossibility theorem. The theorem proceeds from a logical reconstruction of the necessary conditions—
Bedingungen
der
Moglichkeit
—of
ethical
problems and an exact definition and delineation of the purpose of ethics. First, for ethical problems to arise
conflict
between separate and independent agents must exist (or must at least be possible); and a conflict can only emerge in turn with respect to
scarce
means
or "economic" goods. A conflict is possible neither with respect to superabundant or "free" goods such as, under normal circumstances, the air that we breathe, nor with respect to scarce but non-appropriable goods such as the sun or the clouds, i.e., the
"conditions,"
rather than the
"means,"
of human action). Conflict is possible only with respect to controllable ("appropriable") means such as a specific piece of land, tree or cave situated in a specific and unique spatio-temporal relation
vis-a-vis
the sun and/or the rain clouds. Hence, the task of ethics is to propose rules regarding the "proper" versus the "improper"
use
of
scarce
means.
That is, ethics concerns the assignment of rights of exclusive control over scarce goods, i.e.,
property
rights,
in order to rule out conflict. Conflict, however, is not a sufficient prerequisite for ethical problems, for one can come into conflict also with a gorilla or a mosquito, for instance, yet such conflicts do not give rise to
ethical
problems. Gorillas and mosquitoes pose merely a
technical
problem. We must learn how to successfully manage and control the movements of gorillas and mosquitoes just as we must learn to manage and control the inanimate objects of our environment. Only if both parties to a conflict are capable of prepositional exchange, i.e., argumentation, can one speak of an ethical problem; that is,
only if the gorilla and/or the mosquito could, in principle, pause in their conflictuous activity and express "yes" or "no," i.e., present an argument, would one owe them an answer. The impossibility theorem proceeds from this proposition in clarifying, first, its
axiomatic
status. No one can deny, without falling into performative contradictions, that the common rationality as displayed by the ability to engage in propositional exchange constitutes a necessary condition for ethical problems because this denial would itself have to be presented in the form of a proposition. Even an ethical relativist who admits the existence of ethical questions, but denies that there are any valid answers, cannot deny the validity of this proposition (which accordingly has been referred to also as the
"a
priori
of argumentation"). Second, it is pointed out that everything that must be presupposed by argumentation cannot in turn be argumentatively disputed without getting entangled in a performative contradiction, and that among such presuppositions there exist not only
logical
ones, such as the laws of propositional logic (e.g., the law of identity), but also
praxeological
ones. Argumentation is not just free-floating propositions but always involves also at least two distinct
arguers,
a proponent and an opponent, i.e.,
argumentation
is a subcategory of human
action.
Third, it is then shown that the mutual recognition of the principle of original appropriation, by both proponent
and
opponent, constitutes the praxeological presupposition of argumentation. No one can propose anything and expect his opponent to convince himself of the validity of this proposition or else deny it and propose something else unless his and his opponent's right to exclusive control over their "own" originally appropriated body (brain, vocal chords, etc.) and its respective standing room were already presupposed and assumed as valid. Finally, if the recognition of the principle of original appropriation forms the praxeological presupposition of argumentation, then it is impossible to provide a propositional justification for any other ethical principle without running thereby into performative contradictions.

In order to explain this, let me first point out that most, though not all, leading libertarian thinkers were, as a matter of empirical fact, socialcultural conservatives: defenders of traditional, bourgeois morals and manners. Mos
t notably, Murray Rothbard, the single most important and influential libertarian thinker, was an outspoken cultural conservative. So was Rothbard's most important teacher, Ludwig von Mises. (Ayn Rand, another major influence on contemporary libertarianism, is a different matter, of course.)
¹⁹
While this does not prove much (it does
prove only that libertarianism and conservatism can be
psychologically
reconciled), it is indicative of a
substantive
affinity between the two doctrines. It is not difficult to recognize that the conservative and the libertarian views of society are perfectly compatible (congruent). To be sure, their methods are distinctly different. One is (or appears to be) empiristic, sociological, and descriptive, and the other rationalistic, philosophical, logical, and constructivist. This difference notwithstanding, both agree in one fundamental respect, however. Conservatives are convinced that the "natural" and "normal" is old and widespread (and thus can be discerned always and everywhere). Similarly, libertarians are convinced that the principles of justice are eternally and universally valid (and hence, must have been essentially known to mankind since its very beginnings). That is, the libertarian ethic is not new and revolutionary, but old and conservative. Even primitives and children are capable of grasping the validity of the principle of original appropriation, and most people usually recognize it as an unquestionable matter of fact.

¹⁸
See Russell Kirk,
The
Conservative
Mind
(Chicago: Regnery, 1953); idem,
A
Pro
gram
for
Conservatives
(Chicago: Regnery, 1955).

¹⁹
On Rothbard see the contributions to
Murray
N.
Rothbard:
In
Memoriam,
Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1995), especially the contribution by Joseph T. Salerno; on Mises see Murray N. Rothbard,
Ludwig
von
Mises:
Scholar,
Creator,
Hero
(Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1988); Jeff rey A. Tucker and Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., "The Cultural Thought of Ludwig von Mises,"
Journal
of
Libertarian
Studies
10, no. 1 (1991); on Rand see Tuccille,
It
Usually
Begins
with
Ayn
Rand;
Murray N. Rothbard,
The
Sociology
of
the
Ayn
Rand
Cult
(Burlingame, Calif.: Center for Libertarian Studies, [1972] 1990), and from the Randian side Barbara Branden,
The
Passion
of
Ayn
Rand
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1986).

Moreover, as far as the object on which conservatives and libertarians focus is concerned—on the one hand families, kinship relations, communities, authority and social hierarchy, and on the other hand property and its appropriation, transformation and transfer—it should be clear that while they do not refer to identical entities, they still speak about different aspects of one and the same object: human actors and social cooperation. Extensively, that is, their realm of inquiry (frame of reference) is identical. Families, authority, communities, and social ranks are the empirical-sociological concretization of the abstract philosophical-praxeological categories and concepts of property, production, exchange, and contract. Property and property relations do not exist apart from families and kinship relations. The latter shape and determine the specific form and configuration of property and property relations, while they are at the same time constrained by the universal and eternal laws of scarcity and property. In fact, as we have already seen, families considered normal by conservative standards are
household
families, and the family disintegration and moral and cultural decay which contemporary conservatives deplore is largely the result of the
erosion and destruction of households (estates) as the economic basis of families by the modern welfare state. Thus, the libertarian theory of justice can actually provide conservatism with a more precise definition and a more rigorous moral defense of its own end (the return to civilization in the form of moral and cultural normalcy) than conservatism itself could ever offer. In doing so it can further sharpen and strengthen conservatism's traditional antistatist outlook.
²⁰

IV

While the intellectual creators of modern libertarianism were cultural conservatives, and while the libertarian doctrine is fully compatible and congruent with the conservative worldview (and does not, as some conservative critics claim, entail an "atomistic individualism" and "acquisitive egoism"), corrupted by the modern welfare state the libertarian movement has undergone a significant transformation. To a large extent (and completely so in the eyes of the media and the public), it has become a movement that combines radical antistatism and market economics with cultural leftism, counter and multiculturalism, and personal hedonism; that is, it is the exact opposite of the Buchananite program of culturally conservative socialism: countercultural capitalism.

Earlier it was noted that the Buchananite program of social(ist) nationalism does not seem to have much mass appeal, at least not in the United States. This is true to an even larger extent for the libertarian attempt to synthesize market economics with counter- and multiculturalism. Yet as was the case with conservatism before, in this case, too, my central concern is not about mass appeal and whether or not certain ideas can be psychologically combined and integrated, but whether or not these ideas can be combined practically and effectively. It is my plan to show that they cannot, and that much of contemporary libertarianism is false, counterproductive libertarianism (much like Buchanan's conservatism is false and counterproductive).

That much of modern libertarianism is culturally leftist is not due to any such leanings among the major libertarian theoreticians. As noted, they were for the most part cultural conservatives. Rather, it was the
result of a superficial understanding of the libertarian doctrine by many of its fans and followers, and this ignorance has its explanation in a historical coincidence and the mentioned tendency, inherent in the social-democratic welfare state, of promoting a process of intellectual and emotional infantilization (decivilization of society).

²⁰
On the relationship between (traditionalist) conservatism and (rationalist) libertarianism see Ralph Raico, "The Fusionists on Liberalism and Tradition,"
New
Individualist
Review
3, no. 3 (1964); M. Stanton Evans, "Raico on Liberalism and Religion,"
New
Individualist
Review
4, no. 2 (1966); Ralph Raico, "Reply to Mr. Evans,"
ibidem;
also
Freedom
and
Virtue:
The
Conservative-Libertarian
Debate,
George W. Carey, ed. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984).