Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (121 page)

The Americans who accompanied Scowcroft reported that Deng greeted Scowcroft and Eagleburger cordially, saying, “The reason I have chosen President Bush as my friend is because since the inception of my contact with him, I found that his words are trustworthy. . . . He doesn't say much in terms of empty words or words that are insincere.”
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But Deng was still tough as nails, and deadly serious, in his assessment of U.S.-China relations. With respect to June 4, he said that it was “an earthshaking event, and it is very unfortunate that the United States is too deeply involved in it . . . the various aspects of U.S. foreign policy have actually cornered China. . . . The aim of the counterrevolutionary rebellion was to overthrow the People's Republic of China and our socialist system. If they should succeed in obtaining that aim, the world would be a different one. To be frank, this could even lead to war.” Deng then accused the United States of siding with those trying to overthrow
the Chinese government and said that the U.S. press was exaggerating the violence and interfering with China's internal affairs.

Deng regarded Bush's decision to send the two envoys as a good decision. “It seems that there is still hope to maintain our original good relations. . . . I believe that is the hope of President Bush. It is also the hope shared by me. However, a question of this nature cannot be solved by two persons from the perspective of being friends.” Differences between the two countries were caused, Deng said, by the United States, which “on a large-scale has impinged upon Chinese interests. . . . It is up to the person who tied the knot to untie it. . . . It is up to the United States to cease adding fuel to the fire.” Deng went on to explain that the People's Republic of China was founded as a result of twenty-two years of war, with over 20 million lives lost, and no force could substitute for the Chinese Communist Party in governing China. This was a stern message from someone who felt that the fate of his country was at risk and that continuing U.S. support for Chinese protestors had contributed to that risk.

In his response, Scowcroft reiterated that President Bush believed in maintaining good relations with China; it was in the U.S. national interest to do so. Bush also wanted Deng to understand the political constraints on the American president at the time.
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Deng replied by asking Scowcroft to “convey my feelings to my friend, President Bush . . . that no matter what should be the outcome of the discussions between our two governments on this issue, if he would continue to treat me as his friend, I would also like to do that.”
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Scowcroft attempted to explain why the United States harbored such strong feelings about personal freedom—but he didn't get far. Deng concluded the meeting by saying that he did not agree with much of what Scow-croft had said, and that “with regard to concluding this unhappy episode in the relations between China and the United States . . . we have to see what kind of actions the United States will take.”
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And then, Scowcroft reports, Deng took his leave.

One of the casualties in U.S.-China relations at this time was the continuation of U.S. agreements to supply military equipment to China. Between 1983 and 1989, as anti-Soviet allies, the Chinese and Americans militaries had worked out arrangements whereby the United States sold China avionics equipment, missiles, and torpedoes. The biggest single item was a radar system for the F-8 fighter plane; the Chinese also purchased Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters. This package represented a significant amount of money
at China's early stage of economic development. After 1989, because U.S. sanctions prevented the sale of parts to China, including parts for the Sikorsky helicopters, the Chinese were unable to use much of the equipment they had already paid for.

Between 1989 and 1993, there were virtually no contacts between senior U.S. and Chinese military officials. The contacts were resumed in 1993, but the level of trust between the two never returned to the earlier high of 1983–1989. In fact, after 1989 the Chinese turned to the Soviet Union to purchase the SU-27 fighter jet and to Israel for other military equipment and supplies. China was reluctant to buy any important piece of military equipment from the United States.
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At the G-7 economic summit in France that began on July 14, 1989, a month after the Tiananmen tragedy, the main question was not whether to impose sanctions on China, but rather how harsh the sanctions should be. Compared to other leaders, President Bush and Japanese prime minister S
suke Uno favored milder sanctions. President Bush did support withholding new World Bank loans to China and approved of giving permanent residency to Chinese students in the United States, but he opposed stronger measures that he feared might lead to a rupture in overall Sino-U.S. relations.
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On July 28, 1989, Bush again wrote to Deng, repeating his desire to maintain their working relationship. Responding to Deng's view that the United States had “tied the knot,” Bush wrote that he believed it was China's actions that had created the problem. On August 11, Deng replied cordially to Bush, expressing appreciation for his efforts to maintain and develop relations, but repeated that it was the United States that had imposed sanctions and had infringed on China's interests and dignity. Deng then expressed the hope that the situation would soon be changed.
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In his reply to Deng, Bush, aware that China was sensitive to U.S. contacts with the Soviet Union, suggested that after the Bush-Gorbachev meeting on Malta on December 1, Scowcroft could fly to Beijing to brief Deng and Jiang Zemin on the meeting.

Meanwhile, because the United States and Japan had decided not to send high officials to China, Deng welcomed a host of former U.S. officials. He met Leonard Woodcock, who served as a messenger for U.S. Democrats, and he saw both former president Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, who served, in effect, as go-betweens with the Bush administration. In Japan there was no strong opposition party or former politicians who could serve as good messengers, so Deng met leaders of the Japanese business community who were in close contact with the Japanese government. When these visitors
came to Beijing, Deng encouraged them to work with his successor, Jiang Zemin, but he still led the key discussions.

In October 1989 Deng met former president Nixon, accompanied by President Carter's China hand, Michel Oksenberg. Nixon made a forceful statement about why Americans were responding strongly to the June 4 crackdown, but the two sides also explored ways to break the deadlock. Deng said that China was in a weak position and could not take the initiative; the United States, he insisted, was in a strong position and should take the first steps.
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Less than two weeks later, on November 10, the day after Deng officially resigned and the Berlin Wall fell, Deng met former secretary of state Henry Kissinger and assured him that China's policy of reform and opening would be continued. He also gave Kissinger a letter to carry back to President Bush suggesting a diplomatic package whereby (1) China would allow Fang Lizhi, the dissident astrophysicist who had taken refuge in the U.S. embassy, to travel to the United States, (2) the United States would lift some of its sanctions against China, (3) the two sides would endeavor to sign one or two major economic cooperation projects, and (4) Jiang Zemin would visit the United States.
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A few months later, in May 1990, Bush announced that he was granting China most-favored-nation trading status and that the Chinese had permitted Fang Lizhi to exit the U.S. embassy and leave the country.
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By the time Scowcroft and Eagleburger met Deng for a second time on December 10, some progress had been made. Scowcroft was instructed to publicly announce the current visit, and on December 18, CNN broke the news of the earlier secret visit.
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For many Americans who remained deeply distressed by the events of June 4, it was a moral outrage that representatives of the U.S. government would fly secretly to a nation led by Communists who had just shot unarmed advocates of democracy in the streets, especially since the Bush administration had already announced there would be no high-level visits.
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But for Bush and Scowcroft, who thought in terms of the fate of nations and the intricate personal relationships between national leaders, the trip had helped avoid a rift with China and so was clearly in the strategic, cultural, and economic interests of the United States.
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During the second visit, Deng told Scowcroft and Eagleburger that it was good that they were visiting Beijing, for without strong U.S.-China relations it would be difficult to preserve peace and stability in the world. He continued, saying that it was not China that threatened the United States but rather U.S. policies that threatened China: moreover, if there were more turmoil in
China, it would be terrible for the entire world. With his disarmingly light touch, Deng also asked Scowcroft to tell Bush that there is a retired old man in China who believes in the importance of the relationship and that both sides must find a way to resolve their problems.
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Immediately following the visit, the United States announced it would sell China three communication satellites and would support World Bank loans to China for humanitarian purposes. And shortly thereafter, in early January, China announced that it was lifting martial law in Beijing and that 573 detainees from the spring of 1989 were to be released.
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Following these initial overtures, U.S.-China discussions reached a stalemate for about a year. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen complained that the United States had lost interest in negotiating with China. Scowcroft, in turn, noted that Chinese leaders were no longer being flexible. But both sides agreed that the cause of the stalemate was the turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Communism Collapses in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

The political upheaval from 1989 to 1991 in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—in addition to the demonstrations in Beijing in the spring of 1989—caused not only foreigners but also many Chinese to wonder if the Chinese Communist Party would survive. Many Westerners, exhilarated by the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the ending of Communist Party rule in Eastern European countries, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, hoped that supporters of democracy in China would succeed in ending Communist rule in China. Meanwhile, the Chinese leaders, maneuvering to keep their domestic problems under control, were again and again embarrassed that their media reports to the Chinese public were overtaken by unanticipated events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Chinese officials were kept better informed than the Chinese public through the daily translations of the Western media in
Reference News (Cankao ziliao).

Particularly devastating to the Chinese and to Deng personally was the growing mass movement in Romania against China's friend Nicolai Ceau
escu and his wife that culminated on December 25, 1989, with their execution. Ceau
escu was the only Eastern European leader to order troops to fire on civilians, and no Chinese leader could avoid seeing the parallels with the recent military action in Beijing just seven months earlier. Indeed, the sudden turn of events in Romania that led to his execution caused Chinese leaders
to wonder if they were immune to the fate of Ceau
escu, who had earlier expressed approval of Beijing's June 4 crackdown.