Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (45 page)

Beijing Daily
, which was directly under the leadership of the Beijing Party Committee and was now headed by Lin Hujia, immediately published the announcement. Furthermore, three media officials who were attending the Central Party Work Conference—Zeng Tao, president of the New China News Agency (Xinhua) (NCNA), Hu Jiwei, the editor of
People's Daily
, and Yang Xiguang, editor of
Guangming Daily
, all of whom were also vice heads of the Propaganda Department—boldly decided to publicize the contents of the
Beijing Daily
article in their respective publications. The next day, November 15,
People's Daily
and
Guangming Daily
printed the news release from the
Beijing Daily
with the banner headline, “Beijing Municipal Party Committee Announces Tiananmen Is a Revolutionary Action.” The NCNA immediately released an announcement that not only were the masses engaging in revolutionary action, but the incident itself was revolutionary. On
November 16,
People's Daily
and
Guangming Daily
reprinted the NCNA announcement.

Ordinarily such an important political announcement required Politburo approval, but the three bold editors, sensing the changing political mood, took the risky step of acting without higher-level permission.
⁵⁵
When Hu Yaobang complained that the three had not told even him beforehand, let alone the Politburo, Zeng Tao answered that they thought that if Hu Yaobang had been asked, he would have had to shoulder a heavy responsibility for this decision. It was better for them to accept responsibility and just publish it.
⁵⁶

The publication of the announcement caused a flurry of excitement at the conference. Lin Hujia was understandably concerned that he might be criticized for his bold action. On November 16, after the article appeared in the two papers, he called one of the editors to ask who had authorized their headlines. Upon hearing that the editors had simply decided to print what was already in the
Beijing Daily
, Lin said that he would take responsibility for the article in the
Beijing Daily
, but that the other two must assume responsibility for the headlines in their papers. Lin Hujia—worried that Hua Guofeng might be angry—also phoned Hua to explain and ask for understanding. To his great surprise, Hua did not complain about the announcement's publication.
⁵⁷
In fact, on November 18, three days after the appearance of the newspaper articles, Hua went so far as to write in his own calligraphy the title page for
Collection of Tiananmen Poems
, a new book extolling those who had taken part in the April 5 demonstrations. A photograph of Hua signing the title page was carried in the press. The ever curious and politically sensitive public in Beijing understood immediately: Hua Guofeng accepted a complete reversal of the judgment on the Tiananmen incident. He was already following Marshal Ye's advice to adapt to the changing atmosphere so he would not be left behind.
⁵⁸

On November 25, Hua Guofeng delivered his scheduled presentation. It was not a self-criticism but rather a statement that he accepted the dominant views of party members and was ready to continue to serve, even if that meant representing views completely different from those he had earlier espoused. He accepted that the April 5 Tiananmen incident was an authentic patriotic revolutionary movement and that the people involved should all be rehabilitated.

Hua admitted that after Mao's death, he had been wrong to criticize the “rightist reversal of verdicts” that had led to criticism of Deng. And he advised
that the criticisms of those accused of resisting the Cultural Revolution in February 1967 (“the February counter-current”) be reversed and their reputations restored. Peng Dehuai's ashes were to be placed in the Babaoshan Cemetery for Revolutionary Heroes. The case against Tao Zhu would be reversed. The label given to Yang Shangkun, that he was a conspirator against the party, would be removed and he could take part in regular “party life” meetings and receive a new assignment. Kang Sheng was to be criticized.

Hua acknowledged that political problems should be resolved on the basis of the facts and in accordance with the principle that practice is the sole criterion for judging truth.
⁵⁹
Hua acknowledged as well that most conference participants felt that Ji Dengkui's comments on agriculture did not go far enough. In his speech, Hua no longer pointed to Dazhai as a model. Hua's address was warmly welcomed by the conference participants.
⁶⁰
He followed up with another address on December 13, in which he acknowledged that he had personally made errors.

By yielding to the changed political climate and completely reversing himself on a number of issues, Hua avoided a fight.
⁶¹
As he put it, he acted to preserve party unity. But many believe that with the decisive change of atmosphere that had been building up over the summer and fall and that had crystallized during the first three days of the work conference, Hua had no real option. As it was, Hua was allowed to remain as chairman of the party, premier, and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

When a new policy line was introduced, it was expected that the chief supporters of the former line (now referred to as the “incorrect line”) would engage in self-criticisms and declare their support for the new “correct line.” But some of Hua's close associates did not move so quickly and deftly as he did. Wang Dongxing, then vice chairman of the Communist Party and director of the General Office of the party who controlled the handling of the “special cases” and supervised propaganda work, had resolutely opposed rehabilitating large numbers of officials and breaking free of Maoist ideology. Senior officials were convinced that as Mao's loyal bodyguard he had acquired positions beyond his ability and that his great contribution in arresting the Gang of Four had permitted him to remain in a position that he did not deserve in the first place and from which he was blocking progress. After Hua accepted the dominant party atmosphere on November 25, two participants felt sufficiently confident of the changing winds that they criticized Wang Dongxing by name and without prior consultation. They chastised him for blocking the return of senior officials, for opposing “Practice Is the Sole Criterion
for Judging Truth,” for upholding the “two whatevers,” and for denigrating Deng Xiaoping. Others joined in the attack on someone whom many regarded as the biggest obstacle to rehabilitating the wrongly accused officials and to breaking free of the rigid Maoist ideology.

Wang Dongxing refused to offer an oral self-criticism, but on December 13, at the end of the work conference, he presented a written version.
⁶²
He acknowledged that he had made mistakes in the handling of the special cases: “I did not pay due attention to the work to redress some framed, false, and wrong verdicts, and I did not act promptly and failed to do the work well.” Wang also agreed that the materials from the Central Group on the Examination of Special Cases and the Special Group on the Examination of the May 16 Special Cases would be handed over to the Organization Department, following the decision of the party center: “The posts I hold exceed my ability . . . I sincerely request that the party Central Committee remove me from these posts.”
⁶³
Wu De and Li Xin were also criticized, and shortly after the Third Plenum, Zhang Pinghua was replaced. The staff writers Wu Lengxi, Xiong Fu, and Hu Sheng—who had sided with Hua Guofeng and the “two whatevers”—were subject to serious though milder criticism.

Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing remained for the time being members of the Politburo Standing Committee, and three of Hua's allies—Wu De, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Xilian—stayed on the Politburo. Deng, as the emerging preeminent leader, made some changes in work assignments, but decided that those serving on the Politburo and its Standing Committee who had made self-criticisms need not be removed.
⁶⁴
Deng chose to avoid a confrontation and to avoid conveying to the public, both at home and abroad, that a power struggle was going on.

The Central Party Work Conference not only set in motion the replacement of Hua by Deng; it served as a forum for high-level officials to review past errors more openly and consider new policies for the future. In the small group discussions, speaker after speaker related his personal experiences in dealing with the disastrous food shortages and supported the need for more national inputs to solve the problem once and for all. For many leaders, these discussions provided a personal catharsis, as they acknowledged publicly the failures they had not yet faced so directly, failures that had caused the vast suffering and deaths that they had seen personally. Even if they laid primary blame on higher officials, they could not completely escape responsibility; for many officials it was a trauma from which they never fully recovered.

One of the boldest speeches on agriculture was given by Hu Yaobang in
the Northwest group. He argued that Ji Dengkui's proposals were insufficient to resolve the rural problems and still reflected shackled thinking. Further, Hu boldly contended that the union of political and economic activities in a single local unit, the commune, was not working. To solve the problem, the party had to find a way to strengthen the initiative of peasants and local officials. Hu said that if the collective was mismanaged and did not capture the enthusiasm of the peasants, it could not be effective.
⁶⁵
Here Hu was articulating his colleagues' widespread support for decentralizing the rural production team to smaller subgroups. But no one, not even Hu Yaobang or Wan Li (who was then experimenting in Anhui with smaller work groups below the production team), then discussed the possibility of contracting down to the household level and of abolishing the communes. They knew that having such discussions among the party elite would be highly controversial and would undermine the authority of the local party officials still trying to make the collectives work.
⁶⁶

Participants in the small groups also discussed economic issues. Liang Lingguang, minister of light industry (and later governor of Guangdong), stressed the importance of political stability. He reminded others that the three periods of relatively rapid growth—the early years after 1949, the First Five-Year Plan period (1953–1957), and the period of adjustment after the Great Leap Forward (1961–1965)—were all times of political stability. Liang also argued that a higher priority should be given to improving light industry, so that it could better meet daily household needs. He was somewhat ahead of his time in arguing that markets needed to play a greater role. In his view, new production technologies should be imported and to increase exports, taxes on exports had to be reduced.
⁶⁷

Toward the end of the work conference, participants began turning to another question dear to all their hearts: who should be added to the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Standing Committee? The work conference had no authority to make personnel decisions, but most of those who would later make such decisions were in attendance. Since Deng did not want to remove members of the Politburo or its Standing Committee, participants acknowledged that in the short run the Politburo would become somewhat larger so as to allow the entry of new members. It was understood that as people retired or were found unfit, the size of the Politburo would again be reduced. Participants accepted Deng's view that new members should have a proven record of “boldly making things happen
(gan zuo).
”
⁶⁸
The Northwest small group recommended, with a show-of-hands vote, that Chen Yun, Deng
Yingchao, Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen be added to the Politburo.
⁶⁹
At the formal meetings that followed the work conference, these recommendations were officially confirmed.

There was widespread recognition at the conference that in an era when economics was the top priority, the wisest and most experienced specialist in economics, Chen Yun, should be given a high position. Chen Yun, thoroughly aware of Deng's broader experience in two critical areas where he lacked experience, foreign affairs and the military, said that for the paramount position, Deng was the only appropriate person.
⁷⁰
But participants enthusiastically recommended that Chen Yun be made a vice chairman of the party.

What united Deng and Chen Yun at the time of the work conference was their determination to reverse the verdicts on senior officials and allow them to return to work. Deng became in effect the spokesperson for a collective leadership, especially in foreign affairs, and along with Marshal Ye he already held informal authority in the military. But Chen Yun acquired authority over personnel issues and within weeks took responsibility for economic concerns. In overall political status—that is, in determining political direction and selecting key personnel—Chen Yun was Deng's equal.

Deng Prepares for Reform and Opening

When Deng returned to Beijing from Southeast Asia on the fifth day of the work conference, Marshal Ye briefed him on the changed political climate and advised him to prepare for his new responsibilities. At this point, the highly respected Marshal Ye, whose seniority dated back to 1927 when he had taken part in the Guangzhou uprising, and who never wanted the responsibilities of power, emerged as “kingmaker.” Marshal Ye believed deeply that the errors of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had been caused by the excessive concentration of power in the hands of one person. He urged both Hua Guofeng and Deng to work together in leading the party and the country. When Ye met with Deng, Deng agreed that they should strengthen the collective leadership and limit the publicity given to a single person.
⁷¹
Hua too had accepted Marshal Ye's advice to yield on the content of party policy and to accept Deng as the preeminent party spokesperson. Without any public celebration, then, Deng accepted Marshal Ye's advice to prepare for his new role, even as Hua Guofeng retained his formal titles as head of the party, the government, and the military.