Descent Into Chaos (77 page)
Read Descent Into Chaos Online
Authors: Ahmed Rashid
Chapter Seven. The One-Billion-Dollar Warlords: The War Within Afghanistan
Chapter Eight. Musharraf’s Lost Moment: Political Expediency and Authoritarian Rule
1
See my articles: “Iran and US Vie for Influence on the Front Line,”
The Daily Telegraph,
May 2, 2002, and “Warlord, Profiteer, Ideologue, Chief,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
May 23, 2002. In May 2002, I was told by several Afghan officials in Ghaurian, on the Iranian border, that Arabs, Pakistanis, and Central Asians would come through Ghaurian at night, heading for the Iranian border. Two Iranian intelligence generals met with Khan regularly in Herat. He had now become a jihadi. “More urgently than reconstruction we need the spirit of jihad.
Jihad
is just one word to describe freedom; it’s a holy word meaning independence, and we must keep the memory of the war against the Soviets and Taliban alive,” he said.
See my articles: “Iran and US Vie for Influence on the Front Line,”
The Daily Telegraph,
May 2, 2002, and “Warlord, Profiteer, Ideologue, Chief,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
May 23, 2002. In May 2002, I was told by several Afghan officials in Ghaurian, on the Iranian border, that Arabs, Pakistanis, and Central Asians would come through Ghaurian at night, heading for the Iranian border. Two Iranian intelligence generals met with Khan regularly in Herat. He had now become a jihadi. “More urgently than reconstruction we need the spirit of jihad.
Jihad
is just one word to describe freedom; it’s a holy word meaning independence, and we must keep the memory of the war against the Soviets and Taliban alive,” he said.
2
Donald Rumsfeld visited Herat on April 29, 2002.
Donald Rumsfeld visited Herat on April 29, 2002.
3
The Shura had ten separate associations under its umbrella, including those for lawyers, economists, teachers, engineers, painters, calligraphers, poets, sportsmen, and even a group that promoted “Agriculture, Livestock and Veterinary Medicine.” Its charter said that “the Shura provides authorities and international aid agencies with professional consultations through its associations.”
The Shura had ten separate associations under its umbrella, including those for lawyers, economists, teachers, engineers, painters, calligraphers, poets, sportsmen, and even a group that promoted “Agriculture, Livestock and Veterinary Medicine.” Its charter said that “the Shura provides authorities and international aid agencies with professional consultations through its associations.”
5
Gary Berntsen,
Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al Qaeda,
New York: Crown, 2005. He describes how he hired a Pashai commander from eastern Afghanistan, code-named Barkat, to track down bin Laden without even meeting him. It is clear that Barkat is Hazarat Ali.
Gary Berntsen,
Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al Qaeda,
New York: Crown, 2005. He describes how he hired a Pashai commander from eastern Afghanistan, code-named Barkat, to track down bin Laden without even meeting him. It is clear that Barkat is Hazarat Ali.
6
Sarah Chayes explains the situation in the south in great detail in Sarah Chayes,
The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban,
New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
Sarah Chayes explains the situation in the south in great detail in Sarah Chayes,
The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban,
New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
7
Afghanistan National Human Development Report, Kabul, 2004.
Afghanistan National Human Development Report, Kabul, 2004.
8
Interview with Ryan Crocker, Islamabad, February 7, 2006.
Interview with Ryan Crocker, Islamabad, February 7, 2006.
9
This term was popularized by Human Rights Watch. See their “Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement, One Year Later, a Catalog of Missed Opportunities,” December 1, 2002.
This term was popularized by Human Rights Watch. See their “Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement, One Year Later, a Catalog of Missed Opportunities,” December 1, 2002.
10
Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide,”
The Washington Post,
October 22, 2004.
Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide,”
The Washington Post,
October 22, 2004.
11
The war cost $17 billion between October 7, 2001, and May 1, 2002, according to congressional documents; $1.37 billion was spent on classified surveillance and intelligence, $1.76 billion for munitions, and $4.7 billion for deploying troops that were never used.
The war cost $17 billion between October 7, 2001, and May 1, 2002, according to congressional documents; $1.37 billion was spent on classified surveillance and intelligence, $1.76 billion for munitions, and $4.7 billion for deploying troops that were never used.
12
Interview with Ryan Crocker, Islamabad, February 7, 2006.
Interview with Ryan Crocker, Islamabad, February 7, 2006.
13
The full text of Joseph Biden’s speech reported in “Biden Promises $130 Million for Security in Afghanistan,”
Los Angeles Times,
May 17, 2002.
The full text of Joseph Biden’s speech reported in “Biden Promises $130 Million for Security in Afghanistan,”
Los Angeles Times,
May 17, 2002.
14
Ibid.
Ibid.
17
The New York Times
said in its editorial on March 27, 2002, “Rescuing Afghanistan will take more than defeating Taliban holdouts. . . . It will also require establishing the authority of the central government and the rule of law throughout the country. That can only be done with expanded international help and more effective American leadership.” Editorial, “Afghanistan at Risk,”
The New York Times,
March 27, 2002. The International Crisis Group urged that the “the immediate priority in Afghanistan has to be an expanded ISAF from 4500 to 25,000 troops.” ICG, “Securing Afghanistan,” March 15, 2002.
The New York Times
said in its editorial on March 27, 2002, “Rescuing Afghanistan will take more than defeating Taliban holdouts. . . . It will also require establishing the authority of the central government and the rule of law throughout the country. That can only be done with expanded international help and more effective American leadership.” Editorial, “Afghanistan at Risk,”
The New York Times,
March 27, 2002. The International Crisis Group urged that the “the immediate priority in Afghanistan has to be an expanded ISAF from 4500 to 25,000 troops.” ICG, “Securing Afghanistan,” March 15, 2002.
19
William Durch, “A Realistic Plan to Save Afghanistan,”
International Herald Tribune,
July 31, 2002. Durch was the director of peace operations at the Stimson Center.
William Durch, “A Realistic Plan to Save Afghanistan,”
International Herald Tribune,
July 31, 2002. Durch was the director of peace operations at the Stimson Center.
22
Interview with Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., August 21, 2002.
Interview with Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., August 21, 2002.
23
The president’s spokesman Ari Fleischer had repeated the mantra on February 25, saying that “the president continues to believe that the purpose of the U.S. military is to be used to fight and win wars, and not to engage in peacekeeping.” International Crisis Group, “Securing Afghanistan.”
The president’s spokesman Ari Fleischer had repeated the mantra on February 25, saying that “the president continues to believe that the purpose of the U.S. military is to be used to fight and win wars, and not to engage in peacekeeping.” International Crisis Group, “Securing Afghanistan.”
24
James Dao, “Bush Sets Role for US in Afghan Rebuilding,”
The New York Times,
April 18, 2002. The United States had spent a total of $13 billion, or $90 billion in today’s money, on the Marshall Plan for Europe.
James Dao, “Bush Sets Role for US in Afghan Rebuilding,”
The New York Times,
April 18, 2002. The United States had spent a total of $13 billion, or $90 billion in today’s money, on the Marshall Plan for Europe.
25
David Rohde and David Sanger, “How the Good War in Afghanistan Went Bad,”
The New York Times,
August 12, 2007.
David Rohde and David Sanger, “How the Good War in Afghanistan Went Bad,”
The New York Times,
August 12, 2007.
26
The Rumsfeld quote is from ibid. The Wolfowitz quote is from Fred Hiatt, “Underachieving Afghanistan,”
The Washington Post,
May 20, 2002. “Just think of the history of the British in Afghanistan in the nineteenth century or even the Soviets in the last century. It is a place that is notoriously hostile to foreigners, notoriously difficult to govern. And it is huge,” said Wolfowitz. Such an argument was never applied to Iraq.
The Rumsfeld quote is from ibid. The Wolfowitz quote is from Fred Hiatt, “Underachieving Afghanistan,”
The Washington Post,
May 20, 2002. “Just think of the history of the British in Afghanistan in the nineteenth century or even the Soviets in the last century. It is a place that is notoriously hostile to foreigners, notoriously difficult to govern. And it is huge,” said Wolfowitz. Such an argument was never applied to Iraq.
27
See my articles “Iran and US Vie for Influence” and “Warlord, Profiteer, Ideologue, Chief.”
See my articles “Iran and US Vie for Influence” and “Warlord, Profiteer, Ideologue, Chief.”
28
In the first stage, towns and villages representing 380 districts in the country were to choose 16,000 delegates. In the second stage, these delegates would hold further elections, whittling down their number to 1,050 delegates representing the 32 provinces.
In the first stage, towns and villages representing 380 districts in the country were to choose 16,000 delegates. In the second stage, these delegates would hold further elections, whittling down their number to 1,050 delegates representing the 32 provinces.
29
Wali Masud told me that “if there is any such move for the king to become president, we would counter it by putting up our own candidate for the president, and there could even be a walkout from the LJ.” The NA leaders had conveyed this threat to Khalilzad and Brahimi.
Wali Masud told me that “if there is any such move for the king to become president, we would counter it by putting up our own candidate for the president, and there could even be a walkout from the LJ.” The NA leaders had conveyed this threat to Khalilzad and Brahimi.
30
I reported extensively on the Loya Jirga in Kabul for
The Wall Street Journal
and
The Daily Telegraph
in day-to-day articles from which these quotes have been taken.
I reported extensively on the Loya Jirga in Kabul for
The Wall Street Journal
and
The Daily Telegraph
in day-to-day articles from which these quotes have been taken.
31
Interview with a senior European diplomat at the Loya Jirga.
Interview with a senior European diplomat at the Loya Jirga.
32
A Hazara, Simar Samar was the popular minister for women’s affairs who had stood up for women’s rights and was despised by the fundamentalist warlords. She was later removed from her post by Karzai.
A Hazara, Simar Samar was the popular minister for women’s affairs who had stood up for women’s rights and was despised by the fundamentalist warlords. She was later removed from her post by Karzai.
33
Interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, Paris, April 26, 2007.
Interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, Paris, April 26, 2007.
34
Dexter Filkins, “Flaws in US Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead,”
The New York Times,
July 21, 2002.
Dexter Filkins, “Flaws in US Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead,”
The New York Times,
July 21, 2002.
35
Interview with Robert Finn, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., November 22, 2005.
Interview with Robert Finn, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., November 22, 2005.
36
Interview with Hamid Karzai, Kabul, December 23, 2002.
Interview with Hamid Karzai, Kabul, December 23, 2002.
37
The conference in Cordoba was attended by major donor countries and held June 28-30, 2002. I attended the conference and came away with the distinct impression that there was growing frustration among the Europeans as to how the United States was handling Afghanistan.
The conference in Cordoba was attended by major donor countries and held June 28-30, 2002. I attended the conference and came away with the distinct impression that there was growing frustration among the Europeans as to how the United States was handling Afghanistan.
1
Text of President Pervez Musharraf’s speech,
The Nation,
January 13, 2002. Five extremist organizations were banned, including Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed—two of the largest groups fighting in Kashmir and closely linked to al Qaeda. The Sunni group Sipah-e-Sehaba and the Shia party Tehreek-e-Jafria were also banned, as was the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, led by Maulana Sufi Mohammed. Another Sunni extremist group, Sunni Tehreek, was put on a watch list.
Text of President Pervez Musharraf’s speech,
The Nation,
January 13, 2002. Five extremist organizations were banned, including Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed—two of the largest groups fighting in Kashmir and closely linked to al Qaeda. The Sunni group Sipah-e-Sehaba and the Shia party Tehreek-e-Jafria were also banned, as was the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, led by Maulana Sufi Mohammed. Another Sunni extremist group, Sunni Tehreek, was put on a watch list.
2
Powell said, “The US applauds the banning of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and welcomes President Musharraf’s explicit statements against terrorism and particularly notes his pledge that Pakistan will not tolerate terrorism under any pretext, including Kashmir.” Text of Powell’s statement,
Dawn,
January 13, 2002.
Powell said, “The US applauds the banning of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and welcomes President Musharraf’s explicit statements against terrorism and particularly notes his pledge that Pakistan will not tolerate terrorism under any pretext, including Kashmir.” Text of Powell’s statement,
Dawn,
January 13, 2002.
3
Poll carried out by the Office of Research, U.S. State Department, February 19, 2002.
Poll carried out by the Office of Research, U.S. State Department, February 19, 2002.
4
“Religious forces have always aligned themselves with the military’s views with regard to the defense budget and the Kashmir and Afghan policies,” boasted former ISI chief Gen. Hameed Gul. Interview with Gen. Hameed Gul,
Herald,
December 2001.
“Religious forces have always aligned themselves with the military’s views with regard to the defense budget and the Kashmir and Afghan policies,” boasted former ISI chief Gen. Hameed Gul. Interview with Gen. Hameed Gul,
Herald,
December 2001.
7
The European Union had signed the agreement with Pakistan in November 2001 to help Pakistani exports, but the agreement needed to be ratified by the European parliament. The referendum was “wholly inappropriate and in conflict with the Pakistan constitution, ” stated the EU parliament. “EU delays Cooperation with Pakistan,”
Dawn,
April 26, 2002.
The European Union had signed the agreement with Pakistan in November 2001 to help Pakistani exports, but the agreement needed to be ratified by the European parliament. The referendum was “wholly inappropriate and in conflict with the Pakistan constitution, ” stated the EU parliament. “EU delays Cooperation with Pakistan,”
Dawn,
April 26, 2002.
8
These comments were made to me after the referendum.
These comments were made to me after the referendum.
9
Musharraf’s interview with the editors of
The Washington Post,
February 9, 2002. See also Mariane Pearl, with Sarah Crichton,
A Mighty Heart: The Brave Life and Death of My Husband, Danny Pearl,
London: Virago Press, 2003.
Musharraf’s interview with the editors of
The Washington Post,
February 9, 2002. See also Mariane Pearl, with Sarah Crichton,
A Mighty Heart: The Brave Life and Death of My Husband, Danny Pearl,
London: Virago Press, 2003.
10
This accusation was made by several ministers and police officials, including Syed Kamal Shah, the inspector general of police in Sindh province. “Daniel Was Over-intrusive, Says IG,”
The Nation,
March 13, 2002.
This accusation was made by several ministers and police officials, including Syed Kamal Shah, the inspector general of police in Sindh province. “Daniel Was Over-intrusive, Says IG,”
The Nation,
March 13, 2002.
11
The New York Times
reported that an ISI officer, Brigadier Abdullah, the head of the Kashmir cell, who had helped create Jaish-e-Mohammed in 2000, had also helped Sheikh in his frequent travels between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Abdullah had been replaced in the shake-up of the ISI after the removal of Gen. Mehmood Ahmad. Douglas Jehl, “Death of Reporter Puts Focus on Pakistan’s Intelligence Unit,”
The New York Times,
February 25, 2002.
The New York Times
reported that an ISI officer, Brigadier Abdullah, the head of the Kashmir cell, who had helped create Jaish-e-Mohammed in 2000, had also helped Sheikh in his frequent travels between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Abdullah had been replaced in the shake-up of the ISI after the removal of Gen. Mehmood Ahmad. Douglas Jehl, “Death of Reporter Puts Focus on Pakistan’s Intelligence Unit,”
The New York Times,
February 25, 2002.
14
Threats and arrests were used repeatedly by the ISI to keep journalists away from sensitive areas. In December 2003 two French journalists, Marc Epstein and Jean-Paul Guilloteau, working for
L’Express
magazine and investigating the Taliban’s regrouping inside Pakistan, were arrested in Quetta and put on trial for visa violations. Their Pakistani fixer, Khawar Mehdi Rizvi, was held by the ISI (which never admitted to holding him) until January 26, when he was charged with sedition and conspiracy. The arrests were seen as a blunt warning to Western journalists to deter them from visiting Quetta, where Taliban leaders were living openly. In May 2004, Afghan journalist Sami Yousafzai, a stringer for
Newsweek,
was held for several weeks by the ISI in North Waziristan. American journalist Eliza Griswold of
The New Yorker,
whom Yousufzai was accompanying, was also arrested but was extradited to the United States.
Threats and arrests were used repeatedly by the ISI to keep journalists away from sensitive areas. In December 2003 two French journalists, Marc Epstein and Jean-Paul Guilloteau, working for
L’Express
magazine and investigating the Taliban’s regrouping inside Pakistan, were arrested in Quetta and put on trial for visa violations. Their Pakistani fixer, Khawar Mehdi Rizvi, was held by the ISI (which never admitted to holding him) until January 26, when he was charged with sedition and conspiracy. The arrests were seen as a blunt warning to Western journalists to deter them from visiting Quetta, where Taliban leaders were living openly. In May 2004, Afghan journalist Sami Yousafzai, a stringer for
Newsweek,
was held for several weeks by the ISI in North Waziristan. American journalist Eliza Griswold of
The New Yorker,
whom Yousufzai was accompanying, was also arrested but was extradited to the United States.
15
“If I am extradited, America will return me in the same way as Indian authorities had returned me and America will suffer if I am killed in a fake encounter,” Sheikh told Sindh high court judge Shabir Ahmad during his trial. He was referring to his being freed from an Indian jail after the Kandahar hijacking and to the fact that Pakistani police were prone to killing terrorist suspects in faked encounters after they had been arrested. “Omar Threatens US of Dire Consequences If Extradited,”
The Nation,
March 13, 2002.
“If I am extradited, America will return me in the same way as Indian authorities had returned me and America will suffer if I am killed in a fake encounter,” Sheikh told Sindh high court judge Shabir Ahmad during his trial. He was referring to his being freed from an Indian jail after the Kandahar hijacking and to the fact that Pakistani police were prone to killing terrorist suspects in faked encounters after they had been arrested. “Omar Threatens US of Dire Consequences If Extradited,”
The Nation,
March 13, 2002.
16
Massoud Ansari, “Daniel Pearl Refused to Be Sedated Before His Throat Was Cut,”
Sunday Telegraph,
May 8, 2004. Three suspects believed to be guards who had watched over Pearl were arrested in the spring of 2004, but charges were never brought against them.
Massoud Ansari, “Daniel Pearl Refused to Be Sedated Before His Throat Was Cut,”
Sunday Telegraph,
May 8, 2004. Three suspects believed to be guards who had watched over Pearl were arrested in the spring of 2004, but charges were never brought against them.
17
Steve Levine, “US Believes bin Laden Aide Murdered Pearl,”
The Wall Street Journal,
October 21, 2003. See also Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s time with CIA in Jane Mayer, “The Black Sites,”
The New Yorker,
August 13, 2007.
Steve Levine, “US Believes bin Laden Aide Murdered Pearl,”
The Wall Street Journal,
October 21, 2003. See also Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s time with CIA in Jane Mayer, “The Black Sites,”
The New Yorker,
August 13, 2007.
18
“We purchased the vehicle a few days before the Musharraf rally in Karachi, and set up the remote-control system to the light switch of the vehicle to assassinate him en route from the Army House, but the remote control developed some fault,” said Mohammed Imran, one of the perpetrators at a police-held press conference. “Lady Luck Foiled Plot to Assassinate Musharraf,”
Daily Times,
July 8, 2002.
“We purchased the vehicle a few days before the Musharraf rally in Karachi, and set up the remote-control system to the light switch of the vehicle to assassinate him en route from the Army House, but the remote control developed some fault,” said Mohammed Imran, one of the perpetrators at a police-held press conference. “Lady Luck Foiled Plot to Assassinate Musharraf,”
Daily Times,
July 8, 2002.
19
Zulfiqar Shah,
Sectarian Violence in Karachi (1994-2002): A Study,
Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2004. The United States gave $73 million to revive the police services in 2002.
Zulfiqar Shah,
Sectarian Violence in Karachi (1994-2002): A Study,
Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2004. The United States gave $73 million to revive the police services in 2002.
22
Interview with Aitezaz Ahsan, Lahore, September 2002.
Interview with Aitezaz Ahsan, Lahore, September 2002.
23
I read the private European Union report.
I read the private European Union report.
24
In July, visitors included Colin Powell, British foreign secretary Jack Straw, the French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin, and the European Union’s foreign policy chief Javier Solana.
In July, visitors included Colin Powell, British foreign secretary Jack Straw, the French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin, and the European Union’s foreign policy chief Javier Solana.
25
Rocca was addressing Congress’s foreign policy subcommittee. Agence France-Presse, “Washington Nudges Musharraf on Polls,”
The News,
July 18, 2002.
Rocca was addressing Congress’s foreign policy subcommittee. Agence France-Presse, “Washington Nudges Musharraf on Polls,”
The News,
July 18, 2002.
27
Reuters, “ ‘US, Musharraf Still Tight,’ Says Bush,” Washington, D.C., August 22, 2002.
Reuters, “ ‘US, Musharraf Still Tight,’ Says Bush,” Washington, D.C., August 22, 2002.
28
The MMA evolved from the Pakistan-Afghanistan Defense Committee established in October 2001 by twenty-six Islamic parties and extremist groups to support the Taliban after the U.S. attack on Afghanistan began. Comprising six Islamic parties, the MMA was formed in January 2002 with direct encouragement from the ISI to revive the Islamic parties after the Taliban’s rout, according to Jamiat-e-Islami leaders. The MMA includes the Jamiat-e-Islami, the largest nationwide Islamic party; the Jamiat-e-Ulema, the largest Islamic party in Balochistan; and the NWFP, the pro-Wahhabi Jamiat Ahle Hadith; the Shia party Millat-e-Jafri; and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, headed by Shah Ahmad Noorani, who became head of the MMA.
The MMA evolved from the Pakistan-Afghanistan Defense Committee established in October 2001 by twenty-six Islamic parties and extremist groups to support the Taliban after the U.S. attack on Afghanistan began. Comprising six Islamic parties, the MMA was formed in January 2002 with direct encouragement from the ISI to revive the Islamic parties after the Taliban’s rout, according to Jamiat-e-Islami leaders. The MMA includes the Jamiat-e-Islami, the largest nationwide Islamic party; the Jamiat-e-Ulema, the largest Islamic party in Balochistan; and the NWFP, the pro-Wahhabi Jamiat Ahle Hadith; the Shia party Millat-e-Jafri; and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, headed by Shah Ahmad Noorani, who became head of the MMA.
29
Andrew Wilder, “Elections 2002: Legitimizing the Status Quo,” in
Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics and Society,
edited by Craig Baxter, Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2004. Wilder, an expert on Pakistani elections and the author of several books, wrote the best essay on voting trends in the elections.
Andrew Wilder, “Elections 2002: Legitimizing the Status Quo,” in
Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics and Society,
edited by Craig Baxter, Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2004. Wilder, an expert on Pakistani elections and the author of several books, wrote the best essay on voting trends in the elections.
30
The MMA won 48 of the 99 seats in the NWFP provincial assembly. In the 1993 elections, the Islamic parties won only 9 of 217 seats to the National Assembly. In the 1997 elections they won only 2 seats.
The MMA won 48 of the 99 seats in the NWFP provincial assembly. In the 1993 elections, the Islamic parties won only 9 of 217 seats to the National Assembly. In the 1997 elections they won only 2 seats.
31
Ahmed Rashid, “Polls and Promises, Pakistan Election,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
October 17, 2002. Other monitoring groups included the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute, the European Union, Human Rights Watch, and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. See also Ahmed Rashid, “Elections ‘Rigged’ in Pakistan by Military Regime,”
The Daily Telegraph,
October 10, 2002.
Ahmed Rashid, “Polls and Promises, Pakistan Election,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
October 17, 2002. Other monitoring groups included the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute, the European Union, Human Rights Watch, and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. See also Ahmed Rashid, “Elections ‘Rigged’ in Pakistan by Military Regime,”
The Daily Telegraph,
October 10, 2002.
32
Khalid Hassan, “US Should Help Pakistan Become a Modern Islamic State— Milam,”
Daily Times,
December 11, 2003. Milam was addressing the Middle East Institute in Washington. Other comments were made to me by U.S. diplomats when they visited Pakistan after the elections.
Khalid Hassan, “US Should Help Pakistan Become a Modern Islamic State— Milam,”
Daily Times,
December 11, 2003. Milam was addressing the Middle East Institute in Washington. Other comments were made to me by U.S. diplomats when they visited Pakistan after the elections.
33
Personal communication with Professor Vali Nasir, October 2003.
Personal communication with Professor Vali Nasir, October 2003.
35
Ahmed Rashid, “Americans Under Threat as Islamists Take Frontier,”
The Daily Telegraph,
November 30, 2002.
Ahmed Rashid, “Americans Under Threat as Islamists Take Frontier,”
The Daily Telegraph,
November 30, 2002.
39
Reuters, “Franks Says No Permanent US Military Bases in Central Asia,” Tashkent, January 24, 2002.
Reuters, “Franks Says No Permanent US Military Bases in Central Asia,” Tashkent, January 24, 2002.
40
The meeting took place at an Italian air base near Rome. The Rome Declaration of May 28, 2002, appeared to signal the end of the cold war as both presidents Bush and Putin were present, along with NATO secretary-general George Robertson. Reuters, “US Doubts Russia Will Be a Future Threat,” Pratica di Mare, Italy, May 29, 2002.
The meeting took place at an Italian air base near Rome. The Rome Declaration of May 28, 2002, appeared to signal the end of the cold war as both presidents Bush and Putin were present, along with NATO secretary-general George Robertson. Reuters, “US Doubts Russia Will Be a Future Threat,” Pratica di Mare, Italy, May 29, 2002.
41
Ibid.
Ibid.
42
Joshua Machleder, “Wolfenshohn Puts Faith in Uzbek Government,” EurasiaNet .org, April 18, 2002.
Joshua Machleder, “Wolfenshohn Puts Faith in Uzbek Government,” EurasiaNet .org, April 18, 2002.
43
President Karimov told the media in May and June 2002 that Namangani was alive. Newspapers in Moscow and Almaty repeatedly reported that he was alive. The Kazakh newspaper
Megapolis
reported that “reports of his death are misinformation Namangani invented himself.” See Artie MacConnell, "Islamic Radicals Regroup in Central Asia,”
EurasiaNet.org
, May 15, 2002.
President Karimov told the media in May and June 2002 that Namangani was alive. Newspapers in Moscow and Almaty repeatedly reported that he was alive. The Kazakh newspaper
Megapolis
reported that “reports of his death are misinformation Namangani invented himself.” See Artie MacConnell, "Islamic Radicals Regroup in Central Asia,”
EurasiaNet.org
, May 15, 2002.
44
Ahmed Rashid,
Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia,
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002.
Ahmed Rashid,
Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia,
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002.
45
Reuters, “Germany Bans Hizb ut-Tahrir,” Berlin, January 15, 2003.
Reuters, “Germany Bans Hizb ut-Tahrir,” Berlin, January 15, 2003.
46
Edmund Andrews, “A Bustling U.S. Air Base Materializes in the Mud,”
The New York Times,
April 27, 2002.
Edmund Andrews, “A Bustling U.S. Air Base Materializes in the Mud,”
The New York Times,
April 27, 2002.
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