Discourses and Selected Writings (10 page)

[26] ‘A man spoke with me today about accepting a priesthood of Augustus.
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I told him not to touch it. “You will lay out a lot of money for little in return.”’

[27] ‘But the clerk will add my name to public contracts.’

‘Are you planning to be there every time a contract is signed, so you can announce to the assembled, “That’s my name he’s writing down there”? [28] Even if you can attend these signing ceremonies now, what will you do when you die?’

‘But my name will survive me.’

‘Carve it in stone and it will survive you just as well. Outside Nicopolis, though, no one is going to remember you.’

[29] ‘But I get to wear a crown of gold.’

‘If you have your heart set on wearing crowns, why not make one out of roses – you will look even more elegant in that.’

[1] Every craft or faculty has a field with which it is primarily concerned. [2] When the faculty happens to be like what it studies, it naturally comes to study itself. When it is different, however, then it cannot. [3] To give an example: shoemaking works on leather, but the craft itself is quite distinct from leather; therefore, it does not study itself. [4] The art of grammar has to do with written speech, but
is
it written speech? No. Therefore, it cannot study itself.

[5] Now, for what purpose did nature arm us with reason? To make the correct use of impressions. And what is reason if not a collection of individual impressions? Hence, it naturally comes to turn its analysis on itself. [6] And what does the virtue of wisdom profess to investigate? Things good, bad and indifferent. And what is wisdom itself? Good. And ignorance? Bad. It is natural for wisdom too, then, to investigate itself, as well as its opposite.

[7] Therefore, the first and most important duty of the philosopher is to test impressions, choosing between them and only deploying those that have passed the test. [8] You know how, with money – an area where we believe our interest to be much at stake – we have developed the art of assaying, and considerable ingenuity has gone into developing a way to test if coins are counterfeit, involving our senses of sight, smell, hearing and touch. [9] The assayer will let the denarius drop and listen intently to its ring; and he is not satisfied to listen just once: after repeated listenings he practically acquires a musician’s subtle ear. [10] It is a measure of the effort we are prepared to expend to guard against deception when accuracy is at a premium.

[11] When it comes to our poor mind, however, we can’t be bothered; we are satisfied accepting any and all impressions, because here the loss we suffer is not obvious. [12] If you want to know just how little concerned you are about things good and bad, and how serious about things indifferent, compare your attitude to going blind with your attitude about being
mentally in the dark. You will realize, I think, how inappropriate your values really are.

[13] ‘But this calls for a lot of preparation, and hard study.’

So what? Do you think the greatest art can be acquired easily, and overnight? [14] It’s true that the principal doctrine of the philosophers is briefly stated; you have only to read Zeno to see my meaning. [15] How long does it take to say, ‘The goal is to follow the gods,’ and ‘The essence of the good is the proper use of impressions’? [16] But, just because it is so brief, the formula prompts other questions: ‘What is God, and what is an impression? How does individual nature compare with the nature of the whole?’ Now the inquiry is beginning to drag out.

[17] Here we have Epicurus saying that goodness is none other than the flesh. But then there are lectures to sit through about man’s dominant principle – that is to say, about what his substance and essence are – and the explanation begins to grow long again. It’s not likely that the good of a snail lies in its shell, so is it likely that Epicurus is correct in identifying man’s good with his body?

[18] Take yourself, Epicurus. Even
you
have a faculty that is greater than the flesh – the faculty which, having examined and thought through the evidence, concluded that flesh was the principal thing. [19] And why are you so fond of burning the midnight oil, working hard to produce so many books on our behalf? Obviously, it must matter to you that we be put in possession of the truth. But who are we, and, more to the point, who are we to you?

Well, now the explanation of Epicurus’ views is growing lengthy too…

[1] When someone is properly grounded in life, they shouldn’t have to look outside themselves for approval.

[2] ‘My friend, what is it you want?’

‘I am satisfied if my desires and aversions agree with nature,
if I exercise impulse and refusal as I was born to do, and if I practise purpose, design and assent the same way.’

‘So why are you acting so stuck up?’

[3] ‘I want everyone I meet to admire me, to follow me around shouting, “What a great philosopher!” ’

[4] And who exactly are these people that you want to be admired by? Aren’t they the same people you are in the habit of calling crazy? And is this your life ambition, then – to win the approval of lunatics?

[1] Everyone has preconceptions. And one preconception does not contradict another. I mean, who of us does not assume that what is good is beneficial and choice, in all cases to be desired and pursued? Who of us does not assume that justice is fair and appropriate? So where does conflict come in? [2] In the application of preconceptions to particular cases. [3] One person, for instance, will say, ‘Well done, there’s a brave man,’ while another says, ‘He isn’t brave, he’s just deranged.’

This is how conflict originates, [4] and it is the source of difference among Jews, Syrians, Egyptians and Romans. They don’t dispute that what is holy should be preferred above everything else and in every case pursued; but they argue, for example, over whether it is holy or unholy to eat pork. [5] This is also the basis of the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles. Call them up before us.

‘What do you say, Agamemnon? Shouldn’t we do what is right and proper?’

‘Naturally.’

[6] ‘What about you, Achilles? Wouldn’t you, of all people, say that we ought to do what is appropriate?’

‘Of course.’

‘All right, then, apply your preconceptions.’

[7] It is just here that conflict starts. Because one says, ‘I shouldn’t have to return Chryseis to her father,’ and the other
says, ‘Indeed you’d better.’ It’s obvious that one of them is misapplying his preconception of what is appropriate. [8] Then Agamemnon says, ‘Fine, if I have to give Chryseis back, then I should get one of the other men’s prizes in return.’ Achilles says, ‘It’s not mine you intend to take, I hope.’ ‘Yours, that’s right.’ ‘Why should
I
be penalized?’ ‘Because it’s not right that I be the only one to go without.’ And this is how conflicts originate.

[9] What does it mean to be getting an education? It means learning to apply natural preconceptions to particular cases as nature prescribes, and distinguishing what is in our power from what is not. [10] The operations of the will are in our power; not in our power are the body, the body’s parts, property, parents, siblings, children, country or friends.

[11] Where should we put the good, then – to which of the two classes of things are we going to assign it? To the class of things in our power. [12] It follows that neither health nor fitness are good, nor are our children, parents or country.

‘That view is not going to win you many friends or converts.’

[13] Well, let’s transfer the designation ‘good’ to health and other externals and see what happens. Suppose someone meets with misfortune and loses these ‘goods’; can they still be happy? ‘Impossible.’ You might ask, too, how they will remain on good terms with their neighbours, since we naturally incline to self-interest. [14] And if it is in my interest to own land, it is in my interest to rob them of it. If it is in my interest to own a coat, it is in my interest to pinch one from the baths. There you have the genesis of wars, factions and seditions.

[15] And how will I be able to stay right with God? Because if I’m harmed and meet with misfortune, I begin to doubt whether he is looking after me. And if he won’t help me, why should I give him my regard? I want nothing to do with a god who allows me to be in my present state. So I begin to hate him, [16] and wonder if the temples and statues we dedicate to him are not intended to placate a malignant force, like Fever. Honorary titles like ‘Saviour’, ‘Rain-bringer’ and ‘Fruit-bringer’ are no longer applicable to him – and all this comes of identifying ‘the good’ with externals.

[17] What should we do? That’s the topic of inquiry for the person who is truly out to philosophize and think deep. Now, if I am in the dark as to what is good and bad, I’m crazy. [18] But if I locate ‘the good’ in the realm of the will I risk being ridiculed. Some grey old man rattling his gold rings and shaking his head at me will come along and say, ‘Listen, my boy, philosophy’s all right up to a point, but don’t get carried away. This question is ridiculous. [19] Philosophers can teach you logic, but you know better than they do the right way to behave.’ [20] ‘Well, if I know what to do, as you say, don’t make an objection if what I choose to do is philosophize.’ I’m not going to try to engage this fatuous old fool in logic. But if I ignore him altogether, he’ll explode in indignation. [21] So I have no choice but to say to him, ‘Humour me as you would someone in love. I can’t help myself, you see, I’m mad.’

[1] Even Epicurus realizes that we are social creatures by nature, but once he has identified our good with the shell,
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he cannot say anything inconsistent with that. [2] For he further insists -rightly – that we must not respect or approve anything that does not share in the nature of what is good.

[3] So how is it that we are suspicious – we who supposedly have no natural affection for our children?
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Why is it, Epicurus, that you dissuade the wise man from bringing up children? Are you afraid that he may become emotionally involved and unhappy? [4] And is that because you have been anxious on behalf of your house-slave Mouse?
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Well, what’s it to Epicurus, anyway, if his little Mouse comes crying to him?
^∗

[5] No, he realizes that, once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love or care for it. [6] Which is why he
says that a man of sense will not take part in politics either
^∗
; he knows the kinds of personal connections that politics involves. So what’s to keep us from living as if we were as unsocial as flies?

[7] But as if he didn’t know this, he has the gall to suggest that we should abandon our children. Even a sheep does not desert its own offspring, or a wolf; should a human desert his? [8] Would you have us be as foolish as sheep or as savage as wolves – neither of which abandons its young? [9] Come on, whoever remembers your advice when they see their little child fallen and crying on the ground?

[10] Personally, I imagine that your own mother and father, even had they predicted that you were going to say such things, would not have exposed
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you.

[1] The true man is revealed in difficult times. So when trouble comes, think of yourself as a wrestler whom God, like a trainer, has paired with a tough young buck. [2] For what purpose? To turn you into Olympic-class material. But this is going to take some sweat to accomplish. From my perspective, no one’s difficulties ever gave him a better test than yours, if you are prepared to make use of them the way a wrestler makes use of an opponent in peak condition.

[3] Now we are sending you to Rome as a spy. And we don’t want one who is easily frightened, or one who will turn back at the first sound of noise, or glimpse of shadow, announcing hysterically that the enemy is practically at the gates. [4] If you tell us on your return, ‘Conditions are terrible in Rome, everywhere death, exile, poverty, informants – everything a shambles. Fly, the enemy is upon us!’ [5] – we will respond by
telling you in future to keep your forecasts to yourself. Our only mistake was in sending a spy like you in the first place.

[6] Diogenes
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went scouting before you did and came back with a very different report. Death, he said, was not evil because it was not dishonourable. Reputation was the empty noise of fools. [7] And he said other things that helped remove the element of fear from pain and poverty. In his manner of life he preferred the minimum of clothing to a purple gown, and the bare ground to a bed, however soft. [8] And as proof of such claims, he produced his assurance, his serenity, his freedom -as well as his tough, radiant physique.

[9] ‘There is no enemy near by,’ he said. ‘All is peace and tranquillity.’

‘Explain, Diogenes.’

‘Look for yourself: am I wounded, disabled or in flight from any enemy force?’

[10] That’s the kind of spy we honour.
You
bring us back a report full of a lot of random noise. Go off and make a better search, this time without the trepidation.

[11] ‘What should I do then?’

What do you do when you leave a ship? Do you walk off with the rudder and oars? No; you leave with your own gear, your oil-flask and wallet. So just remember what belongs to you, and you won’t lay claim to what doesn’t.

[12] The emperor says to you, ‘Remove your broad hem.’

‘Very well, I’ll wear the narrow hem.’

‘Remove that too.’

‘All right, I’ll wear the ordinary toga now.’
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‘Take your toga off.’

‘Fine, I’ll go naked.’

[13] ‘Now your very composure provokes me.’

‘Take my whole body, then.’

Is there any reason to fear someone to whom I stand ready to surrender my miserable corpse?