Dogfight (14 page)

What the citation did not mention was Gibson's concern for his footwear. ‘I had a brand-new pair of shoes handmade at Duke Street in London. We used to fly in a jacket, collar and tie, because we were gentlemen.'[29] Fearing a sea landing, and hence damage to his shoes, he had the presence of mind to take them off and drop them over land before his parachute carried him over the Channel. Remarkably, an astute farmer sent them on to the base—a greater reward than the DFC in the mind of the New Zealander.

Pilots who accumulated a high number of combat sorties during the campaign were more than likely to have made at least one jump, and many made more during the conflict. In 501 Squadron, over the course of the campaign some sixteen pilots either made forced landings or baled from their machines.[30] The pilot with the dubious honour of leading the rankings was ‘Gibbo', who gathered bale-outs like prized possessions. In addition to a crash-landing in France in the May battles and landing in a bomb crater in August, Gibson would bale out of his Hurricane on four occasions—twice over the Channel. He was pretty pragmatic about his approach to exiting his machine:

Having nearly ‘bought it' at Folkestone, he secured a phone at Dover and rang through to the 501 lads and nonchalantly informed them that someone else should pick up his cards and play his hand as he would be late home. The lost Anzacs—Cale and Hight—made no phone calls.

Neither would Lovell-Gregg. The experienced pilot, but inexperienced combat flyer, was seen descending in a blazing Hurricane by a local farmer. In an interview years later he told of Lovell-Gregg's demise:

Three 87 Squadron pilots, including the Kiwis Ward and Tait, flew to the funeral, the only mourners in attendance at his final resting place, the Holy Trinity Church, Warmwell.

As soon as the day had concluded, the tallies from RAF and Luftwaffe pilots were totalled. Fighter Command's men claimed a whopping 182 German machines destroyed while the Luftwaffe was publishing 101 victories. In fact Göring had lost some 75 machines and Dowding 34 fighters in aerial combat. The Germans were facing extreme difficulties as the operational limits of the Ju 87 and Me 110 were exposed. The Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief was now of the opinion that the Stuka would need a three-fighter escort in future and that given the losses in dive-bombers and, even more significantly, the apparent lack of rewards for raids on radar stations, perhaps these should be curtailed. The success of the RAF was also evident in the fact that even the twin-engine bombers were in need of at least two fighters each to avoid crippling losses.

The result was twofold. On the one hand this meant that the number of bombers that could be used in a raid was limited to the number of fighters available for escort duties. Although 1786 Luftwaffe sorties were undertaken, only 520 were by bombers.[33] Thus some fifty per cent of Kesselring and Sperrle's bomber fleets were unable to be used in the day's assault on the grounds that adequate fighter protection was not possible. On the other hand, orders to protect the bombers greatly frustrated German fighter pilots accustomed to more freedom of action. The day's grim results led German airmen to dub it
der schwarze Donnerstag
(Black Thursday). To make matters worse for the Luftwaffe fighter pilots, they were now ordered to undertake their escorting duties at the same altitude as the bombers in order
to more directly engage the intercepting fighters. This meant the Me 109s would be operating from between 12,000 and 20,000 feet. The result was that the RAF fighters would now meet the enemy at their optimum altitude. Park's strategy of concentrating on the bombers was working.

Given the hammering of 15 August it was remarkable that the Germans continued the assault with similar intensity. Aside from a brief hiatus on 17 August, the Luftwaffe undertook some 1700 sorties each day, but Fighter Command was there to meet them every time. Pilots and ground crew were all under considerable strain during this phase of the campaign. By 19 August, Fighter Command had lost ninety-four pilots either killed or missing, and the sixty or so wounded further thinned the ranks. In regards to aircraft, Dowding had lost 183.[34] On the German side 367 machines had been destroyed at the hands of the RAF.

In the lull, Churchill broadcast his thanks to the men involved in the air battle across Bomber, Coastal and Fighter Command:

Deere was listening to the BBC with one of his mates, Gribble. ‘It's nice to know that someone appreciates us, Al. I couldn't agree more with that bit about mortal danger, but I dispute the unwearied.'[36] ‘Despite the flippancy of George's remarks,' recalled Deere years later, ‘such encouraging words from a most inspiring leader were a wonderful tonic to our flagging spirits. To me, and indeed I believe to all of us, this was the first real indication of the seriousness of the Battle, and the price we would have to pay for defeat. Before, there was courage; now, there was grim determination.'

Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park (Air Force Museum of New Zealand) (Note: This and some other photographs in the following pages post-date the Battle of Britain.)

Hawker Hurricane (Imperial War Museum)

Supermarine Spitfire (Imperial War Museum)

Alan Deere (Air Force Museum of New Zealand)

John Gard'ner (right) with his gunner (Suzanne Franklin-Gard'ner)

Boulton Paul Defiant (Air Force Museum of New Zealand)

Keith Lawrence (Keith Lawrence)

Colin Gray (Air Force Museum of New Zealand)