Electromagnetic Pulse (28 page)

The US must establish a global environment that will profoundly discourage such attacks. We must persuade nations to forgo obtaining nuclear weapons or to provide acceptable assurance that these weapons will neither threaten the vital interests of the United States nor fall into threatening hands.

For all others, we must make it difficult and dangerous to acquire the materials to make a nuclear weapon and the means to deliver them. We must hold at risk of capture or destruction anyone who has such weaponry, wherever they are in the world.

Those who engage in or support these activities must be made to understand that they do so at the risk of everything they value. Those who harbor or help those who conspire to create these weapons must suffer serious consequences as well.

In case these measures do not completely succeed, we must have vigorous interdiction and interception efforts to thwart delivery of all such weaponry. To support this strategy, the US must have intelligence capabilities sufficient to understand what is happening at each stage of developing threats. In summary, the costs of mounting such attacks must be made to be great in all respects, and the likelihood of successful attack rendered unattractively small.

The current national strategy for war on terrorism already contains all of these elements. The threat of an EMP attack further raises what may be at stake.

To further forestall an EMP attack, we must reduce our vulnerability to EMP and develop our ability to recover, should there be an attack, in order to reduce the incentives to use such weaponry. We should never allow terrorists or rogue states a “cheap shot” that has such a large and potentially devastating impact.

PROTECTION AND RECOVERY OF CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURES

Each critical infrastructure in the US is dependent upon other infrastructures. The interdependence on the proper functioning of such systems constitutes a hazard when threat of widespread failures exists. The strong interdependence of our critical national infrastructures may cause unprecedented challenges in attempts to recover from the widespread disruption and damage that would be caused by an EMP attack.

All of the critical functions of US society and related infrastructures—electric power, telecommunications, energy, financial, transportation, emergency services, water, food, etc.—have electronic devices embedded in most aspects of their systems, often providing critical controls. Electric power has thus emerged as an essential service underlying US society and all of its other critical infrastructures. Telecommunications has grown to a critical level but may not rise to the same level as electrical power in terms of risk to the Nation’s survival. All other infrastructures and critical functions are dependent upon the support of electric power and telecommunications. Therefore, we must make special efforts to prepare and protect these two high-leverage systems.

Most critical infrastructure system vulnerabilities can be reduced below the level that potentially invites attempts to create a national catastrophe. By protecting key elements in each critical infrastructure and by preparing to recover essential services, the prospects for a terrorist or rogue state being able to achieve large-scale, long-term damage can be minimized. This can be accomplished reasonably and expeditiously.

Such preparation and protection can be achieved over the next few years, given a dedicated commitment by the federal government and an affordable investment of resources. We need to take actions and allocate resources to decrease the likelihood that catastrophic consequences from an EMP attack will occur, to reduce our current serious level of vulnerability to acceptable levels and thereby reduce incentives to attack, and to remain a viable modern society even if an EMP attack occurs. Since this is a matter of national security, the federal government must shoulder the responsibility of managing the most serious infrastructure vulnerabilities.

Homeland Security Presidential Directives 7 and 8 lay the authoritative basis for the Federal government to act vigorously and coherently to mitigate many of the risks to the Nation from terrorist attack. The effects of EMP on our major infrastructures lie within these directives, and the directives specify adequate responsibilities and provide sufficient authorities to deal with the civilian sector consequences of an EMP attack.

In particular, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been established, led by a Secretary with authority, responsibility, and the obligation to request needed resources for the mission of protecting the US and recovering from the impacts of the most serious threats. This official must assure that plans, resources, and implementing structures are in place to accomplish these objectives, specifically with respect to the EMP threat. In doing so, DHS must work in conjunction with the other established governmental institutions and with experts in the private sector to most efficiently accomplish this mission. It is important that metrics for assessing improvements in prevention, protection, and recovery be put in place and then evaluated and that progress be reported regularly. DHS must clearly and expeditiously delineate its responsibility and actions in relation to other governmental institutions and the private sector, in order to provide clear accountability and avoid confusion and duplication of effort.

Specific recommendations are provided below with respect to both the particulars for securing each of the most critical national infrastructures against EMP threats and the governing principles for addressing these issues of national survival and recovery in the aftermath of EMP attack.

It will not be possible to reduce the incentives for an EMP attack to an acceptable level of risk through defensive protection measures alone. It is possible to achieve an acceptable level of risk and reduced invitation to an EMP attack with a strategy of:

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Pursuing intelligence, interdiction, and deterrence to discourage EMP attack against the US and its interests

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Protecting critical components of the infrastructure, with particular emphasis on those that, if damaged, would require long periods of time to repair or replace

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Maintaining the capability to monitor and evaluate the condition of critical infrastructures

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Recognizing an EMP attack and understanding how its effects differ from other forms of infrastructure disruption and damage

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Planning to carry out a systematic recovery of critical infrastructures

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Training, evaluating, “Red Teaming,” and periodically reporting to the Congress

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Defining the Federal Government’s responsibility and authority to act

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Recognizing the opportunities for shared benefits

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Conducting research to better understand infrastructure system effects and developing cost-effective solutions to manage these effects

The cost for such improved security in the next 3 to 5 years is modest by any standard—and extremely so in relation to both the war on terror and the value of the national infrastructures involved. Costs at later times may be adjusted to deal with the then-apparent threat and future levels of effort required.

INTELLIGENCE, INTERDICTION, AND DETERRENCE

The federal government’s efforts to establish and maintain a global environment that profoundly discourages potentially catastrophic attacks is our first line of defense. The development, trading, and movement of critical materials and weapons useful for mounting WMD attacks, including those that are based on the use of EMP, must be identified as early in the process as possible. The methods and materials that could encourage an EMP attack must be added to the list of threats presently being sought out and annihilated. The US and its allies against transnational terrorism must make it exceedingly difficult and dangerous for organizations to position themselves to be a threat, or allow others to use their country and its assets in order to become a threat, specifically including EMP threats. We must hold potential perpetrators at risk of capture or destruction, whenever and wherever in the world they operate.

PROTECTING CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE

Some components of critical infrastructures, such as large turbines, generators, and high-voltage transformers in electrical power systems, and electronic switching systems in telecommunication systems, would require long periods of time to repair or replace. These components should be configured so that even under electronic disruption and damage, such as could be produced by EMP, they do not become further damaged in the course of shutting down or attempting to restore themselves. This type of damage has occurred in the past. During the Northeast power blackout of 1965, Consolidated Edison generators, transformers, motors, and auxiliary equipment were damaged by the sudden shutdown. In particular, the #3 unit at the Ravenswood power plant in New York City suffered damage when the blackout caused loss of oil pressure to the main turbine bearing. The damage kept that unit out of service for nearly a year, and more immediately, complicated and delayed the restoration of service to New York City.

MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR AND EVALUATE THE CONDITION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

After an EMP attack, system operators and others in positions of authority and responsibility must have immediate access to information sufficient to characterize the state of their critical infrastructure systems. Without such system monitoring and reporting information, the system operators will not have the information required to evaluate the extent of the loss of infrastructure and know how to begin restoration of their systems. They may even induce further damage by taking inappropriate actions or failing to take necessary actions. During the time leading up to the August 14, 2003, Midwest power blackout that affected both the United States and Canada, key system operators did not have a functioning alarm system, did not recognize that the alarm system was not functioning, and had only fragmentary information on the changing configuration of the rapidly collapsing power grid for which they were responsible.

RECOGNIZING EMP ATTACK

Electronic upsets and failures occur under normal operating circumstances, even in high-reliability equipment such as that supporting critical infrastructure. EMP-induced upsets and failures, however, are different from those encountered in the normal operation of infrastructure systems, and in fact have unique aspects not encountered under any other circumstances.

EMP produces nearly simultaneous upset and damage of electronic and of other electrical equipment over wide geographic areas, determined by the altitude, character, and explosive yield of the EMP-producing nuclear explosion. Since such upset and damage is not encountered in other circumstances and particularly not remotely to the same scale, the normal experience of otherwise skilled system operators and others in positions of responsibility and authority will not have prepared them to identify what has happened to the system, what actions to take to minimize further adverse consequences, and what actions must be carried out to restore the impacted systems as swiftly and effectively as possible.

Special system capabilities and operator awareness, planning, training, and testing will be required to deal with EMP-induced system impacts. The first requirement is for the operators of critical infrastructure systems to be able to determine that a high-altitude nuclear explosion has occurred and has produced a unique set of adverse effects on their systems. That information can be provided by local electromagnetic sensors, by information from Earth satellite systems, or by other means. Whatever the means, the operators and others in positions of authority and responsibility must receive the information immediately. Therefore, the EMP event notification system must itself be highly reliable during and after an EMP attack.

Operators and others in positions of authority and responsibility must be trained to recognize that an EMP attack in fact has taken place, to understand the wide range of effects it can produce, to analyze the status of their infrastructure systems, to avoid further system degradation, to dispatch resources to begin effective system restoration, and to sustain the most critical functions while the system is being repaired and restored. Failures similar to those induced by EMP do not occur in normal system operation; therefore, the training for, and experience developed in the course of, normal system operation will not provide operators with the skills and knowledge base necessary to perform effectively after EMP-induced system disruption and failure. Training, procedures, simulations, and exercises must be developed and carried out that are specifically designed to contend with EMP-induced effects.

PLANNING TO CARRY OUT A SYSTEMATIC RECOVERY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

A crisis such as the immediate aftermath of an EMP attack is not the time to begin planning for an effective response. Plans to avoid causing further damage to critical infrastructures and to carry out a systematic recovery of those infrastructures must be in hand at the earliest possible time. Planning for responding to an EMP attack should begin now and should be carried out jointly by system operators, hardware and software providers, and experts in both the government and private sectors.