Embedded (16 page)

Moody shared his experiences of corruption, money, and power at the MOD. It played like a Shakespearian drama. He explained to me that the MiTTs do a wonderful job of ensuring there is very limited corruption regarding the pay process. Without them, he said, there would be massive levels of fraud and abuse within the Iraqi pay system. However, because of the American military presence within military units, all the checks and balances worked efficiently and correctly.

Unfortunately, the true corruption happens at levels beyond the U.S. military's purview, namely, in the MOD. At the MOD two corrupt officers will forge documents or submit false rosters and split the winnings. Their oversight is minimal and everyone expects them to be corrupt. After all, that is one of the benefits of being in the pay officer position.

Moody gave me examples of pay officers engaged in corruption. A favorite technique of pay officers was to create false rosters of soldiers. The rosters included the names of anywhere from fifty to three hundred soldiers who had recently quit the Iraqi army. But because of the slow process of updating rosters and the bureaucracy at the MOD, these pay officers were able to collect the pay for these “ghost”
jundi
.

The final punch line from Moody and Ahmed was that corruption had happened, and was going to happen, whenever money was involved. In Iraq, they said, corruption is a form of payment to individuals who are able to make it to positions of power or to those who have spent time creating networks of friends. The basic logic is as follows: if I spend an entire
lifetime building relationships and forming bonds that allow me to reach a position of power, I should be able to extract economic benefits from my position in the form of corruption. Otherwise, what would be the incentive to rise to a position of power?

The more I think about the corruption problem in Iraq, the less I feel the solution is to crack down on these practices. Iraqi corruption is as respected and commonplace as hard work is to the Japanese. Can we tell people in Japan that hard work is bad and that they should simply quit and become lazier? Likewise, I am not sure that telling Iraqis they need to stop being corrupt is the best way to approach Iraq's corruption problem. If we want to fix this issue, first we need to understand the role it plays in the culture.

Tribalism in Iraq

Tribalism. For most Americans the word conjures up the image of a group of Indians sitting in teepees smoking peace pipes. My experiences in Iraq dispelled this idea. I slowly came to understand that a different sort of tribalism pervades Iraqi society. Tribalism has been in this area of the world since the dawn of humankind—before the Crusades, before Islam, and before Christianity. It has been part of the Arab culture for thousands of years. I will save some time by compacting thousands of briefs and papers on Iraqi tribalism into two statements. First, tribalism exists because it helps facilitate survival in austere environments. Second, the method of survival in a tribal context is to ensure members of the tribe focus on community survival versus individual survival.

While no exact parallel exists, the closest Western organization that works on the same fundamental principles is the gang. Gangs are tight-knit groups that bond people together for purposes of survival. Put simply, a solo gangster with an Uzi cannot maintain drug-trafficking turf in Los Angeles because he is an easy kill; however, thirty gangsters with Uzis are much more difficult to defeat. Similarly, in the desert there may be only one watering hole for fifty miles. A few Arabs alone cannot expect to defend this key turf, but a larger group can maintain their resources and livelihood.

Gangs also tend to deemphasize individual efforts and focus more on the efforts of the group. For example, the members do not say, “I am Mike the Maniac and I am also a Crip.” To the contrary, they will say, “I am a Crip.” This focus of attention on the Crips, or the community and not the individual, ensures unity of effort in defending the gang turf. Anyone who
shows signs of defecting from the gang is killed or banished from the gang for fear they may ruin gang integrity and thus the strength of the gang. The exact same mindset of gangs applies to Iraqi tribalism and to Arab culture as a whole.

Moody was always a great source for interesting insights into how tribalism works in Iraq. It was perplexing that he, as the most highly educated and civilized of our terps, also had the greatest tribal pride and adherence to tribal culture. This was just another example of how pervasive tribal identity is in Iraq, even within the well-educated and highly civilized population of Iraq. Tonight's discussion revolved around the tribal concept of “blood money.”

Moody told me about a typical homicide situation in Iraq. Let's say Ahmed, who is part of the Dulaym tribe, kills Hyder, who is part of the Janabi tribe. Based on tribal custom, if someone from another tribe kills someone in your tribe, you must get revenge for this action or all honor in your tribe is vanquished. To lose the honor of the tribe is to lose all credibility in bargaining, to lose all your friends' respect, and to become an outcast in society. Because honor is so important, there is a logical reason why revenge is a good idea in tribal society.

Revenge, in the context of a homicide, means killing someone in the other tribe—quid pro quo. Obviously, the logical progression of this system would imply that all tribes would eventually kill each other off. Fortunately, it does not work like this.

There is another way to get revenge and restore honor that does not involve killing a member of the other tribe. This alternative comes in the form of cold, hard cash. This cash, or “blood money,” can serve as retribution for one member of a tribe killing a member of another tribe. Fortunately, when blood money is involved there is no actual blood shed after the original homicide occurs. The exact blood money amount to be exchanged is determined between the sheikhs of the two respective tribes and is negotiated in a systematic and civilized manner. The system is very similar to the way the Vikings and Anglo-Saxon clans did things over a thousand years ago in northern Europe.

So while on the face of it the tribal system of revenge may seem primitive, it actually is quite civilized and relies on money as the diplomat. The U.S. military has even embraced the blood money concept. Many times the U.S. military will pay off sheikhs or families for accidental deaths. The idea of paying off Iraqi families for their pain and anguish may seem very
crass to Americans, but the payment suffices as blood money and serves to prevent any retaliatory attacks from the tribe affected.

While money solves nearly all tribal conflicts, it is not foolproof. Moody told me about a famous sheikh who lived about sixteen hundred years ago in Iraq. “Jamal, this sheikh was the only sheikhh in history who would not accept blood money—and it led to disaster. As the story goes, a member of an opposing tribe killed the sheikh's brother. As is customary, the opposing sheikh came to negotiate with the affected sheikhh for the blood money amount he would need in order to restore his honor. The affected sheikhh's response was ‘I do not want your money—I want my brother!'” I stopped Moody. “Wait, why didn't he accept the money? Doesn't that mean there will be a war?” Moody replied, “Yep, the sheikh called for war. Eventually, one revenge killing led to another. The downward cycle of death decimated both tribes in the end. Here is the moral of the story Jamal: accept blood money payments.” I concurred with Moody's assessment. Moody responded in jest, “Jamal, you want to know what is even more remarkable about this story? This is the only time in the history of Iraq it was not about the money.”

Moody expanded his discussion of Iraqi tribalism. “Jamal, do you know who understood the tribes better than anyone? Saddam Hussein. He was a master.” Moody followed his praise for Saddam with an example. “Not long ago, two tribes were in a bitter feud because the tribal sheikhs could not agree on the appropriate blood money amount one tribe owed to the other,” he said. “After two days of fighting, there were thirty-eight dead on one side, and forty-five dead on the other, with no resolution in sight. This situation looked like it would end in the destruction of the two tribes.”

Moody paused to catch his breath. “The next day, when the two tribes were standing toe to toe with guns, mortars, artillery, and RPGs ready to destroy each other, Saddam Hussein came to the rescue.” I replied, “Did he fly to the scene in his Superman costume?” Moody laughed. “No, Jamal, there were no Superman costumes involved, but he did send an MOD official from Baghdad to help mediate the issues within the tribes. He asked each sheikhh how much blood money would be required to compensate for the mounting losses on their side. Once the two amounts were negotiated, the official paid the sheikhhs on the spot and told them it was courtesy of Saddam Hussein. The groups quit fighting and went back to a peaceful existence and a high appreciation for Saddam.” I said, “So Saddam became the peacemaker and hero at the same time?” Moody
sneered. “Exactly. And now you Americans want to kill the guy who finally got the tribes to agree on something—you're crazy!”

Our tribal discussion continued. All these new ideas infiltrating my mind were creating new questions I needed Moody to answer. I gave him the best “what-if” scenario I could muster. “Moody, what would happen if some poor man in a tribe accidentally rams his car into someone in another tribe. He will obviously not have the cash to cover the blood money and this simple event could effectively lead to tribal warfare. How do the tribes control these situations?”

“The tribes have a solution to this situation and many like it,” Moody replied. “Effectively, all the tribes in Iraq collect a tax from their members. Personally, I pay around a thousand dinar a month, which is roughly one American dollar. This money goes into what I'll call a blood money fund. When the poor tribal members run into problems with rival tribes and cannot afford to pay the blood money on behalf of the tribe, the fund is used to ensure the money is paid and no further violence takes place. It's like an insurance policy.”

I had more questions for Moody. “This sounds like a welfare policy. Do you have any freeloaders who look at the blood money fund and say, ‘this is a great opportunity to kill someone from the other tribe that I really hate with the added benefit that I won't even have to pay for it?'” Moody answered, “The tribes have this one figured out as well. Before the tribe will use the blood money pot to pay off a member's blood money debt, the sheikhs make certain you are a good member of the tribe and investigate the circumstances of the death. If the tribal sheikhh senses a member was freeloading on the system he would simply hand them over to the other tribe who would subsequently kill the individual responsible for their member's death.” I said, “Wow. Sounds like you have it figured out.”

Just Beat It

My discussion with Moody on tribalism somehow shifted to the topic of beatings. After learning about tribalism's peculiarities, I was not sure Moody could shock me any further. I was wrong. Moody began his lecture on beating people. “Jamal, there is a beating chain of command in Iraqi society. The oldest males sit at the top of the chain of command and the youngest sit at the bottom.” Puzzled, I asked, “A beating chain of command?” Moody said, “Yes, a beating chain of command. Here is how it works. Say you are around the dinner table and the youngest son calls
the oldest son a ‘weakling.' The eldest son, the middle son, and the father, whose honor and respect have been violated, are obligated to beat the offender. And the instigator is obligated to let the beatings happen without a struggle.” I asked, “The older brother, middle brother, and father are obligated to beat the youngest brother? Are you kidding?” Moody responded, “Yes, obligated. One time I had to beat my brother for three hours in the shower until my father said I had gone too far. My heart was broken for beating him, but we both knew it was necessary.”

I had to ask Moody another question. “Wait a second. Why exactly was it necessary for you to beat your brother for three hours? That seems excessive.” Moody explained his logic. “Jamal, this is very difficult for Americans to understand, but I will explain it to you anyway. Let's say I did not beat my brother. Let's also assume the word gets out to the rest of the community that my youngest brother disrespected me and was not punished. This would effectively show the community that the males of my household can't even take care of our own internal affairs.” He paused before continuing his lecture. “Not only does my youngest brother lose his honor in the community, but I lose my honor, my father loses his honor, my grandfather loses his honor, and the entire lineage of males related to my brother lose their honor. Because of this, the family must be sure the youngest brother is beaten. Likewise, the youngest brother will be more than willing to take his beatings, because he understands the consequences of his actions.”

I thought about Moody's beating story. I think I understand the logic. Effectively, if individuals know they will get harsh punishments for doing something wrong, this acts as a strong deterrence. The logic of this system helps explains why Arab nations are more apt to do public beheadings, public beatings, and public limb amputation. The government wants the community to know that if they do not respect society, they will be punished severely.

Iraqi culture is fascinating and very different from our own.

Chapter 11

Death Operations

September 2006

W
e got a call one afternoon from the brigade MiTT. The news was terrible: a
jundi
from the Iraqi brigade had been melted by a mortar shell that landed on the Barwana FOB. When an Iraqi soldier becomes an “angel” (what the U.S. military calls a dead
jundi
) a lot of work is involved. One of our jobs as a MiTT is to coordinate for transportation of the deceased angel from the location of his death to Baghdad. We are also in charge of ensuring there is a MiTT member and an Iraqi soldier with the body at all times until it reaches Baghdad. Once the body reaches Baghdad, the family takes custody and the situation is no longer in the U.S. military's hands.