Europe's Last Summer (23 page)

A similar message was sent by the hand of a naval officer,
Captain Zenker, to his superiors. "His Majesty had promised" to protect Austria if Russia interfered "but did not believe that Russia would enter the lists for Serbia, which had stained itself by an assassination. France, too, would scarcely let it come to war, as it lacked the heavy artillery for the field armies. Yet though a war against Russia-France was not probable, nevertheless the possibility of such a war must be borne in mind from a military point of view."

Wilhelm was aware that he had a reputation for backing down in a crisis. "This time I shall not give in," he told the armaments manufacturer Krupp.

Aboard ship, the Kaiser did his best to avoid looking like someone awaiting important news. Yet on July 6 he allowed two of his naval officers to understand that in nine days Austria's response to what the Serbs had done would be known. At other times the Kaiser told his officers the situation would be resolved in one week or within three weeks. He told the acting armed forces chiefs: "He did not anticipate major military complications. In his opinion the Tsar in this case would not take the part of the regicides. Moreover, Russia and France were not prepared for war. . . . On the Chancellor's advice he was going on his . . . cruise in order not to give cause for disquietude."

Wilhelm told much the same to the chief of his Military Cabinet and to the Prussian minister of war: "the sooner the Austrians make their move against Serbia, the better, and . . . the Russians—though friends of Serbia—will not join in."

On July 7, the day after Germany signed its blank check, Berchtold convened the cabinet of the Dual Monarchy to seek its authorization to move forward. The cabinet was comprised of the Austrian Premier and his ministers, the Hungarian Premier and his ministers, and the handful, such as Berchtold, who were ministers of the Austro-Hungarian union.

The cabinet deliberated and debated for hours. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Count István Tisza, expressed strong opposition to Berchtold's plans. He was alone in doing so, but he kept the others from taking action. Tisza warned that an invasion of Serbia by the Dual Monarchy "would, as far as can humanly be foreseen, lead to an intervention by Russia and hence to a world war." His alternative plan was for Vienna to draw up a list of demands and "issue an ultimatum only if Serbia did not fulfill them. The demands must be stiff but not impossible to meet." Above all, he argued, the Hapsburg Empire should not allow itself to be drawn into a war.

Instead, the cabinet proposed to present an ultimatum to Serbia— a waste of time, as Berchtold should have realized—that Serbia could not possibly accept, and to follow it up by launching an invasion. Tisza, who was entitled to a veto, held out for making demands that Serbia
could
accept. His preference was for a peaceful solution.

All the ministers were convinced that some Serbian officials were connected in some way with the crime in Sarajevo, though they had no conclusive proof of it, and the Sarajevo trial might not take place for weeks or months. That was too long for Berchtold to wait. He needed to act in a matter of days or perhaps a week or two at most.

For a week, July 7–14, Count Tisza stonewalled. Then his foreign policy adviser persuaded him that Hungary, in its quarrel with Romania, would benefit from the crusade against Serbia. Moreover, Berchtold employed two other powerful arguments. There were those in the German government who would be so disappointed in the Dual Monarchy if it failed to act in a manly fashion that they would see no value in remaining an ally: the German alliance, on which all depended, would be lost. Moreover, Berchtold held out hope to the Hungarian Prime Minister; it was not impossible that Serbia would accept Austrian terms, in which case there would be no war after all. (That was not really true, for Berchtold was determined to force a war on Serbia no matter what Serbia said or did.)

Tisza abandoned his opposition, but it had cost Berchtold a week. And the Kaiser, it will be remembered, expected matters to be resolved in a week or two, or three at the most.

From London on July 9, the German ambassador reported that he had discussed the Sarajevo aftermath and Austria's possible response with Sir Edward Grey. He stated that Grey "was in a thoroughly confident mood, and declared in cheerful tones that he saw no reason for taking a pessimistic view of the situation."

July 11.
A question for the German foreign office from the Kaiser's yacht: should the customary telegram of congratulations be sent to the King of Serbia on his birthday, July 12? Answer: "As Vienna has so far inaugurated no action of any sort against Belgrade, the omission of the customary telegram would be too noticeable and might be the cause of premature uneasiness. . . . [I]t should be sent."

July 14.
Vienna to Berlin. The ultimatum to be sent to Serbia "is being composed so that the possibility of its acceptance is
practically excluded.
" But it has not yet been put in final form and would not be before July 19. ("Too bad," notes the Kaiser.)

By mid-July, complaints of Austrian indecisiveness seemed to be justified. It was possible to speculate, as Bavarian officials did, that at the conference of July 5–6, Austria-Hungary would have preferred to have the Kaiser
refuse
the blank check—
not
offer full support—so as to have an excuse for doing nothing.

As had so many European diplomats,
Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austria's minister in Belgrade, had been away on vacation. On July 10 he returned. The Russian representative, Hartwig, promptly called upon him that evening to present formal condolences for the assassinations in Sarajevo. Hartwig denied a rumor that he had failed to mark the occasion by flying the legation flag at half-mast.

Hartwig, who was obese, suffered not only from asthma but also from angina pectoris. It was of the heart pains that he now complained. Official duties would keep him at his post for two days more. Then he could vacation at a spa.

Hartwig inquired what Austria planned to do in response to the events in Sarajevo. Giesl assured him that he need have no fears on Serbia's behalf. Hartwig looked relieved. Then, noiselessly, the Russian diplomat slipped to the floor. A doctor, called immediately, pronounced him dead of a heart attack.

The Giesls sent for
Hartwig's daughter Ludmilla. She brushed aside all attempts to comfort her, bitterly calling them "Austrian words." She searched the room; she asked whether her father had been served food or drink (he had not); and she carefully carried away his cigarette butts, presumably to be tested for poison.

The cigarettes had not been tampered with. What had been poisoned in Balkan Europe in July 1914 was the air. It had become a world of lies, plots, and deceit.

CHAPTER 27: BERCHTOLD RUNS
OUT OF TIME

July 14.
Even though Tisza no longer stood in the way, Berchtold still could not go ahead to attack Serbia. Conrad, the chief of staff, discovered that a leave of absence that had been given to the troops for harvesting of crops would not expire until July 25. An emergency recall would have signaled Vienna's warlike intentions; it could not be done.

To strike before then would be imprudent, the Austrians decided, for another reason. The President and the Prime Minister of France were about to pay a state call on Russia. Therefore the leaders of the two allies would be together, able to concert their response to whatever moves Austria might make. Not wishing to allow this to happen, Berchtold decided to wait until the two Frenchmen had left St. Petersburg and were aboard ship, thus safely out of touch. That meant ascertaining the date that French President
Raymond Poincaré and Prime Minister Rene Viviani planned to leave. He asked his embassy in St. Petersburg to supply him with this information. Having done so, Berchtold planned to present an ultimatum to Serbia on July 23 that would expire July 25.

For use in his proposed note to Serbia, Berchtold wanted information on the latest incriminating evidence uncovered in Sarajevo. One of his officials went to Sarajevo, sifted the evidence, and reported on July 13: It was not what Berchtold would have wished to hear. Much of it was inconclusive. The Austrian investigators had found that "There is nothing to prove or even to suppose that the Serbian government is accessory to the inducement for the crime, its preparation, or the furnishing of weapons. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that this is altogether out of the question." All that could be found was that the assassins had been aided by persons with ties to government.

To wait for conclusive evidence of Serb guilt to surface was no longer an option. Berchtold would have to go forward with the drafting of his ultimatum without the evidence to back him up.

Yet another delay threatened. Conrad advised that the armed forces would not be ready to invade Serbia until August 12. That would be seven weeks after the assassinations—far too long for launching an attack on Serbia that Europe would excuse as an unthinking reaction.

What was Berchtold to do? What was he to tell Berlin? He had run out of time.

What was happening? Berlin inquired. Vienna did not answer because Berchtold had no reply to give.

CHAPTER 28: THE SECRET IS KEPT

Berchtold kept the Germans in the dark, in effect maintaining radio silence. He had a plausible excuse: To achieve surprise in his planned assault on Serbia, he had to keep anyone outside the existing circle from knowing what was going on. As communications could be intercepted and deciphered it was best to communicate as little as possible with anyone.

Keeping the secret proved difficult. The German foreign office passed on to its ambassador in Italy a general sense of Austria's thinking. The ambassador mentioned it casually to Foreign Minister
Antonio di San Giuliano. Italians rarely were entrusted with secrets by the Great Powers because of their reputation for indiscretion. Indeed, a historian of the country's foreign policy at the time writes: "Italian diplomats could not even arrange appointments with major European statesmen." Alerted by the German ambassador, San Giuliano passed on whatever he knew to his embassies in Russia, Austria, and Serbia. The Austrians, having broken the Italian code, knew what San Giuliano was telling his diplomats. Historian Samuel Williamson, who relates this story, conjectures that the Russians, with their sophistication in cryptology, might have broken the Italian code too, and might have alerted Serbia.

The Russians had cracked the Austrian code, had read Berchtold's inquiry as to when the French President and Prime Minister would leave Russia—and could have drawn inferences from this request.

Such leaks were only to be expected as time went on, and as delay led to further delay. A retired Austrian diplomat dropped a hint that was picked up by a British ambassador, who passed on the rumor to a French colleague.

On July 16 the British ambassador to Russia alerted his government to the gathering storm: "Austro-Hungarian government are in no mood to parley with Servia
[sic],
but will insist on immediate unconditional compliance, failing which force will be used. Germany is said to be in complete agreement with this procedure."

The same day, and in the same city, St. Petersburg, the Italian ambassador told a Russian diplomat "that Austria was capable of taking an irrevocable step with regard to Serbia based on the belief that, although Russia would make a verbal protest, she would not adopt forcible measures for the protection of Serbia against any Austrian attempts."

A number of European diplomats heard disquieting rumors, but only a handful had hard knowledge. Even in Vienna few actually
knew,
and in Berlin even fewer.

In a broader sense, moreover, the secret was kept: the public knew nothing of it. As Volker Berghahn writes of Germany: "only a very small circle of men was involved in the crucial decisions which ended in war," and "when it came to making this decision no more than a dozen people were consulted." The same was true of Austria-Hungary. The plotters went on with their work, silently and hidden from view, while, totally unaware, Europe basked in the sunshine of a lazy summer holiday.

PART SIX
CRISIS!

CHAPTER 29: THE
FAIT
IS NOT
ACCOMPLI

On July 16 the Russian ambassador in Vienna cabled his government: "Information reaches me that the
Austro-Hungarian Government at the conclusion of the inquiry intends to make certain demands on Belgrade. . . . It would seem to me desirable that at the present moment, before a final decision on the matter, the Vienna Cabinet should be informed how Russia would react to the fact of Austria's presenting demands to Serbia such as would be unacceptable to the dignity of that state."

This, and similar intimations of Austrian designs, disturbed Russia's foreign minister. But Vienna's ambassador hastened to reassure. He told the Russian foreign minister that Austria-Hungary wanted peace. So Russia did nothing.

On July 18, Pasic, the Prime Minister of Serbia, cabled
Serbian missions abroad (other than in Vienna) that he was determined not to accept any demands by Austria-Hungary that would infringe on Serbian sovereignty.