For Honour's Sake (37 page)

On September 24, Detroit was torched, and two days later Fort Malden was set alight. That same day Perry's squadron was sighted probing carefully up the Detroit River. The morning of September 27 the retreat began in earnest. It was a miserable day. A continual, heavy rain soaked everyone. The downpour combined with the advance of wagons, people, and animals churned up the narrow track, so that the farther back in the line one was, the harder the going. Wagon and cart wheels sunk to the axles and had to be wrestled free. The dresses of the women were sopping with mud as they struggled through knee-deep bogs. Men cursed and swore and pulled and shoved, sweating and shivering at the same time.

Each day that followed only increased the misery of the straggling column. Many civilians had insisted on bringing with them vast amounts of personal belongings. One family alone had thirty horses straining to pull nine heavily laden wagons that carried among other things 1,500 pounds of silver plate. For ten days the retreat went on until the vanguard reached Moravian Town, about seventy miles from Detroit, and Procter decided to make his stand against the Americans. At the opposite end of the long column, a rearguard of soldiers had become so disorganized
and demoralized that it failed to carry out the primary assignment of destroying the bridges to slow the American pursuit.

That the Americans would pursue was never in doubt, and Procter was amazed not to be overrun while on the march. The last pickets to abandon Fort Malden had reported troops coming ashore just as dusk fell. Expecting a fight, Harrison had landed 3,000 regulars and Kentucky Volunteers, and been surprised to find the fort a smouldering ruin. Although Procter had no more than a few hour.' head start, the American general did not immediately pursue him despite his estimation that no more than 580 redcoats remained and that Tecumseh's warriors could be easily scattered. Instead, that night he wrote to Secretary of War John Armstrong: “I will pursue the enemy to-morrow, although there is no probability of my overtaking him, as he has upwards of 1,000 horses, and we have not one in the army.”
²⁷

This was gross exaggeration, of course. Harrison faced mostly infantry, who had neither the ability to master horsemanship on short notice nor the inclination. Most would rather walk than try saddling a horse. There were also far fewer horses than oxen and cattle, and the number of heavily burdened carts moved slower than a man taking a leisurely stroll. This was a gruelling retreat that mimicked the flight of Napoleon from Moscow. And Procter led his people toward a semblance of the same tragedy that had befallen the Grande Armée.

M
aj. Gen. William Henry Harrison's lack of enthusiasm for a quick pursuit of Maj. Gen. Henry Procter's retreating army was as nothing compared to the state of torpor that had settled over the rest of the American northern command as the campaign season of 1813 entered its final months. In early August, Secretary of War John Armstrong had derided operations so far conducted west of Kingston as having left “the strength of the enemy unbroken.” Kingston was “the great depot of his resources,” he advised the new commander of the north, Maj. Gen. James Wilkinson, on August 8. “So long as he retains this, and keeps open his communications with the sea, he will not want the means of multiplying his naval and other defences, and of reinforcing or renewing the war in the West.” Kingston should be either captured directly or cut off from Montreal by an army driving up each side of the wide St. Lawrence River to blockade this vital link in the British communication lines. Once the blocking position was secure, the army could march east to join a second army coming toward Montreal from the south via Lake Champlain and seize the important trading centre. Success in this venture would well position the Americans to drive the British out of Upper Canada and all of Lower Canada west of Quebec in the spring of 1814. With luck even the fortress city itself might be taken and the conquest of Canada completed. “In conducting the present campaign,” Armstrong ordered, “you will make Kingston your primary
object,
and that you will
choose
(as circumstances may warrant), between a
direct
and
indirect
attack upon that post.”
¹

Wilkinson, who had only recently concluded his Odyssean banquet-hall journey from New Orleans to Washington, virtually scurried toward his new command after this meeting—arriving at Sackets Harbor on August 25. On paper his was a formidable army consisting of 14,357 regulars. But that included 2,528 unfit for duty. And the rest were spread out into three separate forces. On Lake Champlain there were 4,053 men, on the Niagara Peninsula at Fort George he had 3,668, and on the Erie frontier another 6,636.
²
The latter were with Harrison at Lake Erie and so of no use in the coming campaign.

More problematic was the fact that almost every officer under his command either hated Wilkinson or held him in contempt. In addition to his role in the conspiracy against George Washington, there was an open and bitter quarrel with the popular “Mad Anthony” Wayne, his former collusion in the Aaron Burr scheme that had sought to carve Louisiana away from the United States to create an independent nation, and various lesser intrigues for which he had faced courts martial only to be exonerated for lack of evidence. As well, Wilkinson's health was poor; he was plagued by fevers that he remedied with a regularly consumed self-prescribed mixture of laudanum and whisky.
³

The commanding general with whom Wilkinson must cooperate to realize Armstrong's objective was also his archrival. Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton, commander of the army at Lake Champlain, was a big, stiff-necked Virginian of sixty years. Hampton's temper was as legendary as his impatience with those who got in his way. Orphaned by a Cherokee raid, Hampton scrabbled his way through a mixture of cunning, good fortune, and bloody-minded determination up from poverty to become one of America's wealthiest plantation owners. His holdings encompassed thousands of acres and were worked by even more slaves.
⁴
A tough disciplinarian, Hampton imposed a strict training regimen on the Champlain command.
Nile.' Weekly Register
reported that even officers were “given to understand that they must and shall ascertain and perform their several duties.”
⁵

But his army was still painfully raw. Col. Robert Purdy, commanding the 4th U.S. Infantry Regiment, described it as “composed principally of
recruits who had been but a short time in the service, and had not been exercised with that rigid discipline so essentially necessary to constitute the soldier. They had indeed been taught various evolutions, but a spirit of subordination was foreign to their views.”
⁶

Hampton had accepted this command reluctantly, consenting only when promised that he would be independent and report directly to Washington. But when President James Madison approved Armstrong's new operational plan, he did so with the proviso that Wilkinson would be in overall command of the newly designated Military District No. 9, which included the commands of Harrison and Hampton. “I ask from the President … my immediate discharge,” an infuriated Hampton demanded.

Armstrong responded with mollification. His command would be separate and distinct, just not independent. Surely he must understand that Wilkinson, as the United States Army's most senior officer, could not be embarrassed by having the more junior Hampton commanding on an equal footing. That would run against convention. What Armstrong could do, however, was directly oversee the entire operation—something he had sought since taking over the War Department. “I shall be with you throughout the campaign and I pledge to you my honor as a soldier that your rights shall not be invaded. I forbear to transmit your letter to the President until I receive your reply.”

“He has locked the door on me,” Hampton growled. The general would serve, but only until the campaign's end. Then he would resign. Meanwhile he promised to be ready to march on September 20 with 4,500 regulars and 1,500 militiamen.
⁷
The objective would be Montreal.

The most obvious route was a direct one from Champlain northwest of the lake bearing its name across the Canadian border at Odelltown and from there almost due north to L'Acadie and then through country that was primarily a scruffy mix of swamps and woods to gain the St. Lawrence across from Montreal. On reaching Odelltown, however, his scouts brushed up against a mixed force of French-Canadian militia supported by a small band of Iroquois, and Hampton abruptly called a halt. His soldiers groused anxiously about the dangers inherent in fighting a large force of Indians. After a personal reconnaissance, Hampton reversed course back to New York. He wrote Armstrong to say that the unusually
dry summer had dried up most of the wells and streams, so persisting would have exposed his army to death by thirst.
⁸

But Hampton was not going to give up. Instead, he advanced west along the Chazy River to Four Corners. From here he would pick up the easterly coursing arc of the Châteauguay River to where it joined the English River and then follow this stream's descent to the St. Lawrence. This would place his army opposite Lachine, within a day's march of Montreal, while always having water close at hand. Hampton set off at a leisurely pace, reaching Four Corners on September 25. Here, he received orders from Armstrong to hold, as Wilkinson would not be able to move for several weeks.
⁹

Wilkinson, meanwhile, was still puzzling over whether to attack Kingston or advance up the St. Lawrence. The day after his arrival at Sackets Harbor he convened a council of war where his intentions, he later wrote, met unanimous endorsement from the officers present. The troops stationed on Lake Ontario would concentrate at Sackets, most having to be moved from Fort George. In cooperation with Commodore Isaac Chauncey's squadron, “a bold feint” would be made on Kingston while the main army would “slip down the St. Lawrence, lock up the enemy in our rear to starve or surrender, or oblige him to follow us without artillery, baggage, or provisions, or eventually to lay down arms; to sweep the St. Lawrence of armed craft, and in concert with the division under Major-General Hampton to take Montreal.”
¹⁰

Having clearly stated his plan, Wilkinson made no haste to implement it. Only on August 30 did he move to Fort Niagara to assemble the soldiers on the Niagara Peninsula for the move to Sackets Harbor. Immediately upon arrival there a fever rendered him bedridden. Although he could have put peninsular commander Brig. Gen. John Boyd in charge, Wilkinson refused. Instead, nothing further was done until October 1, when Chauncey began ferrying troops from Fort George to Sackets Harbor. Over the next two days 3,500 men were shifted, as Wilkinson effectively stripped the peninsula of its occupation force except for an unruly garrison of New York militia commanded by Brig. Gen. George McClure and some Canadian irregulars led by Joseph Willcocks who had cast their lot in with the Americans. On October 2,
the commander returned to Sackets Harbor with the final lift of soldiers. He now had about 8,000 men.

Back on the Niagara Peninsula, McClure and Willcocks either exerted little control over the actions of their men or actively encouraged them to pillage farms and burn the barns in areas they controlled. Finally, in November, as the depredations increased and came to the attention of Maj. Gen. John Vincent at Burlington Heights, he detached a force of 378 regulars of the 8th Regiment of Foot along with some volunteers and Indian warriors under Col. John Murray. Establishing an outpost at Forty Mile Creek, they harried McClure's men, slowly regaining control of more of the peninsula. At the same time, the New York militia were taking their leave the moment their short-term enlistments expired. McClure could soon barely maintain any form of occupation. He began to consider a withdrawal across the Niagara River to Fort Niagara.
¹¹

Wilkinson, meanwhile, no sooner re-established himself in Sackets Harbor than a rather unwelcome visitor arrived in the form of Secretary Armstrong, who announced his plan to run the War Department from there in order to better oversee the forthcoming operation. Armstrong was fed up with delays. Wilkinson seemed no more inclined to engage the British than Dearborn. Hearing that Kingston had been reinforced, he fumed. “With nine day.' start of the enemy what might not have been done? At Kingston we shall no longer find him naked and napping.”
¹²
Wilkinson was dismayed to realize that Armstrong was effectively usurping his command, and the two men began to bicker over details of the operation and its whole purpose. Always obsessively secretive, Armstrong began issuing directives and orders that affected the commands of his generals without informing them of what he was about. Chief among these was an instruction to the quartermaster general to construct winter quarters for Hampton's army on the Châteauguay River just inside Canada. If Armstrong expected to carry Montreal, what purpose did such quarters serve? Hampton would winter in the town. Only if the offensive failed should this preparation “against contingencies,” as Armstrong described it, be necessary.