Foreign Faction: Who Really Kidnapped JonBenet? (16 page)

A
utopsy protocols in this type of investigation calls for the collection of fingernail scrapings that might help identify trace evidence that would link a suspect to the crime. In many instances, a struggling victim may have scratched a perpetrator during the assault, and skin cells or blood from the assailant is left beneath the fingernails.

Scrapings from the fingernails of JonBenét’s hands revealed miniscule samples of DNA that belonged to two different male subjects, and one unidentified female. The samples were too small to identify their biological origin, i.e. blood or skin cells, and investigators came to theorize that the unknown DNA samples had been transferred from contaminated fingernail clippers used in the post-mortem examinations of other bodies processed through the morgue prior to her homicide.

Investigators were able to obtain the DNA samples from eight of the autopsy examinations that preceded that of JonBenét.

These samples were analyzed, but none of these matched the unknown male and female samples collected from JonBenét’s fingernails. Perhaps more disappointing, was the fact that the unknown samples lacked sufficient identifying markers that permitted their entry into the state and national DNA databases.

For purposes of education and clarification, the NDIS (National DNA Index System) is one part of the CODIS
¹⁵
(Combined DNA Index System). It is the national level of several parts that contain DNA profiles that are contributed by federal, state, and local participating forensic laboratories. NDIS was implemented in October 1998 and all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the federal government, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory, and Puerto Rico participate in the NDIS program.

DNA that is authorized by law to be maintained at NDIS includes profiles from convicted offenders, arrestees, legal, detainees, forensic (casework samples), unidentified human remains, missing persons and relatives of missing persons.

The database is maintained by the FBI, and there are minimum requirements for the submission of certain DNA samples to the program. Generally, the 13 core CODIS loci are required for the submission of convicted offender, arrestee, detainee, and legal profiles.

A minimum of 10 core loci are required for the entry of unknown, forensic DNA profiles.

For our purposes here, the CODIS system uses two different indexes to generate investigative leads in crimes where biological evidence has been collected from a crime scene. The
convicted offender
index contains DNA profiles of individuals convicted of certain crimes ranging from certain misdemeanors to sexual assault and murder.

The
forensic index
contains DNA profiles obtained from crime scene evidence, such as semen, saliva, or blood. This is trace, biological DNA evidence that is believed to belong to the perpetrator of a crime who has yet to be identified by law enforcement personnel.

An example of how the CODIS DNA system works is as follows:

During their investigation of a sex assault, detectives will collect an evidence kit from the victim’s medical examination conducted at an emergency room. Swabs from the kit will be submitted to a state laboratory to determine if trace, biological evidence, i.e. semen, was left by the perpetrator. If such evidence is present, the forensic unknown DNA profile of the assailant is then searched against the state and national DNA databases
Convicted Offender and Arrestee Indexes.

If there is a candidate match of someone in the DNA system, a laboratory will conduct further follow-up examinations to confirm the identity of the perpetrator.

A simultaneous search is made of the
Forensic Index
for a possible match. This database contains the DNA profiles of unidentified perpetrators, and matches in this index may link two or more crimes together.

Rapists are frequently serial offenders, and an unknown subject’s DNA profile may be collected from the evidence of many different crime scenes, as well as from many different jurisdictions. Tying cases together through the forensic DNA database has proven to be a valuable tool to law enforcement, and matches of unknown profiles often open up new investigative leads.

Lab technicians turned their attention to the underwear that had been worn by JonBenét at the time of her death to see if they could locate any DNA evidence left by her murderer. Two splotches of blood had been observed in the crotch of her panties, likely deposited there from the vaginal injuries inflicted during the assault, and at the time of her death.

As noted previously, some type of smearing had been observed on her thighs, and technicians and investigators had initially thought that this trace evidence may have been semen left behind by the perpetrator. This was eventually determined to be blood that belonged to JonBenét.

Sampling of the blood in the underwear, however, revealed the mixed presence of male DNA. This was a significant and puzzling discovery. How did male DNA find its way into the underwear of a murdered 6-year old girl? Had this evidence been deposited there by the murderer of JonBenét?

The male DNA sample, subsequently identified as Distal Stain 007-2, only contained 9 genetic markers, and like the DNA collected from beneath JonBenét’s fingernails, was of insufficient strength to be entered into the state and national databases. Moreover, the sample was so small that technicians were not able to identify the
biological origin
of the exemplar. Regrettably, they could not tell police investigators if the biological source of the male DNA was derived from blood, semen, epithelial skin cells, or some other genetic material.

The challenge to technicians was enhancing the DNA sample so that it could be entered into the state and national DNA databases, and it took a while for this technology to develop. As noted above, the FBI requires that 10 out of 13 genetic markers be identified in order for a sample to be entered into the Forensic Index database.

DNA replication technology was utilized in the Denver Police Department’s crime lab, and the 10
^th
marker was eventually strengthened to the point that the unidentified male sample discovered in JonBenét’s underwear was able to be entered into the state and national databases. This laboratory success didn’t take place until 2002, nearly six years after the murder of JonBenét.

The presence of unidentified male DNA in JonBenét’s underwear was evidence that led some investigators and attorneys to believe that an intruder had been responsible for her murder. What other possible explanation could there be for the presence of this evidence at the scene? Coupled with the other evidence discovered by Lou Smit, many thought it compelling evidence that pointed to someone
outside
the family as the perpetrator of the crime.

This partial DNA profile has been entered into the ever-growing national database of felony offenders. Weekly comparisons are run against new, known samples of convicted and arrested offenders, and other unidentified forensic samples collected from unsolved crime scenes around the country.

As of February 2012, this sample has been cross-checked against 10,560,300 known DNA offender profiles located in the CODIS data base.

There are now 417,200 unknown forensic profiles in the database.
Monster’s
partial DNA profile is one of these, and thus far, the contributor of this genetic material has not been identified.

Additionally, there have been 173,500 CODIS “hits” through February 2012, and this information has assisted law enforcement in over 166,700 criminal investigations.

All things considered, DNA profiling is still thought to be a relatively new science and technology is continuously being developed and refined. The DNA database continues to grow in numbers, and by comparison, there are over 71,000,000 fingerprints on file with the FBI for criminal arrests that date back to the early 1920’s. Inked, or electronically scanned, fingerprints continue to be collected from nearly every person arrested in the United States, and are used as a primary means of identification by law enforcement agencies across the nation.

It may only be a matter of time before DNA databases catch up to the number of fingerprints on file, and perhaps one day the DNA profile of an intruder who murdered JonBenét will be collected during an arrest, or from another crime scene.

If we can one day identify him, then maybe we could also learn the identity of other purported co-conspirators who participated in this crime.

1
997 had been an all-consuming year for the detectives working the murder investigation. The stress of trying to solve the murder of a
child
was difficult enough, but the relentless coverage of the media presented additional pressure and challenges.

Nearly 4,000 hours of overtime were logged by the end of the first year and many of the detectives working the case had spent more time in the office, and on the road, than they did with their own families. The division that had developed between the DA’s office and the BPD investigators brought an entirely new level of frustration to the men and women who were striving to uncover the truth of the matter.

The Ramseys had conducted one follow-up interview with investigators in the spring and it didn’t look like they were willing to return to the table anytime soon.

Test results were trickling back from the crime labs and detectives were still awaiting the arrival of clothing articles that had been requested of the family. In some instances, they needed the clothing worn by the family on the night and day of the murder to compare against trace evidence found at the scene, and on the body of JonBenét.

In the fall of that year, the FBI had invited the Boulder authorities to Quantico to present a review of the elements of their case. Detectives were excited about the opportunity to share the information that had been gathered up to that point in time, and had hoped that the insight of the federal investigators would provide them some leverage with the intruder theorists in the Boulder DA’s office.

As teams from both agencies prepared to head to Virginia,
Vanity Fair
¹⁶
ran an article on the status of the investigation. It was highly critical of Alex Hunter’s handling of the case, and a retired federal agent quoted in the article expressed the opinion that the DA’s release of police reports to the Ramsey team in advance of their April 1997 interview was tantamount to
prosecutorial malfeasance.

The former agent, Greg McCrary, had served 25 years with the FBI and indicated that he had at one time been recruited by one of the Ramsey defense investigators to join their team.

McCrary did not hesitate to decline the offer, and cited his reasons in the article: “Because on a ratio of 12 to 1, child murders are committed by parents or a family member. In this case, you also have an elaborate ‘staging’ – the ransom note, the placement of the child’s body – and I have never in my career seen or heard about a staging where it was not a family member – or someone very close to the family. Just the note alone told me the killer was in the family or close to it.”

With regard to the ransom note and practice note found on Patsy’s notepad, McCrary went on to say that “Kidnappers do not spend hours at a crime scene after murdering their victims composing letters.”
¹⁷

Hunter and his team reportedly were not very happy with the article’s portrayal of his office that was now spreading across the country. He ultimately decided not to attend the Quantico presentation and sent senior members of his command staff in his stead.

Boulder investigators spent a couple days sharing the details of their case, discussed the theories that had been proposed, and listened to suggested avenues of investigation as proposed by the experts who comprised the CASKU team.

Members of the FBI had been in fairly regular consultation with Boulder detectives throughout the course of the investigation, but this was the first opportunity they had had to participate in a detailed overview of the evidence collected thus far in the case.

The FBI agents continued to point out that statistics and case histories pointed to parental, family, or insider involvement, when a child was murdered in the home. Stranger abductions were far and few between, and their cumulative experience suggested that authorities needed to continue to take a hard look at the parents.

In reviewing similar cases, there had only been one instance in which a child had been taken for ransom and then found murdered in the home: it was the JonBenét Ramsey homicide investigation.

The agents also expressed the belief that Patsy had authored the ransom note
after
the death of JonBenét as a means of covering up the murder. Although it was possible, they considered it highly unlikely that an intruder would have spent the time to have written the note while in the home.

The additional evidence of a staged crime scene led them to further discount the intruder - kidnapper theory.

Boulder prosecutors reportedly were adamant in their denial that either John or Patsy Ramsey could have been involved in the murder of their daughter. It was reported that voices had been raised, and that the table had taken a pounding during the heated debate.

Cutting short his attendance at this meeting, Lou Smit went off to collect a potential
intruder
suspect from a jail in Tennessee. The man was brought back to Boulder on unrelated charges and eventually cleared as the perpetrator of JonBenét’s murder.

Boulder investigators went away from the Quantico presentation with the feeling that not much ground had been gained during their review of the case. Prosecutors had not been swayed in the least by the FBI’s professional assessment of the case, and they appeared to be dead set against
any
theory of the crime that involved the parents.

The first-year anniversary of JonBenét’s murder came and went, and investigators continued to plug away at a series of “tasks” that the DA’s office wanted completed. It seemed like the task list was never ending, and continuous additions were being made as time slipped by.

It was reported that the Ramseys had attempted to arrange an interview with BPD investigators in January through an intermediary, Father Holverstock from the family church in Boulder. Defense attorneys were purportedly not involved in the outreach, but after some discussion, police decided not to pursue the get-together. The conditions set forth by the Ramseys were not to their liking. They wanted to see more police reports and evidence collected in the case in exchange for the interview.

The Ramsey attorneys subsequently issued a press release indicating that police had declined another interview with the parents of the murdered child. BPD Investigators looked at the event as one in a series of media releases that were attempting to paint them as the uncooperative bad guys, and felt that the offer to interview had been insincere.

Over the course of that winter, both the DA’s office and Boulder Police sought the assistance and advice of additional experts. Alex Hunter brought on several metro-Denver area prosecutors to consult and advise him on the case. These men were seasoned prosecutors who handled many more homicide cases than what Boulder had experienced. They included Adams County DA Bob Grant, Denver DA Bill Ritter, and Jefferson County DA Dave Thomas.

Hunter also arranged to have Dr. Henry Lee, and Barry Scheck review the DNA evidence that had been collected during the case. Both Lee and Scheck had been involved in the O.J. Simpson murder trial and were considered experts on the topic of DNA evidence.

Frustrated by the perceived lack of cooperation they had been receiving from their own DA’s office, Boulder Police sought their own set of experienced prosecutors. Denver attorney Dan Caplis had initially been approached for assistance, and he eventually recruited the services of three attorneys working in the Denver area. They included Rich Baer, a former New York prosecutor; Dan Hoffman, a former dean of the Denver University Law School and former state public safety commissioner; and Bob Miller, who had served as a U.S. Attorney.

This group of attorneys would subsequently be referred to as the Boulder Police Department’s prosecutorial
Dream Team,
and would offer investigators invaluable insight and advice on how to proceed with their investigation.

The publicity the case was attracting seemed to serve as a magnet for some of the more disturbed individuals consumed by this little girl’s death. In one instance, someone bound and duct-taped a nude Barbie doll and left it on the front lawn of the vacant 15
^th
street Ramsey home.

In another instance, a male had been arrested by police for the theft of some pages of the morgue log located at Boulder Community Hospital. Following his release from jail on this charge, he found his way to the Ramsey home and spent the night sitting on the back patio, staring at the house.

Later that night, he tried to set fire to the home by pushing lit papers through a mail slot located near the front door. He called Detective Gosage late the next morning to confess his crime.

Investigators responded to the home following this revelation and confirmed that an attempted arson had occurred, and booked him into the Boulder County Jail on felony charges.

The man was subsequently sentenced to two years in the county jail in January 1998.
¹⁸

The media continued to pound at the division that had developed between the police and prosecutors, and in an effort to put a positive face on the matter, Alex Hunter and Mark Beckner agreed to join forces and moved their teams of investigators to a “secure” room in the Boulder County Criminal Justice Center. It was dubbed the “War Room,” and BPD investigative files and computers were set up to serve as a central location from which to conduct the inquiry into JonBenét’s murder.

Although the idea of a “task force” is not a unique idea when it comes to handling the investigation of major crimes, the successful use of one almost always requires that its members share the same vision and goals. In this instance, the two teams of investigators who had been forced by their superiors to share investigative quarters were diametrically opposed to one another in their interpretation of the crime.

By the time the teams had joined forces in the War Room, there were firmly held beliefs about where the inquiry needed to go, and countless discussions failed to dissuade either side of their position on the matter. It was akin to an effort of mixing oil and water. Try as hard as you want, it just wasn’t going to happen.

The death knell of the effort to combine forces came when a BPD investigator returned to the War Room after days off to discover that his computer was not functioning properly. It appeared that someone had tried to hack into the secure investigative files of the case from his workstation. The computer contained a number of files, but one particular item of concern was that it held the results of
preliminary
DNA testing. (It is important to note, that in this period of time, DNA testing often took
months
to see any return of lab results. In today’s environment, DNA results can be turned around as quickly as 24 hours from submission.)

The DNA test results were something that Boulder police had held back from the DA’s office because of alleged leaks to the media, and they suspected that someone from their team had been responsible for compromising the computer of the detective who managed that information.

A search of the security card-reader system for the door to the War Room revealed that one unauthorized entry had been attempted over the weekend. The security card belonged to a deputy DA who had been involved with the investigation, but who had
not
been granted security clearance to enter the room.

The security system indicated that, in fact, no entrance had been gained through this attempted card-swipe, but BPD investigators wondered why the attempted entry with the use of this card had been made at all.

No one who had legitimate access to the War Room admitted to
hacking
the detective’s computer, and the police department subsequently requested the assistance of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation’s computer technology team. The hard drive of the computer was examined for signs of unauthorized access and it was subsequently publically announced that the malfunction had been attributed to an
equipment problem,
and had not been the result of an unauthorized breach of the computer.

Detectives had been told by their own IT wizard that the computer had, in no uncertain terms, been compromised. Despite CBI’s press release, they continued to believe that someone with the DA’s office had hacked the computer in search of the DNA information.

The alleged breach of the computer had taken place within only a few days of the War Room being opened, and set the tone for the interactions that BPD investigators would have with their counter parts in the coming weeks. After only one and a half months, Boulder investigators would abandon the secure room at the Justice Center and move back to the environs of their own building.

There had been serious deliberation in the PD about pushing for a grand jury after the FBI had spoken to the issue, and this continued to gain momentum through the spring of 1998.

Hunter indicated he was willing to consider the use of the grand jury, but he first wanted to see what Boulder PD
had
that would establish the threshold he needed for a successful prosecution. Investigators were tasked with putting together a presentation for the DA’s office that supported the
need
for convening the grand jury inquiry.

Over the course of two days in early June, 1998, Boulder investigators, and other forensic experts, proceeded to outline the evidence that had been collected and examined in the case. Lead investigators who presented during the briefing included Detective Sergeant Tom Wickman, and Detectives Steve Thomas, Tom Trujillo and Jane Harmer. Opinions were offered as to the possible interpretation of some of the evidence, and conclusions that could be inferred therefrom.