 | objections to the Franco-German negotiations (Auriol,
Journal du Septennat,
6: 52, 100).
|
| 71. Eden,
Full Circle,
40.
|
| 72.
L'année politique, 1952,
30712; and for Schuman's speech of February 11, ibid., 47782; Clesse,
Le projet de CED,
11520.
|
| 73. On the outcome of London, see Massigli to Paris, February 18, 1952, and
Note
from Central Europe Office, February 23, 1952, MAE, EU 194955, Généralités, vol. 97; Eden,
Full Circle,
3841; Schwartz,
America's Germany,
25556; Acheson,
Present at the Creation,
61521; Dockrill,
Britain's Policy,
9398; and see the record of these meetings in
FRUS, 155254,
5: 3686.
|
| 74. Acheson,
Present at the Creation,
626. The United States and France signed a memorandum d'accord on February 25, 1952, for the aid. This agreement began a new means of financing European arms production, to be called "offshore procurement." Of the $ 600 million, $ 130 was designated for Indochina, $ 170 for economic aid, and $ 200 million would be used by the Americans to buy in France arms and equipment that would then be transferred to the French forces in Europe or Indochina. The final $ 100 million would be used to pay for American troops stationed in France. As the Service de Cooperation Economique of the Quai pointed out, "the off-shore formula is seductive, as it allows our own arms industry to continue functioning," and indeed profiting from American aid (
Note pour M. Charpentier
[the director of economic affairs in the Quai], March 8, 1952, MAE, DE/CE, vol. 469). Offshore procurement also opened up a new chapter in Franco-American financial controversy, as Irwin Wall has shown in
The United States and the Making of Postwar France,
21832. On the German contribution to NATO, see Acheson to Truman, February 21, 1952,
FRUS, 195254,
5: 8086; and Acheson to McCloy, February 26, 1952, ibid., 26162.
|
| 75. Soutou, "La France et les notes sovietiques de 1952 sur l'Allemagne"; Wettig, "Stalin and German Reunification"; Large,
Germans to the Front,
14549 (and n. 54 for the historiographical debate over this "missed opportunity"). The Soviet notes and the western responses are reproduced in
L'année politique, 1952,
49293, 49697, 5089, 51014.
|
| 76. Tripartite Declaration, draft of May 16, 1952,
FRUS, 195254,
5: 66062; final version, ibid., 68688; on Schuman's troubles in the cabinet, see Dunn to State, May 20, 1952, ibid., 663, and Acheson to Bruce, May 24, 1952, ibid., 67980; Eden,
Full Circle,
46467; Acheson,
Present at the Creation,
64350.
|
| 77. Bérard,
Un ambassadeur se souvient,
39092.
|
| 1. McGeehan,
The German Rearmament Question,
though he takes the story only to 1952, concludes that French rejection of the EDC "was
not
clearly explicable" (235). Fursdon,
The European Defense Community,
focuses less on diplomacy than on the treaty itself. Schwartz,
America's Germany,
chap. 10, examines the case from the perspective of German-American relations. Three excellent articles provide insight into Dulles's policy: Steininger, "John Foster Dulles, the European Defense Community, and the German Question"; Hershberg,
|
|
