Authors: Kentaro Toyama
65
.
The Sarkozy quotation is from
Wall Street Journal
(2009). The reportage on Sarkozy’s commission appears in Uchitelle (2008).
66
.
Stiglitz et al. (2009).
67
.
In an incident that simultaneously illustrates a cause of the technocratic crisis as well as an outcome, when I was shopping this very book to publishers, one editor told me this: “I worry that part of what makes this book so distinctive – it’s evenhanded, less polemical approach – is the same thing that will make it harder for us to sell. Right or wrong, it’s often those books that take a firm stance that we have the most success with.” To paraphrase . . . We don’t care if you’re right or wrong; we’d rather have a more polarizing, less balanced perspective.
Chapter 6: Amplifying People
The Importance of Heart, Mind, and Will
1
.
Sawyer (1999).
2
.
Swaminathan (2005).
3
.
Hindu
(2006).
4
.
Jhunjhunwala et al. (2004).
5
.
See, for example, Best (2004).
6
.
It was either Veeraraghavan et al. (2005) or (2006).
7
.
For more about telecenters, see Kuriyan and Toyama (2007).
8
.
Internet cafés typically end up catering to young men playing video games and consuming adult content. Assuming they do well as businesses, their primary benefit is to the entrepreneur in the form of increased or diversified income. But this is the same benefit that any additional line of business would have for a small entrepreneur, and success is less a function of the technology as it is the entrepreneur’s skill. Those same entrepreneurs often sell an array of products and services,
but few people make a fetish of, say, using cigarette sales to increase business the way that telecenter proponents do with computers. For a comprehensive overview of telecenter research, see Sey and Fellows (2009).
9
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Digital Green was modeled on another project we supported at Microsoft Research India called Digital StudyHall (n.d.).
10
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Gandhi et al. (2009).
11
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For an alternate description of Digital Green, see Bornstein (2014).
12
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Jack and Suri (2011), Mbiti and Weil (2011), and Morawczynski and Pickens (2009) all report that the frequency of urban-rural remittances is greater with M-PESA. Mbiti and Weil (2011) and Morawczynski and Pickens (2009) also suggest that the total amount of remittances is greater. Morawczynski’s (2011) PhD thesis looks at M-PESA’s rise and usage patterns in depth.
13
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It’s very tempting at this point to suggest that Partner X become the go-between between the Internet and Partner X’s constituents. Whatever pregnant mothers want to know, Partner X would look up online and relay to the mothers. But unless Partner X has health-care providers on its staff, this is naïve and dangerous. Would
you
go to a hospital where the staff members aren’t trained doctors and nurses, but people who look up articles on Wikipedia and study surgery on YouTube?
14
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This phenomenon is not rare. I’ve been to several places in both India and parts of East Africa where communities have had so many failed packaged interventions foisted upon them that they have grown cynical of outsiders coming in with yet another one. Some communities are outright hostile. Anyone committed to supporting these communities must undo the damage of earlier efforts first, before being able to meaningfully engage.
15
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In a study with its partner, Voluntary Association for Rural Reconstruction & Appropriate Technology, Digital Green was found to increase annual income by 68 percent, on average, from $144 a year to $242. Some households saw their incomes double.
16
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It’s also possible for technology projects to build the institutional capacity required from scratch. Grameen Foundation (2014), a nonprofit I advise that seeks technological innovations for global poverty, did exactly that in its Community Knowledge Worker (CKW) project in Uganda. It identified, recruited, trained, and empowered local villagers to serve as CKWs in their communities.
17
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Ramkumar (2008) includes a case study on social audits, including challenges of implementation, as written by a former MKSS member.
18
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Veeraraghavan (2013).
19
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“Vincent” is a pseudonym used here to protect the boy’s identity.
20
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Gamification is a hot trend among tech-minded social activists, but it turns out to be incredibly difficult to design games that people voluntarily play
that are also educational or productive. The essence of the problem is that it’s difficult to hit two birds with one stone. It’s very hard to design a compelling game, and it’s very hard to design a good educational app, so it’s extra hard to design a compelling educational game. Any given educational game is inevitably less compelling than the best fun-only games. Thus, the fun-only games tend to thrive and win out.
21
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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2014b), pp. 305, 382.
22
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International Math Olympiad (2014).
23
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OECD (2011), p. 230; OECD (2013b), p. 174. The “ninth-worst in educational disparity” statistic is based on gaps in PISA math scores between students in the top ninety-fifth percentile and the bottom fifth percentile in socioeconomic status.
24
.
Duncan (2012).
25
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I want to be clear that I’m not arguing against, say, programming classes for underprivileged teens. The important part of such programs, though, is that they apply quality resources preferentially for those with the least advantages –
not
that they involve technology. Thus, mass distribution of tablets is pointless, because it’s not quality education in itself. But afterschool arts programs for the children of poor families would be good, even if it doesn’t involve high-tech.
26
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Warschauer (2006).
27
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The OECD’s (2011) recommendations for the United States span twenty-eight pages and focus on culture, teacher capacity, administration, and spending policy (pp. 227–256). There isn’t a single word about computers or other technology, except to illustrate resource differences between rich and poor schools.
28
.
Bilton (2014).
29
.
Shirky (2014).
Chapter 7: A Different Kind of Upgrade
Human Development Before Technology Development
1
.
Ratan et al. (2009). Positive responses like this are partly genuine, but Dell et al. (2012) also find that recipients of packaged interventions are good at second-guessing what providers want to hear.
2
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There is an endless debate in the international development community about whether providing people with entertainment is worthwhile or not. See, for example, Arora and Rangaswamy (2014). Certainly, they increase momentary pleasure, and it could be argued that escape offers a palliative for an otherwise difficult life. And in any case, it seems wrong to prohibit or hinder entertainment. But it’s another thing to spend scarce resources for purposes whose long-term
contributions to well-being are fleeting, and that could simply be sedating people into accepting unacceptable conditions (entertainment is the opium of the masses?). At the very least, if entertainment is the primary goal of a packaged intervention, proponents should advertise the goal as such, not fall back on it as a last-resort benefit for otherwise unimpactful projects.
3
.
This was especially true in India, where the pay difference between menial work and even the least demanding office work can easily be a couple of zeroes.
4
.
Ratan et al. (2009).
5
.
Drexler et al. (2010).
6
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Banerjee et al. (2011).
7
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Mitra and Arora (2010).
8
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“Learned helplessness” is a psychological phenomenon first described by renowned psychologist Martin Seligman. Seligman and Steven Maier (1967) conducted experiments with dogs that showed that if dogs were inflicted with prolonged electric shocks that they couldn’t escape, many (though not all) stopped bothering to try to find ways to avoid the shock altogether. Notably, the learned helplessness persisted even after the dogs were offered an exit. Corresponding tendencies have been found in human beings, particularly with certain instances of depression (Seligman 1975).
Anthropologist Oscar Lewis (1961), who observed such traits in poor communities in Mexico, the United States, and elsewhere, believed they were social adaptations that were both a result and a cause of impoverished conditions. His notion of a “culture of poverty” was politically hijacked in America as a way to blame poor communities for their own plight, but Lewis meant it in a very different way. What he saw was that congenital poverty teaches lessons that are useful for survival, but not necessarily optimal for escape. So, for example, under conditions of extreme poverty, whatever effort a farmer puts in on the farm, other factors, such as pests, bad weather, or corrupt bureaucrats, might have more influence on his income. The circumstances don’t encourage personal initiative. Or, where there is an urgent demand to put a meal on the table today, it’s hard to learn the value of saving for the future. Or, if unjust authority figures are particularly ruthless, it might be safer to accept one’s situation than to expend one’s energy rocking the boat. The intention to help one’s future self can be snuffed out under extreme hardship. Lewis writes, “The subculture of poverty can be viewed as attempts at local solutions for problems not met by existing institutions,” and “the culture of poverty [has] a counter quality and a potential for being used in political movements aimed against the existing social order.” A good review of the issues occurs in Small et al. (2010), who also conclude that careful, sensitive study of culture’s role in poverty is merited.
9
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Singer (2011).
10
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Controversially, some differences between groups that are often explained as differences in culture or personality could be explained as different breadth of intention. For example, if superior intention correlates with concern for larger circles of life, then the radius of concern is one measure of intrinsic growth. Isn’t it wiser for a society to honor women’s rights as well as men’s rights? To seek the benefit of people in other groups or nations as well as one’s own? And even to be sensitive to animal suffering as well as to human suffering? As Jeremy Bentham (1789 [1907]) noted, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”
11
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Bourdieu (1979 [1984]). Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s discourse on cultural capital is part description and part political critique. His core claim is that various forms of social and cultural capital enforce class barriers, and that they are propagated by education and other social structures that have historical determinants. I borrow his ideas here without the social critique – middle-class cultural capital is important for anyone wanting a middle-class life. Bourdieu often rambles, so his interpreters have been helpful. See, for example, Grenfell (2008).
A similar argument is made by sociologist Annette Lareau (2011), who follows parenting styles in different households. What she finds are stark differences between working-class families and middle-class ones, leading to what she calls a “transmission of differential advantages”: Better-off families inculcate habits of the better off in their children; working-class families inculcate habits of the working class. Lareau cites Bourdieu and shares his social critique, but the problem is less that class advantages and disadvantages both propagate across generations (which has the positive benefit of ratcheting any gains that families make) as that we don’t have social systems in place to help the less-privileged children rise beyond their heritage.
Earlier drafts of this book contained a chapter on intergenerational transfer of intrinsic growth. I may make a version of it available at my website (
http://www.geekheresy.com
).
12
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Carol Dweck (2007) is a leading psychologist whose research shows the value of a “growth mindset” over a mindset that values traits that are hard to change. Her book’s back cover says that it’s something that “all great parents, teachers, CEOs, and athletes already know.” That is, those with discernment intuit this without the research. Mueller and Dweck (1998) show how child-rearing is better served by praising effort (thus leading to a growth mindset) than by praising ability.