Goering (62 page)
Authors: Roger Manvell
In testimony made by Goering during interrogation by a British investigator at Nuremberg (April 6, 1946), he claimed to have been responsible for the entire air war against Britain. The pause that followed the collapse of France was due, he said, partly to the need to reorganize and strengthen the Luftwaffe, and partly to uncertainty in his own mind whether the invasion of England or the conquest of the Mediterranean should come first. He also explained that the diversion of his bombing attacks from the strategic centers of the R.A.F. to London in order to fulfill Hitler's demand for retribution prevented him from destroying the principal defense in Britain against the invasion, namely the R.A.F. and the Navy, though he also admitted that the Germans were very short of shipping space. Both the Air Force and the Navy would have had to be crippled from the air before any landing could have been successful. He told Hitler that Britain's morale would never be broken by the raids on London; Bath was attacked, he said, because on one occasion he had mentioned to Hitler that government offices had been evacuated there from London. In reply to a direct question on the fact of the matter, he admitted with a broad grin that he never himself flew on any mission over Britain in wartime, and this was recently confirmed to the authors by Brauchitsch.
We are very grateful to Mr. Mc-Louis Jacketts, head of the Air Ministry Historical Branch, and to Mr. Denis Richards, co-author of R.A.F.,
1939â45,
the officially sponsored history of the R.A.F. during the Second World War, for supplying details of the above interrogation of Goering. Mr. Richards has also made for us the following assessment of Goering as Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe:
“That the Luftwaffe was beaten and broken long before the German land forces tasted defeat in the west was in no small measure the fault of its own corpulent chief. The swashbuckling, the bonhomie and the easy charm had served well enough in the years of the prewar buildup, and up to the point where the German military machine cut its all-too-easy way across the Low Countries and France. But as soon as the Channel was reached and a new and unrehearsed phase of the war opened up, his imperfections as commander became clear. At the very beginning of the Battle of Britain he called off, almost as soon as they had started, the German attacks on our coastal radar stationsâattacks which, had they been continued, might well have decided the whole issue. A few weeks later he threw away his second great chance. He abandoned his very successful onslaught against our fighter sector stations and turned instead to bombing London. This he did on direct orders from Hitler, and here we have one of the keys to his weakness as a commander: he presented to Hitler no considered or consistent plan either for the development or for the strategic employment of the German Air Force, but simply bowed to the Führer's erratic bidding. This he did even when he knew the Führer's bidding to be nonsense.
“Above all, although the Luftwaffe in 1940 possessed radio aids to night attack far beyond anything then in service with the R.A.F., Goering had given no serious thought to air operations outside the two spheres of direct military support and simple terrorization. He proved unable either to mount an effective strategic attack or to repel one. Typical of his limitations was his later mishandling of the Me 262âthe first jet aircraft to see service.
“Long before the end of the war, Goering's inadequacy as head of the Luftwaffe was almost notorious. He was receiving the fruits of German scientific invention, but failing to organize or employ them effectively. Unable to repel the Anglo-American attacks, he was also without means of mounting any comparable offensive of his own; at a time when the Allied bombing was becoming increasingly accurate and successful, the Luftwaffe could retaliate on the British homeland only with their vexatious but indiscriminate and, in the circumstances, ineffective V weapons. But by then the once brilliant figure of the Reich Marshal had long ceased to dominate any scene beyond the confines of his own Carinhall. Immured on his private estate remote from the storm centers, he had become more and more a cipherâa vehicle for the transmission of unsound orders from Hitler, and a figure increasingly ignored by his able subordinates who were actually fighting the war.”
There are a number of books which deal either wholly or partially with the Nazi despoilation of the art collections of Europe. The principal of these are
Salt Mines and Castles,
by Thomas C. Howe, and Rose Valland's
Le Front de l'art.
The matter was much discussed at the Nuremberg trial, and the principal documents connected with the Rosenberg Task Force are included in the documents published in connection with the trial. H.F., however, made special investigation in Germany, Holland and France, and received invaluable help from the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlog Documentatie in Amsterdam, where considerable material exists concerning Goering's art deals during the war, and from Dr. Bruno Lohse, Goering's art adviser and agent in Paris. He also met Andreas Hofer and Mlle. Valland. The well-known but still “classified” Report on Art Looting compiled for the Office of Strategic Services in 1945 also provided us with valuable information.
Gretl Afzelius (nee Thirring, sister of Professor Hans Thirring) told H.F. how proudly Goering would refer to the family castles. When she was first introduced to his Swedish relatives, Goering said airily of her, “She was brought up at one of our castles!”
Frau Emmy Goering told this story to H.F.
See Thomas C. Howe,
Salt Mines and Castles
, p. 210; also I.M.T., IX, p. 125.
The Art Looting Investigation Report, known as the Rousseau Document after Theodore Rousseau, one of the principal investigators along with Thomas C. Howe, reveals that Goering's art collection before the war only amounted to some 200 pictures.
See I.M.T., III, pp. 62â65; IV, p. 72; IX, p. 115. The principal Trial Documents involved are PS 136, 138, 141, 3042.
See I.M.T., III, pp. 69â71. Among the more famous collections stolen by Rosenberg in collaboration with the Vichy government were those of the Rothschild family and the Katz, Kahn, Weill, Seligmann and Schloss collections. These and many other collections were seized on the specious excuse that they might be smuggled out of France into Spain. Goering insisted that the French authorities should have first call on whatever they required for the Louvre, and the works sent to Germany were sometimes paid for, though at a very low valuation. The money earned this way was paid to the Vichy Commission for Jewish Affairs, never to the original owners.
Trial Document PS 1985. See also I.M.T., VII, p. 180.
Dr. Lohse told H.F. of the case of the eighty-year-old Jewish art expert Professor Friedlaender. He had left Germany for Holland, and after the occupation Goering did what he could to protect him. When eventually the Gestapo arrested him, Lohse flew to Berlin to intercede with Goering, who told him Hitler had forbidden him to act any further on behalf of deserving Jews. “You know how I admire the old man,” said Goering. “But I can't do a thing.” Then he grinned at Lohse. “But why don't you do something yourself? Use your initiative!” Lohse, without using Goering's name, bluffed the Gestapo into releasing Friedlaender, who survived the war, staying in Amsterdam. Shortly before his death he gave Lohse a signed photograph to commemorate his intervention.
Document in Rijksinstituut, Amsterdam.
Ibid.
Ibid
.
See Janet Flanner,
Men and Monuments,
p. 248. Also documents held at the Rijksinstituut, Amsterdam.
De Boer in conversation with H.F.
Goering paid nearly two million guilders for his bogus Vermeer, partly in cash and partly by exchanging against the price of the picture some thirty works whose combined valuation still fell short of the total for the “Vermeer.” The Vermeers themselves emerged in a carefully contrived atmosphere of secrecy; Hofer only managed to see the first of them with difficulty in case he might be wanting to acquire it for Goering. This was the
Christ in the House of Mary and Martha.
It had been brought to the dealer de Boer, nailed to the bottom of a wooden box, by its owner, who insisted on remaining anonymous. When Hofer did eventually see it, he accepted it as genuine, as did his wife, who was an expert cleaner and restorer of pictures, and he wrote to Goering on July 7, 1943, describing the picture as “the latest sensation” but advising against paying for it the enormous sum the anonymous owner demanded. De Boer, however, had heard there was a second “Vermeer” that had been discovered and he said that he would try to find it for Goering. But in September 1943 Alois Miedl, the German art dealer who had taken over the Goudstikker Gallery, telephoned Hofer from Amsterdam to report that he was coming to Berlin with a very important picture. This proved to
be the Christ and the Woman Taken in Adultery;
this was also nailed to the bottom of a wooden box and had an anonymous owner who was demanding two million guilders for the work. Goering managed to forestall an attempt to acquire this picture for Hitler, and after much bartering he finally agreed to pay in the manner described above the price of 1,650,-000 guilders. The anonymous owner was van Meegeren himself.
Held in the Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Potsdam.
Information provided by the Rijksinstituut, Amsterdam.
The giving and receiving of presents became part of the Renaissance ritual of Goering's life. He received far more than he gave, but he was not ungenerous in providing innumerable presents for his staff on such formal occasions as Christmas. Hundreds of presents were packed and sent out, and many more were given personally at the gatherings assembled at Carinhall to exchange good wishes with the Reich Marshal and his wife. Vanity as much as goodwill prompted these attentions; silver pencils, for example, would be given out, or even, as a special favor, a fine gun for a sportsman. But once Christmas was over, January would become the season for receiving gifts, and those who wanted to keep his favor sent him the expensive birthday presents which they had either discovered or been told that he wanted. Hundreds of presents arrived, some of great value, making each year substantial additions to Goering's collection of art. Examples were a Dutch river landscape by Salomon van Ruysdael given by Dr. Friedrich Frick, an industrialist, and valued at 80,000 marks; a sixteenth-century French tapestry given by Dr. Planck of Cologne and valued at 45,000 marks; a winter landscape by Jan van Goyen presented by Alois Miedl, an art dealer who had handled many works for Goering but gave him this painting, valued at 80,000 marks. A case which particularly angered Goebbels in the midst of his personal campaign for total war was the request for advice from the mayor of Berlin in January 1944 as to what the city should give Goering that year; in previous years, according to Semmler's record of Goebbels' angry comments, Goering's adjutant would telephone the city authorities early in the month and advise on the right present to buy for Goeringâperhaps a Vandyke costing 250,000 marks. Goebbels felt that 25,000 marks was more correct, but it is interesting to note that even he accepted the fact that the city should give Goering a present of some sort. The records in fact show that in 1942 the city gave Goering a painting by Tintoretto valued at 220,000 marks, but that in 1944 the authorities took Goebbels' advice and gave him a painting of the school of Antonio Moro valued at only 25,000 marks.
Gisela Limberger told H.F. that Goering once took her to Paris so that she could see for herself the origin of the works that caused her so much labor.
See Janet Flanner,
Men and Monuments,
p. 243.
According to Louis P. Lochner (
The Goebbels Diaries,
p. 197) the Americans found some 25,000 bottles of champagne in Goering's Alpine chalet.
In addition to the principal sources, information for this chapter was taken from Professor Trevor-Roper's
The Last Days of Hitler; Karl Koller's Der Letzte Monat;
Asher Lee's
The German Air Force
; Adolf Galland's
The First and the Last; Milton Shulman's Defeat in the West; The Goebbels Diaries; and Felix Gilbert's Hitler Directs His War
. Of exceptional value have been the personal recollections of Bernd von Brauchitsch, who accompanied Goering south after he parted from Hitler. Of importance also are the accounts given us by Frau Goering, Karl Bodenschatz, Adolf Galland, Erhard Milch and Robert Kropp.
See Gilbert,
Hitler Directs His War,
pp. 40, 44.
See Frischauer,
Goering,
pp. 246â47. The authority of Kropp and Koller is given for the statement that Goering was deeply depressed at this time and resorting to drugs. Frischauer's authority for the conversation between Goering and Jeschonnek before the suicide is given as “a close friend.”
Schellenberg,
op
.
cit.,
p. 301.
See Chapter 6, note 27, and Semmler,
Goebbels,
p. 97.
See I.M.T., XVII, p. 58.
The initial fault for this incident in fact lay with Messerschmitt himself, who had responded to what he thought was an idle question by Hitler as to whether this new plane could carry a bomb. Messerschmitt without sufficient thought had said, “Yes, my Führer,” whereupon Hitler affirmed that the plane was to be regarded primarily as a bomber. Goering was at first as upset by this decision as the others in the Luftwaffe, but he lacked the authority to assert this point of view with Hitler, who, tired of advice that went against his wishes, forbade anyone to mention the subject again in his presence. This decision shortened the war by a considerable period.
See Butler and Young,
Marshal without Glory
, pp. 233â34.
Milch in conversation with H.F.
See Galland,
op. cit.,
p. 262. The previous month Goering had recommended the increased allocation of prisoners of war to the armament works. See I.M.T., VIII, p. 287.
See I.M.T., IX, pp. 144â45 and 283
et seq.
See Reitlinger, SS, p. 334 and note.
Fifteen trucks took Goering's property from Rominten in October when it was threatened by the Russian advance. See Frischauer,
Goering,
p. 255.
See Shulman,
op. cit.
, p. 259. Goering's statement was made during interrogation.
See Gilbert,
Hitler Directs His War,
p. 111
et seq.
Accounts of the evacuation of Carinhall were given H.F. by Frau Emmy Goering, Bernd von Brauchitsch and Willy Schade. Brauchitsch last saw Carinhall on April 19. Rose Valland told H.F. that she went to Carinhall later, as soon as she could gain entry to Germany. She found the place in ruins, including the mausoleum. Here she found a skull among the rubble. It could only have been Carin's. “I dropped it and, being a Christian, offered a prayer to
le bon Dieu!”
she said.
See
The Bormann Letters,
pp. 112, 131, 146â47, 191. The remark made by Bormann to Lammers, which follows, is quoted by Trevor-Roper in
The Last Days of Hitler,
p. 100.
See Boldt,
In the Shelter with Hitler,
p. 27.
Galland in conversation with H.F.
Brauchitsch remembers well the lengthy discussion over the text of this message to Hitler. Goering was deeply worried. The final sentence was drafted by Goering himself to make the message seem more human and voice concern for Hitler, but its exact meaning was never very clear.
See Trevor-Roper,
The Last Days of Hitler,
p. 151
et seq.
Also I.M.T., XVII, p. 57, and Frischauer,
Goering,
p. 265.
See Shirer,
End of a Berlin Diary
, p. 158, and
The Last Days of Hitler,
p. 164.
The famous raid on Berchtesgaden by the R.A.F. occurred at about 9 A.M. Hitler's Berghof was destroyed. The S.S. barracks were severely damaged. A bomb fell close to Goering's chalet, and a section of the structure caved in. The air-raid shelter could not contain everyone who crowded into it, and captors and captives (all suffering from various degrees of shock) moved into the safer
Stollen,
or mine shaft, in the mountain. Bernd von Brauchitsch has vivid memories of this period.
Brauchitsch told H.F. that everything was disorganized at this time and the morale of the S.S. guards was low. According to Kropp, Goering, together with his family and members of his staff, was taken to Mauterndorf three days after the air raid, traveling in a convoy of cars overnight. Kropp writes: “We could move around freely in Mauterndorf castle as well as in the courtyard. Goering treated the two commanding S.S. officers as if they were his guests; they attended his dinner table even though their orders were to shoot Goering, his family and his entire entourage as soon as Berlin fell into enemy hands. In Mauterndorf Goering was certainly not short of codein pills. He could take as many as he wishcd.”
See Shulman,
op. cit.
, p. 296.
See Butler and Young,
op. cit.,
p. 259.
Brauchitsch was present at this lunch, which he reports to have been a good meal suitable for an officers' mess. The atmosphere was not without a certain excitement and relief after the long journeys they had all undertaken in bad road conditions. From the point of view of the Americans, to have captured Goering was a notable triumph. From Goering's point of view the meeting seemed the first step toward a new phase of prestige, since he would negotiate an honorable surrender. The lunch therefore had something of the air of a celebration in beautiful surroundings in the spring.
Goering was in Augsburg nearly a fortnight. Apart from interrogations, he and his companions had nothing to do but think, and the inactivity depressed Goering, who brooded in his room. The Americans undertook to protect his family. Brauchitsch recalls sharing with Kropp the task of destroying part of the enormous quantity of paracodeine tablets that Goering had brought with him. They flushed large numbers down the lavatory pan, since it did not seem right for the Americans to discover him in possession of so many thousands of these pills. Nevertheless, Goering retained a substantial reserve in his toilet case.
