Authors: Lilly Ledbetter
Grace and Grit (33 page)
We can’t afford more of the same votes that deny women their equal rights. Barack Obama is on our side. He is fighting to fix this terrible ruling, and as president, he has promised to appoint justices who will enforce laws that protect everyday people like me. But this isn’t a Democratic or a Republican issue. It’s a fairness issue. And fortunately, there are some Republicans—and a lot of Democrats—who are on our side.
My case is over. I will never receive the pay I deserve. But there will be a far richer reward if we secure fair pay. For our children and grandchildren, so that no one will ever again experience the discrimination that I did. Equal pay for equal work is a fundamental American principle. We need leaders in this country who will fight for it. With all of us working together, we can have the change we need and the opportunity we all deserve.
BENCH ANNOUNCEMENTLedbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 05-1074
Tuesday, May 29, 2007
F
OUR MEMBERS
of this Court, Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and I, dissent from today’s decision. In our view, the Court does not comprehend, or is indifferent to, the insidious way in which women can be victims of pay discrimination. Today’s decision counsels: Sue early on, when it is uncertain whether discrimination accounts for the pay disparity you are beginning to experience. Indeed, initially you may not know that men are receiving more for substantially similar work. (Of course, you are likely to lose such a less-than-fully baked case.) If you sue only when the pay disparity becomes steady and large enough to enable you to mount a winnable case, you will be cut off at the court’s threshold for suing too late. That situation cannot be what Congress intended when, in Title VII, it outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in our Nation’s workplaces.
Lilly Ledbetter, the plaintiff in this case, was engaged as an area manager at a Goodyear Tire and Rubber plant in Alabama in 1979. Her starting salary was in line with the salaries of men performing similar work. But over time, her pay slipped in comparison to the pay of male employees with equal or less seniority. By the end of 1997, Ledbetter was the only woman left working as an area manager and the pay discrepancy between Ledbetter and her 15 male counterparts was stark: Ledbetter’s pay was
15 to 40 percent less
than every other area manager.
Ledbetter complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in March 1998. She charged that, in violation of Title VII, Goodyear paid her a discriminatorily low salary because of her sex. The charge was eventually brought to court and tried to a jury. The jury found it “more likely than not that [Goodyear] paid [Ledbetter] a[n] unequal salary because of her sex.” The Court today nullifies that verdict, holding that Ledbetter’s claim is time barred.
Title VII provides that a charge of discrimination “shall be filed within [180] days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” Ledbetter charged, and proved at trial, that the paychecks she received within the 180-day filing period were substantially lower than the paychecks received by men doing the same work. Further, she introduced substantial evidence showing that discrimination accounted for the pay differential, indeed, that discrimination against women as supervisors was pervasive at Goodyear’s plant. That evidence was unavailing, the Court holds, because it was incumbent on Ledbetter to file charges of discrimination year-by-year, each time Goodyear failed to increase her salary commensurate with the salaries of her male peers. Any annual pay decision not contested promptly (within 180 days), the Court affirms, becomes grandfathered, beyond the province of Title VII ever to repair.
Title VII was meant to govern real-world employment practices, and that world is what the Court today ignores. Pay disparities often occur, as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in small increments; only over time is there strong cause to suspect that discrimination is at work. Comparative pay information is not routinely communicated to employees. Instead, it is often hidden from the employee’s view. Small initial discrepancies, even if the employee knows they exist, may not be seen as grounds for a federal case. An employee like Ledbetter, trying to succeed in a male-dominated workplace, in a job filled only by men before she was hired, understandably may be anxious to avoid making waves.
Pay discrimination that recurs and swells in impact, is significantly different from discrete adverse actions promptly communicated and “easy to identify” as discriminatory. Events in that category include firing, denial of a promotion, or refusal to hire. In contrast to those unambiguous actions, until a pay disparity becomes apparent and sizable, an employee is unlikely to comprehend her plight and, therefore, to complain about it. Ledbetter’s initial readiness to give her employer the benefit of the doubt should not preclude her from later seeking redress for the continuing payment to her of a salary depressed because of her sex.
Yet, as the Court reads Title VII, each and every pay decision Ledbetter did not promptly challenge wiped the slate clean. Nevermind the cumulative effect of a series of decisions that, together, set her pay well below that of every male area manager. Knowingly carrying past pay discrimination forward must be treated as lawful. Ledbetter may not be compensated under Title VII for the lower pay she was in fact receiving when she complained to the EEOC. Notably, the same denial of relief would occur had Ledbetter encountered pay discrimination based on race, religion, age, national origin, or disability.
This is not the first time the Court has ordered a cramped interpretation of Title VII, incompatible with the statute’s broad remedial purpose. In 1991, Congress passed a Civil Rights Act that effectively overruled several of this Court’s similarly restrictive decisions. Today, the ball again lies in Congress’ court. As in 1991, the Legislature has cause to note and correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S SPEECH upon the signing of THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY RESTORATION ACT, January 29, 2009
I
T IS
fitting that with the very first bill I sign—the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Restoration Act—we are upholding one of this nation’s first principles: that we are all created equal and each deserve a chance to pursue our own version of happiness.
It is also fitting that we are joined today by the woman after whom this bill is named—someone Michelle and I have had the privilege of getting to know for ourselves. Lilly Ledbetter did not set out to be a trailblazer or a household name. She was just a good hard worker who did her job—and did it well—for nearly two decades before discovering that, for years, she was paid less than her male colleagues for the very same work. Over the course of her
career, she lost more than $200,000 in salary, and even more in pension and Social Security benefits—losses she still feels today.
Now, Lilly could have accepted her lot and moved on. She could have decided that it wasn’t worth the hassle and the harassment that would inevitably come with speaking up for what she deserved. But instead, she decided that there was a principle at stake, something worth fighting for. So she set out on a journey that would take more than ten years, take her all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States, and lead to this day and this bill which will help others get the justice she was denied.
Because while this bill bears her name, Lilly knows this story isn’t just about her. It’s the story of women across this country still earning just seventy-eight cents for every dollar men earn—women of color even less—which means that today, in the year 2009, countless women are still losing thousands of dollars in salary, income and retirement savings over the course of a lifetime.
But equal pay is by no means just a women’s issue—it’s a family issue. It’s about parents who find themselves with less money for tuition and child care; couples who wind up with less to retire on; households where, when one breadwinner is paid less than she deserves, that’s the difference between affording the mortgage—or not; between keeping the heat on, or paying the doctor’s bills—or not. And in this economy, when so many folks are already working harder for less and struggling to get by, the last thing they can afford is losing part of each month’s paycheck to simple and plain discrimination.
So signing this bill today is to send a clear message: that making our economy work means making sure it works for everybody. That there are no second-class citizens in our workplaces, and that it’s not just unfair and illegal—it’s bad for business—to pay somebody less because of their gender, or their age, or their race, or their ethnicity, religion, or disability. And that justice isn’t about
some abstract legal theory, or footnote in a casebook—it’s about how our laws affect the daily realities of people: their ability to make a living and care for their families and achieve their goals.
Ultimately, equal pay isn’t just an economic issue for millions of Americans and their families, it’s a question of who we are—and whether we’re truly living up to our fundamental ideals. Whether we’ll do our part, as generations before us, to ensure those words put on paper some two hundred years ago really mean something—to breathe new life into them with the more enlightened understanding that is appropriate for our time.
That is what Lilly Ledbetter challenged us to do. And today, I sign this bill not just in her honor, but in honor of those who came before her. Women like my grandmother, who worked in a bank all her life, and even after she hit that glass ceiling, kept getting up and giving her best every day, without complaint, because she wanted something better for me and my sister.
And I sign this bill for my daughters, and all those who will come after us, because I want them to grow up in a nation that values their contributions, where there are no limits to their dreams and they have opportunities their mothers and grandmothers never could have imagined.
In the end, that’s why Lilly stayed the course. She knew it was too late for her—that this bill wouldn’t undo the years of injustice she faced or restore the earnings she was denied. But this grandmother from Alabama kept on fighting, because she was thinking about the next generation. It’s what we’ve always done in America—set our sights high for ourselves, but even higher for our children and our grandchildren.
And now it’s up to us to continue this work. This bill is an important step—a simple fix to ensure fundamental fairness for American workers—and I want to thank this remarkable and bipartisan group of legislators who worked so hard to get it passed.
And I want to thank all the advocates who are in the audience who worked so hard to get it passed. And this is only the beginning. I know that if we stay focused, as Lilly did—and keep standing for what’s right, as Lilly did—we will close that pay gap and we will make sure that our daughters have the same rights, the same chances, and the same freedom to pursue their dreams as our sons.
THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY RESTORATION ACTPublic Law 111-2
111th Congress
1st Session
An Act
To amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and to modify the operation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, to clarify that a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful under such Acts occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled
,
.
This Act may be cited as the “Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009”.
.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), significantly impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that Congress established and that have been bedrock principles of American law for decades. The Ledbetter decision undermines those statutory protections by unduly restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress.
(2) The limitation imposed by the Court on the filing of discriminatory compensation claims ignores the reality of wage discrimination
and is at odds with the robust application of the civil rights laws that Congress intended.
(3) With regard to any charge of discrimination under any law, nothing in this Act is intended to preclude or limit an aggrieved person’s right to introduce evidence of an unlawful employment practice that has occurred outside the time for filing a charge of discrimination.
(4) Nothing in this Act is intended to change current law treatment of when pension distributions are considered paid.
.
Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
“(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.
“(B) In addition to any relief authorized by section 1977A of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981a), liability may accrue and an aggrieved person may obtain relief as provided in subsection (g)(1), including recovery of back pay for up to two years preceding the filing of the charge, where the unlawful employment practices that have occurred during the charge filing period are similar or related to unlawful employment practices with regard to discrimination in compensation that occurred outside the time for filing a charge.”.
.
Section 7(d) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626(d)) is amended—
(1) in the first sentence—
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; and
(B) by striking “(d)” and inserting “(d)(1)”;
(2) in the third sentence, by striking “Upon” and inserting the following:
“(2) Upon”; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
“(3) For purposes of this section, an unlawful practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this Act, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when a person becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when a person is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.”.
.
(a) A
MERICANS
W
ITH
D
ISABILITIES
A
CT OF
1990.—The amendments made by section 3 shall apply to claims of discrimination in compensation brought under title I and section 503 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 1211 et seq., 12203), pursuant to section 107(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 12117(a)), which adopts the powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5).
(b) R
EHABILITATION
A
CT OF
1973.—The amendments made by section 3 shall apply to claims of discrimination in compensation brought under sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791, 794), pursuant to—
(1) sections 501(g) and 504(d) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 791(g), 794(d)), respectively, which adopt the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 for determining whether a violation has occurred in a complaint alleging employment discrimination; and
(2) paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 505(a) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 794a(a)) (as amended by subsection (c)).
(c) Conforming Amendments.—
(1) R
EHABILITATION
A
CT OF
1973.—Section 505(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794a(a)) is amended—
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting after “(42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (f) through (k))” the following: “(and the application of section
706(e)(3) (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(3)) to claims of discrimination in compensation)”; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting after “1964” the following: “(42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) (and in subsection (e)(3) of section 706 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5), applied to claims of discrimination in compensation)”.
(2) C
IVIL
R
IGHTS
A
CT OF
1964—Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) is amended by adding at the end the following:
“(f) Section 706(e)(3) shall apply to complaints of discrimination in compensation under this section.”.
(3) A
GE
D
ISCRIMINATION IN
E
MPLOYMENT
A
CT OF
1967.—Section 15(f) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a(f)) is amended by striking “of section” and inserting “of sections 7(d)(3) and”.
.
This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, take effect as if enacted on May 28, 2007 and apply to all claims of discrimination in compensation under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 621 et seq.), title I and section 503 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that are pending on or after that date.
Approved January 29, 2009
.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
—S
. 181 (H.R. 11):
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
, Vol. 155 (2009):
Jan. 15, 21, 22, considered and passed Senate.
Jan. 27, considered and passed House.
DAILY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS
(2009):
Jan. 29, Presidential remarks.
Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office,
DOCID: f:pub1002.111, p. 123 STAT. 5.
