Grunts (81 page)

5
FMFPAC, Operations Report, February 1967, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Annette Amerman; Corson, “Combined Action Program in Vietnam,” Reference Branch Files; Gunnery Sergeant John Brockaway, oral history, #638; First Lieutenant Thomas Eagan, oral history, #707; Staff Sergeant Edward Evans, interview with Corporal Joseph Trainer and other CAP members at Thuy Phu village, #2341; Brown, oral history, #1603, all at USMCHMD; Klyman, “An Alternative Not Taken”; Major Gary Telfer, Lieutenant Colonel Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming, Jr.,
U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1984), pp. 188-92; Peterson,
Combined Action Platoons
, pp. 44-45; Hemingway,
Our War Was Different
, pp. 99, 120.

6
Brockaway, oral history, Thuy Phu village interview, USMCHMD; Jim Donovan, interview with the author, July 3, 2008; Hemingway,
Our War Was Different
, p. 99; Flynn,
Voice of Hope
, p. 54; Goodson,
CAP Mot
, p. 53.

7
“The Marine Combined Action Program,” National Archives; Corson, “Combined Action Program, Vietnam,” Reference Branch Files; Thuy Phu village interview, both at USMCHMD; Klyman, “An Alternative Not Taken”; Sherman, “One Man’s CAP,” pp. 60-61; Donovan interview; Peterson,
Combined Action Platoons
, pp. 44-50. Nearly every report and every study on the program speaks of the language gap as a serious, protracted issue. This point is so beyond dispute that I saw little need to cite them all.

8
Lieutenant General Victor Krulak to Lieutenant General Lew Walt, December 2, 1966, enclosure, comments from the troops, Box 1, Folder 15, Victor H. Krulak Papers, GRC; Eagan, oral history, USMCHMD; Captain Nick Grosz, oral history, Vietnam Company Command Oral History, Box 16, Folder 1, United States Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle, PA (Grosz commanded a combined action company); Klyman, “An Alternative Not Taken”; Lieutenant Commander Lawrence Metcalf, “Corpsman Numbah One Bac Si!”
Marine Corps Gazette
, July 1970, pp. 12-13; Lawrence Metcalf, “The CAP Corpsman,”
U.S. Navy Medicine
, December 1970, pp. 8-9; Sherman, “One Man’s CAP,” p. 60; Hemingway,
Our War Was Different
, pp. 122-35; Peterson,
The Combined Action Platoons
, pp. 116-18. Most scholars agree that the MEDCAPs were the most successful aspect of civic action. Too much of the other American civic action efforts amounted to giveaways that engendered suspicion among the Vietnamese and did little to further the goal of pacification. The Vietnamese did value and appreciate the medical treatment, though. Lieutenant Eck put this best when he remarked: “When you give people material things, you don’t give them much. When you give them yourself, that’s something.” The CAP corpsmen gave generously of themselves.

9
“The Marine Combined Action Program,” National Archives; Corson, “Combined Action Program, Vietnam,” Reference Branch Files, USMCHMD; III Marine Amphibious Force, Presidential Unit Citation Recommendation, 1968, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Annette Amerman; Klyman, “An Alternative Not Taken”; Corson,
The Betrayal
, pp. 183-84; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming,
U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967
, pp. 187-91. The best single source on the daily patrols, firefights, and general war of wits between the CAPs and the VC is Bing West,
The Village
(New York: Pocket Books, 2000). The book covers the activities of one CAP in Binh Nghia over the course of several years. As a young officer, West was a participant as well as an observer/chronicler of the team’s actions. Despite being overrun twice, the Binh Nghia CAP succeeded in forging strong ties of kinship with the villagers. Because West’s fine book has been so heavily utilized by other CAP historians, I have chosen to rely upon other, lesser-known sources.

10
Eagan, oral history, USMCHMD; Edward Palm, “Tiger Papa Three: The Fire Next Time, Part Two,”
Marine Corps Gazette
, February 1988, pp. 67-73; Palm, “Tiger Papa Three, Part One”; Donovan interview; Hemingway,
Our War Was Different
, pp. 35-37; Goodson,
CAP Mot
, pp. 222-31, 84-88.

11
FMFPAC, AAR, April 1967; 1st Combined Action Group, AAR, February 1969; III Marine Amphibious Force citation recommendation, all copies in author’s possession, courtesy of Annette Amerman; Corson, “Combined Action Program, Vietnam,” Reference Branch Files; “Interview with survivors of CAP 6, 3rd CAG,” oral history, #3222, both at USMCHMD; Jack Shulimson, Lieutenant Colonel Leonard Blasiol, Charles Smith, and Captain David Dawson,
U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1997), pp. 620-22; Flynn,
A Voice of Hope
, pp. 68-73; Hemingway,
Our War Was Different
, pp. 59-60, 86-92; Peterson,
The Combined Action Platoons
, pp. 56-59; Goodson,
CAP Mot
, pp. 91-107.

12
Donovan, “Combined Action Program,” pp. 31-32; Charles Smith,
U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1988), pp. 291-94; Cosmas and Murray,
Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970-1971
, pp. 144-47; Hemingway,
Our War Was Different
, pp. 95-96, 166-69; Goodson,
CAP Mot
, p. 29; Peterson,
The Combined Action Platoons
, pp. 60-62.

13
“The Marine Combined Action Program,” National Archives; FMFPAC Monthly Operations Reports and Command Chronologies, 1965-1967 (these reports are of such questionable veracity that they are still known as “Krulak’s Fables”); III Marine Amphibious Force, Command Chronologies, 1965-1966, all copies in author’s possession, courtesy of Annette Amerman; Major R. D. King, “Future of Combined Action,” October 12, 1970; Corson, “Combined Action Program, Vietnam,” both in Reference Branch Files, USMCHMD; T. P. Schwartz, “The Combined Action Program: A Different Perspective,”
Marine Corps Gazette
, February 1999, pp. 64-68; Palm, “Tiger Papa Three: The Fire Next Time,” p. 76; Sherman, “One Man’s CAP,” p. 62; Donovan, “Combined Action Program,” pp. 31-32; Kopets, “The Combined Action Program,” pp. 8-9; Donovan interview; Klyman, “An Alternative Not Taken”; James Trullinger,
Village at War: An Account of Revolution in Vietnam
(New York: Longman, 1980), pp. 115-32; Westmoreland,
A Soldier Reports
, p. 166; Cosmas and Murray,
Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970-1971
, pp. 148-49; Walt,
Strange War, Strange Strategy
, p. 105; Hemingway,
Our War Was Different
, pp. 56, 83, 177-78; Peterson,
The Combined Action Platoons
, pp. 86-94. The North Vietnamese Army official history,
Victory in Vietnam
, is completely silent on the combined action platoons. Given the propagandistic tone that is prevalent in much of the work, perhaps this absence of commentary on the CAPs is a veiled recognition that they had some success.

Chapter 7

1
4th Infantry Division, “Battle of Dak To,” After Action Report (AAR), Record Group (RG) 472, Records of the 29th Military History Detachment, Box 200, Folder 2; General William Westmoreland, National Press Club Press Conference, November 21, 1967, RG 319, Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Box 32, Folder 4; General William Westmoreland message to Admiral Ulysses Grant Sharp, November 22, 1967, RG 319, Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Box 32, Folder 5; General William Westmoreland to Admiral Sharp, December 10, 1967, Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Box 33, Folder 1, all at National Archives, College Park, MD; William Westmoreland,
A Soldier Reports
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), pp. 236-38; Victor Krulak,
First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), p. 201; Ted Arthurs, command sergeant major of the 4th Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry, claims in
Land with No Sun: A Year in Vietnam with the 173rd Airborne
(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2006) that the soldiers of his unit coined that unhappy moniker for Dak To; Robert Barr Smith, “A Lousy Place to Fight a War,”
Vietnam
, October 2005, pp. 28-30; Dale Andrade, “Why Westmoreland Was Right,”
Vietnam
, April 2009, offers a spirited defense of the general and his attrition strategy. The official People’s Army of Vietnam (NVA) history,
Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), hardly mentions the 1967 Dak To battle. Some historians believe that the NVA lured the Americans to Dak To so that they would not be in place to oppose the massive Tet Offensive of 1968, which mainly focused on populated areas. The NVA history does not specifically confirm this, though.

2
4th Infantry Division, AAR; 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, December 9, 1967, AAR, Box 200, Folder 5; 5th Special Forces Group, November 6-December 3, 1967, AAR, Box 200, Folder 6; 173rd Airborne Brigade, “The Battle of Dak To,” AAR, Box 200, Folder 3, all in RG 472, Records of the 29th Military History Detachment; General William Peers, briefing to MAC-V commander’s conference, December 3, 1967, RG 319, Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Box 33, Folder 1, this and all previous sources at National Archives; William Peers, oral history, Box 1, Folder 1, William R. Peers Papers, United States Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle, PA; Barr, “A Lousy Place to Fight a War,” p. 28; Shelby Stanton,
The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973
(New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), pp. 136-38, 166-69; Edward Murphy,
Dak To: America’s Sky Soldiers in South Vietnam’s Central Highlands
(New York: Ballantine Books, 2007), pp. 56-81, 133-34;
Victory in Vietnam
, p. 212.

3
4th Infantry Division, AAR; 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, AAR; Major John Ramsay, G3 Air, AAR, Box 200, Folder 6; 4th Infantry Division, Artillery, AAR, Box 200, Folder 3; General Order #404, PFC Clinton Bacon, Army Commendation Medal Citation; General Order #361, Spec-4 Cecil Millspaugh, Bronze Star Medal Citation, Box 205, Folder 6, all in RG 472, Records of the 29th Military History Detachment; 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Presidential Unit Citation (PUC), RG 472, U.S. Army Vietnam, Adjutant General, Awards Branch, Box 9, Folder 4, this and all previous sources at National Archives; Bill Vigil, interview with the author, April 7, 2008; Steve Edmunds, unpublished memoir, pp. 1-2, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Edmunds;
www.ivydragoons.org
Web site.

4
4th Infantry Division, AAR; 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, AAR; General Order #4563, PFC Nathaniel Thompson, Bronze Star with “V” for Valor Medal Citation; General Order #4561, PFC William Muir, Bronze Star with “V” for Valor Medal Citation; General Order #320, Spec-4 John Kind, Bronze Star with “V” for Valor Medal Citation; General Order #94, PFC John Trahan, Bronze Star with “V” for Valor Medal Citation, all citations in RG 472, Box 205, Folder 6, Records of the 29th Military History Detachment; 1st Brigade, 4th Division, PUC, RG 472, U.S. Army Vietnam, Adjutant General, Awards Branch, Box 9, Folder 4, this and all previous sources at National Archives; Bob Walkowiak, e-mail to the author, March 25, 2008; Robert Babcock, ed.,
War Stories: Utah Beach to Pleiku
(Marietta, GA: Deeds Publishing, 2001), pp. 566-71.

5
4th Infantry Division, AAR; 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, AAR; G3 Air, AAR; 4th Infantry Division, Artillery, AAR; 4th Aviation Battalion, Box 200, Folder 3; 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, AAR, Box 200, Folder 3; 4th Infantry Division, Outline and Statistical Summary, Dak To Operation, Box 200, Folder 4; General Order #4502, Captain John Falcone, Silver Star Medal Citation; General Order #370, Lieutenant William Gauff, Bronze Star with “V” for Valor Medal Citation; General Order #4285, Staff Sergeant Raymond Ortiz, Silver Star Medal Citation; General Order #1187, Captain John Mirus, Silver Star Medal Citation; General Order #148, Spec-4 Stephen Edmunds, Bronze Star with “V” for Valor Medal Citation, Box 205, Folder 6, all in RG 472, Records of the 29th Military History Detachment; 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, PUC, all at National Archives; Walkowiak e-mail; Steve Edmunds, unpublished memoir, pp. 1-3; Larry Skogler, interview with the author, April 18, 2008; Babcock,
War Stories
, pp. 571-77;
www.ivydragoons.org
;
www.virtualwall.org
, John Falcone entry. Lieutenant Colonel Belknap was killed in a helicopter accident a couple weeks after the Battle of Hill 724. Several Ivy Dragoons told me that the crash destroyed many of the battle records, making 724 somewhat anonymous in the history of the Dak To campaign. I hope that my account has redressed that anonymity somewhat.

6
173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR, RG 472, Records of the 29th Military History Detachment, Box 200, Folder 3; 173rd Airborne Brigade, Presidential Unit Citation, Dak To, RG 472, Adjutant General Award’s Branch, Box 5, Folder 9; 1st Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, Operation MacArthur, AAR, RG 472, Box 1101, Folder 1, all at National Archives; Thomas McElwain, interview with the author, March 2, 2008; Ken Lambertson, interview with the author, April 9, 2008; David Watson, interview with the author, January 25, 2008; Terrence Maitland and Peter McInerney,
The Vietnam Experience: A Contagion of War
(Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 170-71; Arthurs,
Land with No Sun
, p. 159; Murphy,
Dak To
, pp. 56-81, 174-84. Every Task Force Black veteran with whom I spoke was effusive in their praise for McElwain.