Hannibal (31 page)

With this double blow, so brilliantly if somewhat treacherously executed, Scipio had destroyed the combined forces of the Carthaginian army. Hasdrubal Gisgo and Syphax themselves managed to escape, with only a few thousand men between them. Hasdrubal as commanding general had been guilty of grave negligence in allowing himself to be lulled into a sense of security. His experiences fighting against Scipio in Spain should have alerted him to the fact that the Roman was both a great strategist and a devious and hard-hitting commander in the field. He now followed up his night attack, pursuing Hasdrubal Gisgo and the remnants of his army, driving him out of a town where he had taken refuge and sacking several local settlements. There was fear and confusion in Carthage but, despite the urgings of the peace party, the resolution was taken to fight on. Carthage’s immense wealth was used to give Hasdrubal and Syphax the money to set about forming another army. The arrival of four thousand Celtiberians, recruited from Spain, produced a fighting core for the new force, and within a short space of time Hasdrubal and Syphax had raised an army of some 30,000 men which they assembled in an area known as the Great Plains on the Bagradas river. Scipio wasted no time and, leaving a token siege force around Utica, marched rapidly after the enemy. When he caught up with them he destroyed this second army in a masterly set piece battle. Once again Hasdrubal and Syphax escaped in the general rout, the first to Carthage and the other to Cirta.

Scipio, even more than Hannibal, never relaxed after a success but followed up his advantage. He now moved against a number of North African towns, some of whom came over to him out of fear, and others because of old grudges against Carthage. Next Scipio began the siege of Utica—this time in earnest—with half his army, sending the other half under Laelius and Masinissa along the North African coast into Numidia. Masinissa was eager to try conclusions again with his enemy Syphax, both for the sake of Sophonisba and to recapture Cirta which, although now the capital of Syphax, had once belonged to Masinissa’s father. In a hard fought battle he and his cavalry and the enduring Roman legionaries not only routed Syphax’s army but captured him alive. Masinissa’s triumph was complete, for not only did he regain Cirta but, exercising a truly North African sense of revenge, he also took his enemy’s wife Sophonisba for his own. Scipio was later to reprimand him for this, since Syphax and his wife were both the prisoners of Rome, and to Rome they must go. Sophonisba, rather than be held captive to adorn a Roman triumph, took poison. The story of this young Carthaginian noblewoman, enmeshed in war and politics, is a curious and moving one. Bearing some resemblance to the stories of Dido and Cleopatra, it is yet another North African tragedy.

These successive disasters in the spring and early summer of 203 had thoroughly alarmed everyone in Carthage. The same Hanno who had commanded Hannibal’s heavy cavalry at Cannae was put in charge of all defence, and Carthaginian envoys were sent to Rome to try to negotiate terms of peace. As a last blow to Carthaginian fortunes, an attempt to relieve Utica failed. All these disasters coming on the heels of one another now prompted a clamour at every level, from the council on the Byrsa to the homes, workshops and warehouses of the city—‘Recall Hannibal!’ Unfortunately, as events were to show, they had left it a year too late.

Despite the naval superiority of Rome, three Carthaginian fleets managed to cross the Mediterranean between Italy and North Africa during that year. One carried the dying Mago back from the Ligurian coast with his mixed force of Balearic troops, Ligurians and Gauls; the second was sent up from Carthage to evacuate Hannibal; and the third was this same one, enlarged by such ships as Hannibal had in Croton, bringing him back to defend Carthage in her hour of need. The sea is wide, and in the days of primitive communications it was hardly possible for the Romans to keep an eye on all the shipping routes. Centuries later, even Nelson, who was consciously looking for Napoleon’s fleet, failed to sight him as he sailed triumphantly towards Egypt.

Hannibal’s fleet was clearly inadequate for his needs, and the army which he finally brought back with him to Africa probably numbered no more than 15,000 men (estimates range between 12,000 and 24,000). The Army of Italy was a strange composite. There can have been few if any of the veterans who had crossed the Alps with him some fifteen years before. The Bruttians, Gauls, and Roman deserters who now made up the large part of his troops were clearly not of the same quality, but they still willingly followed the same man, their one-eyed Carthaginian general. That he was short of transports is evident from the fact that he could not take back the horses which had helped him to so many of his victories and which he would sadly need the following year. All had to be killed so as not to leave them for the Romans.

In the autumn of 203 Hannibal looked his last on the small port of Croton and, beyond the old city, saw the rugged heights of the Sila range, dense with trees, a wild wolf landscape. For the last few years he had had to make this area his home, but once he had ranged all Italy; from the Po valley in the far north, to smiling Etruria, to the west coast and the Bay of Neapolis, where the Greek cities clustered, and then, many times, to the wilder shores of the Adriatic. He knew the land and its peoples as few Italians would ever know it: cities and townships, the frowning walls of Rome—where he had never penetrated—hot plains like Cannae, domesticated valleys, indolent Capua, peasants and charcoal burners, wild mountain men and tough, disciplined Romans—a whole world, which he had almost made his own. Now he was going home, to a city that he could hardly remember. Yet it was for Carthage that he had fought so long and suffered so much—for Carthage and for an oath taken by a boy on a smoking altar.
 

XXVIII

ZAMA

In the autumn of 203 B.C., before Hannibal had left Italy, the terms of a treaty proposed by Scipio to the Carthaginians had already been accepted by them and had been sent to Rome for discussion. In view of the long bitterness of the war, and the desolation that had been made of great areas of Italy, they were moderate. Firstly, all Carthaginian forces were to leave Italy, and Spain must be abandoned. All deserters, runaway slaves and prisoners-of-war must be returned to Rome. All Carthaginian warships save twenty must be surrendered. A very large quantity of wheat and barley must be supplied to feed the Roman troops and, finally, a heavy indemnity must be paid. It is not surprising that Carthage accepted terms that compared favourably with those of the First Punic War, and an armistice was concluded, pending a ratification of the treaty from Rome.

Scipio also sent Masinissa to Rome in company with Laelius, the former to obtain recognition of his Numidian kingship and the latter, who knew his general’s mind, to enlarge on the proposed terms and act as spokesman for Scipio’s interests in the treaty. It is significant that Masinissa should go to Rome for confirmation of his kingship. In the past, Carthage had been the natural seat of authority for all local kings and their tribes. Scipio’s action is already asserting the dominance of Rome over North Africa. Furthermore he is presenting his Fabian enemies with a
fait accompli,
and making Rome responsible for North African affairs.

In the same year that Hannibal left Italy his old honourable opponent Quintus Fabius Maximus died, the man who had done more than any other to teach the Romans that the only way to wear down—and finally defeat—such a military genius was the way of ‘the delayer’. The Romans, except on a few disastrous occasions, had followed the old man’s precepts until they had kept Hannibal confined in the wild country of the south, and lastly in a narrow area around Croton. The news that Hannibal had finally left their land naturally brought rejoicing in Rome and an effusion of hope, but there still remained great anxiety, as Livy reveals.

Men could not make up their minds whether it was a fit subject for rejoicing that Hannibal, retiring from Italy after sixteen years, had left the Roman people free to take possession of it, and not rather a ground for apprehension that he had crossed over to Africa with his army intact. The place doubtless had been changed, they thought, not the danger. Foretelling that mighty conflict Quintus Fabius, recently deceased, had often predicted, not without reason, that in his own land Hannibal would be a more terrible enemy than in a foreign country. And Scipio would have to deal…with Hannibal, who had been born, one might almost say, at the headquarters of his father, the bravest of generals, had been reared and brought up in the midst of arms; who even in boyhood was a soldier, in earliest manhood a general; who, ageing as a victor [Hannibal was about forty-five], had filled the Spanish and Gallic lands and Italy from the Alps to the Straits with the evidence of his mighty deeds. He was in command of an army whose campaigns equalled his own in number; was toughened by enduring such hardships as one could hardly believe human beings had endured; had been spattered with Roman blood a thousand times and carried the spoils, not of soldiers only but of generals. Many men who would encounter Scipio in battle had with their own hands slain Roman praetors, generals-in-command, consuls; had been decorated with crowns for bravery in scaling city-walls and camp defences; had wandered through captured camps, captured cities of the Romans. All the magistrates of the Roman people did not at that time have so many fasces [those symbols of authority] as Hannibal was able to have borne before him, having captured them from fallen generals.

This account, while showing in what great awe Hannibal was still held by the Romans, errs in its description of his army. Livy, or his authorities, is speaking of the army that marched over the Alps, and that had long since disappeared. Hannibal was now in command of the ragged composite force that had held Croton for the past few years. Nevertheless, his arrival in Africa, bringing any army at all, had such an effect upon Carthaginian morale that the Barcid party began almost immediately to seek for a renewal of the war.

Hannibal landed at Leptis near Hadrumetum (Sousse) where he set up camp for the winter and began to reorganise his forces and recruit more soldiers and horsemen. Here he was joined by the remnants of Mago’s army and learned that his youngest brother was dead. There can be small doubt that Hannibal would have accepted Scipio’s peace terms as being the best thing for Carthage, even though he can have had little knowledge of the political factions and intrigue in the city. But he was astute enough to know that the overall Carthaginian position was hopeless in view of the loss of Spain, the increasing power of Rome by sea and by land, and the native manpower that fuelled their legions. He had defeated the Romans many times in battle, it was true, but he knew that the Romans were hardy and brave soldiers, knew too that they were already—dangerously—beginning to learn from his tactics, and were adopting more flexible methods on the battlefield. In his early years in Italy he had profited
from the out-of-date system whereby the consuls were automatically in charge of the legions and, since they were changed every year, never had the time to learn professional expertise or adapt their tactics. He had also been able to make use of known divisions and differences of temperament between two consuls. But he saw quite clearly in the emergence of Scipio the shadow of the future, where individual generals, in like manner to himself, would emerge—men totally dedicated to war, learning by experience on the battlefield, and familiarising themselves with not only the nature of the battle terrain but also the quality and the racial character of their adversaries.

Whatever Hannibal may have thought about accepting the peace conditions, the war faction in Carthage, making use of his name and fame, had now got the upper hand. In the winter of 203 B.C. a food-convoy from Sicily destined for Scipio’s forces was caught in a storm and driven ashore in the area of Carthage, and Carthaginian warships were sent out to capture it and bring the provisions into the city. This was in clear contradiction of the truce, and Scipio despatched envoys by sea to register a protest. On their way back the ships carrying the envoys were treacherously attacked by Carthaginian triremes, sent to lie in wait for them, and they narrowly escaped with their lives. Scipio rightly saw this as a declaration that the truce was over and that war was renewed. Here indeed was evidence of Punic faith, although it is very doubtful if Hannibal, seventy miles away in Hadrumetum, had any knowledge of it. It was an act of folly, something to which he was not prone.

Scipio reopened the war and attacked such towns in the area as were still under the jurisdiction of Carthage. Throughout the summer of 202, while Hannibal, realising that a major battle was now inevitable, continued to train and gather more recruits for his army, Scipio laid siege to Carthaginian towns, showing no mercy when they fell and enslaving the inhabitants. He was determined to show the Carthaginians that those who broke treaties had put themselves outside the normal considerations of war. He, too, was fully aware that the final test was yet to come and that Carthage could not be forced to yield until he and Hannibal had met on the field of battle and established conclusively the outcome of the war. Masinissa, having returned from Rome confirmed in his kingship, was away in Numidia consolidating his hold upon the country; he received an urgent summons from Scipio to muster all the men he could and join the Romans.

Hannibal now received orders from Carthage to march and challenge Scipio before it was too late. The council and the city were deeply worried by the devastation of their land that was going on unchecked, and at the loss of tribute-paying cities and townships: they were witnessing the destruction of the fertile hinterland which for centuries had maintained the great mercantile city on the sea. Hannibal refused to be hurried and replied that he would fight when he was ready. He had good reason for his response since he was still waiting for reinforcement of his cavalry arm, in which he was singularly deficient, and he knew well enough how large a part the Numidians had played in all his successful actions. He was trying to replace this deficiency by training up elephants, and at the time of the final engagement he had some eighty of them in his army. These were, however, young animals, which had never been in action and, as events showed, were more of a liability than an asset. The fact was that even though the Romans themselves used the elephant to some extent in later centuries, it was already an obsolescent weapon of war. Elephants had achieved successes in the past through their formidability when unleashed in great waves upon primitive people and undisciplined lines of infantry. But the Romans in Italy had already taken their measure and had discovered that, when assailed by flights of the formidable
pilum
, they were likely to turn tail and run down their own army. Semi-trained elephants, which were all that Hannibal was able to muster, were to prove the truth of this in the crucial battle.