Heligoland (2 page)

But in August 1890 Lord Salisbury (who was both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary) prepared to hand over this enchanting island to Germany in order to halt further German encroachments into East Africa, thereby preventing the ruthless German colonialist Dr Karl Peters – himself born near Heligoland – from gaining control of the headwaters of the Nile. This astonishingly audacious deal – concerning which the islanders’ opinions were never sought – included Zanzibar and various border areas in East Africa. Salisbury certainly did not get everything his own way. His fiercest critic was no less a personage than Queen Victoria, who in private furiously condemned Salisbury for even considering handing over the island. Several British newspapers and cartoonists were nearly as scathing in their criticism.

One cause of the interest in the island was its actual physical composition. The power of the waves in the Bight was such that Heligoland (and Sandy Island) was perpetually changing its shape. Coastal erosion was ongoing: sometimes barely perceptibly, but occasionally, especially in winter, dramatically, as prized sections of the cliffs disappeared overnight. And yet somehow Heligoland retained a magical quality of indestructibility. No matter what Nature (or Allied bombers) could hurl at it, the island would always survive. For decades none of this has ever needed to be known to British travellers because few, if any, caught even the most distant glimpse of the island. Passengers on civilian airliners never see Heligoland through the portholes because all the aircraft that shuttle between England and the main northern German cities – Bremen, Hanover, Hamburg and Berlin – cross the North Sea coast over the Netherlands. And even the car ferries operating between Harwich and nearby Cuxhaven often sail past the island at night.

In view of the number of significant events and personages with which it has been associated, it is astonishing that Heligoland has remained so undiscovered. It is only 290 miles from Great Yarmouth, yet very few people in Britain even know of its existence at the centre of the stormy Bight. Each year, on 9 August, the islanders gather at their town hall, the Nordseehalle, for a dignified public commemoration of the 1890 cession. But no British person ever attends it. By an extraordinary series of oversights, Heligoland has repeatedly missed out on opportunities to make the headlines in Britain. It broke a remarkable assortment of historical records: in addition to having the quaint distinction of being Britain’s smallest colonial possession, Heligoland was also Britain’s only colony in northern Europe. The first sea battle of the First World War was fought in its waters, while in the Second World War it was reputed to have been the first piece of German territory upon which RAF bombs fell. Then, in the postwar era, it secretly figured in Britain’s atomic bomb programme.

So often it slipped through the net. In Victorian times its people were seldom invited to colonial gatherings, and later, when the British Commonwealth began to take shape in the 1920s, it did not participate in that either because it no longer had any constitutional links with Britain. Both the 25th and the 50th anniversaries of its transfer into German hands coincided with more dramatic events in the First and Second World Wars respectively, and so the occasions passed unnoticed in Britain. Several interesting consequences have flowed from this lack of wider British knowledge of Heligoland. Almost invariably it has allowed Whitehall a freer hand, almost always at the expense of the interests of the island. For the public, having ceased to be reminded of it, Heligoland vanished beyond the horizon of consciousness. Soon the only readily perceivable lost worlds were fictional places in movies like:
Mysterious Island
(1961),
Creatures the World Forgot
(1971),
The Island at the Top of the World
(1974), and
The People That Time Forgot
(1977).

Government secrecy has certainly played a part in the island’s history. At first it was as a matter of traditional diplomatic practice that details of the 1807 accession treaty were not publicly disclosed until 1890. More recently there are grounds for wondering whether official attempts have been made to brush aside embarrassing details of Britain’s treatment of Heligoland. Dusty ledgers at the Public Record Office at Kew clearly show in fine copperplate handwriting that several confidential documents concerning the attitudes of the islanders to the swap deal have been destroyed. However, the Heligolanders have clear memories of the misdemeanours committed against their island. This is their story of the enchanting island that Britain knew as the ‘Gibraltar of the North Sea’.

Some 30 miles from the coasts of Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony, Heligoland rises like a fist from the swirling waters of the North Sea. Its cliffs tower some 200 feet above sea level, their red sandstone vivid against the cold flatness. Nearby are Germany’s East Frisian Islands (Borkum, Memmert, Juist, Norderney, Baltrum, Langeoog, Spiekeroog and Wangerooge), separated from the mainland by mud and sand flats. Strung parallel to the Lower Saxony coast, this chain of low-lying islands once formed an offshore bar stretching from Calais to the Elbe. Between the coastal islets stretch the muddy estuaries of the rivers Elbe, Ems, Weser and Eider. In this area, known as the Heligoland Bight, strong currents, high winds blowing down from the Arctic and relatively shallow waters combine to produce not only severe weather but also steep waves. Historically, in some winters the rivers would freeze over, and with the thaw large sheets of ice would tear free and flow downstream to the open sea. Even in medieval times such dangerous waters required daring and specialist piloting skills that very few locals other than the Heligolanders were perceived to possess. Centuries later those exceptionally grim sea conditions were vividly brought to the attention of British mariners in the spy novel
The Riddle of the Sands
by the famous adventure writer and yachtsman Erskine Childers.

By the late summer of 1807, during the Napoleonic wars, England’s situation had become more dangerously isolated than ever. On land, Bonaparte’s armies were sweeping across Europe, relentlessly shattering the powerful coalition the British Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger, had constructed just two years earlier with Austria, Russia and Sweden. Austria was defeated at Austerlitz in 1805, Prussia partly broken at Jena in 1806, and the Russians overcome in East Prussia in July 1807. Under the terms of the momentous Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807, Napoleon demanded that Russia become an ally of France; its territories were much reduced and some occupied by French troops, as was what remained of the Lower Saxony part of Prussia. So swiftly did Napoleon’s forces ride into Lower Saxony later that month that Sir Edward Thornton, Britain’s plenipotentiary in Hamburg (effectively its ambassador) had to flee overland to Kiel, narrowly escaping capture. When, soon afterwards, French troops occupied Portugal and then Spain, Napoleon assumed that in some form or other he had secured control of the entire coastline of mainland Europe from the Adriatic to the Baltic.

So far, of all the forces ranged against Napoleon, only the Royal Navy had succeeded in making any significant strategic impact. The attacks on French shipping off Egypt at the Battle of the Nile in 1798 and on the Danish fleet at the Battle of Copenhagen in 1801 proved that Britain was able to make audaciously devastating strikes by sea. Forced by the destruction of the French and Spanish fleets at the Battle of Trafalgar in October 1805 to cancel his long-planned invasion of England, Napoleon decided to bide his time and rebuild his navy. In the meantime he devised an equally ambitious scheme that was intended to subjugate Britain by economic means. In November 1806 he decreed that the so-called ‘continental system’ was to be imposed along the entire coastline of Europe; this was intended to stop any of France’s enemies, as well as neutral countries, from trading with Britain. By placing Britain under blockade, he hoped to ruin the international trade that formed the bedrock of her prosperity, and thus force her to accept his terms for peace. In January 1807 the British government retaliated by declaring a counter-blockade, by which Royal Navy warships would prevent vessels of any neutral country having commercial dealings with any French port, or with any port belonging to the allies of the French.

The stop and search duties this required British warships to undertake were, in certain significant respects, similar to other functions at which they were accomplished. Although such ships could often be subordinate in design to French ships, their signalling systems were more efficient and their discipline superior, making them formidable opponents in action.
¹
The skills involved in maintaining a maritime embargo they had perfected during the long years of blockading France’s invasion fleet, most notably in the unforgiving seas off Brest and Boulogne. Nevertheless the additional burden of having to impose a counter-blockade against the entire continent greatly stretched the navy’s resources. But Admiral Thomas Russell was determined to keep the might of his squadron concentrated on its job of blockading what remained of the Dutch fleet, sheltering near the island of Texel, and since March 1807 the only vessel he could spare to take station off the mouth of the Elbe was a solitary frigate.

The work was dangerous, but it had to be done. Such were the risks of sailing in bad weather so close to shore (which was unlit at night), the spectre of shipwreck was ever-present. Indeed, of the navy’s total loss of 317 ships in the years 1803–15, 223 were either wrecked or foundered, the great majority on account of hostile natural elements. Notwithstanding the sea-keeping qualities of the Royal Navy’s ships, their capacity for endurance was far from endless. Such was the merciless pounding of the seas on hulls, rigging and spars, Admiral Russell knew that scarcely a month would go by when he did not have to send one or more of his vessels to the safety of the home dockyards for repairs.

The royal dockyards had just about been able to cope with these casualties because as well as building new ships they also had the capacity to repair damaged vessels. From the Baltic they received virtually all the high-quality basic products required, such as timber, flax, hemp, tallow, pitch, tar, linseed, iron ore and other necessities.
²
But all that was suddenly thrown into jeopardy in the summer of 1807 when Sir Edward Thornton sent reports to London indicating that France was planning to seize Denmark’s fleet. As a neutral country, Denmark was in an invidious position between the warring factions. As a significant naval power, whose fleet had been rebuilt since 1801, she was regarded as a potential prize by both sides. On 21 July 1807, hearing – possibly via Talleyrand – that Napoleon and Alexander I of Russia were in the process of forming a maritime league against Britain in which Denmark would play a part, the War Minister Lord Castlereagh issued demands for the surrender of the Danish fleet.

Having battled around the Skagerrak in atrocious seas only to encounter frustrating calms in the Kattegat, Admiral Gambier’s task force of twenty-one ships-of-the-line, carrying nearly 20,000 troops, eventually arrived off Copenhagen on 2 September. When the Danish government rejected calls for surrender, a heavy naval bombardment of the city began. The most fearsome weapons used by the British, to devastating effect, were bomb-vessels equipped with huge mortars that lobbed 10-inch diameter fragmentation shells. These burst on contact and cut down personnel indiscriminately. By 5 September some two thousand of Copenhagen’s inhabitants had been killed, many more were wounded and, to bitter parliamentary criticism, the remains of the Danish fleet was seized and brought into the Yarmouth Roads. This brutal pre-emptive strike had been a flagrant breach of Denmark’s neutrality, and it threatened to be politically disastrous. Soon the key states under French influence – Russia, Prussia and Austria – declared war on Britain.
³
Significantly, on 17 August Denmark abandoned its neutrality and also declared war on Britain. The British had already been taking stock of Denmark’s possessions, wondering which might be strategically useful, and Denmark’s new stance soon focused British attention on Heligoland.

The fact that Britain had never before needed to fight a war in Europe on such a scale meant that a weakness now appeared in its campaigning. Numerous hitherto obscure parts of Europe were now suddenly of tremendous strategic value – but Britain had little or no intelligence about them. Rather astonishingly, although Heligoland was only some 290 miles from the Norfolk coast, scarcely anyone in Britain knew anything about the island, or even what it looked like. It seems quite probable that the only detailed chart of it the Admiralty had in its possession was a copy of one which had been made for the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce in 1787. This chart had recently been received from the second-in-command of Admiral Russell’s flagship, HMS
Majestic
, Lieutenant Corbet D’Auvergne; he had acquired it from one Captain Dunbar, who happened to purchase it over the counter of a commercial ship’s chandler during a visit to Copenhagen in 1806.
⁴
Fortunately for Admiral Russell, Lieutenant D’Auvergne was not just an exceptionally enterprising officer. He happened to be the younger brother of Rear-Admiral Philip D’Auvergne, otherwise known as the Duke of Bouillon, who was at that time controlling a network of spies gathering intelligence for Britain via the Channel Islands. The Jersey-based Bouillons were Belgian aristocrats who well knew the frailty of small national entities, having fled to England as long ago as 1672 when they were deposed from their homeland by the French.

The scarcity of detailed knowledge about the south-east part of the North Sea was slightly more surprising because Britain had – albeit intermittently and fleetingly – made various contacts with Heligoland over many centuries. There is a possibility that the island even received its name from a seventh-century English missionary called St Willibrod. The first written reference to the island appeared in ad 98, when it was recorded under the name ‘Hyrtha’ by the Roman historian Tacitus. At the very end of the seventh century, after Willibrod’s accidental arrival there after a shipwreck in about ad 699, it acquired the name Heligoland (meaning ‘Holy Land’), possibly because Willibrod himself came from Lindisfarne, on Northumberland’s Holy Island, or perhaps because it had been a sacred place of the old Norse heathen gods.