Henry Knox (23 page)

Part of the problem was ineptness in the department of quartermaster. Major General Thomas Mifflin, a former congressional delegate and severe critic of Washington, had resigned from the post after being denied promotion. Congress and Washington both wanted Greene to take over the job. Not only was Washington confident that Greene could greatly improve conditions in the army; he also wanted a loyal friend serving in such a vital position. Greene, however, was torn between his desire to retain a field command and the opportunity to help the army in an administrative position. He coveted fame and was painfully aware that no one in history had been celebrated for service as a quartermaster. "I hate the place [the quartermaster department]," he wrote Knox, "but hardly know what to do. I wish for your advice in the affair, but obliged to determine immediately.“
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Greene knew he could not turn down the quartermaster job. Every day men were dying, and their gaunt bodies were wrapped up and stored to await burial when the ground thawed. As many as 2,500 men succumbed. Others
felt they had no option but to desert and risk the penalty of death. By remaining in camp, they risked the same fate by starvation. The quartermaster was a vital link in transporting supplies from the commissary general to the men, whether in camp or on the march. If he took the post, Greene would have to establish supply posts over a vast amount of territory, and understand the terrain and the strategies of both the Continental and British armies and overcome the complex logistics of transporting provisions during a war.

He reluctantly took the job, commenting to General McDougal, "All of you will be immortalizing yourselves in the golden pages of history while I am confined to a series of [administrative tasks] to pave the way for it.“
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Washington agreed with Knox that only a draft would fill the army's needs and had explained its critical importance to another congressional committee that had recently arrived at Valley Forge. The commander in chief wrote Knox on Thursday, March 5, 1778: "I do not know what steps Congress intend to recommend to the States for filling their regiments, but I am certain that nothing short of the measure you mention will prove effectual. . . . I very much fear that the States will each proceed in different ways, most of them feeble and ineffectual.
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The first week of March, Knox packed his bags for the return trip to Valley Forge. He and Lucy decided that she and their daughter would follow him to camp when the winter weather abated. Several wives of generals had made a home in camp, including Nathanael Greene's wife, Kitty, a close friend of Lucy's, Martha Washington, and General Lord Stirling's wife. As they parted, Henry and Lucy reminded each other that their separation would be short this time.

After an uneventful trip, Knox immediately went about organizing the artillery and directing the cannons and arms that were daily arriving at Valley Forge. On April 18, Congress directed Washington to convene a war council of his generals to plot out a military campaign for the spring, and the commander asked for written opinions from his key advisors. The generals had already discussed three plans. The first was to remain in a defensive posture while training and instilling discipline in the army and new recruits in order to improve the army's proficiency. Some generals favored taking the offensive and making an attempt to liberate Philadelphia. The final option floated in discussions was changing the seat of the war and attacking the British in New York. Knox wrote a detailed opinion of the choices the Americans faced on Thursday, April 23. He thought that standing pat could be disastrous because not only would their army receive fresh troops, but so would the British.

Knox wrote to Washington that: "If theirs should be the greatest and earliest received, we shall the infinite mortification to have waited for nothing but disgrace. We shall be obliged to make a defensive war with an inferior force, to be perfectly attendant on the enemy's motions, move when they move, halt when they halt, retire when they advance or [risk] everything on the hazard of a general action where the probability of success will be apparently against us."

He kept in mind the need to maintain public support for the cause, believing that many would lose faith in American hopes if commanders declined to attempt a blow against the British. "Our friends, and those who wish to be our friends, will be dispirited, because we cannot protect them; neutrals will take an active part against us; the disaffected will be confirmed in their disaffection, and our army induced to desert. The enemy will be able to raise such numerous recruits from ourselves as when incorporated into their old troops, will enable them to garrison the conquered places without any sensible diminution of their principal force, which will be left free for new operations.“
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Victory would cure many of the army's problems, he stressed. "Success in military matters procures applause, and covers every defect in planning or executing an enterprise.“
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The chances of freeing Philadelphia through a prolonged siege did not seem promising, Knox explained to Washington. The army lacked the heavy battering cannons and military supplies needed for a protracted engagement, and given the British's ability to send reinforcements, such a plan would require 36,000 men. "I am afraid we should find great difficulty to obtain so large a number or subsist them." Instead, Knox favored leaving the enemy uncertain whether New York or Philadelphia would be their target.

He saw several advantages in attempting a siege of New York, believing that New Englanders would be more supportive of the army if the war were carried north.

"It is an enterprise of which the New England people are enthusiastically fond, and they would most cheerfully turn out as many men as to assist the Continental Army as would be required," he told Washington, estimating that the Continental force under the commander in chief could be boosted from 5,000 men to 25,500 merely by shifting the seat of the war. Knox believed that Massachusetts would provide 8,000 men, New Hampshire and New Jersey 2,000 each. New York could be counted on to supply 2,500 men and Connecticut another 4,500. About 2,500 Continental troops were already stationed
in Albany along the Hudson River. He ticked off other advantages, such as better access to food and forage, navigable rivers to provide transport, and access to as many as fifteen large battering cannons from Boston, Providence, and forts along the Hudson. Knox laid out a detailed plan for recruiting and transporting troops as well as a blueprint for a two-pronged attack on Manhattan Island.

"New York, in my opinion, is of much greater consequence to the Britons in their design of subjugating America than Philadelphia or any other place whatever," he wrote.
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Washington's key advisors were divided on a plan of attack. Of the eleven generals who submitted their written opinions, only three joined Knox in recommending an assault of New York. Three, including Lafayette, wanted to stand pat and drill and train the army, while three wanted to pursue a siege of Philadelphia, and yet another general wanted to attack both cities.

When Congress had asked Washington to hold a war council to consider the summer campaign, Knox's name initially was omitted from the list of generals who should be consulted. The omission was corrected two days later. Washington suspected that Knox's reputation had suffered during the controversy surrounding Conway and Gates and reaffirmed his faith in Henry in a letter on Saturday, April 25, to New York congressman Gouverneur Morris, who had served on the committee that had visited Valley Forge. "Prejudices may be entertained by some against General Knox, there is no department in the army that has been conducted with greater propriety, or to more advantage, than the one in which he presides; and owing principally, if not wholly, to his management. Surely whatever plans may be come into, the artillery will have no small share in the execution.“
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Three days later, a letter from Major General Conway was read in Congress. He complained that his talents were being wasted in the outpost in Albany, removed from the scene of action in the war, and offered his resignation. To his surprise, Congress accepted. Many delegates had begun to view Conway as a malcontent and malignancy in the army. Eight states voted to accept the resignation, and only Virginia voted against his departure. Conway immediately wrote to Congress that he had been misunderstood and that he had not intended to resign. But Congress took no action to reinstate him.
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With the removal of Conway, the internal threat to the command of Washington and his key generals had passed.

As the spring temperatures warmed the air, news arrived at Valley Forge that France had agreed to an alliance with the United States and had signed a
treaty on February 6. Congress immediately ratified the treaty in a unanimous vote on Monday afternoon, May 4. Knox and the rest of Washington's commanders knew that the nature of the war had completely changed and momentum had shifted. They were no longer battling the powerful British alone; now they were in partnership with the formidable French army and navy. Many of their problems in obtaining supplies and provisions could be overcome, while the British, now involved in a global conflict, could no longer commit as much of their resources to America.

Over the winter, Major General Frederick William August von Steuben, inspector general of the army, had drilled the soldiers in marching in formation and in using bayonets with remarkable success. He and Alexander Hamilton wrote the army's first military manual and imposed improved standards of hygiene. Knox watched as the soldiers marched with new precision. A cheer went up from everyone in the ranks: "Long live the King of France." Knox's men then fired another round of thirteen guns, which was answered by another general discharge of muskets and the cheer "Long live the friendly powers of Europe." Again Knox's men set off a thunderous explosion of thirteen cannons, and the soldiers responded with choreographed musket fire. The men cheered, "To the American States." With France changing the American prospects, Knox joined in the unanimous opinion of generals at a May 8 war council to decline attacking either Philadelphia or New York until the military situation could be reassessed. Washington believed the British could no longer provide much reinforcement for the troops already in America.

Signs appeared that the royal troops were preparing to evacuate Philadelphia. According to American intelligence reports, the British had moved their heavy cannons out of the city and were preparing wagons and teams of horses. Washington wrote Knox on May 17 that "this requires a state of readiness in us for marching at the shortest warning.“
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Knox responded the same day that the artillery was ready to move in a day or two but that he was waiting on horses from the quartermaster. He also said he was waiting on guns from New England and needed Greene to push through the shipping. Two thousand muskets were expected from Springfield and another 2,000 from Albany.
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Lucy arrived at Valley Forge accompanied by her escort, Major General Benedict Arnold, on Wednesday, May 20. Friends were struck by the tender nature of Henry and Lucy's relationship as well as the way their personalities seemed to complement each other. General Greene commented to his wife that he found Henry and Lucy to be "a perfect married couple." Arnold also received a warm welcome at Valley Forge, where his heroics at Saratoga had
been talked about throughout the winter. His limp—from a leg wound suffered in the battle—elicited sympathy mixed with admiration. As a result of the wound, one of Arnold's legs was now an inch shorter, which precluded him from assuming a field command. Washington gave Arnold an affectionate embrace along with a finely adorned epaulette and sword knot that a friend in France had presented to the commander in chief. Arnold's previous slight by Congress had apparently been forgotten after the delegates restored his rank and seniority.

Knox and the other military leaders around Washington daily expected that the British would evacuate Philadelphia. They learned that the large cannons and the baggage of Howe's army had already been shipped down the Delaware River or sent by transports to New Jersey. New York City was likely the royal army's destination. The American army, however, still suffered from the effects of the hard winter and smallpox. They were too weak to force a battle. The anticipated English evacuation was delayed when the Frederick Howard Carlisle peace commissioners arrived from England with promises to repeal the Tea Act and to refrain from taxing the Americans in the future. The English also sharply criticized the American alliance with France. Nathanael Greene wrote to Knox, "Poor John Bull appears to be sick of his bargain and I believe would gladly be off, could he do it with any kind of decency. Finding he cannot subdue us by force, our enemy is trying to disunite us. They point out the folly of a connection with a country [France] differing from us in language, customs and religion—all of which, however, will avail nothing. Arms must decide the matter.“
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The American army was also delayed from action, awaiting reorganization by Congress. By Wednesday, May 27, the final plan was authorized and announced. Knox's artillery corps received a pay hike to better retain qualified officers and gunners. The pay of an artillery captain, for example, was boosted to $50 from just $20 a month, and the men in his regiment were generally paid 25 percent more than comparable soldiers in other departments in the army due to the added expense of serving in the artillery corps. His men had to buy their own supplies, which included items to maintain the cannons and horses. But Knox was given only three field commanders, which left him little room to promote men for heroism, initiative, or outstanding service.

On Thursday, May 28, Washington appointed Major General Arnold to command the American troops in Philadelphia when the British finally left. In recent weeks, army soldiers had lined up to take an oath of allegiance to the United States under an order by Congress. On Saturday, Knox administered
the oath to Arnold, who swore on his honor that "I, Benedict Arnold, do acknowledge The United States of America to be Free, Independent and Sovereign States and declare that the People thereof owe no Allegiance or Obedience to George the Third, King of Great Britain, and I renounce, refuse and abjure any Allegiance or Obedience to him.“
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