History of the Second World War (59 page)

It deserves mention that the recent German reinforcements included five of the new fifty-six ton Tiger tanks, mounting a long 88-mm. gun. These monsters were a ‘secret weapon’, but Hitler had decided to send a few to Tunis for test in combat, and two of them were attached to the Djedeida combat group in this fight for Tebourba.

In the days that followed, the Allied commanders planned an early renewal of their offensive, with increased strength. But the prospect was soon diminished by Nehring’s early action to extend his gains. He now planned to use his small armoured force to recapture Medjez el Bab by a wide outflanking move south of the Medjerda River. Here Combat Command B of the U.S. 1st Armored Division had just been deployed, with a view both to the renewed advance and to keeping it separate from the British, so that it could fight as an integrated team. An advanced detachment was posted at Jebel el Guessa, a piece of high ground south-west of Tebourba which overlooked the flat country further south. As a preliminary to their own outflanking move, the Germans attacked this observation point early on December 6, and overran its defenders, who had become disorganised in a hasty attempt to withdraw. Reinforcements had been sent, but were slow in starting, and when they arrived on the scene suffered a costly repulse.

This fresh German stroke, and threat, caused the newly arrived commander of the British 5th Corps, Lieutenant-General Allfrey, to order a withdrawal of his troops north of the river, from their position near Tebourba to one near Hill 290 (which the British had named Longstop Hill’) closer to Medjez el Bab. Moreover, he advised a longer withdrawal, to a line west of Medjez el Bab. This proposal was endorsed by Anderson but turned down by Eisenhower. Longstop Hill, however, was evacuated.

Writing on the 7th to a friend, General Handy, Eisenhower remarked: ‘I think the best way to describe our operations to date is that they have violated every recognised principle of war, are in conflict with all operational and logistic methods laid down in text-books, and will be condemned in their entirety by all Leavenworth and War College classes for the next twenty-five years.’

Resuming their flank thrust on December 10, with a force including about thirty medium and two Tiger tanks, the Germans were checked two miles short of Medjez el Bab by a well-posted French battery, became temporarily bogged when they tried to move off the road to outflank it, and were then led to withdraw by an American threat to their own rear from a detachment of Combat Command B. But they scored an indirect and unforeseen success when Combat Command B started to withdraw after dark from its exposed position, became confused, reversed course on a false rumour of German threat, and turned off along a muddy track near the river, where many of its remaining tanks and other vehicles became stuck, and were abandoned. This disaster was temporarily crippling, while very damaging to the prospect of an early resumption of the Allied push for Tunis. For the moment, Combat Command B had only forty-four tanks left fit for action — barely a quarter of its full strength. The two German counter-strokes had all too effectively upset the Allies’ plan and prospects.

Meanwhile Colonel-General Jurgen von Arnim had been sent by Hitler to take supreme command of the Axis forces, which were rechristened the 5th Panzer Army. He took over from Nehring on the 9th and, with the arrival of further reinforcements, proceeded to expand the two perimeters covering Tunis and Bizerta into a general bridgehead, formed by a hundred-mile chain of defence posts, and stretching from the coast some twenty miles west of Bizerta to Enfidaville on the east coast. It was divided into three sectors, the northern one held by the improvised Division von Broich (named after its commander), the central one (from west of Chouigui to just beyond Pont-du-Fahs) by the 10th Panzer Division, which had been arriving in driblets, and the southern sector by the Italian Superga Division. The Allied Intelligence estimated the Axis forces in mid-December as about 25,000 fighting troops and 10,000 administrative personnel, with eighty tanks — an estimate which was in excess of the mark. The Allies’ effective fighting troops numbered close on 40,000 — some 20,000 British, 12,000 American, and 7,000 French — and their total strength was much larger, as their administrative organisation was more lavish.

Delays in the build-up, partly due to bad weather, led Anderson to postpone the renewal of the offensive. But on the 16th he decided that it should start on the 24th, so as to utilise a full moon for an infantry night assault. It was to be delivered by the British 78th Division and 6th Armoured Divisions, together with part of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division.

To gain room for deployment, preliminary attacks were made to regain Longstop Hill and also Hill 466 on the more northerly line of approach to Tebourba. Both suffered from confusion in bad weather and developed into protracted see-saw battles, so that the main attack had to be postponed. By the 25th the Germans had completely regained their original positions — and, very naturally, now gave ‘Longstop Hill’ the name ‘Christmas Hill’.

Already, on Christmas Eve, Eisenhower and Anderson had reluctantly decided to abandon the intended offensive in view of these setbacks and the torrential rain, which was turning the battleground into a morass. The Allies had lost ‘the race for Tunis’.

Yet, by the irony of luck, this failure turned out one of the biggest blessings in disguise that could have happened. For without such a failure Hitler and Mussolini would not have had the time or encouragement to pour very large reinforcements into Tunisia and build up the defence of that bridgehead to a strength of over a quarter of a million men — who had to fight with an enemy-dominated sea at their back, and if defeated would be trapped. When the Axis forces were eventually overwhelmed, in May, the south of Europe was left almost bare, so that the follow-up Allied invasion of Sicily in July had an easy run. But for the Allied failure in December which led to that huge ‘bag’ in May, it is all too probable that the Allied re-entry into Europe would have been repelled. What Churchill was fond of calling the ‘soft under-belly’ was so mountainous as to be very hard country for an invading force, and only became soft when there was a lack of defenders.

CHAPTER 23 - THE TIDE TURNS IN THE PACIFIC

Japan’s offensive aims in the Pacific, to establish what she called ‘The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’, had been virtually achieved within four months.* By that time Malaya and the Dutch East Indies had been completely conquered, as well as Hong Kong; so had almost the entire Philippines and the southern part of Burma. Within another month the surrender of the island-fortress of Corregidor brought the fall of America’s last foothold in the Philippines. A week later the British had been driven out of Burma, back into India, and China was thus cut off from her allies. This vast run of conquest had cost the Japanese only about 15,000 men, 3 80 aircraft, and four destroyers.

* For map, see pp. 200-1.

After such a series of easy triumphs the Japanese were, naturally, reluctant to change over to the defensive — as their strategic plan ordained. They feared that such a change might bring a gradual decline of fighting spirit, while giving their Western opponents, economically much stronger, a breathing space for recovery. The Japanese Navy, in particular, was anxious to eliminate the two possible bases for an American come-back in the Pacific — Hawaii and Australia. As they pointed out, the U.S. Navy’s carrier force could still operate from Hawaii, while Australia was obviously being turned into a springboard, as well as a stronghold.

The Japanese Army, with its mind still focused on China and Manchuria, was unwilling to release the troops required for such expeditions, which in the case of an expedition to invade Australia would have to be large. It had already declined to co-operate in a plan of the Combined Fleet Staff to take Ceylon.

The Navy, however, hoped that by a further successful stroke in either direction it might overcome the Army chiefs’ objection and induce them to provide the troops required for one or other of these expeditions, but was itself divided in mind about the best direction. Admiral Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet Staff favoured a plan to take Midway Island (1,100 miles west of Pearl Harbor) — as a bait to draw the U.S. Pacific Fleet to action, and crush it. The Naval Staff, however, preferred a thrust through the Solomon Islands to take New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa — and, by capturing this island chain, block the sea-routes between America and Australia. A weighty argument for the latter plan, of isolating Australia, was that the Japanese had already gone a long way towards completing the ring. For by the end of March they had advanced from Rabaul into the Solomon Islands as well as into the northern coast of New Guinea.

The debate between the alternative naval plans was interrupted, and diverted, by the American air raid on Tokyo, of April 18, 1942.

THE TOKYO RAID

This air strike at the Japanese capital, the heart of Japan’s homeland, was inspired by the idea of retaliation for Pearl Harbor, and planning for it had begun in January. As the distance from any surviving American base was too far, the raid must necessarily be made from naval carriers. But as the Japanese were known to have a picket boat patrol operating 500 miles out from the mainland, the strike aircraft would have to be launched from a distance of about 550 miles, involving an out and back flight of at least 1,100 miles — which was too far for naval carrier planes. Moreover the U.S. Navy’s few, and precious, carriers would be endangered if they had to wait in the area until the raiding planes returned. So it was decided to use U.S. Army Air Force bombers, of longer range, and also that they should fly westward after bombing Tokyo to land on Chinese airfields.

That entailed a flight of more than 2,000 miles, and the ability to take off from carriers. So the B.25 Mitchell was selected. These bombers, with extra fuel tanks fitted, could carry a 2,000 lb. bomb load for 2,400 miles. The pilots, led by Lieutenant-Colonel James H. Doolittle, practised short take-offs and long overwater flights. Only sixteen planes were employed, as they were too large to be stowed below deck, while they had to be allowed sufficient space for the take-off.

On April 2 the carrier selected for the task,
Hornet,
sailed from San Francisco with its escort of cruisers and destroyers. On the 13th it was joined by Task Force 16, organised round the carrier
Enterprise,
which was to give air support — as the
Hornet’s
own planes were stowed below deck. Early on the 18th the carrier force was sighted by a Japanese patrol boat while still more than 650 miles from Tokyo. The naval commander, Vice-Admiral William F. Halsey, conferred with Doolittle, and they agreed that it would be better to launch the bombers immediately despite the extra distance involved. It proved a wise and fortunate decision.

Taking off in a heavy sea between 0815 and 0924, the bombers reached Japan within four hours, catching the defences by surprise, and dropped their bombs (including incendiaries), on Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe. They then flew on to China, aided by a tail wind. Unfortunately, by a misunderstanding, Chuchow airfield was not ready to receive them, so that the crews had to make a crash-landing or drop by parachute. Out of the eighty-two man total, seventy returned — three who did not were executed by the Japanese for bombing civilian targets. The two carriers escaped unhurt, and reached Pearl Harbor on the 25th.

Another piece of good fortune was that, despite the patrol boat’s warning, the Japanese had expected the raid to come a day later than it did, on the 19th — when, as they reckoned, the carriers would be close enough to launch their naval bombers. By then the air forces would have been ready and Admiral Nagumo’s carriers would have reached their planned position for a counterstroke.

The prime result of the raid was the fillip it gave to American morale, which had been badly shaken by Pearl Harbor. But it also forced the Japanese to keep four Army fighter groups at home for the defence of Tokyo and other cities, while another resultant diversion was the despatch of a punitive expedition of fifty-three battalions to drive through Chekiang Province, where the American bombers had landed. A still more important effect, inherently causing a diversion of strength, was the decision to forestall further raids by undertaking the Midway operation as well as the thrust to cut Australia off from America. The dual effort was detrimental to concentration of effort and strength.

Under the revised Japanese plan the first move, itself dual, was to be an advance deeper into the Solomon Islands to seize Tulagi as a seaplane base to cover a further leap south-eastward, coupled with the capture of Port Moresby on the south coast of New Guinea, which would bring Queensland within range of Japanese bombers. Then the Combined Fleet under Yamamoto was to carry out the occupation of Midway Island and key points in the Western Aleutians. After the desired destruction of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the third move would be a resumption of the advance in the south-east to block the sea-routes from America to Australia.

The first of these moves led to the Battle of the Coral Sea, the second to the Battle of Midway, and the third to the prolonged and intense struggle for Guadalcanal, the large island close to Tulagi.

An ironical, and indirect, effect of this diverse Japanese plan was that it helped to cement a split in American planning and command arrangements.

At the beginning of April the United States had assumed responsibility for the whole Pacific area, except Sumatra, while the British would remain responsible for Sumatra and the Indian Ocean area. China was a separate theatre of war, under American tutelage. The American sphere was divided in two — the South-west Pacific area under General MacArthur, whose headquarters were now established in Australia, and the Pacific Ocean area under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. Both were strong and forceful men, likely to clash. The Japanese plan provided ample call on, and scope for, the activity of each. Moreover the borderline between their respective spheres came in the Solomon Islands, where the Japanese amphibious threat required the conjoint use of MacArthur’s ground forces and Nimitz’s naval forces. Thus they had to develop a working arrangement.