Hitler: Ascent, 1889-1939 (175 page)

18 
Klaus-Jürgen Müller,
Generaloberst Ludwig Beck: Eine Biographie
, Paderborn, 2008, pp. 101, 103.

19 
Raeder’s statement before the Nuremberg military court; reprinted in Wirsching, “Eine neue Quelle,” p. 548f. (quotation on p. 549).

20 
Die Regierung Hitler
, part 1, vol. 1, no. 17, p. 51 (dated 8 Feb. 1933). On the relationship between Hitler and the military leadership during the early phase of the regime, see Klaus-Jürgen Müller,
Armee und Drittes Reich 1933–1939: Darstellung und Dokumente
, Paderborn, 1987, pp. 51f.

21 
Die Regierung Hitler
, part 1, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 9 (dated 1 Feb. 1933).

22 
Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels. Part 1: Aufzeichnungen 1923–1941
, ed. Elke Fröhlich, Munich, 1998, vol. 2/3, p. 122 (entry for 3 Feb. 1933), p. 213 (entry for 4 Feb. 1933).

23 
Reprinted in Bernd Sösemann, with Marius Lange,
Propaganda: Medien und Öffentlichkeit in der NS-Dikatur
, Stuttgart, 2011, vol. 1, no. 53, pp. 95–9. See
Die Regierung Hitler
, part 1, vol. 1, no. 9, pp. 29f. (dated 2 Feb. 1933), no. 11, pp. 34f. (dated 3 Feb. 1933).

24 
Goebbels,
Tagebücher
, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 123 (entry for 4 Feb. 1933). On the election campaign of February/March 1933 see Gerhard Paul,
Aufstand der Bilder: Die NS-Propaganda vor 1933
, Bonn, 1990, pp. 111–13.

25 
Quoted in Becker,
Hitlers Machtergreifung
, pp. 57–60 (quote on p. 59).

26 
Goebbels,
Tagebücher
, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 126 (entry for 11 Feb. 1933).

27 
Domarus,
Hitler
, vol. 1, part 1, pp. 203–8.

28 
Goebbels,
Tagebücher
, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 127 (entry for 11 Feb. 1933).

29 
Erich Ebermayer,
Denn heute gehört uns Deutschland…Persönliches und politisches Tagebuch
, Hamburg and Vienna, 1959, pp. 21f. (entry for 11 Feb. 1933).

30 
Jesko von Hoegen,
Der Held von Tannenberg: Genese und Funktion des Hindenburg-Mythos
, Cologne, Weimar and Vienna, 2007, pp. 378–80.

31 
Papen to Hugenberg, 12 Feb. 1933; BA Koblenz, N 1231/38. On the origins of the “Battle Front Black, White and Red” see Beck,
The Fateful Alliance
, pp. 93f.

32 
Hoegen,
Der Held von Tannenberg
, p. 382. See Wolfram Pyta,
Hindenburg: Herrschaft zwischen Hohenzollern und Hitler
, Munich, 2007, p. 817.

33 
The content of the meeting, according to the report by the leader of the Berlin offices of Gutehoffnungshütte, Martin Blank, to Paul Reusch, 21 Feb. 1933, reprinted in Dirk Stegmann, “Zum Verhältnis von Grossindustrie und Nationalsozialismus 1930–1933,” in
Archiv für Sozialgeschichte
, 13 (1973), pp. 477–80. See also Fritz Springorum to Paul Reusch, 21 Feb. 1933, ibid., pp. 480f.; Henry A. Turner,
Die Grossunternehmer und der Aufstieg Hitlers
, Berlin, 1986, pp. 393–5; Joachim Petzold,
Franz von Papen: Ein deutsches Verhängnis
, Munich and Berlin, 1995, pp. 170–3. On Gustav Krupp’s position see Harold James,
Krupp: Deutsche Legende und globales Unternehmen
, Munich, 2011, pp. 196–9. On the 75:25 split there followed a disagreement as not all donors wanted “Battle Front Black, White, Red” to receive a quarter of the money. See Hugenberg to Schacht, 2 March 1933; Schacht to Hugenberg, 3 March 1933; BA Koblenz, N 1231/38.

34 
Goebbels,
Tagebücher
, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 133 (entry for 21 Feb. 1933).

35 
Ibid., p. 130 (entry for 16 Feb. 1933). See Martin Broszat,
Der Staat Hitlers: Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung
, Munich, 1969, pp. 90–5.

36 
Directive from Göring dated 17 Feb. 1933; Becker,
Hitlers Machtergreifung
, pp. 74f.

37 
Kessler,
Das Tagebuch
, vol. 9, p. 542 (entry for 17 Feb. 1933).

38 
Broszat,
Der Staat Hitlers
, p. 95.

39 
See Heinrich August Winkler,
Der Weg in die Katastrophe: Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik 1930 bis 1933
, Berlin and Bonn, 1987, p. 879; Joachim Fest,
Hitler: Eine Biographie
, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin and Vienna, 1973, p. 541. On SA terror attacks against the left see Richard J. Evans,
The Coming of the Third Reich
, London, 2004, pp. 317–21.

40 
Kessler,
Das Tagebuch
, vol. 9, p. 444 (entry for 19 Feb. 1933). See ibid., p. 544 (entry for 20 Feb. 1933), p. 545 (entry for 22 Feb. 1933).

41 
On the controversy over the Reichstag fire see, most recently, Sven Felix Kellerhoff,
Der Reichtagsbrand: Die Karriere eines Kriminalfalles
, Berlin, 2008. When all the arguments are considered, the thesis that van der Lubbe acted alone is the most plausible. In the summer of 1945, in the Mondorf internment camp near Luxembourg, Schwerin von Krosigk asked Göring who had been responsible for the Reichstag fire, saying “You can tell
me
the truth.” Göring responded that he would have been proud if he had “set the Reichstag ablaze,” but “unfortunately he was completely innocent.” Schwerin von Krosigk to Fritz Tobias, 27 Jan. 1970; BA Koblenz, N 1276/40; see also Schwerin von Krosigk to Heinrich Fraenkel, 20 Jan. 1975; ibid.

42 
See Ernst Hanfstaengl,
Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus: Erinnerungen eines politischen Aussenseiters
, Munich, 1970, pp. 294f.; Goebbels,
Tagebücher
, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 137 (entry for 28 Feb. 1933): “Hanfstaengl called with the news: the Reichstag is burning. What an imagination [I thought]. But it was true.”

43 
Rudolf Diels,
Lucifer ante portas…Es spricht der erste Chef der Gestapo
, Stuttgart, 1950, p. 194. Göring said to Papen: “This can only be a Communist attack on our new government!” Franz von Papen,
Der Wahrheit eine Gasse
, Munich, 1952, p. 302. Sefton Delmer (
Die Deutschen und ich
, Hamburg, 1963, p. 190) also quoted Göring telling Hitler that the fire was “definitely the work of the Communists.”

44 
Goebbels,
Tagebücher
, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 137 (entry for 28 Feb. 1933).

45 
Diels,
Lucifer ante portas
, p. 194.

46 
Delmer,
Die Deutschen und ich
, p. 191.

47 
Goebbels,
Tagebücher
, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 137 (entry for 28 Feb. 1933).

48 
André François-Poncet,
Als Botschafter in Berlin 1931–1938
, Mainz, 1947, p. 95.

49 
See Thamer,
Verführung und Gewalt
, p. 254; Evans,
The Coming of the Third Reich
, pp. 334f.

50 
Cabinet meeting on 28 Feb. 1933;
Die Regierung Hitler
, part 1, vol. 1, no. 32, pp. 128–31 (quotation on pp. 128, 129).

51 
Reprinted in Becker,
Hitlers Machtergreifung
, pp. 107f.; Sösemann,
Propaganda
, vol. 1, pp. 105f. See the comprehensive analysis by Thomas Raithel and Irene Strenge, “Die Reichstagsbrandverordnung: Grundlegung der Diktatur mit den Instrumenten des Weimarer Ausnahmezustands,” in
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte
, 48 (2000), pp. 413–60.

52 
Karl-Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer and Gerhard Schulz,
Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung: Studien zur Errichtung des totalitären Herrschaftssystems in Deutschland 1933/34
, 2nd revised edition, Cologne and Opladen 1962, p. 82.

53 
Ernst Fraenkel,
Der Doppelstaat: Recht und Justiz im “Dritten Reich,
” Frankfurt am Main and Cologne, 1974, p. 26. See Norbert Frei,
Der Führerstaat: Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft 1933 bis 1945
, new and expanded edition, Munich, 2001, p. 51.

54 
See Pyta,
Hindenburg
, p. 814.

55 
Becker,
Hitlers Machtergreifung
, p. 117.

56 
François-Poncet,
Als Botschafter in Berlin
, p. 21. See also Papen’s comment to Cardinal Michael Faulhaber, 1 March 1933: “The National Socialists are all keyed up right now, but after the elections, they’ll calm down.” Becker,
Hitlers Machtergreifung
, pp. 113f.

57 
Werner Jochmann,
Nationalsozialismus und Revolution: Ursprung und Geschichte der NSDAP in Hamburg 1922–1933. Dokumente
, Frankfurt am Main, 1963, p. 425.

58 
Hedda Kalshoven,
Ich denk so viel an Euch: Ein deutsch-holländischer Briefwechsel 1920–1949
, Munich, 1995, p. 169 (dated 10 March 1933).

59 
Quoted in Ian Kershaw,
The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich
, Oxford, 1987, p. 52.

60 
Becker,
Hitlers Machtergreifung
, pp. 116f.

61 
Kessler,
Das Tagebuch
, vol. 9, p. 550 (entry for 5 March 1933).

62 
See Jürgen Falter, Thomas Lindenberger and Siegfried Schumann,
Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik: Materialien zum Wahlverhalten 1919–1931
, Munich, 1986, pp. 41, 44.

63 
Ebermayer,
Denn heute gehört uns Deutschland
, p. 35 (dated 5 March 1933). See Kesssler,
Das Tagebuch
, vol. 9, p. 350 (entry for 6 March 1933): “Despite unprecedented pressure and the complete paralysis of their propaganda, the Social Democrats only lost 100,000 votes and the KPD only one million. That’s an amazing and admirable demonstration of the indomitability of the ‘Marxist Front.’ ”

64 
Goebbels,
Tagebücher
, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 141 (entry for 6 March 1933).

65 
Sackett’s report to Foreign Minister Hull, 9 March 1933; Becker,
Hitlers Machtergreifung
, p. 135.

66 
Goebbels,
Tagebücher
, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 138 (entry for 2 March 1933) See also Schwerin von Krosigk’s recording for a BBC programme on German history between 1918 and 1933 (1966): “In the first time Hitler in fact seemed to be a man whom one could get on. He was very polite; when things were discussed in the cabinet he kept to the subject; he did not mind contradiction and he did not interfere with the work of the ministries.” BA Koblenz, N 1276/37.

67 
Schwerin von Krosigk, essay on Hitler’s personality (
c
.1945); Ifz München, ZS 145, vol. 5; see also Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk,
Es geschah in Deutschland: Menschenbilder unseres Jahrhunderts
, Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1951, p. 199.

68 
Cabinet meeting on 7 March 1933;
Die Regierung Hitler
, part 1, vol. 1, no. 44, pp. 159–66 (quotations on pp. 160, 161).

69 
Cabinet meeting on 11 March 1933; ibid., no. 56, pp. 193–5.

70 
Goebbels,
Tagebücher
, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 145 (entry for 12 March 1933), p. 147 (entry for 15 March 1933).

71 
Quoted in Peter Longerich,
Joseph Goebbels: A Biography
, London, 2015, p. 212.

72 
Cabinet meeting on 7 March 1933;
Die Regierung Hitler
, part 1, no. 44, p. 160.

73 
Goebbels,
Tagebücher
, part 1, vol. 2/3, p. 142 (entry for 8 March 1933), p. 143 (entry for 9 March 1933).

74 
See Volker Ullrich, “Wohlverhalten um jeden Preis: Die ‘Machtergreifung’ in Hamburg und die Politik der SPD,” in Angelika Ebbinghaus and Karl-Heinz Roth (eds),
Grenzgänge: Heinrich Senfft zum 70. Geburtstag
, Lüneburg, 1999, pp. 303–18; Ursula Büttner, “Der Aufstieg der NSDAP,” in
Hamburg im “Dritten Reich,
” ed. Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg, Göttingen, 2005, pp. 59–62.

75 
See Broszat,
Der Staat Hitlers
, pp. 135–7; Thamer,
Verführung und Gewalt
, p. 260; Frei,
Der Führerstaat
, pp. 55f.

76 
G. Heim to Hindenburg, 10 March 1933;
Die Regierung Hitler
, part 1, vol. 1, no. 54, pp. 190f. On the fall of Bavaria see Falk Wiesemann,
Die Vorgeschichte der nationalsozialistischen Machtübernahme in Bayern 1932/33
, Berlin, 1975.

77 
See Peter Longerich,
Heinrich Himmler: Biographie
, Munich, 2008, pp. 159f.; Robert Gerwarth,
Reinhard Heydrich: Biographie
, Munich, 2011, pp. 89ff .

78 
Domarus,
Hitler
, vol. 1, part 1, p. 222; See David Clay Large,
Where Ghosts Walked: Munich’s Road to the Third Reich
, New York and London, 1997, p. 237.

79 
Die Regierung Hitler
, part 1, vol. 1, no. 80, p. 276 (dated 31 March 1933), no. 93, p. 312 (dated 7 April 1933). See Broszat,
Der Staat Hitlers
, pp. 143f.; Frei,
Der Führerstaat
, p. 57. In a letter to Interior Minister Frick on 29 March 1933, Hugenberg protested that the drive to “disable the Communists” was being used to undermine the position of the DNVP in the state parliaments. Hugenberg wrote of his impression that “our agreement that the fresh election, which I never wanted, would not impact on any of the parties involved was increasingly being pushed into the background.” BA Koblenz, N 1231/36.