Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea (29 page)

Possibly, however, this was not Hitler’s chief reason for the defense of the Baltic coast. His orders to units isolated in East and West Prussia began to emphasize the importance of tying down enemy forces only after the loss of Danzig and Gdynia was imminent. As was the case with the Kuban and the Crimea, there were other factors involved. The fact that Hitler commanded some areas held to tie down enemy divisions does not mean he did so everywhere. This was certainly true for France’s Atlantic ports, whose defense Hitler ordered for logistical reasons.
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To ascertain the main reason for the defense of Courland and subsequent areas along the Baltic, perhaps one must look elsewhere.

Dönitz

T
HE DEBATE OVER THE PROPOSED
evacuation of Army Group Courland yields some intriguing clues to the navy’s, and particularly Dönitz’s, role in the defense of Courland. The Skl first examined the possibility of evacuating the army group in response to a request from Guderian in early September 1944. The Skl reported on this occasion that it would require five months to bring Schörner’s men and equipment back to Germany, but it added that the navy did not have enough fuel for an undertaking of this magnitude.
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The question of large-scale troop evacuations next arose in mid-October, when Guderian planned to withdraw three armored and two infantry divisions from Courland. The Skl reported that it could ferry these units to the Reich in eight days. This estimate indicates that the navy’s ability to transport troops inexplicably underwent a sudden and dramatic improvement. The Skl’s Shipping Section reckoned that the evacuation of these five divisions involved the transport of 40,000 men, 4,000 horses, and 7,000 vehicles.
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Yet if the navy could accomplish this in eight days, it should have been possible to evacuate the entire army group in less
than five months. In the first place, the proposed eight-day evacuation included the transport of all three of Army Group North’s armored divisions. Infantry divisions possessed significantly fewer vehicles, and their shipment would not require as many vessels. In addition, at this stage of the war German shipping losses far outstripped gains from new construction.
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The navy’s ability to evacuate troops by sea should have worsened, not improved.

An analysis of troop evacuations from Courland in January 1945 provides further evidence that the Skl withheld accurate information. A glaring omission in the navy’s reports on transport capacity from September and October 1944 was merchant ships. The Skl provided estimates based solely upon the transport capacity of the fleet’s vessels. When evacuating three divisions in January 1945, the Skl instructed the Reich Commissar for Shipping’s supply ships to load horses and vehicles for the return trip. At least two of the steamers used for this purpose were not among the vessels listed for transport tasks in the fall. There is also no mention of the passenger ships later used so effectively to evacuate refugees from East Prussia.
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In January the naval liaison officer at OKH listed six transports, with a total capacity of 12,000 men per voyage, engaged in evacuations from Courland that had not been included in earlier estimates.
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Although it is certainly possible that some of these vessels were engaged elsewhere in the fall of 1944, it is rather unlikely none were available at all. Furthermore, in January the Skl revised the figures for its warships’ loading capacity, this time with unmistakable increases.
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Finally, the time required to evacuate 32,000 men in January was only four to five days.
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In the fall of 1944 Dönitz had—successfully—made the evacuation of troops from Courland appear considerably more difficult than it would have been.

Shortly after Vietinghoff assumed command of Army Group Courland in January 1945, he wrote Guderian asserting that it would be possible to evacuate the entire army group, with all essential combat equipment, in only forty days. Vietinghoff’s calculations stand in sharp contrast to the navy’s reports. He based his estimates on a plan the army group prepared in late January 1945. Vietinghoff had ordered this study following the evacuation of Memel and the withdrawal of the front in East Prussia, which rendered chances for an attack to East Prussia remote indeed.
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On 15 February OKH requested the navy to determine the time necessary to evacuate 100,000 men from Courland, both with and without their equipment. The next day, due to the situation on Army Group Vistula’s front, Hitler instructed the Skl to furnish data on the time required to withdraw eighteen divisions from Courland. Obviously alarmed, the Skl rushed off a reply
warning that once the Soviets realized large-scale evacuations were in progress, their aircraft would cause serious delays by mining convoy routes and harbors. The Skl also predicted disruption from Russian air attacks on Libau and heavy Allied bombing raids on the convoys’ ports of destination. Although Soviet submarines were not expected to cause serious problems, occasional losses had to be anticipated. Furthermore, once the ice melted the appearance of Russian motor torpedo boats was likely.
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This response did not even hint at how long the evacuation would take, and the Skl would have been hard pressed to present a gloomier picture.

The Skl’s Shipping Section presented Dönitz with a picture only slightly less bleak, although it claimed that an increase in transport capacity was possible. Postponing the transfer of a division from Norway would provide four transports, but it would be virtually impossible to obtain more vessels than that. The Reich Commissar for Shipping’s resources were tied up supplying Army Groups North and Courland and evacuating troops, wounded, and refugees. The twenty-three ships available could transport roughly 25,000 men, 5,600 horses, and 3,500 vehicles per voyage. Accounting for delays caused by weather and mines, the Shipping Section estimated a round trip required seven days. Since the divisions were to bring all their equipment, this worked out to one week per division, or eighteen weeks for the transport of eighteen divisions. Dönitz met with Hitler on the 17th, and to Hitler’s question how long it would take to evacuate the entire army group, about 300,000 men, he replied ninety days. Dönitz pointed out that this calculation did not include disruption caused by Soviet interference and cautioned that any ships lost could not be replaced.
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Again there are problems with Dönitz’s estimates. On 15 February the Skl had boasted that in four weeks (18 January–14 February) nearly eight divisions and several miscellaneous units had been evacuated from Courland.
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Based on these figures, which do not include any additional vessels, the transport of eighteen divisions should have been possible in nine weeks, or half the Skl’s time estimate. In addition, if merchant shipping was so busy delivering supplies to Courland, could not these vessels take on men and equipment for the return trip? Finally, the navy’s numbers simply do not make sense. On the one hand the Skl claimed it could transport 25,000 men weekly, yet on the other it estimated the evacuation of one division per week. Divisional strengths in Courland averaged at best 6,000 to 7,000 men.
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The army group’s staff officers also worked out a plan, but they reached entirely different conclusions from the Skl. They calculated on the basis of a six-day cycle and claimed that with eighteen transports, fifty-four freighters, four hospital ships, and accompanying escorts the navy could evacuate
208,000 men with their most important vehicles and equipment in fifteen to eighteen days. Yet it may well have been impossible for the navy to assemble an armada of this size; the Skl maintained it had only twenty-three vessels available. Additional questions arise considering the estimates from September. Although at that time the Skl declared there was not enough fuel to evacuate the army group, in mid-February the Shipping Section reported that coal supplies posed no problem. At first glance the navy’s September calculation for the transport of 500,000 men in five months appears consistent with the February claim of the three months to evacuate 300,000, but there are some very important differences. Germany’s fuel situation had seriously deteriorated—not improved—in the intervening months: Why was there fuel suddenly available? It also appears consistent that if the navy shipped 25,000 men per voyage and a round trip required about a week, then the evacuation of 300,000 men would take twelve weeks, or nearly ninety days as Dönitz had stated. Yet again this is not the case. In its calculations, the army group considered that it only had 18,125 vehicles (including artillery) and 10,578 horses. Once these had been evacuated additional space would be available for troops and equipment. According to the numbers Dönitz presented Hitler, each round trip would convey some 3,500 vehicles and 5,600 horses, in addition to the 25,000 men.
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The navy thus would have transported all vehicles from Courland within six trips, and all horses in only two voyages. It seems that in the autumn of 1944 the Skl juggled its numbers to prevent Courland’s evacuation.

The Skl war diary contains a cryptic passage at the end of February 1945 noting that the Shipping Section had reported it could gain six large transports by postponing tasks in the Skagerrak. With these vessels the navy could evacuate 100,000 men, or approximately twelve divisions with equipment, in twelve weeks. Then the diarist remarked that by drastically reducing all other tasks and concentrating the necessary tonnage on Courland, which was possible, the evacuation of 100,000 men could be carried out in three days. Yet the following day Dönitz insisted he could not reduce transport tasks in the Skagerrak for Courland’s benefit and that Hitler had already approved this decision.
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Apparently there were differences of opinion even within the Skl regarding the navy’s actual ability to evacuate troops from Courland. Dönitz, however, with Hitler’s agreement, rejected any argument that indicated Courland’s evacuation was possible within an acceptable amount of time.

The final occasion for serious consideration of abandoning Courland occurred in mid-March, when Guderian approached Dönitz with a special request. Explaining that he believed Hitler’s decision to hold Courland
stemmed from naval interests, Guderian sought Dönitz’s support in convincing Hitler to evacuate Courland completely. According to Wagner’s account, Dönitz expressed surprise and assured Guderian that naval considerations played no role in the decision to defend Courland. Dönitz informed Hitler that the navy regarded the possession of West Prussia as decisive but had no interest in holding Courland, whose supply burdened the navy. Hitler thereupon explained that he had demanded Courland’s defense solely for reasons dealing with the war on land and again rejected the idea of an evacuation. Hitler later asked how long it would take to bring five divisions from Courland; Dönitz reported, in accordance to his earlier statements, that this would require five weeks. He gave a more detailed explanation the following day, but Hitler received the report without comment.
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Bridgehead Courland

A
NOTHER POSSIBLE REASON
Hitler ordered Courland held was because he hoped to use the army group’s position in Latvia as a springboard for a future offensive against the Soviet Union. This idea generally has been regarded with derision;
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it has not received serious consideration. For that reason it is all the more important to explore this possibility. Contrary to the assertions of most German generals and some historians, Hitler was no imbecile in military affairs. Probably the most common criticism of Hitler as a military commander is that he never permitted retreats. This explanation is often presented as the sole reason for the defense of Courland and other “pockets” along the Baltic. There are unquestionably many examples of instances when Hitler refused to allow retreats against the advice of his generals. Often this was a serious mistake, but in others he had what he considered valid strategic reasons for rejecting these appeals. Two examples from the southern sector of the Eastern Front may illustrate this. In late 1943 and early 1944 Hitler resisted commanders’ calls for retreats in the Ukraine, because he wanted neither to lose Ukraine’s rich mineral and agricultural resources nor to make them available to Stalin. Furthermore, some generals seem to have assumed that withdrawals freed only German troops, ignoring that usually greater numbers of Russian soldiers would become available as well. Moreover, the Germans often had to destroy or abandon supply dumps during withdrawals, and the Red Army hastily conscripted men in recaptured areas.
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When the Soviets drove the Nazis from the Ukraine they exploited the region’s mineral, agricultural, and human resources as Hitler had feared.

A second example is the defense of the Crimea, the site of a major German defeat in the spring of 1944. Hitler did not want to give up the Crimea for a number of reasons, including fear of the effect upon Turkey’s attitude, increased vulnerability of Romanian oil fields to air raids, and the navy’s concerns about Soviet control of the Black Sea base at Sevastopol. The Soviets isolated Axis forces on the peninsula in early November 1943, and by May 1944 the German Seventeenth Army had been smashed. At the end of April 1944 the Turks halted essential chrome deliveries and at the beginning of August broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, although Turkey did not declare war on Germany until February 1945.
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Tactically, it made sense to retreat, but strategically Hitler considered the economic and diplomatic consequences too great to do so.

Although Hitler usually refused to yield territory, he allowed more retreats than is generally recognized. In early 1943 Hitler authorized retreats from the Demiansk corridor and the Rzhev salient, a position from which he could threaten Moscow, and that summer he permitted a withdrawal from the Orel bulge.
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Although Hitler did not allow retreats as frequently as most generals would have liked, his actions in the fall of 1944 require a closer look. If one examines what the Germans were actually doing when Hitler ordered Courland held, an unprecedented picture emerges—this was a period when Hitler ordered several major retreats on a number of fronts. Although somewhat before the directive to defend Courland, on 16 August Hitler instructed Army Group G to withdraw from southern France.
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In doing so, he retreated from the nation in which he had achieved his greatest triumph. When Hitler ordered Schörner to defend Courland, German armies also were in the process of evacuating Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, and parts of Hungary—in other words, most of the Balkan Peninsula. Hitler had begun to withdraw troops from the Greek islands in September and on 2 October OKW instructed Army Group F to accelerate the retreat. The following day Hitler approved the army group’s plan to pull out of Greece, Albania, and southern Macedonia.
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German troops evacuated Athens on 13 October, exactly one week before Hitler ordered Courland’s defense. Most Germans were probably more familiar with Athens and Salonika, which Nazi troops had just abandoned, than with Libau or Windau, for which Hitler decided to fight.