Hitler's Bandit Hunters (60 page)

One of the most detailed collections of interrogations and documents of pre-trial preparations were those concerning the Warsaw uprising of 1944. The significance of the uprising lay with the possible defendants and witnesses. With the exception of Hitler, Himmler, and Dirlewanger, all the leading German participants were in allied custody; some in Poland, but the majority at Nuremberg. The single most important military personality was Col. Gen. Heinz Guderian. The SS was of course represented by Bach-Zelewski, and the Nazi civilian administration by General Governor Hans Frank. On the next level, there was General Vormann, the army commander in Warsaw; Ernst Rode, the chief of staff of the KSRFSS; and Heinz Reinefarth, the Kampfgruppe commander at the center of the street fighting. Waiting in the wings with due trepidation were Warlimont, Hitler’s dynamic advisor; Wolff, Himmler’s former adjutant; and Dr. Ludwig Fischer, the Nazi governor of Warsaw. There were a host of field officers and operatives of varying ranks, including the SS commander of the Warsaw security police. Telford Taylor chose to focus the case on German army responsibility for the destruction of Warsaw rather than to
place the key defendants on trial for war crimes. This led to perhaps the most bizarre example of what happened when expert witnesses were granted too much leeway.

On July 20, 1944, hours after the bomb plot against Hitler, Guderian became chief of the General Staff of the Army. The former armored warfare specialist “Fast Heinz” Guderian cut a shabby picture in Nuremberg. Confinement did not call forth his finest hour. He spent much of the first part of his incarceration with other senior army defendants attempting to form a united and Nazi defense. When his coup failed, he broke ranks and elected a legal defense of denial. Guderian denied everything, concocting implausible stories especially about his part in Warsaw.
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His vehement denials caused his complexion to become puce or to redden with severe palpitations, indicating that perhaps Hitler had taught him something after all. His subsequent 1952 memoirs failed to mention his dramatic performances.
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Guderian’s bizarre behavior continued when on January 29, 1946, he was interrogated by a Polish army officer. It seems Guderian attempted to locate a “mutual understanding” by suggesting his old family home had been within 1919 Polish borders. He said he rarely passed by Poland, meaning the General Government, preferring to visit his family in the Warthegau, a territory of western Poland annexed to the Reich in 1939. Unable to grasp the insensitivity of his remarks, he then changed tack and stated that he came from a long family line of German Junkers with a homeland that had been Prussian for hundreds of years. The Polish officer’s reply was calm but firm, reminding Guderian that the area had been Polish long before it had been German.
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On this footing the less than cordial interrogations concerning the Warsaw uprising proceeded.

Guderian denied any planning responsibilities and claimed that he had only met Hitler on a few occasions, “none of which had any political significance.” This was interesting for the interrogators because his promotion to chief of the general staff was made by Hitler personally, after the July 20, 1944, bomb plot. Guderian stated that Bach-Zelewski received orders from Hitler to destroy Warsaw. Bach-Zelewski’s units were of doubtful quality, “highly evil,” and conducted “ruthless actions.” Guderian claimed that the implementation of the Geneva Convention in the surrender negotiations was his idea. Regarding the razing of the city and the shooting of civilians, he said, “this order concerning human beings is not known to me. The order concerning the razing of the town I heard from Hitler myself.”
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Guderian was then presented with a section of Hans Frank’s diary. On August 3, 1944, at 9:10 p.m., Guderian had called Frank on the telephone and said, “in the city of Warsaw a verdict is to be accomplished with all ruthlessness.” He denied that any such discussion had taken place and suggested that the phone call in the diary entry concerned the Luftwaffe’s bombing of Warsaw. Again, Guderian blamed Bach-Zelewski for the destruction of Warsaw. The interrogator then referred to a telegram Bach-Zelewski received from Guderian on October 11, 1944, ordering
him to “raze Warsaw to the ground…. I notify you of this since this new Führer order about the destruction of Warsaw is of the greatest importance for any further policy in Poland.”
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Contrast this with his 1952 memoirs: “I requested that Warsaw be included forthwith in the military zone of operations; but the ambitions of Governor-General Frank and the SS national leader Himmler prevailed with Hitler.”
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A confrontation broke out in the cells between Guderian, Ernst Rode, and Bach-Zelewski. The interrogators asked Rode for his version of the events. According to Rode, the order was distributed through OKH to 9th Army and through Himmler on behalf of the SS-Police. The actual route was from Guderian to General Vormann to Bach-Zelewski. Rode stated that a conference had taken place between Hitler and Guderian, which preceded the destruction order. Guderian offered Bach-Zelewski siege artillery both to defeat the Polish resistance and to destroy the city. Bach-Zelewski had asked Guderian if the order could be rescinded but was told it was a direct Hitler order. Thus Bach-Zelewski had tried to persuade General Bor, commander of the Polish resistance, to prevent this from happening by surrendering under the Geneva Convention. Rode contended that this operation had also fallen under the authority of the army because Bach-Zelewski’s commendation for the Knight’s Cross came from General Vormann. Guderian would meet Bach-Zelewski only with Major-General Wenck as a witness while Bach-Zelewski in turn took Rode. The interrogators asked why Bandenbekämpfung had been practiced in the operational sector, and Rode explained that the fighting had broken out behind the German lines and only later became part of the “operational area” (
Operationsgebiet).
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This appeared to be regarded as convincing testimony from an objective and professional senior police officer.

On August 9, 1946, Ernst Rode was interrogated regarding the operational circumstances for the Warsaw uprising. Rode gave an explanation that wrapped the SS command system under the Wehrmacht and the army. He told his interrogators that Guderian and Bach-Zelewski took witnesses to their meetings, which is why he was able to testify authoritatively. The combating of the partisans was supposed to be Himmler’s responsibility. Rode placed Guderian in overall command, with Himmler commanding Dirlewanger and Bach-Zelewski under the dual commands of the SS and the army. Rode said Bach-Zelewski had tried to prevent the destruction of Warsaw but implied that Guderian refused to intervene to prevent it. He said the army was always in command and this was proved in the issue of the highest medals. Rode said Bach-Zelewski reported directly to Hitler for resources and decisions. The atrocities committed by Dirlewanger’s and Kaminski’s troops were not sanctioned by Bach-Zelewski. Later, Bach-Zelewski summarily executed Kaminski and had Dirlewanger and his troops removed.
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On August 14, 1946, Bach-Zelewski stated that the Polish uprising initially attacked the local German garrison. Then Himmler intervened and sent
Reinefarth to quell the uprising although the German 9th Army under Vormann was in control of Warsaw. Bach-Zelewski insisted that his only conferences with Guderian were when Rode was present. Guderian had offered him heavy artillery to destroy the city. Bach-Zelewski contended that he had tried to change Guderian’s mind in regard to the reduction of Warsaw, but the latter reacted very coolly and said it was a Hitler order. Bach-Zelewski insisted that Guderian fully appreciated Hitler’s destruction order in detail. He continued by stating that the destruction order was already in progress on his arrival in the city. Guderian, Bach-Zelewski alleged, had informed Vormann and Stahl of the destruction order and therefore the army was responsible. On September 22, Bach-Zelewski maintained that he knew everything in great detail but was responsible for nothing. During this interrogation, he explained how a large-caliber railway mortar and one hundred flamethrowers were used to suppress the uprising. Then, two days later, he alleged that Himmler was very taken with Guderian and they formed a strong working relationship; not unlike Bach-Zelewski and Himmler, it might be noted. On October 5, 1946, Bach-Zelewski was again questioned over the army’s responsibility for the destruction of Warsaw. Bach-Zelewski alleged that Vormann had not been forceful enough to clarify the chains of command or to control the flow of orders. He continued that this weakness made him directly responsible for the deaths. For this reason, the first fourteen days of German counteractions were the responsibility of Vormann and Stahl. Bach-Zelewski then added that the Warsaw Shield had been granted to the men by Hitler but he did not believe they were worthy of it.
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When Nikolaus von Vormann gave evidence on September 21, 1946, he began by stating his command period for the 9th Army: June 25 to September 30, 1944. This confirmed that he was the senior army commander. He then stated that political control originated with the General Government. Vormann stated that the army came under SS control and that the roles were only reversed in terms of military operations. He stated that Kaminski was a disaster for the operations and wanted him removed. Guderian, he alleged, promised good troops but sent a rabble. Vormann added that Bach-Zelewski had received elements of an armored division under his central command. Troops inside the city were under Stahel’s command while troops outside were under Bach-Zelewski, over whom he had no control.
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On October 2, 1946, Vormann alleged that he complained of the atrocities to Army Group Centre and that it was he who had Kaminski removed from Warsaw. He stated that Bach-Zelewski was directly subordinate to Himmler, which was why the men received the Bandenkampfabzeichen, distributed by Bach-Zelewski, instead of the Iron Cross. He was asked the direct question, “In your position as Operational Commander in Chief were you authorized to give orders to [Bach-Zelewski]?” Vormann replied that if Reinefarth and Bach-Zelewski had not complied with his requests, he could overrule them, although he confirmed they were not under his command.

Heinz Reinefarth was questioned on September 19 and 20, 1946. He had arrived in Warsaw on August 5 or 6, 1944, reporting to Vormann on his arrival. He was given command of one army battalion and one police battalion. Reinefarth confirmed that Bach-Zelewski told him of Hitler’s order to destroy the city. Stahel had set up a combat headquarters in Warsaw that was already functioning. He then met Kaminski who was in the uniform of an SS-Brigadeführer; his men were in German army uniforms. According to Reinefarth, Vormann told him that he had given Kaminski the authority to loot Warsaw, which Reinefarth opposed. But Vormann said this was an inducement to fight, as he was well aware of Kaminski’s behavior. Reinefarth firmly stated that Kaminski came under Vormann’s command. Bach-Zelewski had informed Reinefarth of the women and civilians shot and burned. Kaminski was under the command of Rohr, who wanted rid of him because of the behavior of his troops, including rape and murder. Rohr had lost control of Kaminski and his men, who were regularly found inebriated and refused orders. For this reason, Bach-Zelewski decided to remove Kaminski through subterfuge, having him arrested and then executed. Reinefarth finally stated that Bach-Zelewski all along wanted to settle with the Poles through political rather than armed means. But Bach-Zelewski was under Vormann’s command and this constrained his movements.

The end of the Warsaw interrogations and the International Military Tribunal did not end the Warsaw debacle. A most unusual situation arose when Bach-Zelewski was sent, under American immunity but with Polish army guards, to give evidence in a trial of war criminals in Warsaw. Having been responsible for the destruction of Warsaw and the deaths of many Poles, this was indeed ironic. He traveled on February 14, 1947, and remained in Warsaw for four weeks. He provided a report on his return. On arrival in Warsaw, he was taken to the large collection prison of Mokotow, whose inmates included both Poles and Germans. The defendants included Dr. Fischer, Warsaw governor; Otto Meisinger, commander of the Warsaw security police; and Philip Bouhler, who had been involved in the euthanasia program. He gave little evidence in regard to the destruction of Warsaw. A command chart was written down by Bach-Zelewski (refer to Diagram V) and offered into the proceedings. It was intended to portray a confusion of authorities in order to disguise his authority. It appeared to work. True to their word, the Poles returned Bach-Zelewski to the Americans. Thus the destroyer of Warsaw had been protected from a Polish request for extradition. One can only admire the good grace of the Polish people to have suffered such an inequitable situation; it was just another of the many injustices never healed at Nuremberg. Following his evidence, the U.S. ambassador Murphy was passed the testimony on March 3, 1947. A clue to the treatment of the Poles can be found in this testimony:

Since there was no supply department attached to my staff and I
had no supply organizations at my disposal, I had to hand over control to the civil administration but the question of efficiency was not affected…. Finally I state that hundreds of thousands of civilians and tens of thousands of soldiers of Polish nationality owe their lives due to my sense of responsibility alone. For this, my humane victory over crime, Himmler gave me the reward in the form of a communication by a notary, that my brother Victor had died insane in the Boldeschwing Institution, near Bielefeld.
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The subject of Warsaw was again aired, albeit briefly, in the “Hostages” trial, case seven in the military tribunals at Nuremberg. This was prosecuted by the U.S. Army against German officers involved in antipartisan warfare principally in Yugoslavia. It was a strange case because the Yugoslavs had their own war crimes process, while the Americans imprisoned all the leading commanders of the Wehrmacht but had not elected to extradite them. The trial did not attempt to distinguish between antipartisan warfare, Bandenbekämpfung, or crimes committed by the Nazis in the name of security. It was another attempt by Taylor to bury the German army in further shame. Bach-Zelewski again appeared as Taylor’s expert witness. To parry his testimony, the defendants attempted to raise the questions of Warsaw in the court proceedings. By this time, Bach-Zelewski was well versed in manipulating the courtroom into believing his version of events. Immediately after being questioned about Warsaw, he said, “I crushed the insurrection in two months fighting and my troops had ten thousand casualties…. I bear responsibility for my corps in Warsaw then and today and when I was in command of troops I bear all responsibility.”
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Bach-Zelewski was asked if he was in Hitler’s confidence at this time; he replied in the affirmative but stated he was not in Himmler’s. He was asked if he had tried to “exert pressure against the supreme leadership,” to which he replied, “certainly not, sir.” The losses for Warsaw had also changed. In January 1946, Bach-Zelewski claimed he had saved “hundreds of thousands of civilians and tens of thousands of soldiers of Polish nationality.”
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In October 1945, he estimated total losses in six weeks of combat, “20,000 German and Poles 10,000 military and 40,000 civilians.”
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This contrasts with the figures from his dairy listed in appendix 5.