Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (53 page)

Company 1 from the 1/16th Inf still remained in Raudal and at 1910 hours on April 23, it was ordered to advance cross-country towards Lapphaugen and establish contact with its parent battalion. A blizzard prevented it from making its way through the mountains and at 1230 hours on April 24, it was ordered to remain in its position to provide security in the Raudal/Stordal area. However, that same evening the company was ordered back to Bones and the following morning it was directed to join its battalion in Fossbakken. It arrived in Fossbakken, totally exhausted, at 1400 hours.

The Envelopment

The 1/12th Inf started its move from Levangen in the afternoon of April 23. The troops labored incredibly hard to ascend Fjordbotneidet at night, in a raging snowstorm on the steep roadless incline that rose 1,200 to 1,500 feet from the valley bottom. They carried loads of 60 lbs as they struggled forward in snow that was chest deep at times. The wind blowing in their faces made it difficult to see and a large number suffered from snow blindness. It was particularly difficult to bring the artillery forward. Major Bøckman moved the battalion with two companies forward in order to maximize his firepower if he should encounter the enemy. This meant that numerous tracks had to be made through the snow over a relatively broad area. Local guides noted that the winter storm was one of the worst they had experienced in an area where snowstorms are frequent and severe.

There was a misinterpretation of orders from the very start within the right envelopment force. The 1/12th Inf had no contact with the Alta Bn after leaving Tennevoll. The brigade order directed the Alta Bn to provide security for the 1/12th’s right flank and rear. Bøckman interpreted this to mean that the two battalions should advance together across Fjordbotneidet. The brigade commander also understood the division’s directive to mean that the force advancing over Fjordbotneidet consisted of the 1/12th Infantry, the Alta Bn, and half of a mountain artillery battery.

The snowstorm became so bad during the day that Fleischer considered calling off the attack. However, he allowed the operation to proceed since he concluded that it would be more difficult to bring the 1/12th back over the mountains than to allow it to proceed. Fleischer, his chief of staff, and the British liaison officer arrived in Levangen by car in the afternoon of April 23 and Lieutenant Colonel Dahl briefed them. Fleischer planned to spend the night at the 6th Brigade’s CP and left the Alta Bn around 0200 hours on April 24. The weather had turned vicious, the general and his party were snowed in at Levangen, and the house of a merchant in Soløy became the division CP for the rest of the operation. The 1/12th Inf had left a communication relay station in Soløy and this allowed Fleischer to communicate with the Alta Bn, the 1/12th Inf, and the 6th Brigade CP.

Communications problems plagued the operation from the beginning, as did the lack of maps. The radio communication equipment promised the 1/12th Inf in the operational order failed to materialize and the detachment laying landlines as the unit advanced failed to keep up in the storm. Major Bøckman sent his adjutant to the rear to inform the brigade that the battalion, because of the weather and limited visibility, could not accomplish its mission of preventing traffic on Route 50 from Gratangen to Lapphaugen. Brøckman’s orders called for blocking Route 50 by fire from the hills to the north. He was not permitted to enter the valley. Hovland’s explanation for Fleischer’s decision that the 1/12th should not enter the valley but should cut the German line of retreat and reinforcement by blocking-fire from afar is that he wanted to give the battalion a “careful baptism of fire.”

Bøckman now requested brigade permission to enter the valley and physically cut Route 50. This request came to Fleischer’s attention and he concluded that it was inappropriate for Colonel Løken to direct the operation over Fjordbotneidet since the brigade no longer had reliable communications with the 1/12th. After a short telephone call to the brigade, Fleischer assumed direct control of the two battalions in the envelopment. The frontal attack on Lapphaugen and the envelopment were two parts of the same operation but now those two parts answered to two commanders.

It appears that the brigade CP had no great difficulties communicating with the 1/12th Infantry’s communications relay station since Fleischer, who was located near that station, communicated regularly with the brigade by telephone. The difficulty was with communications between that station and the battalion. Therefore, Fleischer’s assumption of control failed to solve the communications problem.

General Fleischer approved Major Bøckman’s request to cross into the Gratang Valley to the Fjellhøgda Farm and ordered him to send security into the south mountains, including Hill 509, if that was possible. The lead elements of the battalion cut Route 50 around 0600 hours on April 24. This severed the road between the reinforced German company at Lapphaugen and the rest of the battalion in the Gratangen area. The half battery of mountain artillery supporting the 1/12th remained on Fjordbotneidet, in a position where it could fire into the valley.

No German units were sighted except for a three-man patrol that was captured. Major Bøckman concluded that the German battalion had withdrawn its forward line to the high ground in the pass between Gratangen and Bjerkvik. He planned to send reconnaissance into the mountains south of Route 50 but the soldiers were too exhausted after their overnight advance in the blizzard.

The troops needed shelter and food and the adjutant skied back to the communications relay to brief the division and ask for permission to go into quarters on the farms near Route 50. This request was approved provided the battalion employed strong local security. According to the adjutant, Major Lindbäck-Larsen told him that the Alta Bn was advancing across Fjordbotneidet to secure the 1/12th Infantry’s flank and rear and that a conclusion of operations at Lapphaugen was expected within a couple of hours. This indicates that the division was aware of the movement of the Alta Bn despite later claims that the battalion had moved without authorization prior to the order to do so that evening.

The 1/12th took up quarters in the valley between 1700 and 1800 hours, with the rifle companies in the built-up area north of the river and the battalion CP and headquarters’ company in the area between the river and Route 50. The machinegun platoons were attached to the rifle companies. The positions astride Route 50 that the battalion had spent the day preparing were abandoned with the intention of reoccupying them at 0600 hours on April 25. As at Bjørnefjell, no security forces were left in the defensive positions. This was an indefensible breach of elementary rules for military units in proximity of the enemy.

The unit’s 15-hour march over mountains in a howling blizzard and a further 12 hours preparing defensive positions stretched the soldiers’ physical and mental capabilities to their limits. It would have been wise to rest the troops in shifts as soon as they reached the valley. However, physical exhaustion does not explain why Majors Omdal and Spjældnes allowed a similar thing to happen at Bjørnefjell.

Because of the storm and limited visibility, the companies were ordered to establish only close-in security and to maintain unit cohesion as they took quarters. It is obvious, based on subsequent events, that the security measures were inadequate. The Germans noted, “The Norwegians did not figure on any German counterattack because of the storm and the deep snow and were so negligent that hardly any sentries secured their nightly rest area.”
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The Frontal Attack

Another reason for Fleischer assuming direct command of the enveloping force and for allowing the 1/12th to take quarters in the valley may have been his belief that the attack against Lapphaugen was going well. In fact, it was not launched according to plan and was not going well. The heavy snowstorm was the primary factor for the faltering attack, but the way it was executed and the determination by which it was pursued by the brigade contributed to its failure.

The 2/15th Inf advanced with two companies forward, but in a rather disorganized fashion due to the blizzard. Company 5 advanced along Route 50 while Co 6 tried to make a curve-like advance to the right of Co 5, allowing it to approach the German positions from the northeast near the eastern point of Lake Lapphaugvannet. Company 5 had to shift to the left in order to give room for Co 6. The battalion reserve, Co 7 with an attached machinegun platoon, followed behind and slightly to the north of Co 6.

The attack started shortly before 1000 hours on April 24, ten hours later than planned, after Battery 7 fired a 20-minute preparation. The heavy weapons company’s mortars and machineguns fired on the German positions for five minutes during a momentary clearing in the weather. The advancing Norwegian troops had snow driven by gale force winds in their faces, resulting in near-zero visibility. The German defenders had the wind at their backs, making it much easier to observe to their front. The Norwegians struggled to make headway through heavy snow. Their skis sank into the loose snow up to their knees. The attack came to a halt in the bad weather, and the forward troops dug in and fired at the Germans during the brief moments of visibility.

It was much the same story with Co 6. Its attack was stopped by German fire and the troops sought concealment by digging into the snow. One soldier was killed. Company 7 attempted a flanking movement, approaching the German positions from the north, but was caught in the open by German machinegun fire and two of its soldiers were killed before the unit withdrew into the wood line. The 2/15th Infantry’s attack came to a halt by noon.

The Norwegians made the mistake of not maintaining contact with the enemy. They even failed to keep the German positions under observation after the initial attack failed. Consequently, they were unaware that the Germans withdrew from Lapphaugen around 1500 hours.

Colonel Løken had a significant superiority in numbers with almost two battalions supported by two and a half batteries of artillery and heavy mortars. However, he used his resources in a piecemeal and hesitant manner. The 1/16th, minus one company, was scheduled to advance on the left flank of the 2/15th. That battalion arrived in Fossbakken at 2300 hours the previous night after a tortuous march from Bones. It went into bivouac in the woods a short distance south of Fossbakken. For reasons that are not obvious, the 1/16th did not participate in the initial attack.

Around 1300 hours, the brigade tried to get the attack going again by sending the 1/16th along the southern hillside where it could approach the German positions from the southeast. The heavy snowfall prevented the 1/16th from reaching its attack position during the day, despite enormous efforts. The snow was so deep that it was impossible to bring heavy weapons forward even with the use of sleds. Major Hunstad, the battalion commander, finally reported to Løken around 2000 hours that his battalion was in position about one kilometer east of Lapphaugen and was ready to attack.

The brigade, however, concluded that a continuation of the attack at night in a snowstorm was pointless. The 1/16th was ordered into bivouac positions between Lapphaugen and Fossbakken and it arrived there around midnight. We do not know why Colonel Løken did not order the 1/16th to proceed westward another two kilometers and take up positions in Oalgge Pass instead of withdrawing two kilometers eastward to its bivouac area. While the 1/16th could not trap the Germans because they withdrew around 1500 hours, the Norwegians did not know this and occupation of the pass would have cut the line of retreat for the German company the Norwegians still believed was at Lapphaugen. The companies from the 2/15th were also withdrawn a short distance and went into bivouac in the same general area as the 1/16th. The brigade notified division that blizzard conditions made a continuation of the attack on Lapphaugen impossible.

The termination of the frontal attack left the 1/12th Inf in position behind the enemy force withdrawing from Lapphaugen. The battalion therefore sat astride the line of retreat of a smaller German force. However, the division worried that the 1/12th would be caught between German forces at Lapphaugen and other units further south and decided to make deployment changes. The Alta Bn was ordered to break out of its bivouac in Levangen and proceed through Fjordbotneidet to secure 1/12th Infantry’s right flank. The Alta Bn was in fact already in positions on the south side of Fjordbotneidet, behind the 1/12th.

Lindbäck-Larsen writes that the early movement of the Alta Bn was contrary to operational plans. Lieutenant Colonel Dahl maintains that he received orders to move forward earlier than claimed by Lindbäck-Larsen otherwise he would not have taken his battalion on a 15-hour, 1,200 feet ascent in the most difficult weather conditions imaginable. Dahl’s adjutant reported later that his commander received orders to move forward around 0500 hours on April 24 because the 1/12th Inf had entered the Gratang Valley.
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Whatever the case, the early move was fortunate since Dahl’s battaliion was already in the position to which the division now ordered it.

However, the division limited the Alta Battalion’s role to protecting the right flank of the 1/12th and supporting it by fire. It was ordered not to enter the valley. The Alta Bn had no contact with the 1/12th after midnight. The supporting unit was responsible for maintaining contact with the supported unit. This was apparently not done.

Fleischer’s second action dealt with the 1/16th Inf, a unit already worn down from moving around in a winter blizzard for two days without much rest. The general directed the brigade to send this battalion to Tennevoll in Levangen where it would come under the division commander’s direct control. The battalion received the movement order at 0230 hours on April 25, two and a half hours after it had reached its bivouac.

This action changed the very nature of the offensive since the northern pincer over Fjordbotneidet now became the main effort. Colonel Løken’s original command of four infantry battalions was reduced to one, with the other three now under Fleischer’s direct command. There was no obvious need for a third battalion on the northern flank and certainly no need for it to make another exhausting night move in a snowstorm. Over three feet of new snow had fallen and the battalion commander stated that he was uncertain when he could reach his destination. The battalion was then ordered to rest in a bivouac at Fossbakken before making the move.