Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (66 page)

In the evening of May 2, after a delay of nearly 24 hours, the 6th Bde ordered the 1/16th Inf to resume its advance along the east side of Gressvann towards the area to the northeast of Storfossen. The battalion was reinforced by Co 5 from the 2/16th. Major Hunstad began his advance at 0400 hours on May 3 with two companies forward, the 1st on the left and the 3rd on the right. While Co 3 followed the east shore of the lake, Co 1 worked itself diagonally up the steep mountainside into a flanking position between Hills 1013 and 1146. Despite continued fire from German positions on the high ground to the west and on the northwest slope of Bukkefjell, the battalion reached its initial objective at the southern end of the lake.

The German positions southeast of the cabin, on the northwest slope of Bukkefjell, were the battalion’s next objective. Company 1 worked its way along the foot of Hill 1146 towards the German right flank. The company eventually reached an avalanche within 400 meters of the Germans. Company 3 occupied the high ground east of the cabin. Both companies found themselves in open terrain under heavy German fire that the artillery and mortars failed to silence. Around 2000 hours, Hunstad ordered the companies to dig in for the night. It took quite an effort to keep the troops, soaked from the wet snow, from falling asleep.

There were good reasons for the stiffened German resistance. The 16-man detachment, driven back on May 1, was reinforced that evening by a platoon from Schleebrügge’s force. The defenses in the Sorebalak-Gressvann area were taken over by Lieutenant Müller’s company in the early evening of May 3. Dietl and Windisch were sufficiently concerned about the Norwegian threat in the east to order Co 11 commanded by Captain Lömberger to move into the area between Læigastind (Hill 1335) and Britatind (Hill 1009). Company 11 had just arrived in the Storfossen area from Bjerkvik and Co Erdmenger took over its positions in that area.

The left prong of the Norwegian advance ran out of steam at the line reached by Major Hunstad’s battalion. This was five kilometers short of the 6th Brigade’s objective for the offensive. The 1/16th Inf remained in these positions until May 5 when the battalion was relieved by the 2/16th Inf and given another mission. The 1/16th was first moved to a rest area north of Hill 437 but after a couple of hours in that position, it was alerted for an advance via Lortvann to the lake on the east side of Læigastind (Hill 1335). At that point, the battalion would come under the operational control of the 7th Brigade. The withdrawal of 1/16th Inf from the Gressdal front was compensated for by the movement of 1/12th Inf to the north end of Gressvann where it became the brigade reserve.

The 2/16th Inf continued the pressure on the German positions on the ridgeline between Bukkefjell and Gressdalselven (Gressdal River), placing these positions under heavy direct and indirect fire. Because of this pressure, the Germans withdrew and the Norwegians promptly occupied their positions. The Germans carried out a series of air attacks against the 2/16th on May 7 without inflicting any serious casualties. The Norwegians continued to probe towards Storfossen and the north side of Storebalak where the Germans had now established a number of defensive positions. The Gressdal River had thawed below Storfossen and it was not possible to move ammunition, supplies, and heavy weapons forward using sleds. The Norwegians examined alternate routes over the mountain plateau east of Storebalak.

The Germans concluded that the Norwegian advance in Gressdal had ended and that they were preparing an operation to bypass Gressdal with an advance through Bukkedal and against Storebalak. These conclusions were undoubtedly based on the failure of 2/16th to resume the attack in force and observations of Norwegian activities associated with the examination of alternate routes.

There are several reasons for the failure of General Fleischer’s main effort to reach its objective. The Norwegians neglected to secure Britatind overlooking the route of advance through Gressdal. The division reported the mountain clear of German units, but the Norwegians failed to send forces to occupy it. The early and piecemeal beginning of the 6th Brigade’s offensive tipped their hand and Colonel Windisch’s quick recognition of the dangers posed by the Norwegian advance in Gressdal and Dietl’s quick dispatch of three companies to this flank averted a serious problem.

Major Schleebrügge’s grasp that Britatind was the key to the operation and his quick occupation of that objective enabled the Germans to place flanking fire on the advancing Norwegian troops. At the same time, his quick reinforcement of the German defenders in Gressdal reduced the chance of a Norwegian breakthrough.

The 6th Brigade attacked with two battalions but, as noted, the 2/16th Inf had been reduced to little more than a reinforced company when it began its advance. The weakest battalion was given the lead and there was insufficient space in the valley to deploy more the one battalion at a time.

General Dietl noted that Norwegian marksmanship was outstanding and their winter equipment and cross-country mobility was superior. However, their lack of aggressiveness when faced with obstacles demonstrated that they had still not achieved the required experience to eliminate quickly even a few determined defenders.
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There was a change in command of the 6th Brigade on May 8. Colonel Løken was reassigned to command the 6th District Command when Colonel Mjelde fell ill. Lieutenant Colonel Ole Berg, who had been a member of General Ruge’s staff, became the new 6th Brigade’s commander. This change of command came after the left prong of the Norwegian offensive ran out of steam and it could therefore not have contributed to the abandonment of the Gressdal attack.

The Germans were experiencing problems of their own. They were outnumbered by more than 6 to 1 on the northern front and they lacked some key equipment for winter warfare. There are repeated references in the 3rd Division journal to requests for such things as sunglasses and snowshoes. These were slow in arriving and General Dietl finally sent a curt message to General Jodl on May 4 stating that despite repeated requests, equipment needed badly by Group Windisch had not arrived. The 3rd Division was informed within four hours that sunglasses and snowshoes were on their way. The first parachute drop to Group Windisch on May 6 resulted in a mess of broken sunglasses.

The Germans also had difficulties obtaining ground support from the Luftwaffe. There are repeated references in the 3rd Division journal to requests for air support that was not provided, to requested aircraft arriving in the area but not dropping bombs, and to the Luftwaffe bombing German positions. One such incident resulted in six killed and four wounded. The problem was twofold. The Luftwaffe had not provided liaison to Dietl’s forces, not even a transmitter/receiver by which they could communicate with the aircraft. Radio equipment was finally delivered on May 6.

The second problem with air support was that pilots used maps with a scale of 1:1,000,000, rendering accurate air support an impossibility. Major Schleebrügge’s forces were bombed by their own aircraft on May 7 and he sent a blunt message that was relayed to Group XXI and the air support center in Trondheim. The major pointed out that effective close air support was impossible without a direct radio link between the troops and supporting aircraft. The maps carried by pilots made it impossible to distinguish between friendly and enemy positions in the mountainous terrain. Under these conditions, calling for air support often made a bad situation worse.

Attack by the Chasseurs Alpins

The dispositions of the 7th Brigade and the 6th Bn, 27th CA were discussed earlier in this chapter. There was still some movement of forces on April 30 in preparation for the planned offensive. The reinforced Co 2 from the Reserve Battalion, 16th Inf arrived by sea from Salangen and deployed to Foldevik and Laberget as rear security. The 6th Reserve Medical Company was also on its way by sea to the same location.

Lieutenant Colonel Dahl issued the attack order on May 1. The French forces were to attack that same day towards the southern end of Storevann with three companies driving south through Labergsdal while the fourth company and the mortars advanced along Route 50. These forces would converge at the southern end of Storevann. The Alta Bn remained in its positions in the Fjelldal-Holtås area during this initial phase of the attack and awaited further orders. The 2/15th Inf was in an assembly area in the woods southeast of Kvernmoen, while the 7th Mountain Artillery Battery was in position in the Fjellhøgda area. The 9th Motorized Artillery Battery did not reach the area until May 7 because the roads had to be cleared of snow.

Aerial reconnaissance indicated that the Germans had abandoned their positions north of Hestevann, the northernmost lake in the string of lakes on the east side of Route 50. The reconnaissance also showed that there were German defensive positions in the valley between Hills 513 and 785.

Reconnaissance by Co 5, 2/15th Inf in Labergdal revealed that the Germans had a strong blocking position in Nedre Labergdal. A German platoon-size force occupied the blocking position in an area consisting of large boulders from which they dominated the flat valley below. Major Celerier, commander of the 6th Bn CA, conducted a personal reconnaissance with Captain Hanekamhaug, commander of Co 5, 2/15th. In the afternoon of April 30, Celerier ordered Hanekamhaug’s company, reinforced by the battalion’s SES, to seize the German positions on May 1.

Hanekamhaug’s plan involved sending two platoons towards the German positions along the valley bottom, one on each side of the river. The two platoons were to approach the German positions frontally and halt at a distance where fire directed towards them would be ineffective. Hanekamhaug with the other two platoons and the French SES constituted the main attack. This force would advance along the western slopes of Snaufjell, approaching the German flank from the northeast.

The advance began at 0500 hours. The two platoons in the valley moved to within 500 meters of the German positions and dug in without receiving fire. The Germans were so preoccupied with this direct approach that they did not notice the advance of the main attacking force along the west slope of Snaufjell. When Captain Hanekamhaug came even with the Germans, he ordered the French Lieutenant Blin, commander of the SES, to close on the enemy positions. Hanekamhaug sent one platoon and the machineguns forward another 300 meters as security against an expected German counterattack.

Lieutenant Blin and his men were able to approach the Germans unnoticed and when his men were in a good location to storm the positions, they opened a devastating volley. After about two minutes of intense fire, the Germans displayed the white flag of surrender and 18 of them with six machineguns passed into captivity. The Norwegian reports are full of praise for the conduct of their French allies in this operation. The two Norwegian platoons in the valley occupied the German positions quickly and prepared for a counterattack. The counterattack came in less than 30 minutes against the Norwegian left flank and some of the Norwegian troops in the 1st Platoon were driven temporarily from their positions. The German attack was eventually repulsed but not before the 1st Platoon commander was fatally wounded.

A three-man Norwegian patrol sent out shortly before the German counterattack to establish contact with the French unit advancing along Route 50 was lost. Another squad size patrol was sent out on the morning of May 2. It worked its way past the German machinegun nests, established contact with the French unit, returned without losses, and provided important information on German dispositions.

While the Norwegians and French had successfully eliminated the German blocking position between Nedre and Øvre Labergsdal, the Germans succeeded not only in blocking further French advances through Labergsdal and along Route 50, but also occupied the Snaufjell mountain between the two axes of advance. From this high ground, small German ski detachments harassed the French units constantly and made it impossible to establish any reliable contact between the two axes of advance. The German ski platoon on Snaufjell was small, only about 20 men. Lieutenant Colonel Valentini finally requested that Lieutenant Colonel Dahl clear the Snaufjell plateau with Norwegian ski troops. Captain Hanekamhaug was given this mission.

Major Celerier opposed the operation because he believed the Norwegians would take heavy casualties. Consequently, Hanekamhaug’s order was changed to a reconnaissance in force of the western, northern, and eastern approaches to Snaufjell. The company, with SES attached, carried out the reconnaissance, often under fire, in an exhaustive 25-hour march that brought them back to Labergsdal through Elvenes. In the process, Hanekamhaug’s troops drove the Germans from Hill 513, and this allowed the French in Labergsdal to establish contact with their company on Route 50. The reconnaissance resulted in a sketch map of the German positions, but this proved of little help as the Germans kept shifting their men from position to position, giving the impression that the mountain was held by a much larger force than they actually had.

French attempts to clear the Germans from Snaufjell were slow and methodical against stiff German opposition. The German forces in this isolated position were resupplied by air and General Béthouart reported that they displayed “extraordinary endurance.”
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The slow French progress was due to their lack of training in winter conditions and their shortage of appropriate equipment. Béthouart was well aware of the difficulties his troops faced. He ordered that all operations take place at night in order to minimize exposure to German air attack and to take advantage of the improved mobility provided by the night frost. Béthouart concluded that it would take a long time to reach Narvik from the north. Admiral Cork eventually ordered that French troops on the northern front limit themselves to keeping the Germans tied down until the planned landing in the Bjerkvik area drew German forces in that direction.
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The Norwegians were not informed about this decision. The result was that the hopes in the original plan of bypassing the German positions on Gratangseidet by the advance through Labergsdal never came to fruition. The Norwegians demanded better operational coordination, which was one of the reasons for Lindbäck-Larsen’s visit to the British headquarters in Harstad on May 6, discussed earlier in this chapter.