Immigration Wars: Forging an American Solution (4 page)

It was not always that way. In 1970, work-based immigration accounted for 70 percent of all newcomers in the United States.
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But since federal law was changed to make extended family preferences the paramount immigration priority, the numbers have flipped. By 2011, about one million immigrants were granted permanent
legal residence in the States—about average for the past decade.
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Of that number, 453,000—nearly half—were immediate family members, either spouses, minor children, or parents of U.S. citizens, mostly prior immigrants. Another 235,000 were other relatives, including adult children, grandchildren, and siblings. In other words, nearly 65 percent—almost two-thirds—of all new permanent residents obtained that status by virtue of their family status.

By contrast, only 139,000—roughly 13 percent—were admitted for work purposes. Another 113,000 were refugees, and 50,000 came in through the “diversity lottery.” That lottery was created so that specific countries would not completely dominate immigration—indeed, it is thought to have been a nod to the Irish immigrant lobby. The diversity lottery illustrates vividly the pent-up demand for American immigration: in 2008, 13.6 million foreigners competed for the 50,000 diversity slots, or approximately 250 applicants for every visa.
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Yet aside from relatives of existing immigrants, workers, refugees, and a handful of other highly specialized visa categories, the tremendously oversubscribed diversity lottery is the only means for most people to lawfully enter the United States.

We cannot get a handle on our immigration system until we
deal seriously with the family preference policy. Family reunification encompasses two categories. The first includes “immediate” relatives, defined as spouses, unmarried minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens. Those relatives have no numerical limits. The second category is preferential admissions, which extends to unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens, immediate family members of permanent legal residents, adult married children of U.S. citizens, and siblings of U.S. citizens. The second category is capped at around 226,000 per year. The total number of family reunification immigrants is far greater than the numbers forecast by proponents of the current immigration law.

When parents and siblings are given immigration preference, their entry in turn creates an entitlement to vast numbers of other extended family members to gain preference as well—a phenomenon called “chain immigration.” Indeed, the numbers are so great that even with family members accounting for nearly two-thirds of all legal immigrants, there still are large backlogs of eligible family members waiting for admission.

In terms of cost/benefit analysis, extended family members typically do not produce the economic benefits that work-based immigrants do, and they impose far greater costs. Many extended family immigrants are children, elderly people, or others who do
not work yet often consume a disproportionate share of social services such as schooling and health care.

If we want to increase the number of work-based immigrants without substantially increasing the overall number of immigrants, we must reduce family-based immigration. To do so requires narrowing the definition of “family” for purposes of admission preferences. The United States is an outlier in that regard. The European Union, for instance, limits family reunification to spouses and minor children.
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We propose limiting guaranteed admissions to spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens. Reuniting married couples and their children is the essence of family reunification. By contrast, siblings and parents cause substantial chain immigration because their children, siblings, and parents then receive guaranteed admission preference as well. We would further modify the policy in two ways. First, we would “grandfather” relatives who have applied for family reunification at the time the new policy is adopted, so that they do not have to start the process over again. Second, we would add to the guaranteed admission category the spouses and unmarried minor children of legal permanent residents. Because they are currently relegated to the second tier of the preferential admissions policy, many husbands, wives, and children of permanent
legal residents are separated for many years—which creates pressure for the legal permanent residents to leave or to bring in their families illegally.

Critics object that defining family as a nuclear family reflects Western values rather than the cultural values of many current immigrants. Well, yes. We are a Western nation, and our immigration policies should reflect our values. But Americans also accord significant value to extended families, and we certainly do not propose to exclude them. Extended family relatives should be allowed to pursue a path to American immigration—but in our view, through normal (though expanded) immigration channels rather than by the preference given to other types of immigrants.

Narrowing the scope of family preferences would open hundreds of thousands of opportunities for immigrants even without expanding the current numbers of legal immigrants who come to the U.S. each year. Given the urgency of bringing in highly skilled immigrants and giving them a path to citizenship, it is imperative to do just that.

We propose to create four general categories of immigration:

1. Family immigration, defined as spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents.

2. Work-based visas, vastly expanded beyond current numbers. We will discuss below the parameters of how this system would work.

3. A system of regular immigration. This system would replace the diversity lottery and increase its numbers. Anyone sponsored by a U.S. citizen who does not have a criminal record and who will not be dependent on social services could seek admission through this process—including extended family members of current U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents—on a nonpreferential, first-come, first-served basis.

4. Refugee and asylum immigration.

Based on current numbers, we estimate that under this new policy, family preference admissions would comprise about 350,000 immigrants annually and refugees would continue to amount to 100,000 annually. Even without an increase in current immigration numbers, that would leave about 550,000 spots for regular and work-based immigrants. If those were divided fifty-fifty, that would double the current number of opportunities for work-based immigrants while still providing ample opportunities for family-based immigration and for others who wish to come to the United States.

Creating a “normal” path to citizenship would be a very important step in meaningful immigration reform. This is what most people think of as the traditional process of immigration. Most Americans probably don’t realize that the traditional avenue of immigration is all but foreclosed by our current system. While past immigrants “waited their turn in line,”
there is no line in which most of those aspiring to become Americans can wait with any realistic hope of gaining admission
. By resurrecting that vital process, and increasing work-based immigration, we would greatly reduce the pressure for illegal immigration.

An example of people who could take advantage of a normal immigration path is members of the Chinese middle class, hundreds of thousands of whom leave China every year.
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They tend to be professionals and have some savings; but if they are not students or wealthy investors, don’t have special skills, or don’t have relatives in the United States, there is little prospect for them to emigrate to the States. Typical among them is Wang Ruijin, a secretary at a Beijing media company, who lamented that to “get along here [in China] you have to be corrupt or have connections; we prefer a stable life.” She and her husband plan to send their daughter to school in New Zealand, in the hope that it will open the door for the entire family to leave. Because the United States
does not have an option for such immigrants, we are losing out on many hardworking people who would enrich our country.

The overall immigration process would be further enhanced if the immigration agency could project an estimated waiting time, assigning numbers and personal representatives so that aspirant immigrants can make plans and stay informed on the status of their applications. That would be especially helpful for work-based visa holders who are often in immigration limbo, not allowed to change jobs and having no idea when or whether they will be able to obtain green cards. A reformed immigration process should embody the two essential elements of an efficient, functioning system that promotes the rule of law: certainty and predictability.

We would divide the increased number of work-based visas between highly skilled workers and a guest-worker program for less-skilled workers. For both types of workers, we should create a clear path for citizenship.

One major flaw in our current system is that foreign students gain valuable postsecondary education in the United States and then are not able to obtain work visas. Likewise, highly skilled workers obtain work visas but then cannot obtain green cards. Two important changes would be enormously helpful in increasing
the supply of skilled immigrants. First, students who obtain advanced degrees in the STEM fields—science, technology, engineering, and mathematics—should automatically be entitled to work visas if they obtain jobs in those fields following graduation. That employment should not solely be tied to large companies, but should include small companies and start-ups that are such dynamic forces in our economy. Second, workers in especially important occupations requiring specialized skills should be given green cards after a specified time, and they should know that up front.

Some countries are using point systems to determine entry priorities for immigrant workers with special skills. We believe the immigration agency should be able to establish priorities based on objective criteria including skills that are in particular demand and unemployment rates in specific occupations. In that way, our immigration system will enable us to meet our most urgent needs while not exacerbating unemployment.

Reform also should encompass entrepreneurs. Current law provides for a small number of short-term EB-5 visas for foreigners who invest $500,000 in distressed areas. If the investment creates at least ten new jobs, the visa converts automatically to a green card. In 2008, 945 immigrants invested $400 million under
the program. Similarly, a proposed StartUp Visa Act has bipartisan support. It would give two-year visas to foreigners who are able to attract $250,000 in capital from American investors. If they create five or more jobs and exceed $1 million in revenues or new capital, the visa is converted to a green card.
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We favor all of the above, in unlimited numbers. We cannot have enough new investors. But we are mindful of the fact that the vast majority of the founders of immigrant-created start-up businesses came not as investors or entrepreneurs but as students or workers. Student visas should be plentiful and readily accessible, not only for the talent that many foreign students bring as possible future Americans, but for the goodwill toward America they engender if they return to their native countries. In this regard, private universities provide an excellent screening mechanism to bring in the most talented students, eliminating the need for government to make such determinations.
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Similarly, a guest-worker program linked to market demand is an essential part of fundamental immigration reform. The temporary guest-worker visa should be renewable on an annual basis so long as the work relationship continues. If jobs disappear, the number of guest-worker visas will decline as well.

The Krieble Foundation advocates a “red card” program, in
which temporary foreign workers would be matched in a computer database with prospective employers. The employees would then be issued a red card with a microchip that allows immigration authorities to monitor entry and exit, and can be used by the employer to verify eligibility. Guest workers would be subject to all applicable laws such as minimum wage and payroll taxes. Such a policy would ensure an adequate but not excessive flow of temporary workers for the many jobs that cannot easily be filled by native-born workers—and again allows the market, rather than the government, to determine which skills are needed and which workers are best suited to provide them.

A temporary guest-worker process also allows us to “test-drive” future American citizens. Current law requires temporary workers to declare their intent not to immigrate to the United States.
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That makes no sense given that the guest-worker program provides a chance for visitors to demonstrate the qualities we desire for American citizenship. We believe that after five years of working pursuant to renewable temporary work visas, guest workers should be entitled to green cards if they have obeyed the law and paid taxes. Many guest workers intend to perform only seasonal work in the United States, so this will not necessarily provide an incentive for them. But by establishing a path to citizenship
for those who follow the rules and benefit our country, we remove yet another perverse incentive for illegal immigration for those who would like to remain in the United States permanently.

One more reform is absolutely essential: numbers for work-based visas should be automatically adjusted, using similar objective criteria, on an annual basis to reflect changes in market needs. Most countries’ immigration numbers adjust to changed conditions; ours, by contrast, are cast in stone.
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The recent experience with the expiration of increased numbers for high-skilled work visas—which shrunk the number by nearly two-thirds—caused severe shortages of skilled workers. Yet at the time the numbers expired, Congress was politically paralyzed on immigration issues and unable to act. We cannot afford to risk future supply of skilled workers on ever-shifting political vagaries. By establishing objective criteria pursuant to which automatic numerical adjustments are made, we create a demand-based immigration system that we might call the Goldilocks system: never too hot, never too cold, and always just about right. Any future Congress could, of course, adjust the formula. But the point is that appropriate shifts in immigration numbers would not require congressional action and thus would not be subject to the vicissitudes of politics.