Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect (27 page)

Hamas even broke with its old ally Hezbollah. On June 17, 2013, Hamas called on Hezbollah to withdraw its troops from Syria and concentrate on the fight against Israel.
⁴¹

Hamas turned for support to Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. The emir of Qatar became the first head of state to visit Gaza and pledged $400 million in aid. Hamas's shift away from Syria and Iran could have long-term ramifications. Hamas leaders could remain independent, accepting money from diverse sources. Or their close reliance on money from US allies such as the gulf countries could open new possibilities for US and Israeli influence. If that seismic shift were to occur, at a minimum, Hamas would have to be included in the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. That doesn't appear likely anytime soon.

Palestinian views on Syria are divided. In the beginning they welcomed an uprising that would replace Assad with a popular government more supportive of the Palestinian cause. As the civil war dragged on, however, they became concerned with external forces and extremist groups hijacking the uprising. Nevertheless, Palestinians overwhelmingly opposed Assad. A poll by the Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research showed only 12.6 percent of Gaza and West Bank residents
supported Assad's regime.
⁴²
A University of Haifa opinion poll among Israeli Arabs, also known as 1948 Palestinians, indicated that 72 percent supported or strongly supported the end of Assad's regime.
⁴³

To be sure, some Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza supported Assad. The Arab Socialist Baath Party in Palestine has held small rallies in the West Bank. Hamas prohibited pro-Assad demonstrations in Gaza, although some Assad supporters tried to organize rallies. A few prominent Palestinians supported the Syrian regime, most notably Bishop Atallah Hanna of the Greek Orthodox Church in Jerusalem.
⁴⁴

Political leader Barghouti, on the other hand, said the Arab Spring revolutions, including in Syria, would eventually triumph. “I believe this is just one stage, like has happened in many revolutions in the world. You have revolutions and counterrevolutions. People seek their way. I'm optimistic.”
⁴⁵

Palestinians overwhelmingly rejected foreign interference in Syria's war. Sixty-three percent opposed US and European arms going to the rebels, according to a 2013 Pew research poll.
⁴⁶

A similar percentage opposed US military intervention in Syria, a view that united Hamas and Fatah as well. Both argued that any US attack would serve to put pro-US forces in power, not help the Syrian people. “The Americans do not want good [for] the Syrian people,” said Hamas spokesman Salah Bardaweel. “The Americans only want to serve American and Israeli interests.”
⁴⁷
Fatah also strongly condemned US hypocrisy in criticizing Syria's use of chemical weapons. Fatah official Abbas Zaki said that the United States didn't act “when Israel used phosphorous weapons during its aggression against the Gaza Strip in 2008 and 2009.”
⁴⁸

Palestinians don't want foreign domination of Syria, but neither do they want dictatorship—secular or religious. Assad used support for Palestine as a justification for staying in power. But it turns out that he had little justification to claim their popular support.

Israelis and Palestinians can't help but see Syrian developments through their own lenses. For Israeli leaders, the civil war gave them
temporary respite from a devilish leader but presented the possibility of ultra-right-wing Islamists gaining influence. They continue to fear democratic reforms in the Middle East. “We are a minority in the region,” explained history professor Zisser. “Minorities always prefer a strong authoritarian regime rather than a popular regime backed by an unreliable majority.”
⁴⁹

Palestinians said such a view dooms Israel to isolation and paranoia. “The Israelis are afraid of Arab democracy,” said political leader Barghouti. “Israel is shortsighted because democracy will come to the Arab world.”
⁵⁰

This argument reminded me a lot of the discussion I had with Rabbi Zeldin in 1967. Back then, Israel had to ally with dictators such as the Shah of Iran and leaders of apartheid South Africa because if the masses took over in those countries, they would oppose Israeli policies. Memo to Israeli leaders: maybe Israeli policy is the problem, not the people of the world.

I got lost on my way to the State Department. I showed up at the main headquarters, a massive, fortresslike building taking up several city blocks in downtown Washington, DC. But guards at the building had never heard of who I was supposed to meet. Turns out I was at the wrong place. My meeting was in an annex across the street and down the block.

A young woman employee in this section had been after me for months to talk with her colleagues about what was wrong with US policy in Syria. I was openly skeptical about any impact my definitely outside-the-box views might have. But she was very insistent. I finally agreed but only if I could also get a State Department interview to use in my articles and in this book. We struck the deal. I put on my nicest sport coat and conservative tie, got on the metro, and headed to Foggy Bottom.

At the time of our interview, in April 2012, the State Department was officially supporting the nonviolent resistance in Syria led by the Syrian National Council (SNC). The State Department wanted the American people to believe that the SNC represented the major Syrian opposition groups. Its leader, Radwan Ziadeh, had lived in the United States, spoke fluent English, and promised democracy and pluralism for the new Syria.

I sat down with an official State Department spokesperson, who, under Washington rules, wouldn't allow his name to be used. When asked which group in the SNC actually provided a democratic alternative to Assad, he paused for a full fifteen seconds. “We continue to encourage and cajole them to lay out a vision. It's a work in progress.”
¹
So even after working with internal and external opposition groups for over a year, US plans weren't going so well.

Another State Department source, we'll call her “Kathy,” explained the US conundrum. She didn't want her name used, fearing retaliation for her critical views. She said the Obama administration had provided $100 million for salaries and equipment to the SNC as of April 2012. “But the SNC is faction-ridden,” she told me. We're trying to find a horse we can ride but we're not having much luck.”
²

The official spokesperson admitted that Syria provided unique problems for the United States. Syria has a Sunni majority but also many minority groups. He insisted that the SNC was inclusive of all of these groups. He admitted, however, that they had little in common beyond favoring the downfall of Assad. “Once the common enemy is removed, that's when the divisions occur.” He added, “We do understand this is a long haul.”
³
However, the Obama administration had no idea how long the “long haul” would be.

In practice, the SNC was never able to gather broad support within Syria. By October 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared the SNC a failure. The United States finally acknowledged that the SNC didn't represent the struggle inside Syria and lacked participation by minority groups.
⁴
In November, the SNC was replaced by a new coalition, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. That coalition also failed to develop significant support inside Syria, while conservative and ultraconservative Islamists continued to grow (see chapters
5
–
6
).

Meanwhile, the Obama administration was pursuing a secret, military track. The CIA began overseeing arms shipments to the Free Syrian Army no later than June 2012 when it leaked the story to the
New York Times
. The CIA began directly arming and training rebels in early 2013 (see
chapter 5
).

Proclaiming support for nonviolent resistance while arming rebels was not seen as a contradiction, according to State Department critic Kathy. She said State was populated with “humanitarian interventionists,”
people who favor one or another form of military intervention by claiming it will, in the end, protect civilians. “But we never discuss the legality of such attacks, let alone the morality,” she told me. Controversial policies are sent to the legal department for review. “They'll always find a way to justify whatever policy is decided.”
⁵

State Department officials insisted that Syrians would benefit from US policy in the long run. The spokesperson acknowledged that ordinary Syrians were hurt by American economic sanctions, which had caused a massive drop in their standard of living. But, as if admonishing naughty children, the spokesperson told me Uncle Sam would make it up to them. “Once the behavior changes, once we have the Assad regime step down, we will make good on making sure this is an environment where Americans can do business.”
⁶
There's an interesting logic here. He assumed that the solution for economic collapse is American business investment. What's good for American business, apparently, is good for the Syrian people.

Similarly, the State Department saw no contradiction between criticizing Assad's human-rights record and supporting pro-US regimes elsewhere in the region also committing abuse, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The State Department simply assumed that US allies can and will change while enemies will not. The spokesperson explained that allies may abuse human rights, “but we work with them.”

Peter van Buren, a twenty-four-year veteran foreign-service officer said the State Department excelled at such “clever use of words.” Van Buren wrote a blog critical of US foreign policy that brought down the wrath of State Department officials. He retired in 2012. Word games about human rights “only carry weight here in the United States,” he told me. “In the real world, none of these words mean anything. If you're in Saudi Arabia and you speak out against the government, you're going down. You'll not be found again. If you're in Syria and do the same thing, you'll be a freedom fighter as you go down.”
⁷

I hopped in a taxi to visit a former diplomat now living in Bethesda, Maryland, an upper-middle-class enclave bordering DC. Henry Precht
was a career foreign-service officer, deputy ambassador to Egypt, and officer in charge of the Iran desk in Washington in the 1970s. The desk officer is the main State Department official following day-to-day activities in any given country.

Precht helped deflate a few popular myths about how US foreign policy is made. He told me that the much-ballyhooed secret intelligence that the public is not allowed to see was, in fact, not terribly insightful or useful. “If you read the
New York Times
and had some familiarity with how the government works, you'd be as well-informed as if you sat on the desk and read the classified cables,” he told me.
⁸
In general the country desks, including the Syria desk, don't have better sources than those of a good journalist. On occasion, he said, “there were CIA reports that did an outstanding job,” providing unique sources and analysis.

I asked Precht a question frequently asked of me in my Mideast travels: What would Americans think if Syria was training and arming dissident groups in the US? Does the State Department ever hold itself to the same standards demanded of others? “Certainly not,” replied Precht. “We set the standards for the [people of the] world, and they better get in step,” he said with an ironic smile. “If they don't, they'll be damned in our human-rights report.” The State Department issues an annual human-rights report that inevitably finds the most severe abuse is perpetrated by countries considered hostile to the United States.

Precht did have some positive comments about Foggy Bottom. He said there are many dedicated foreign-service officers. Policy makers listen to advice from these professionals, he said. They don't just cherry-pick intelligence to bolster a preconceived policy. “If you have a good case, it's welcome.” That doesn't apply during crises, however. Voicing contrary views during a run-up to war, for example, “might mean the end of your tenure. I had two kids to educate; I wasn't going to take that risk.”

When I first became a student activist in the 1960s I discussed a similar issue with my dad. He urged me to get an education, join the government, and make changes from within. I argued that only massive pressure from the streets would change US foreign policy; individuals
only get swallowed in the morass. My meanderings around Washington over the years confirmed my view from the 1960s. Very intelligent people wrote highly sophisticated analyses that often got ignored at the highest levels when pertaining to critical issues such as war and peace. US foreign policy is made by a political, military, and economic elite who care little about the grunts in a State Department annex, as my friend Kathy eventually found out. She quit the State Department and now resides in academia, where she can join those bringing pressure from the street.

The State Department, the CIA, and other government agencies claimed that the United States must be involved in Syria to protect American national interests. But what exactly are those interests, and do they benefit ordinary Americans? US Middle East policy relies on the bedrock principle that the United States is different from other powers. Russia and China are resource-greedy giants willing to support dictators when it's to their commercial advantage. Even close allies Britain and France have been known to advance their business interests at the expense of human rights. But the United States is exceptional because it operates out of concern for humanity and promotion of democracy. This notion of American exceptionalism was well-articulated by Obama in his 2013 speech to the United Nations. “Some may disagree, but I believe that America is exceptional—in part because we have shown a willingness through the sacrifice of blood and treasure to stand up not only for our own narrow self-interests, but for the interests of all.”
⁹

That would come as a great surprise to the people of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt, and Syria—to name a few recent examples. But by claiming that America protects the interests of all countries, American exceptionalism disguises the US ruling elite's real motives. The United States has considered the Middle East critical since the first oil fields began pumping in Iraq in 1927. US oil companies were given 23.75 percent ownership of the oil consortium that controlled the fields, part of the imperialist division of the region after World War I (see
chapter 3
). After World War II, the United States became the dominant power in the region. Its
oil companies controlled vast wealth either directly or through joint agreements with local elites. The Persian Gulf region—which includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates—is responsible for some 30 percent of the world's oil production and 55 percent of its reserves.
¹⁰
Protecting those oil supplies—and the profits they generate—has become a vital part of the American national interest.

Of course, US leaders don't mention the profit motive. They always argue that the United States is protecting the region from outsiders who are intent on disrupting the world's oil supplies. For example, Obama said, referring to the Middle East, “Although America is steadily reducing our own dependence on imported oil, the world still depends on the region's energy supply, and a severe disruption could destabilize the entire global economy.”
¹¹

But who exactly can promote stability? Well, we certainly can't depend on oil companies owned by Russian, Chinese, or other suspicious countries. So we have to rely on companies owned by the United States and its close allies. Halliburton and Schlumberger must be able to drill for the oil and build the pipelines. Chevron/Texaco, Exxon/Mobil, BP, and other Western oil companies are the only reliable businesses to pump or distribute the oil. And while these patriotic companies are protecting the national interest, one cannot deny them a profit, can one?

Lest you think I'm just some incurable radical, an oil-industry-hating journalist, look at some of the US government documents leaked by Edward Snowden. The National Security Administration (NSA) spied on foreign leaders such as Brazil's president Dilma Rousseff and on the state-owned oil company Petrobras. Most of the NSA's spying on foreign leaders had nothing to do with suspected terrorism but focused on finding commercial advantage for US corporations. The NSA collected inside information about upcoming deals, trade negotiations, and new technologies.
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Done by anyone else, it would be called industrial espionage.
¹³
Done by the NSA, it's protecting our national interests.

Syria has no strategic minerals and produces relatively little oil. It has no important seaports or military bases. But it has something any
real-estate agent would envy: location. Syria borders Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. Iran flies arms into Damascus, which are then transported over land to Hezbollah in Lebanon. So whoever holds power in Syria will have significant, long-term impact on the region.

Syria's location also puts it in jeopardy. Syria fought two wars with Israel and has continued a cold war with that country ever since. It became Iran's only Arab ally and a key supporter of Hezbollah. Israel and the United States had tried over the years to break Syria away from Iran. Had they been able to do so, Assad's other faults would have been forgiven. But Syria's continued alliance with Iran became one of the main justifications of Western attempts to overthrow Assad. Tom Donilon, President Obama's national-security adviser, said in 2011 that the “end of the Assad regime would constitute Iran's greatest setback in the region yet—a strategic blow that will further shift the balance of power in the region against Iran.”
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