Japan's Comfort Women (20 page)

However, there is no documentation to prove that the US forces conducted interrogation of these 150 women. There is also no documentation to show whether crimes committed by the Japanese forces in Okinawa were investigated in order to prosecute Japanese officers who were responsible for violating the human rights of these Koreans.

Some photos of Korean, Chinese, and Indonesian comfort women captured by the Allied forces have been found at the Public Record Office in London, the US National Archives, and the Australian War Memorial.10 However, the fact that no record of interrogation of these comfort women has yet been found implies that neither the US forces nor the British and Australian forces were interested in investigating crimes committed by the Japanese forces against Asian women. It can therefore be concluded that the military authorities of the Allied nations did not regard the comfort women issue as an unprecedented war crime and a case which seriously violated international law, despite their having sub-stantial knowledge about this matter.

There were two cases in which some members of the Japanese Army were tried and prosecuted at B & C Class war crimes tribunals for the crime of enforced prostitution. One involved 35 Dutch girls in Indonesia, who were forced to work at military brothels for about two months – the case that we have examined in the previous chapter. The victims in the other case were islanders from Guam. However, these were exceptional cases in that the victims in the former case were Caucasians and the trial in the latter case was conducted in conjunction with an affront to the American national flag by the Japanese.11

The following incidents also indicate the disinterest of US forces in the comfort women issue. In early September 1945, a group of US military government officers flew from Okinawa to Kyonsong to take over the Japanese military government of Korea. The group included Brigadier-General Charles Harris, Colonel Swift and Colonel Argo of XXIV Corps. Shortly after their arrival, a dinner party was arranged at the Chosen Hotel by Japanese officers led by Deputy Chief of Staff, General Sugai. There were 28 officers, including five or six Japanese, at the dinner, and alcohol was served. About 12 or 15 Korean “geisha” were brought to the hotel by the Japanese after the dinner. The Japanese officers left early, but the Americans danced with the girls until 2 or 3 o’clock in
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the morning. All expenses for this dinner party were paid for by the Japanese.

Some American officers who attended were later interrogated by staff of the Inspector General’s Office of XXIV Corps. All denied allegations that they were provided with condoms and that they slept with the women.12 These Korean women were probably comfort women who had been serving Japanese men during the war. Although the war officially ended on August 15, a few weeks before the dinner party was held, Korean comfort women continued to be exploited by the Japanese and the Americans. Some of these American officers were from G-2, one of whose duties was to collect information on war crimes, and Colonel Argo was the Chief of Police.

Why was awareness of the comfort women issue as a serious war crime clearly lacking in the mind of the leaders of the Allied forces? One reason probably lies in the fact that the majority of the women victims of this enforced military prostitution were Asians and were therefore neither white women nor civilians of the Allied nations. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Dutch forces, who prosecuted Japanese officers for the crime of forcing Dutch girls and women into prostitution, did not even bother to investigate most cases in which Indonesian women were victimized. Some historians have pointed to the “absence of Asia” in the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.13 Probably the comfort women issue was also ignored for the same reason. It took almost half a century for the enslavement of the comfort women to be considered one of the most serious and unprecedented war crimes in history.

Another reason can be sought in soldiers’ common perception of women (i.e.

their sexual ideas), which we find more or less universally in military ideology, regardless of its nationality. A common refrain is the idea that women are morally obliged to offer amenities to soldiers who are fighting at the risk of their lives, to defend their people and the nation. This kind of androcentric ideology has been, and still is, deeply rooted in most military forces and the societies that support them. For this reason, military men are generally quite insensitive towards the services rendered by women. American soldiers and officers during World War II were undoubtedly tainted with these attitudes, and this was probably one of the major factors that hindered them from correctly understanding the comfort women issue. Therefore it seems necessary to closely examine the sexual ideology of the US military forces and their relevant policies during World War II, in order to understand why the US failed to take up this issue as a serious war crime against humanity.

US military policies on the prevention of venereal

disease in World War II

Very few first-hand documents have been unearthed containing information on official US policies regarding military prostitution and related matters during World War II. Yet secondary sources reveal that the US and other Allied forces had plans to establish military brothels to serve their own soldiers in various areas as they advanced. It has been argued that in some places such facilities 88

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were set up, but were forced to close down within a short period of time.14

However, I have recently discovered a large number of relevant documents at the US National Archives which contradict this interpretation and require a new approach to this issue.

Most of the documents that I analyze below are from the records prepared by the US War Department over nearly three years between August 1942 and July 1945. Some relevant Australian archival documents are also examined. These documents can be roughly divided into two categories: •

the first group comprises those documents related to measures taken by the War Department to tackle persistent high rates of venereal diseases ( VD) among US forces, especially those stationed overseas; •

the second set of documents is those detailing complaints over sexual misconduct by members of the US forces. These documents were submitted to the War Department from within as well as outside the military forces.

Among these documents, one of the earliest official records is a confidential memo dated August 6, 1942. Colonel W. A. Wood, Jr. (Director of the Requirements Division, General Staff Corps) sent a memo to the Surgeon General, informing him that:

A special military requirement is established for provision of individual venereal prophylactic units to individual members of the military service located beyond the limits of the continental United States where no standard prophylactic measures are, or will be available for use, and where no individual protective measures are available for private purchase from the Army Exchange Service, commercial or other sources.15

Another confidential memo indicates that the army air force was responsible for the transportation of such “prophylactic units” to troops stationed outside the US, and that they were to be sold at cost.16 The fact that prophylactic units were airlifted and not transported by ship clearly indicates that the distribution was a
matter of urgency
.

It was probably quite difficult for the Requirements Division to estimate how many “individual venereal prophylactic units” were actually required for distribution at this stage. Colonel Wood requested the Surgeon General to determine “the basis of the above requirement and procurement of such amount.”17 In response to this request, on October 15, 1942, an Executive Officer of Medical Corps, Colonel John Rogers, produced a report18 which contains the following estimate: b. Requirements are established as follows:

(1) Initial issue (tentative) per man overseas:

Mechanical prophylactic units – 12 (units of one) Chemical prophylactic units – 12

This is considered to be a 3 months requirement.

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(2) Maintenance issue 4 mechanical and 4 chemical per man per month or 4,000 of each per 1,000 men per month.

(3) Distribution factor – 3,000 per 1,000 troops strength or 25 percent of initial issue.

c. Cost for the calendar year 1943 is estimated as follows: Unit cost of mechanical unit

$ .03

Unit cost of chemical unit

$ .15

Total cost of initial issue

$6,480,000. (*)

Total cost of maintenance

$25,920,000.

Total cost of distribution factor

$1,620,000.

Total cost for calendar year 1943

$34,020,000.

(*) This figure is based on 3,000,000 men overseas in 1943.

On the assumption that each US soldier overseas had sexual intercourse once a week, the allocation of prophylactics would consume a staggering US $34 million of the military budget each year. This is equivalent to 17 percent of the entire money spent on the Manhattan Project, or 15.5 percent of the total cost of rifles distributed to the 8 million US soldiers during World War II. It is not surprising therefore that the War Department tried to distribute them at “cost price.”

The War Department not only seriously deliberated over the distributions of condoms and venereal disinfectants but in fact implemented such plans in the latter half of 1942. Behind this massive enterprise lay the problem of a wide and rapid spread of venereal diseases amongst US forces stationed overseas. In particular, the diseases were prevalent among the forces stationed in Africa, the Middle East, and India. For example, in the case of one Afro-American (“coloured”) unit stationed at Karachi, the VD rate was as high as 500 per 1,000 per year.19

The Inspector General who investigated this matter reported that the military authorities “could bring this problem out in the open as other countries have done,
establish supervised houses
and prevent a great number of our young men from being infected with the vilest forms of venereal diseases prevalent on this earth” [emphasis added]. Thus, he advocated that military-controlled brothels would be necessary to contain widespread VD amongst US forces stationed overseas. At the same time he criticized the War Department’s official policy regarding prostitution, by claiming that “the provisions of War Department Circular 170, 1941 are scarcely applicable in foreign countries.”20 Circular 170, which was also called “the May Act,” enabled the Secretary of War to issue orders to prohibit prostitution in a certain area, if prostitution in that area was found to be “harmful to the efficiency, health, and welfare of military personnel at the specified post, camp or station.”21 In other words, this Inspector General was implying that the prohibition of prostitution would not solve the spread of VD among the forces because it would encourage the business to go underground.

The War Department certainly did not adopt a policy of permitting or encouraging the establishment of “supervised houses.” However, it arranged the 90

Why did US forces ignore the issue?

mass distribution of condoms and disinfectants. The armed forces also instructed soldiers on how to apply chemical prophylaxis immediately after visiting brothels, by providing “prophylaxis stations” in red-light districts frequented by US soldiers in overseas theaters. It seems that such military prophylaxis stations were set up in various red-light districts in foreign countries from early in World War II.22

Despite such measures, VD apparently remained quite a serious problem among the US forces stationed in Africa, the Middle East, and India. On September 25, 1942, Colonel Stanhope Bayne-Jones (Acting Director of Preventive Medicine, Division of Medical Corps) advised Colonel Lawrence Hanley (Assistant Chief of Staff of G-1) to send Major William Brumfield, a VD control specialist, to these theaters for the purpose of investigating current conditions and recommending remedial action. As a result, Major Brumfield was assigned to this task on October 1, 1942.23 His field investigation was conducted between the end of October 1942 and mid-January 1943, and on March 2, 1943 his report was submitted to the Assistant Chief of Staff.

In the meantime, it seems that the health situation for troops was worsening, and as a consequence, the distribution of “prophylactic units” to overseas areas was further increased. According to a report prepared by Colonel John Rogers on October 15, 1942, such overseas areas included Alaska, Canada, Newfound-land, and Panama. Furthermore, the bulk of those prophylactic units, initially for sale at cost, were now made available free of charge. Free condoms and chemical units were transported by air to 14 locations listed in the records, spread out over three different regions: South America (such as Brazil and Trinidad), Africa (including Lagos, Khartoum, and Cairo), and India (such as Karachi and Calcutta). The total distribution was 4,900 packets of condoms (each packet contains three) and 14,700 chemical units.24 The fact they were airlifted and distributed for free to the troops in these three regions indicates the seriousness of VD problems in those places.

In addition, 100,000 packets of condoms and 150,000 chemical units were shipped out from the port of New York on September 29, 1942 to unspecified destinations, 55,000 packets of condoms, together with 165,000 chemical units, were dispatched from the same port again on October 2 of the same year. These were also intended for free distribution. According to the same report, by then condoms were made available at all foreign stations where post exchanges were located. The criteria for distribution were 2,160 packets per month per 1,000

men in temperate and cold climates, and 3,000 packets per 1,000 men in warm climates.25

It was not only troops stationed overseas but also those within the continental United States that were affected by VD. A memo dated October 8, 1942, prepared by the Personnel Division, G-1, indicates that VD among the domestic forces due to prostitution was becoming a serious problem.26 By the end of 1942, the invocation of the May Act (mentioned above) began to be seriously discussed by the senior staff of G-1. It was concluded that its invocation could not be avoided “if the local authorities fail to take correct measures within a reasonable
Why did US forces ignore the issue?