Japan's Comfort Women (6 page)

The origins of the comfort women system
17

Table 1.2
The distribution of comfort stations and the sanitary conditions [southern China, 1939]

Unit

Place

Numbers of

VD rate (per 100)

comfort women

Units directly

Guangzhou

159

28

under the Army

Kuno Corps

East Guangzhou

223

1

Hamamoto Corps

North Guangzhou

129

10

Supply Unit

Henan

122

4

Foshan Sub-unit

Foshan

41

2

Iida Sub-unit

Haikou

180

not recorded

Total

850 [sic]

Plate 1.3
A group of comfort women being transferred from a ship to a barge for landing in Shantou in South China. The date is unknown.

Source
:
Mainichi Shimbun
comfort women who were brought from the homeland of each unit. (Many units of the Japanese Imperial Army were made up of men from the same region.) However, as the kempeitai conducted this statistical survey with units stationed in the same places where it had offices, the numbers of comfort women working 18

The origins of the comfort women system
for the units outside its contact areas were not included. Therefore, the actual numbers were most certainly many more than 1,000.

Indeed, on April 15, 1939, Dr. Matsumura (the head of the 21st Army’s medical section) reported at the section meeting that altogether between 1,400

and 1,600 comfort women were “imported” to serve the 21st Army. This was apparently based on the ratio of one woman to 100 soldiers. VD examinations of these women were conducted twice a week, and the cost of medical treatment of VD patients among these women was paid by brothel owners.26 Dr. Matsumura’s use of the word “imported” suggests that the majority of these women were Koreans and Japanese, not local Chinese women.

In July 1941, the Japanese Imperial Army started building up a large troop concentration (approximately 800,000 soldiers) near the border between the Soviet Union and northern China, planning to invade Soviet territory. In order to conceal their real intentions, the Imperial Headquarters claimed that the troops were concentrated here for a large-scale training exercise named “Kwantung Army Special Manoeuvres.” It is reported that the Kwantung Army, under the command of Lieutenant-General Umezu Yoshijir
d
, planned to procure 20,000 Korean comfort women to serve these troops. For this purpose, a staff officer, Major Hara Zenshir
d
, requested cooperation from the Governor-General of Korea, General Minami Jir
d
, and eventually secured 8,000 Korean women.27 However, no official documents have so far been discovered to prove this conduct, and it is necessary to rely on the testimonies contained in several individual accounts. One of those testimonies is that of a former medical officer who was involved in transporting 2,000 Korean women by cargo train from Korea to northern China.28

The military’s policies can be summarized in the following manner, based on analysis of various documents and other relevant information. When the Japanese Imperial forces first set up comfort stations in the early stage of the Sino-Japanese War, the target for “recruitment” of comfort women was Japanese professional women rather than Koreans. Military leaders soon realized, however, that the recruitment of large numbers of Japanese professional women was far from easy. The exploitation of Korean women was then planned and implemented. Initially Koreans resident in Japan, and in particular from Kyushu Island, were used for this purpose, then massive numbers of young women from Korea were mobilized. As will be examined in more detail in the next chapter, the depressed economic conditions in the Korean Peninsula led to the migration of a large number of brothel proprietors and prostitutes from Korea to China in the late 1930s. This also contributed to the military plan to mobilize Korean women on a massive scale for the Japanese comfort women system. Local Chinese women were also rounded up by invading Japanese troops and pressed into hastily set up comfort stations. In particular, the exploitation of Chinese women occurred immediately after the Nanjing Massacre.

Comfort stations during the Sino-Japanese War can be categorized roughly into three different types. The first type were permanent stations attached to large supply bases located in major cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Tianjing,
The origins of the comfort women system
19

and Beijing. The second type were semi-permanent stations attached to large army units such as divisions, brigades, and regiments. Some of the stations in the first and second categories were managed by private proprietors under the strict control of the military authorities. Others were directly run by the military forces. The third type of station were those temporarily set up by small battalion-size units near the front lines in war zones. Most of these stations are believed to have been run by each unit.

For the first type of station, not only Koreans but also Japanese professional women were “employed” (although from 1939 very few Japanese women went to China to work as comfort women). On the other hand, in the second and third categories of stations, the majority of comfort women were either Korean or Chinese. The degree of coercion used for procuring women seems to have intensified according to the type of station and was most intense in the third type. It seems that the third category was often operated without obtaining permission of the central military authorities, as the troops were far away from headquarters. Thus, in these cases, many local civilian women were forcibly exploited, as it was difficult for these troops to access Korean or Japanese comfort women. It is clear that lack of authority from higher headquarters also contributed to wanton abuses by local troops in securing comfort women from the vicinity of their military bases.29

As we will examine later, when the Pacific War started, the operation of these three types of comfort stations was simply expanded geographically. Which type of comfort station became dominant in the area where Japanese forces were stationed depended on the local situation.

The organizational structure of the comfort women
system

In order to clarify who was responsible for organizing the exploitation of women on such an unprecedented scale, it is necessary to analyze how the comfort women system became a general policy of the Japanese Imperial forces, and how this policy was implemented by military leaders.

At this time, however, it is quite difficult to conduct thorough research on this issue, mainly due to restrictions on access to relevant documentation: •

Firstly, many official military documents are still classified and not open for public inspection – for example, several thousand volumes of
GyDmu Nisshi
(Records of Military Plans and Operations) and
JEgun Nisshi
(Field Diaries) housed in the Research Library of the Japanese Defence Agency.

•

Secondly, all documents prepared by the Japanese Police during the Asia-Pacific War are still closed.

•

Thirdly, it is believed that many relevant documents were prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, both of which had major responsibilities for colonial Korea and Taiwan. (From 1942, the Ministry of Home Affairs replaced the Ministry of Colonial Affairs 20

The origins of the comfort women system
in charge of administration of Taiwanese affairs.) However, none of these official records has so far been released.

•

Finally, it is also believed that Japanese government ministries – the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Public Welfare and the Ministry of Justice – still retain considerable numbers of relevant documents, but these are not access-ible to researchers. The fact that there is no Freedom of Information Act in Japan makes it difficult to change the present research conditions.

In addition, many people who were directly involved in setting up and implementing the comfort women system are still alive, but they remain silent on this issue.

Therefore, the following analysis is based upon the limited number of official documents that have so far been discovered. A few documents as well as some testimonies are available, and these detail actual military instructions or orders to set up comfort stations (as detailed earlier). Let us look at these records more closely in order to clarify from whom such orders originated, and who was responsible for implementing the scheme.

•

In March 1932, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army under the command of General Shirakawa Yoshinori set up comfort stations in Shanghai. General Okamura Yasuji (the Deputy Chief of Staff ), and Lieutenant-General Okabe Naozabur
d
(another senior staff officer of this Army) instructed their junior officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Nagami Toshinori, to take charge of this task.30

It seems very unlikely that the Army commander, General Shirakawa, was unaware of the fact that such instructions were issued by top-ranking officers of his own army. Shirakawa was the Minister of War between 1927 and 1929.

In 1944, Okamura became the general commander of the China Expeditionary Army, the highest position within the entire Japanese forces stationed in China.

Okabe was promoted to commander of the North China Area Army in the same year. Nagami later became the commander of the 55th Division.

•

In December 1937, the Central China Area Army issued an instruction to each contingent force to set up comfort stations. The commander of this Army was General Matsui Iwane, and the Chief of Staff was Major-General Tsukada Osamu.

On receiving this instruction, Iinuma Mamoru (Chief of Staff of the Shanghai forces) ordered members of the 2nd Section of the Staff Office to draw up a plan. His junior staff officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Ch
d
Isamu, was responsible for implementing the plan. The commander of the 10th Army was Lieutenant-General Yanagawa Heisuke. This Army also set up comfort stations under the instruction of the Central China Area Army Headquarters. A staff officer of the 10th Army, Lieutenant-Colonel Terada Masao, set up a comfort station staffed with Chinese women. He used the kempeitai to procure these women.31

After the war, General Matui was tried at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.

He was accused of responsibility for the Nanjing Massacre. It can be said that he was also responsible for the comfort women operations, as the commander
The origins of the comfort women system
21

of the Central China Area Army which issued an instruction to set up such facilities. Ch
d
later became the Chief of Staff of the 32nd Army, and Terada was elevated to the position of head of the Armament Department in the Imperial Headquarters. The 10th Army commander, Yanagawa, later served as Minister of Home Affairs in Prince Konoe’s cabinet in 1941.

•

In June 1938, Lieutenant-General Okabe Naozabur
d
(then Chief of Staff of the North China Area Army) issued an instruction to each unit to set up comfort stations to serve several hundred thousand soldiers in this army.32

The commander of these forces was General Terauchi Hisaichi. Terauchi was the Minister of War in the previous two years.

•

The commander of the Kwantung Army was Lieutenant-General Umezu Yoshijir
d
, and the Chief of Staff was Lieutenant-General Yoshimoto Teiichi.

It has been reported that in about July 1941, the Kwantung Army planned to mobilize 20,000 Korean women and requested assistance from the Government-General (i.e. the colonial government) of Korea. As a result, about 8,000 Korean women were reported to have been sent to northeast China (i.e. Manchuguo). Although no official documentation has been unearthed to prove such conduct, a number of testimonies refer to this operation, including one by a former staff officer of the Kwantung Army, Lieutenant-Colonel Hara Zenshir
d
.33 It implicates many bureaucrats of the Government-General of Korea in procuring a large number of Korean women, and therefore the Governor-General, General Minami Jir
d
, was also responsible. Minami served as the Minister of War for a short period in 1931.

It is clear from these examples that senior staff officers of each army issued orders to establish comfort stations, and that staff officers of subordinate units made a plan and put it into operation. All were undoubtedly elite army officers.

As commanders of each army, they had distinguished careers. Some of them were cabinet members of the Japanese government. In short, the comfort women system was created and developed as a well-planned policy by a group of top Japanese military leaders.

During the Asia-Pacific War, the Japanese Imperial forces stationed five armies overseas. These armies were under the supervision of the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff, who were subordinate to the Grand Marshal (i.e.

the Emperor).34 See Figure 1.1, which shows the locations of army headquarters in parentheses.

Each army engaged in warfare at the Emperor’s orders. The Chief of the General Staff advised the Emperor in planning war strategies. The ultimate right of command over each army lay in the hands of the Emperor. However, in reality, the Chief of the General Staff was responsible for war strategies and military operations, and the Minister of War was responsible for military administration. As far as matters related to comfort women are concerned, the staff section of each army was responsible for dealing with them, and if necessary, the Ministry of War issued instructions to each army’s headquarters.35

22

The origins of the comfort women system
Korean Army (Seoul)

Minister of War

Taiwanese Army (Taipei)

Emperor