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1489-AA.
Date: July 16, 2009
Victim: President Nicolas Sarkozy
Location: Paris, France
Details: Sarkozy became sick after his morning jog and was hospitalized for tests.

1490-AA.
Date: August 4, 2009
Target: Actress/Singer Miley Cyrus
Location: Tybee Island, Georgia
Details: A man reportedly stalking Miley Cyrus was arrested by police after traveling to Cyrus' movie location twice attempting to find her. He assaulted police officers who removed him, and was ordered by the court to undergo a mental evaluation.

1491-AA.
Date: August 15, 2009
Target: Mayor Tom Barrett
Location: Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Details: Barrett was attending the Wisconsin State Fair with his family when he observed a man threatening a woman with a metal pipe. As Barrett called 911 on his cell phone, the man began striking him with the pipe. The assailant then fled. Barrett was hospitalized with injuries.

1492-AA.
Date: August 27, 2009
Target: Prince Mohammed bin Nayef
Location: Jiddah, Saudi Arabia
Details: Al-Qaeda terrorist Abdullah Hassan Talea Asiri contacted Nayef and offered to surrender. The Prince sent his bodyguards to escort Asiri to the palace. During the meeting, Asiri handed his cell phone to Nayef. Explosives reportedly hidden in Asiri's rectum were detonated by the cell phone, blowing Asiri in half. Nayef suffered only minor injuries.

1493-AA.
Date: September 2, 2009
Target: Religious Affairs Minister Hamid Saeed Kazmi
Location: Islamabad, Pakistan
Details: Three men reportedly opened fire on Kazmi's unarmored vehicle as it drove past. Two men on bicycles were armed with pistols, and one man on foot was armed with an AK-47. Kazmi's driver was killed, his bodyguard was critically injured, and Kazmi was wounded. One of the gunmen was reportedly seen before the attack asking questions near Kazmi's office. An official spokesman said the government would provide armored vehicles and more bodyguards to federal ministers in the future.

1494-AA.
Date: September 15, 2009
Target: TV Host Ryan Seacrest
Location: Orange, California
Details: Seacrest was getting into his car after attending a charity event when he was assaulted. The man also reportedly assaulted a security guard who intervened. The man was arrested for assault, battery, and possession of a switchblade knife. Seacrest later obtained a restraining order against him.

1495-AA.
Date: October 1, 2009
Target: IMF Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn
Location: Istanbul, Turkey
Details: Strauss-Kahn was giving a presentation at a university when coordinated protestors in the audience stood up, yelled, threw a shoe, and one charged the stage. Bodyguards for the IMF Director intercepted the man charging the stage, and evacuated the protectee. After order was reestablished, Strauss-Kahn returned to the stage and joked, "Turkish students are polite. They waited until the end to complain."

1496-AA.
Date: October 5, 2009
Target: CNN Commentator Lou Dobbs
Location: New Jersey
Details: Dobb's wife was standing outside their home with a driver when a bullet was reportedly fired at the house, striking the vinyl siding near the roof. No one was injured. Dobbs said the incident followed "weeks and weeks of threatening phone calls."

1497-AA.
Date: October 14, 2009
Target: Singer Leona Lewis
Location: London, England
Details: Lewis was signing books in a store when a man punched her in the side of the head, knocking her down. He was overpowered by security agents and arrested. Lewis immediately left the event, suffering from a bruised face. The man had reportedly been rejected by producers of the X-Factor contest, which Lewis won.

1498-AA.
Date: November 8, 2009
Target: Singer Morrissey
Location: Liverpool, England
Details: Morrissey was performing when he was struck in the head with a plastic beer bottle. He left the stage and didn't return to complete the show.

1499-AA.
Date: November 17, 2009
Target: Authors Robert Spencer and Elan Journo
Location: New York, New York
Details: NYU students disrupted a presentation by Spencer and Journo entitled, "The Jihad Still Threatens America." During Spencer's remarks, a protester in the crowd began yelling as a diversion. As Security guards escorted him out, two other protesters rushed forward and threw pies at the two speakers. Journo was struck in the shoulder; Spencer was not hit.

1500-AA.
Date: November 20, 2009
Target: Lawmaker Abdul Rab Rasoul Sayyaf
Location: Kabul, Afghanistan
Details: Sayyaf was riding in his convoy outside the capital when a remote-controlled bomb exploded, killing five bodyguards. Sayyaf was not injured. He had survived previous assassination attempts.

1501-AA.
Date: November 24, 2009
Target: President Barack Obama
Location: Washington, DC
Details: Michaele and Tareq Salahi, a married couple from Virginia, gained access to the White House state dinner to which they were not invited. After photos of the Salahis attending the dinner surfaced on Michaele's Facebook page, the Secret Service began a criminal investigation. Secret Service Director Mark Sullivan later testified before Congress that proper procedures were not followed and three agents had been suspended.

1502-AA.
Date: December 3, 2009
Target: Government Ministers
Location: Mogadishu, Somalia
Details: A man disguised as a woman, including a veil and woman's shoes, committed a suicide bombing at a crowded graduation ceremony. The blast killed 19 people, including four government ministers seated at the front of the room. 60 people were wounded. The ministers' bodyguards were reportedly all waiting outside the meeting hall.

Appendix 1

A letter and text that can be provided to your protectee along with a copy of this book

Dear Protectee:

No doubt you've seen bodyguards apply strategies that you wondered about or maybe even felt were unimportant. Many of the questions you might have had about protective security are answered in this book, and we encourage you to read it. Your being better informed will benefit you and also others in your environment who could be affected by the risk surrounding you -- whatever level of risk you might perceive it to be.

Aside from the reference material, this book is only five chapters long, 140 pages. In case you don't read it now, we're briefly noting eleven precepts that will enhance your safety, well-being, and convenience:

1. The extensive study undertaken for this book produced many insights, the most striking of which is also the simplest:
   

   The overwhelming majority of public figure attacks are over in less than five seconds.
   Within just those few seconds, all the damage that will be done has been done.
   

   The five-second statistic could be discouraging, because it grants very little time for protectors to respond effectively. However, embedded within that five-second statistic is one of the most encouraging lessons we learned: Attackers are even more handicapped by the speeding clock than are protectors, and
   when protectors have the position and readiness to respond, they will prevail, almost always.
   This means it is in your best interest to allow your protectors to occupy the positions they feel are best.
   
2. Public figure attackers who fired handguns at targets within 25 feet usually hit their targets, while attackers who fired handguns from farther away than 25 feet almost never hit their targets.
   This means that your safety is nearly assured when the set-up provides 25 or more feet between you and the nearest members of the general public.
   All types of attack are less effective from farther away than they are from close. 25 feet emerges as a magic number in three critical ways, and effective protectors will strive for having that much distance between you and the public, much less than 25 feet between you and your protectors, and much less than 25 feet between your protectors and the public. Effective protectors spend a lot of time preparing for every public appearance, and much of their energy is applied to influencing space -- negotiating for more space between the stage and the seats, more space between the red carpet and stanchions, in short, more space between you and those who might try to harm you. Every foot counts, and your support will be important.
   
3. The majority of attacks happen when the protected person is in or around the car, and these attacks succeed an astonishing 77% of the time. This statistic is, first and foremost, a clear call for having an armored car. It also teaches the value of not hanging around the car longer than is necessary.
   Avoid dallying and having conversations and goodbyes at the car
   -- do it all inside the building, and then depart. You are less vulnerable when moving, and you are most vulnerable when standing around saying goodbye, which people too commonly do at the car door.
   
4. All public figure attacks happen at the same time: Now.
   What we mean is that the present moment is the only time anything can occur. Accordingly, when you are in public, there is no such thing as a casual moment to your protectors. Staff members and assistants might view that time as a respite from work or as mere transit time, but your protectors are always engaged and busy whenever you are in public. Since they must be fully present -- not just physically, but mentally as well -- you'll notice when you're in public that your protectors sometimes don't look at you when you speak to them. They might even seem unresponsive at times. Understand that they are keeping their attention on the mission at hand -- and they are doing their primary work right now.
   
5. Anytime a member of the public can reliably know when and where to encounter you, that's when risk arises,
   and that's when enhanced protective coverage ought to be considered. This includes announced public appearances as well as public or private events at which your presence might be assumed or predicted.
   
6. Most people are not interested in the appearances or actions of your protectors.
   Protective coverage is almost never as apparent to others as it is to you (since you're the protectee, in the center and able to see everything).
   While most people are not even aware of your protectors, attackers are, and that's where you can benefit from deterrence.
   
7. Every public appearance is an opportunity to discourage future problems.
   When protective strategies send the message that you are not easily and readily accessible, it enhances your safety and reduces the likelihood of interference and unwanted encounters -- that day and well beyond.
   
8. Many successful attacks occurred when the protected person was leaving an event, so if you must arrive at a public event via the front entrance (for media or other reasons),
   always depart via a non-public route.
   Risk is enhanced as events end because organizers and local security personnel typically come to think their job is done. Any semblance of crowd control, attentiveness, and even pride in the event is often lost toward the end. At the same time, an attacker waiting along the exit route has been afforded time to prepare, to see the car being put in place, to judge distances, to observe security personnel, to assess protective strategies, and to select a position. He might be afforded hours to plan, to prepare himself, to gain confidence. You can take away every single advantage an attacker or unwanted pursuer might have -- simply by departing through an alternate exit. When you allow your protectors to apply this important precept -- Public Entry, Non-public Departure -- you'll also get other benefits: You'll be on your way home while others are still waiting for their cars or pressing through the crowd or experiencing all the unpleasant aspects of a public appearance.
   
9. Locations contain inherent advantages and disadvantages, and the hand you are dealt can be improved by advance work, set-up, and positioning. Accordingly,
   grant your protectors a fair say in the arrangements for your public appearances.
   
10. Listen to intuition,
    yours and your protectors'. An intuitive feeling of concern or fear is an excellent reason to ask questions, change a plan, or do things differently.
    
11. Avoid giving your protectors tangential tasks and responsibilities.
    The minute you give a protector an assignment that's outside his primary mission, you are taking his attention and energy away from your safety -- most particularly if you are in public. Through decades of observing protectors and protectees, the majority of so-called failures by protectors were failures to handle non-security tasks in the way expected or hoped for. Thus, protectors end up being measured not by choosing the best positions or maintaining the greatest readiness -- but by how they handled the luggage, the wake-up call, the phone message, the cat, the hair dryer. Most damagingly, a protector who has "failed" at some tangential mission might begin to adjust his actions toward priorities other than safety. When a protector is with you in a public environment, think of him as the professional equivalent of a pilot flying a jet. You want him undistracted, and you want to measure his performance by the only standards that really matter: safety and readiness.
    

Lessons in this book were learned by others at great expense. You can gain these same lessons with ease. Whether or not you read this brief book, at least consider incorporating these eleven simple precepts into your approach to safety.

We close with this encouragement: Analysis of both actual and simulated attacks -- thousands of them -- shows that when ready protectors are in a position to respond, they will prevail, almost always.