Kennedy (104 page)
Authors: Ted Sorensen
Whatever their differences, the President liked Nehru. At a news conference shortly after the Prime Minister’s departure, annoyed by a question on whether he had found “pro-Communist” tendencies in the Indian leader, Kennedy said he knew of “no rational man…who holds that view”; and he went on to defend Nehru’s commitment to individual liberty and to national independence.
He was critical of Nehru’s use of the Western-hating Krishna Menon and his blatant seizure of the tiny Portuguese enclave of Goa in late 1961. But the following year, when Nehru’s daughter paused briefly in Washington on an unofficial lecture tour, she was astonished to receive a personal call from the President. He warned her that newspaper interviewers across the country would try to pit her against the Congress, which was then considering a slash in Indian aid funds because of the
Goa incident. Introducing her to his own technique of preparing for press conferences, he proceeded to fire at her the toughest questions she might be asked on her tour.
Kennedy’s own press conference answers and public statements when traveling outside his own country—and those statements and speeches at home which affected foreign countries—were beamed not only to government leaders but also to their constituents. “He talked,” said Averell Harriman, “over the heads of government to the hearts of people.” He particularly enjoyed talking on several occasions to foreign students on the White House lawn; and he sounded more pleased than miffed when he returned from one such encounter to tell me that his tie clasp and handkerchief had been lost when the crowd swarmed around him. (The two Indonesian students who had taken them returned them the next day.)
His trip to Western Europe in the summer of 1963 was criticized by Washington columnists on the grounds that his host governments in Germany, England and Italy were all in a stage of transition which made negotiations difficult. But Kennedy’s primary purpose was not to negotiate with governments but to talk to their publics in the wake of De Gaulle’s charges against the U.S. His trip was concerned, he said, with “the relationship between the United States and Western Europe…. This is a matter of the greatest importance to us and, I hope, to the
people
[of Europe].”
He returned from that trip exhilarated by the feeling that he had reached the general public, particularly the younger generation. He realized that he had enjoyed on that trip several advantages unrelated to the force of his foreign policy ideas: the contrast between his youthful vitality and the weary pessimism of most older leaders—the adoption of all the old Kennedy campaign techniques, including advance men, motorcades, outdoor rallies, local humor and maximum television coverage—the combined appeal of his own victory over religious intolerance and his fight against racial injustice—and an identification with the kind of cultural and intellectual excellence which appealed to European traditions.
He took satisfaction nevertheless in the belief that his tour had gained increased respect for the nation as well as the man. He did not feel that “world opinion” was either an identifiable fact or a reliable force. Nor was he willing
to base those decisions which affect the long-run state of the common security on the short-term state of our popularity in the various capitals of Europe…. We are going to have disagreements…. But… whenever the United States has a disagreement with a foreign country, it is a mistake always to assume that the
United States is wrong, and that—by being disagreeable to the United States—it is always possible to compel the United States to succumb….
I think too often in the past we have defined our leadership as an attempt to be rather well regarded in all these countries. The fact is you can’t possibly carry out any policy without causing major frictions…. What we have to do is to be ready to accept a good deal more expression of newspaper and governmental opposition to the U.S. in order to get something done.
I don’t expect that the U.S. will be more beloved, but I would hope that we could get more done.
America’s role as world leader, he observed, often involved it in disputes between its friends and allies. Our support—and occasionally our services as a mediator—were sought by both sides; and the likelihood of both being pleased with our stand was remote. In the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent, his efforts to restore harmony were diligent, often suspect on both sides and largely unsuccessful. But a temporary success of sorts was registered in 1962 in the territory of West New Guinea, the subject of a bitter dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia. To avoid a war which the Dutch had no desire to fight and which the Indonesians had every intention of winning with massive Soviet backing—and to strengthen the position of the Indonesian moderates, the only hope against an ultimate Communist takeover in that country—Kennedy made available the brilliant diplomatic services of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker as a UN mediator. Some American diplomats, more concerned with complaints from the Dutch and Australians than with the resultant rise in our standing with some of the Asian neutrals, did not support this effort with any enthusiasm. But “our only interest,” said the President, “is…a peaceful solution which we think is in the long-range interests of [all concerned]. The role of the mediator is not a happy one; [but] we are prepared to have everybody mad if it makes some progress.”
Despite this refusal to give priority to America’s popularity in world opinion, he never discounted the practical effect of popular respect for American ideals on the cooperation of other leaders, on the maintenance of our overseas installations and on resolutions in the UN and OAS. The competition with the Soviets was not on the material and military level only, and even military actions required the support of other peoples. While America’s interests were more important than her image, at times they were affected by it. Thus, in the developing world in particular—and aided by a greatly improved USIA program under Murrow, by a more active and attractive UN posture under Stevenson
and by a growing, energetic Peace Corps under Shriver—Kennedy set out to change “the stereotype view of the United States…—about fifty years old…Marxist oriented…[and unaware of] the tremendous changes which have taken place in the United States…the cultural efforts…the intellectual efforts.”
He succeeded beyond his own expectations in dispelling the notion that the United States was unconcerned, conservative and committed to the status quo. USIA surveys in Western Europe in 1963—on the heels of the Skybolt controversy and De Gaulle’s attacks—showed a higher proportion of approval for American foreign policy, even in France, than at any time in the eight-year history of these surveys. A poll by
Asia Magazine
found him well ahead of Nehru as “the most admired world figure today.” The reports of Peace Corps men in Africa and the mail he received from Eastern Europe all indicated a personal breakthrough of international significance in those areas. His receptions in Latin America were particularly unforgettable (as was his anger upon discovering that the White House social officer was sending down the Presidential china for his every meal). The exuberance of the crowds yelling
“Viva!”
soon caused him to join in. At first the notion of men embracing him with the traditional Latin-American
abrazo
embarrassed him, and his visits began with a stiff handshake at the airport. But by the time he departed from that same airport he was exchanging
abrazos
with as much gusto as his hosts. Those Latin-American trips were also aided by the expert work of State Department interpreter Donald Barnes, for elsewhere Kennedy had constant problems with lifeless translations of his rhetoric, requiring him on his 1963 German trip to borrow Adenauer’s interpreter for his important Frankfurt and Berlin speeches.
I have many vivid memories of those Kennedy overseas trips-—the smiles and tears on the faces of West Berliners, the crowds running up to our motorcades in Naples and San Jose, the dazzling effect of Jacqueline Kennedy on presidents and peasants, her husband’s stealthy gaze at the magnificent Cologne Cathedral dome in the midst of a prolonged prayer, the laughter among West Germans understanding his quips before they were translated, the regal splendor of the state dinners at Schönbrunn and Versailles and his ornate quarters at the Quai d’ Orsay Palace in Paris. (As I reported to him on my findings, he suggested I speak softly in the middle of the room, adding: “Or don’t you think our oldest and closest ally could be capable of ‘bugging’ my bedroom?”)
“One of the most moving experiences” of his life, in his words, was his 1963 journey to Ireland. Although he had privately kept an eye on Ireland’s hopes for a U.S. sugar quota from the Congress, his earlier interest in the land of his forebears was largely literary and political. His
companions on a youthful visit there to his sister Kathleen, his mother told me, were mostly English or “Anglo-Irish.”
But in 1963 he discovered in full measure the joys of the country and its people. The first outsider ever to address a joint assembly of both houses of the Irish Parliament (holding its first session on television), he delivered a major foreign policy address on the role of the little nations; and it filled that island with pride.
11
To his third cousin, Mary Kennedy Ryan, he expressed gratitude for the hot tea, the delicious salmon (asking if it had been illegally poached), the blazing fire and the fact that “some of the Kennedys missed the boat and didn’t all go to Washington.” At Cork he introduced all the Irish aides traveling with him, claiming that Dave Powers’ local cousins looked less Irish than Dave. Simultaneously awarded honorary degrees by the rival National University of Ireland and Dublin’s Trinity College (an institution less favored by the Irish Catholic hierarchy), he said he felt equally part of both, “and if they ever have a game of Gaelic football or hurling, I shall cheer for Trinity and pray for National.” Wholly fascinated by his talk with the aged wife of Ireland’s President De Valera, he quoted in his farewell talk at Shannon airport a poem she had taught him, promising like the poet “to come back and see old Shannon’s face again.”
He was so pleased with the specially designed O’ Kennedy coat of arms, with an added strong arm holding both an olive branch and arrows, that his wife had it made into a seal ring for him. Not much of a ring wearer, he kept it in his desk, but one day he told her with a mischievous smile: “I used my Irish seal on a letter today—-to the Queen of England!”
1
He had previously decided against the flights anyway on the grounds that the results were no longer worth the risk. He was genuinely disturbed on the four occasions during his term when mechanical or other failures caused accidental penetration of Soviet air space, and he instigated the adoption of more rigid safeguards.
2
Earlier he had joked about what an insult it was to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to say he looked like Nixon.
3
The President resisted the temptation, he later told me, to cite at this point Khrushchev’s “precedent” in Hungary.
4
At this point Gromyko corrected the interpreter, possibly for policy reasons, saying that the Chairman had not mentioned manufacture—but Khrushchev said he had.
5
During a long dinner he accepted in good grace all the anti-Communist jokes I had heard, and supplied a few of his own from their “Armenian Radio”; and the following day, when we flew together on a Presidential staff plane, he responded to my suggestion that he was now in the hands of the U.S. Air Force with the smiling reply: “I know they will not deliberately crash the plane with Kennedy’s Assistant aboard!”
6
Instead of 100 percent as the original agreement had provided in the case of an adverse American decision. The President was unenthusiastic about the budget aspects of this proposal, but he and Ormsby-Gore had worked it out on the plane going down.
7
Does he suggest, said the President, “that what happened at Cuba proved that the United States might not defend Europe? That is a peculiar logic. If we had not acted in Cuba, [would] that…have proved we would defend Europe?…The United States over the last…twenty years has given evidence that its commitments are good. Some [Europeans]…may not believe that commitment, but I think that Chairman Khrushchev does—and…he is right.”
8
Although the evidence is strong that De Gaulle virtually told him to expect a veto when the two met at Rambouillet.
9
I was witness, for example, to a very large wager by a high-ranking New Frontiersman that John Kennedy would be President long after De Gaulle.
10
“I didn’t get here by taking that kind of stuff from anybody,” he had warned one former friend who said he would raise new health issues if not given his way on a personal matter.
11
An eloquent quotation from David Lloyd George, on the contribution of small countries, he diplomatically attributed only to “one of the great orators of the English language”; but a reference to the Atlantic as a “bowl of bitter tears” was attributed by name to James Joyce, whose books had once been denounced in Dublin.
THE BERLIN CRISIS
I
N A 1959 INTERVIEW
Candidate Kennedy predicted that Berlin in time was certain to be a harsh “test of nerve and will.” He could not then have known that his own will and nerve would be so harshly tested so soon in that beleaguered city.
Military and diplomatic agreements near the close of the Second World War left Berlin one hundred miles within the East German territory controlled by Soviet troops, with no specific guarantees of Western access, and with a four-power administration of the city itself. In 1948, a series of Soviet actions had split the city into Soviet-occupied East Berlin and Western-occupied West Berlin. For ten years East Berlin and East Germany were increasingly cut off from their Western counterparts. Then, in 1958, Khrushchev demanded a German peace treaty, permanently legitimatizing the division and ending all Allied occupation rights inside East German territory. That demand, and the explosion of the Paris Summit Conference of 1960, made it clear that Berlin and Germany would top the Soviet Chairman’s agenda for discussions with Eisenhower’s successor.
