Legacy of Secrecy (49 page)

Rusk had not known of these developments prior to my communication

with him.”19

This call from McCone might have been when Rusk first learned

about the JFK-Almeida coup plan, an operation so sensitive that McCone

would not have included it in a routine office memorandum. When we

interviewed Rusk, he indicated that he had first learned shortly after

JFK’s death that all of the planning he and other officials had been doing

for months—for a Cuban coup and invasion—was for an “active” opera-

tion.20 Before that, Rusk had thought the planning was so the United

States would be ready just in case a powerful Cuban official was found to

overthrow Fidel. Like other top officials present at JFK’s big November

12, 1963, meeting about Cuba, Rusk had heard Desmond FitzGerald say,

the “CIA is in touch with three persons who are in the military” in Cuba,

and that the CIA was trying to get them “to talk and plot Castro’s down-

fall.”21 We know from interviewing someone who worked with Rusk on

one of Bobby’s Cuban subcommittees that Rusk probably already knew

about Rolando Cubela, but thought he was only a midlevel official with

little power, whom the CIA was using to try to find a far more power-

ful Cuban official. Rusk and his associate never considered Cubela as

someone who could actually stage a coup; they (along with McCone)

had also not been told that Helms and FitzGerald were trying to con-

vince Cubela to assassinate Fidel.

Our impression from talking to Rusk was that he was told briefly and

generally about the JFK-Almeida coup plan within a day or so after JFK’s

death, and then learned more at a later time. Rusk was adamant in our

interview that the “coup” and “second invasion” he had learned about

after JFK’s death were completely different from the Cubela operation,

which would have required Rusk to have gained more than a passing

knowledge of the JFK-Almeida coup plan.

Rusk also indicated in our interview that he was told about the coup

plan not by Bobby Kennedy or one of his close associates, but in the

course of his duties as Secretary of State. Rusk wasn’t as close to Bobby

Kennedy as some Cabinet officials who agreed to stay on under LBJ,

such as Defense Secretary McNamara. Perhaps that’s one reason Rusk

was told about the coup plan after JFK’s death, while some other offi-

cials, like McNamara, apparently weren’t told at all. But even McCone

couldn’t tell Rusk everything, since Helms was withholding so much

from his boss. (Helms would eventually withhold information directly

from Rusk, when Rusk asked Helms in 1966 if the CIA had tried to use

Cubela in an assassination operation. Helms told Rusk it hadn’t, and

Rusk wouldn’t learn that Helms was lying until 1975. In stark contrast

with his normally placid demeanor, Rusk’s anger about being lied to by

Helms was quite evident in our 1990 interview.)

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LEGACY OF SECRECY

A somber Bobby Kennedy took time out from his family and official

duties for a private meeting with Harry Williams, who told us the meet-

ing occurred within two days of JFK’s death, placing it on either Sat-

urday or Sunday. Almeida was still in Cuba, and his family was still

outside of Cuba under US surveillance, but any plans for a coup were

completely on hold. Harry says that Bobby “didn’t say much,” but told

Harry that “things are going to change,” now that Bobby no longer

essentially ran Cuban operations and policy for the United States. Harry

says he already knew that Bobby and “Johnson . . . hate[d] each other’s

guts,” so Bobby’s role and the plans would no doubt be very different.

Bobby didn’t voice any suspicions to Harry about Artime or any other

Cuban exiles, probably because by that time, Oswald’s seemingly pro-

Castro stance had been publicized extensively. In addition, Bobby knew

about some of the information coming from Mexico City, which would

have made him suspect, only briefly, that Castro might have had a hand

in JFK’s death.22

At the time, Harry didn’t suspect any Cuban exiles; that would only

come later, after he saw the ties between two of E. Howard Hunt’s exile

associates and Santo Trafficante. For the time being, Harry’s suspi-

cions were also directed at Fidel, especially once a Cuban exile linked

to Artime and the CIA showed him a photo of Oswald going into the

Cuban embassy in Mexico City. In 1992, when Harry told us about see-

ing the photo, he didn’t know about our Naval Intelligence source who

had described a similar photo. The accounts of Win Scott and other CIA

personnel who saw the Oswald photo had also not been publicized or

declassified at that time.

It’s important to point out a significant difference between Bobby

Kennedy and Richard Helms in the aftermath of JFK’s murder. Helms

would continue at least some of his unauthorized operations, hiding

them from LBJ the same way he had hidden them from JFK and Bobby.

In contrast, while Bobby withheld some information about the coup

plan from LBJ, he didn’t try to proceed with the plot behind LBJ’s back,

even after it became clear that Castro had nothing to do with JFK’s death

and that Almeida was still in place, unexposed, and willing to stage a

coup. Harry still had a direct line of communication to Almeida that

didn’t require CIA assistance, and enough exile contacts (and goodwill

from spearheading the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners) that Harry

could have gotten into Cuba even without the help of US authorities at

Guantanamo. Once inside Cuba, Harry could have met with Almeida

and proceeded with the coup. Bobby knew that all the planning and

preparations for the invasion and post-invasion occupation had been

completed, so LBJ would have had little choice but to commit the already

trained and ready US forces if Almeida sent word of Castro’s death.

However, it appears that Bobby never even considered the option of

going behind LBJ’s back. Once it became apparent, by late December,

that Almeida was still willing to go forward with the coup, Bobby would

deal with LBJ directly on the matter.

In Dallas, the press was still feeding the public a steady diet of news

stories, even as Chief Curry told tired journalists that Oswald’s transfer

to the county jail was being put off until Sunday morning. He assured

them that if they were back by 10:00 AM, “they won’t miss anything.”23

Earlier that day, CBS radio reporter Dan Rather had delivered the big-

gest scoop of his young career, when he told his listeners about being

one of the very first journalists to see what would become known as the

Zapruder film. Illustrating the power of suggestion, and most journal-

ists’ desire at the time to please authorities and network bosses, Rather

described the movie this way: “I have just returned from seeing a movie

which clearly shows the President’s assassination . . . his head went

forward with considerable violence.”24

Of course, the film shows no such thing; instead, JFK’s head jerks

back and to his left. But it would be more than a decade before any of

the American public could glimpse the actual film and many more years

before the public could easily view and study clear copies of the footage.

We should point out that Rather was allowed to see the film just once,

and only at normal speed, and the grainy 8-millimeter home movie was

nothing like the digitally enhanced version available today. But it does

demonstrate that the “official” version of the shooting—three shots, all

from the rear—was so prevalent among officials by Saturday that Rather

believed that more than his own eyes.

Also in Dallas, Jack Ruby was getting ready to lay the groundwork for

the following day, when his excuse for being near police headquarters

at the time of Oswald’s transfer would be that he had to wire $25 to one

of his dancers, Karen Carlin. To begin preparing this cover story, Ruby

had Carlin and several others go to Nichols Garage. All those involved in

this meeting later gave authorities different accounts of what happened

there. Carlin was willing to agree to whatever Ruby said, because the

previous day, a Ruby associate had ordered her to meet him and threat-

ened, “If you’re not down here, you won’t be around too long.”

Karen Carlin arrived at Nichols Garage before Ruby did; then Ruby

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LEGACY OF SECRECY

called the parking attendant and told him to loan Carlin $5—and be

sure to time-stamp the receipt—for which Ruby would reimburse him.

(The following day, Ruby’s time-stamped Western Union receipt would

be designed to “prove” that Ruby just happened to be near the police

station when Oswald was being moved.) When Ruby arrived at the

garage, his cover story was that he was supposed to loan Carlin another

$25. But Ruby claimed he didn’t have it and couldn’t get it, ignoring the

fact that his club and its safe were next door. The plan was for Ruby to

wire Carlin the money the next day, from a Western Union office only

one block from the police station where Oswald would be moved. It’s

clear this was only a cover story, since there were two Western Union

offices much closer to Ruby’s Oak Cliff apartment.25 There was no need

for Ruby to go all the way downtown to use the Western Union office

near the police station—except for the fact that Ruby had to silence

Oswald.

Chapter Eighteen

On November 24, 1963, at 10:00 AM (Eastern time), CIA Director McCone

met with LBJ to tell him about “the Cuban situation,” including “our

operational plans against Cuba,” according to McCone’s notes.1 How-

ever, the briefing was only twenty minutes long, and there was much to

go over besides the JFK-Almeida coup plan and AMWORLD, so John-

son’s understanding of Cuban operations was still in its early stages. LBJ

and McCone no doubt also discussed the latest information from Mexico

City about poor Silvia Duran and KGB agent Kostikov. Such information

would keep LBJ worried about possible Cuban or Russian involvement

in JFK’s murder; in another meeting that weekend, LBJ asked former

JFK aide Ted Sorenson, “What do you think of the possibility of a foreign

government being involved [in JFK’s assassination]?”

These concerns would drive LBJ’s need for secrecy and his desire

to limit any real investigation that might expose foreign links to JFK’s

murder that could generate a crisis with Russia or Cuba. Hence, the

Miami Herald
was unable to publish anything further about the Tampa

assassination plot mentioned in the previous day’s
Tampa Tribune.
In

addition, no newspaper or TV station followed up on the
Miami Herald’
s

intriguing November 24 newspaper story—which included many “no

comment” responses from officials who didn’t deny anything in the

original
Tampa Tribune
story (some of which the
Herald
repeated). In

hindsight, that type of story should have attracted attention from at

least some other journalists, and perhaps it did. But nothing was ever

published or broadcast, at least not for decades.

In South Carolina, white supremacist and Marcello associate Joseph

Milteer was having breakfast with his friend William Somersett, unaware

that Somersett was an informant for the Miami police. The subject of

JFK’s murder came up again, and “Milteer advised that they did not

have to worry about Lee Harvey Oswald getting caught because he

‘doesn’t know anything.’” However, as if he needed to make sure, Milt-

eer excused himself so that he could telephone someone.2

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LEGACY OF SECRECY

In Dallas, Jack Ruby was spruced up, dressed in his finest, for the spot-

light he was sure to occupy after he completed his assignment. Ruby

was probably nervous, but not about the length of time he might have

to spend in jail after shooting Oswald. Under Texas law, for murders

involving a “sudden passion,” the sentence could be as brief as two

years, with time off for good behavior, or even just probation.3 Instead,

Ruby was probably only worried that after he pulled out his gun and

started shooting at Oswald, he might hit a policeman or a policeman

might start shooting at him. Getting into the police station basement

where the transfer would take place would be no problem for Ruby,

since the FBI later acknowledged that “as a result of his friendship with

a number of police officers, Ruby had easy accessibility to the Dallas

Police Department.”4

The executive director of the House Select Committee on Assassina-

tions, former Mafia prosecutor G. Robert Blakey, said that “the murder

of Oswald by Jack Ruby had all the earmarks of an organized crime hit.”5

Also, the Committee found that Ruby’s shooting Oswald wasn’t “spon-

taneous,” and that Ruby probably had help entering the basement of

the police station for the transfer.6 The staffs of both the Committee and

the Warren Commission focused particular attention on one of Ruby’s