as the "lewd or prurient" interests she identifies with porn. Moreover, this latter description of pornography does not meet Steinem's condition that pornography be material whose message is "violence, dominance, and conquest." 59 Indeed, if sexual subservience is part of a woman's self-determined plan of seduction, she might wonder where to locate the objection of degradation.
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Suppose, as some philosophers have suggested, that we add to mutual consent and mutual pleasure an equality of partnership that requires that the materials depict people satisfying each other. 60 Then, however, the requirement is too strong for still photographs, which necessarily describe only one instant or aspect in the life of their subjects (Do respectful lovers always and simultaneously respond to the needs of each other? How would a still photograph show this?); and the requirement is too weak to preclude s/m porn, which antiporn feminists reject but which, according to sex radical feminists, can depict consent, mutuality, and moral equality, just not equality of sexual roles. Kittay argues that since many viewers of s/m porn cannot see the moral equality that the practitioners promise, the sex depicted is illegitimate. 61 However, as I suggested earlier, moral equality is difficult to show even in more vanilla contexts; and Kittay's view confines s/m sex work to an interpretation solely in terms of a patriarchal ideology that eroticizes power in oppressive, not parodying or liberating, terms. Dominatrixes who do s/m work primarily because it pays well report that they are not aroused by it, much less oppressed by it, while others say that they can happily combine business with pleasure. 62 Alan Soble suggests that a speciflable set of internal and external cues can help us distinguish depictions of lovemaking from those of pure sex, or consensual from coercive s/m sex. However, one difficulty with Soble's suggestion is that if the same cues are not shared by all viewers, or if we cannot be sure that the intended cues are received, then we are as much at a loss for one single, appropriate interpretation as before. I agree that if feminists do not want to condemn all sex work, we need ways to distinguish the degrading from the nondegrading sort; but sexual and social bias, institutional setting, and personal taste and moral judgment will all have an effect on what is to count, for individual men and women, as legitimate sex and legitimate sex work. In short, the context in which the sex work occurs is just as important as, if not more important than, the content of the work itself. 63
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Helen Longino recognizes the importance of context when she points out that sexually explicit depictions of women being degraded can be used as educational tools to help us understand the harm that pornography does (Longino's "moral realism"). Therefore, Longino adds, for sexually explicit material to degrade women, there must be "no suggestion that this sort of [degrading] treatment of others is inappropriate." Longino proposes that women are degraded in pornography when they are depicted as women whose sole purpose ought to be their sexual subordination to men, and women whose sole pleasure ought to consist in serving men's every sexual whim no matter how destructive or abusive. That is, the degradation must not just be depicted in pornography for it to be objectionable; it must also be endorsed . 64
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The strength of Longino's argument rests on pornography's ability to both depict and endorse degradation. Exactly what does it mean to depict degradation and endorse it? Judith M. Hill makes the important point that being degraded requires more than being subordinated, exploited, or abused: degradation implies that the victim
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