Magnificent Delusions (23 page)

According to Richardson, “India is relatively more important to our interests than Pakistan.” Furthermore, he expected that there would be a sharp reaction from India if the United States changed
its policy and resumed supplying weapons to Pakistan. “If we can please only one of the two countries, we should lean toward India, the larger and more influential power,” he declared unequivocally. “Pakistan's unhappiness will be containable. It will continue to maintain good relations with us as a political offset to its relations with the USSR and Communist China and because we are Pakistan's largest aid donor.”
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The State Department also recommended to maintain the status quo and retain the arms embargo for South Asia. But Richardson realized that Nixon felt “some obligation to President Yahya” that might “take the form of providing some military equipment or some economic development related help.” He expressed the hope that any gesture toward Pakistan would not mark a significant departure from existing policy. In response, the State Department recommended a one-time exception to the embargo and supported the sale of six F-104 fighter aircraft to Pakistan, planes that Pakistan had asked to purchase.

Kissinger asked officials at the State Department to review their recommendation. He told assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, Joseph Sisco, that Nixon “feels morally obligated to do something” for Yahya. Kissinger then proposed that the United States offer a military aid package to Pakistan that included seven B-57 bombers and the tanks that Pakistan had been requesting for some time.

Sisco informed Kissinger that those additions would make “a defensive replacement package” seem more offensive and would “have more effect in India.” He felt that adding six B-57s could be justified as a replacement of old planes, but more tanks would have an “unfortunate psychological effect.” After bargaining with the State Department on behalf of the Pakistani military, Kissinger explained, “Our worry is that this package is so small they will consider it an insult.”
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Although willing to offer more weapons to Pakistan in discharging what Nixon considered a moral obligation, the White House was not completely ignorant of the views of Pakistan's generals. Kissinger had learned firsthand during a conversation with the West
Pakistan governor, Air Marshal Nur Khan, that Pakistan was ready to stumble into another war as it had done earlier. Nur Khan, known for his intellect and professional competence, came from a district in Punjab that was home to many of Pakistan's military men. He had been the chief of the air force and was a quintessential member of Pakistan's establishment.

In their meeting in Lahore in August 1969 Nur Khan had told Kissinger that Pakistan realized it could not take Kashmir by force, but there was no reason for Pakistan to cease its support for Kashmiris, which, according to Nur Khan, was now limited to propaganda. The air marshal said he could see why the United States and the other great powers would want the Kashmir problem to be settled, but he could see “no reason why Pakistan would benefit from such a settlement.”

Nur Khan offered a succinct explanation of Pakistan's strategic vision. “In the present situation Pakistan obviously is not going to get what it wanted,” he said to Kissinger, as a settlement would require appeasement of India, which in turn “would formally declare Pakistan's second class status in the subcontinent.” Consequently, waiting for an opportunity to arise that would force India's hand in Kashmir while increasing its own military preparedness would serve Pakistan better. Nur Khan also made it clear that Pakistan needed additional US aircraft to maintain its military balance with India.
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He effectively told Kissinger that Pakistan was in a permanent state of war with India over Kashmir and had no interest in resolving the conflict through talks. Pakistan did not want to be seen as less important or less powerful than India; equal status with India took priority over solving specific issues such as Kashmir.

In Kissinger's mind Pakistan's readiness to go to war again with India was not enough to deter him and Nixon from resuming arms supplies to Pakistan. Yahya's value as an ally lay in creating an opening for US ties with China, and that mattered more, as did the need to outmaneuver the Soviet Union in South Asia. Although neither India nor Pakistan were likely to go communist any time soon, Nixon's team constantly thought about the need to deny the Soviets influence in Pakistan. Thus, when Yahya scheduled a visit to Moscow
in June 1970 Kissinger rushed to convey to him Nixon's willingness to sell a substantial amount of military hardware that Pakistan had requested.

Pakistan would now be able to get a twelve-aircraft squadron of tactical fighter aircraft (F-104Gs or F-5s) or six replacement F-104As. Kissinger explained that their intent was to enable Pakistan to reactivate its F-104A squadron, either by replacing planes lost and bringing it up to strength or by trading in the old planes and reestablishing the squadron with new aircraft. In addition, three hundred armored personnel carriers and four advanced design naval patrol antisubmarine aircraft would be supplied. Seven B-57 bombers would replace B-57 aircraft the United States had previously supplied but had been lost through attrition.

Kissinger told Hilaly that “the President wanted President Yahya to know that this has been done on the basis of his personal intervention and personal interest.” Hilaly noted the word “sell” and asked whether credit could be discussed. Pakistan simply did not have the money to buy the equipment, but Kissinger's team had been working on the assumption of a cash sale. Given the congressional opposition as well as restrictions imposed by the Foreign Military Sales Act, offering credit to Pakistan would be difficult.

If Kissinger had expected appreciation from Pakistan, none was forthcoming. Hilaly pointed out that there were no tanks on the list. Kissinger explained that the White House had tried to introduce tanks into the package but realized that “this could wreck the whole arrangement”; the furor that might have arisen in Congress could have produced further amendments to the Foreign Military Sales Act or the later appropriations legislation, making “any kind of arrangement impossible.” According to Kissinger, it was important to first establish the principle that the United States will continue to supply military equipment to Pakistan before moving forward.
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Yahya's response was somewhat better than Hilaly's. Joseph Farland, a lawyer who had arrived in Pakistan as US ambassador soon after Yahya's coup, informed the Pakistani president of the decision. Farland, a West Virginia Republican who owned a coal mining company, had previously served as ambassador in the Dominican
Republic and Panama and had a reputation for pursuing unconventional methods of diplomacy. In Pakistan this had translated into regular informal meetings with key public figures, including Yahya and his inner circle. “Yahya immediately exclaimed that he was deeply pleased and appreciative of the president's action,” Farland reported to the State Department. “Yahya said the president's decision is not only a gesture of friendship, but also evidence that the U.S. understands Pakistan's problems and difficulties,” he continued. But the idea of cash sales did not cheer the Pakistani president. “Pakistan is broke and everyone knows it,” he told Farland, adding that the United States knew that better than anyone else.

According to Farland, Yahya said “he valued above all the friendship and support which President Nixon's decision evidenced.” He did not want to get into a detailed discussion of the package that had been offered, but the Pakistan army “badly needed to replenish its tank inventory” and would have to continue to seek supplies. “Yahya left me in no doubt,” Farland summarized, “that he was sorry we had been unable accommodate Pakistan on tanks, to which they obviously attach great importance.”
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Subsequently the Pakistani leader explored ways to get around the cash-payment framework. Yahya asked Farland about the possibility of “substantial concessions on prices” and “concessions on timing of payments.” He said that he and his government would face a very difficult situation if Pakistan was unable to pay for US equipment that it required and desired and that the Americans had offered to sell.
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The deal was, for Pakistanis, as much a matter of national prestige as a question of securing equipment for their armed forces.

Nixon and Yahya got a chance to speak directly when Yahya visited the United States for the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations of the United Nations. Each president had one major issue on his mind: Nixon was uneasy about the slow pace of his outreach to China, and Yahya was troubled by the difficulty in procuring American arms, which he needed in order to retain the Pakistani military's respect even more than to confront India.

Kissinger took notes of their meeting in the Oval Office. “Yahya is tough, direct, and with a good sense of humor,” observed
Kissinger. “He talks in a very clipped way, is a splendid product of Sandhurst and affects a sort of social naiveté but is probably much more complicated than this.”
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That apparently made it easier for Nixon to treat Yahya as a personal friend instead of approaching him as the head of state of an ally that had drifted away.

The US president began the conversation by blaming congressional opposition for “difficult times in our relationships with our allies” and assuring Yahya that “we will stick by our friends.” Nixon said, “There is a psychosis in this country about India” before promising that “We will keep our word with Pakistan.” Nixon's comments about India animated Yahya, as did the words “we will work with you” and “we will try to be as helpful as we can.” Yahya said somewhat poetically, “We were surrounded by enemies when we became friends. We are no longer surrounded by enemies but we will still remain friends.”

Neither leader addressed directly the objections that most Americans raised about military supplies to Pakistan, but Yahya wanted Nixon to know that he would not strengthen the American president's congressional critics by simultaneously seeking weapons from the Soviet Union. If Pakistan really felt threatened by India and needed weapons for its defense, closing other options for acquiring them would not make sense. “We are a sentimental people and we will never do anything to embarrass you,” Yahya declared, meaning that Nixon's gesture of support had earned him personal goodwill in Pakistan. Nixon responded, “Your people are too proud to do a thing like that,” appreciating that Pakistan chose being an American ally over the nonalignment India had adopted.

But then Yahya set aside his pride and added, after expressing approval for the recent military assistance package, an additional request for economic aid. The Aid to Pakistan Consortium, organized by the World Bank, was scheduled to meet in the near future, he explained. The Japanese prime minister, Eisaku Sato, had apparently told Yahya that the amount of Japanese aid to Pakistan would depend on whether the United States would agree to a significant contribution. Nixon then turned to Kissinger and, according to Kissinger, “ordered me to do what I could to encourage assistance to Pakistan.”
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The Pakistani president also updated Nixon on Pakistani domestic politics. General elections were scheduled for December 7, he said, adding a swipe at Bhutto for accusing Yahya of waiting to cut a deal with India and selling out Pakistan. “It was absurd the levels to which political opponents would stoop,” Kissinger reported Yahya as saying.

In response, Nixon proposed “a strong Presidency as in France” for Pakistan. Yahya said, “Without it Pakistan would disintegrate. Our people like the Parliamentary system only because they have been ruled by Britain for so many centuries, but they cannot make it work and they do not have the basic prerequisite, namely a two-party system; we have about 35 parties.”
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Once he felt that Yahya was sufficiently confident of US support, Nixon gave him his assignment, beginning with the words: “I understand you are going to Peking.” Nixon then declared, “It is essential that we open negotiations with China.” He wanted Yahya to tell Zhou Enlai that the United States would not close ranks with the Soviet Union against China now that the Sino-Soviet rift was widening, and that the United States was also willing to send a high-level emissary to Peking “to establish links secretly.”

Yahya said he had been told to establish secret links before and had communicated it to the Chinese. The Chinese had asked whether the United States was thinking of a hotline to Peking, similar to the one that existed to Moscow. Nixon categorically told Yahya that was not what he meant—the United States was willing to send ambassadors.
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The significance of the message was not lost on Yahya: until now Yahya was conveying to the Chinese Nixon's desire for good relations, but now he could play an even more substantive role by providing cover for secret links involving a high-level emissary.