Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome (13 page)

namely, that the “wooden wall” referred to the Athenians’ construc-

tion of a fleet of triremes funded with the revenue from their silver

mines at Laureion, proved to be correct. The success of Themistocles’

naval strategy at Salamis was decisive for the victory of the Greeks over

the Persian fleet.7 In contrast, the Persian army killed those who had

remained behind in Athens, plundered the sanctuaries, and set fire to

the place.8

In the fol owing year, the Persian general Mardonius recaptured the

empty city of Athens, and before retreating to Boeotia he demolished

its wal s and burned the city to the ground: “But since he had had no

success in persuading them [the Athenians] to do so [i.e., make an agree-

ment with him], and he had now learned the whole truth, he demolished

60 Berkey

al wal s, buildings, and sanctuaries stil standing, leaving everything in

a heap of ruins.”9 When the Athenians returned to their city after the

defeat of Mardonius at the Battle of Plataea in 479 BC, they encountered

the carnage of their ruined homes and desecrated shrines and temples.10

Thucydides describes the scene to which the Athenians returned:

Meanwhile the Athenian people, after the departure of the bar-

barian from their country, at once proceeded to bring over their

children and wives, and such property as they had left, from the

places where they had deposited them, and prepared to rebuild

their city and their walls. For only isolated portions of the cir-

cumference had been left standing, and most of the houses were

in ruins; though a few remained, in which the Persian grandees

had taken up their quarters.11

In the wake of this violent destruction, the Athenians’ immediate

concern was to establish a secure environment in which they could be-

gin to reconstruct their lives. It was not possible for the Athenians to

ignore the losses they had suffered. Just as Americans today wrestle with

the chal enge of developing a fitting tribute to those who perished at

Ground Zero in New York City, the question of how to memorialize

the dead and commemorate the event was of critical importance to the

citizens of Athens.12 They elected not to reuse the material from their

destroyed temples in the construction of new buildings. Rather, they

left the stones to commemorate the Persian sack, perhaps in accordance

with the Oath of Plataea:13 “and having defeated the barbarians in war, I

wil not raze any of the cities that fought against them, and I wil rebuild

none of the temples that have been burned and cast down, but I will

leave them as a monument to men hereafter, a memorial to the impiety

of the barbarians.”14 Accordingly, when the Athenians constructed a new

wal to guard the northern side of the Acropolis and decided to incor-

porate architectural fragments from the archaic temple (most strikingly,

the temple’s old column drums), the effect was to serve as a war memo-

rial that provided a vivid reminder of the Persian destruction of the city.15

Thucydides initiates his discussion of the Pentekontaetia with the

construction of the Themistoclean walls, recognizing it as an early

stage in the growth of Athenian power:16

Why Fortifications Endure 61

Perceiving what they were going to do, the Spartans sent an em-

bassy to Athens. They would have themselves preferred to see

neither her nor any other city in possession of a wall; though

here they acted principally at the instigation of their allies, who

were alarmed at the strength of her newly acquired navy, and the

valor which she had displayed in the war with the Persians. They

begged her not only to abstain from building walls for herself, but

also to join them in throwing down the remaining walls of the

cities outside of the Peloponnesus. They did not express openly

the suspicious intention with regard to the Athenians that lay be-

hind this proposal but urged that by these means the barbarians,

in the case of a third invasion, would not have any strong place,

such as in this invasion they had in Thebes, for their base of op-

eration; and that the Peloponnesus would suffice for all as a base

both for retreat and offense. After the Spartans had thus spoken,

they were, on the advice of Themistocles, immediately dismissed

by the Athenians, with the answer that ambassadors should be

sent to Sparta to discuss the question. Themistocles told the

Athenians to send him off with all speed to Lacedaemon, but not

to dispatch his colleagues as soon as they had selected them, but

to wait until they had raised their wall to the height from which

defense was possible. Meanwhile the whole population in the city

was to labor at the wall, the Athenians, their wives, and their chil-

dren, sparing no edifice, private or public, which might be of any

use to the work, but throwing all down.17

Thucydides makes a correlation between Athens’s possession

of walls and its power. He concludes by commenting that the alac-

rity with which this circuit was built compromised the quality of its

workmanship:

In this way the Athenians walled their city in a short space of

time. To this day the building shows signs of the haste of its ex-

ecution; the foundations are laid of stones of all kinds, and in

some places not wrought or fitted, but placed just in the order in

which they were brought by the different hands; and many col-

umns, too, from tombs and sculpted stones were put in with the

62 Berkey

rest. For the bounds of the city were extended at every point of

the circumference; and so they laid hands on everything without

exception in their haste.18

The Athenians, therefore, demonstrated firm resolve to defend

themselves. Perhaps Thucydides is also drawing a parallel between the

city’s walls and the rise of the Athenian Empire. Both were formed rap-

idly, and both marked a rupture with the past. The Athenians incorpo-

rated the graves of their ancestors into the wall, and with their imperial

power they experienced unprecedented prosperity, thereby transform-

ing both the city and its landscape. The archaeological remains of this

circuit of walls, 6.5 km in length, reveal that while it was hastily built,19

its construction was solid.20

Thucydides’ discussion of the birth of the Athenian Empire is fa-

mous and explains the strategic motivation for the enlargement of

the circuit of Athens’s walls. It also shows the tenuous nature of the

relationship between Athens and Sparta and their history of non-

cooperation, which stretched back to before the Persian Wars.21 The

rise of Athenian power also led to the formation of a bipolar structure

in the interstate system.22 Athens and Sparta also differed from each

other with respect to matters of defense. Given that walls are a ubiqui-

tous feature of archaic and classical poleis, it is notable that Sparta did

not possess them.23 Militaristic Spartan society saw no valor in its citi-

zens seeking cover behind defensive fortifications,24 and it was not until

Epaminondas’s invasions of the Peloponnese in the decade following

the Spartan defeat at the Battle of Leuctra
(371 BC) that the Spartans

were forced to defend their native territory and witness firsthand the

construction of hostile walled cities.25

Themistocles also pursued his earlier plan of making Piraeus the

main harbor of Athens, both in military and in commercial terms, an

act that was a logical precondition for the subsequent construction of

the Long Walls. With his ostracism in 472 BC and death in 467, Them-

istocles would never fully realize his intentions. Nevertheless, with in-

creases in the numbers of ships in their fleet and the revenue generated

from their empire, the Athenians witnessed the growth of the size and

importance of Piraeus. They selected Hippodamus of Miletus to plan

Why Fortifications Endure 63

the town, presumably during the time of Pericles.26 Thucydides pro-

vides Themistocles’ rationale for the importance of fortifying Piraeus,

as well as his overall strategic vision:

Themistocles also persuaded them to finish the wal s of the Pi-

raeus, which had been begun before, in his year of office as archon;

being influenced alike by the fineness of a locality that has three

natural harbors, and by the great start that which the Athenians

would gain in the acquisition of power by becoming a naval peo-

ple. For he first ventured to tel them to stick to the sea and forth-

with began to lay the foundations for empire. It was his advice,

too, that they built the wal s of that thickness which can stil be

discerned round the Piraeus, the stones being brought up by two

wagons meeting each other. Between the wal s thus formed there

was neither rubble nor mortar, but great stones hewn square and

fitted together, cramped to each other on the outside with iron and

lead. About half the height that he intended was finished. His idea

was that by their size and thickness they would keep off the attacks

of an enemy; he thought that they might be adequately defended

by a smal group of invalids, and the rest be freed for service in the

fleet. For the fleet claimed most of his attention. He saw, as I think,

that the approach by sea was easier for the King’s army than that

by land: he also thought the Piraeus more valuable than the upper

city; indeed, he was always advising the Athenians, if a day should

come when they were hard pressed by land, to go down to the

Piraeus, and defy the world with their fleet. In this way, therefore,

the Athenians completed their wal , and commenced their other

buildings immediately after the retreat of the Persians.27

The Athenians’ decision to concentrate their military resources on

naval warfare and the construction, maintenance, and sailing of tri-

remes would have strategic repercussions throughout the remainder of

the classical period, not only in Athens but throughout the Greek world.

In particular, they capitalized on the strength of their citizens, the ma-

jority of whom were il -equipped for fighting in the hoplite phalanx.

The thetes, the lowest of the four Solonian property classes, now served

in the capacity of oarsmen in the Athenian fleet. With the decision to

64 Berkey

emphasize the fleet, the Athenians enlisted the greatest possible number

of citizens in pursuit of the security and prosperity of Athens. And in or-

der to forgo engaging directly with the enemy on land, the fortification

of the polis was essential. As the cornerstone in the process of advanc-

ing the political power of thousands of poorer Athenians, the wal s of

Athens—and now those of Piraeus as wel —appear to have assumed a

new, democratic significance in the minds of some Athenians.28

After the construction of the walls of the city and those of Piraeus,

the next phase in the history of the fortification of Athens was the build-

ing of the Long Walls.29 This project initially involved the construc-

tion of two walls, each 6 km in length, which ran from Athens to the

harbors of Phaleron and Piraeus. The first phase of construction was

completed early in Pericles’ political career,30 and later he would con-

vince them to build a third wall, which ran parallel to the Piraic walls.31

In the event of a siege, these walls, which connected the city with the

port, would permit the Athenians access to their naval fleet, merchant

ships, and the provisions that they supplied. During the Peloponnesian

War, the Long Walls also provided a safe haven for the rural citizens of

Attica, even though this was likely not their original purpose.32 Donald

Kagan describes Pericles’ strategy in the following terms:

Pericles, however, devised a novel strategy made possible by the

unique character and extent of Athens’ power. Their navy en-

abled them to rule over an empire that provided them income

with which they could both sustain their supremacy at sea and

obtain whatever goods they needed by trade or purchase. Al-

though Attica’s lands were vulnerable to attack, Pericles had all

but turned Athens itself into an island by constructing the Long

Walls that connected the city with its port and naval base at Pi-

raeus. In the current state of Greek siege warfare these walls

were invulnerable when defended, so that if the Athenians chose

to withdraw within them they could remain there safely, and the

Spartans could neither get at them nor defeat them.33

Athens’s fortifications successfully defended its populace during the

war, and it was not until the Spartans blockaded Piraeus that the Athe-

nians were forced to capitulate. Even with the Athenians’ success in

Why Fortifications Endure 65

withstanding the Spartans behind their walls, Pericles’ strategy chal-

lenged the traditional Greek warrior ethic and failed to deter the Spar-