Mosquito: Menacing the Reich: Combat Action in the Twin-engine Wooden Wonder of World War II (14 page)

In April 1944 at 1655 MU at Warboys, Frank Diamond, a navigator who had flown a tour on Stirlings in 15 Squadron at Mildenhall, crewed up with Flight Sergeant Ron Hemming and they were posted to 571 Squadron at Oakington. Frank Diamond recalls:

As my pilot was not commissioned we did not share the same Mess. This was unfortunate but it did not interfere with our operational efficiency. We were destined to fly with the Pathfinders and operated alongside a Lancaster squadron with the role of providing some cover for the heavy bombers by creating diversionary trails and raids. Having in mind our wooden airframes, our friends on the Lancs dubbed us ‘the model aeroplane club’. Our casualty rate was much lower than theirs. This was acknowledged later in our tour when it was suggested that we could extend it from thirty to fifty and this we agreed to do. However, predicted flak and radar controlled searchlights were a threat up to 30,000ft. We took Mosquito MM156 to Berlin and on our approach a master searchlight caught us. Escape was made impossible as others immediately backed it up and we were held for 12 minutes into and away from the target area. At first we were fearful of being taken by a fighter circling above us. Just after releasing our 4,000lb bomb and turning away there was a flak burst close to the tail. It had missed us. As we had now jettisoned our wing fuel-tanks and no longer had the bomb, we could increase speed and dash for home. Speaking of the experience the following day I said that as a true veteran of flak in a Stirling over the Ruhr, that it was a bit close but really nothing that bad. However, I agreed to go to the hangar and take a look at the damage. The holes in the tail unit were being repaired. The jagged holes in the skin were being trimmed with a fine toothed saw and inserts cut to fit and be glued in to place before taping with fabric and painting. I thought no more of it. We never flew that aircraft again but this was of little significance to my mind. The ground staff officer had taken a much closer look and found serious damage to the main structure in addition to the skin and he had ruled it unfit for further use. I now know that the Grim Reaper was denied our scalps by a very narrow margin indeed. If that shell burst had occurred at a mere fraction of a second earlier that would have been a direct hit. And, at age 22 I would not have lived to enjoy a further 60 years or more.

The C-in-C of Bomber Command, Sir Arthur Harris, was, I think, obsessed with attacking Berlin, recalled Flight Lieutenant John E.L. Gover DFC of 692 Squadron, and, I think, rightly so. It was considered, though, that such a target would be out of range, because we carried 600 gallons of petrol, which we burned at a rate of 120 gallons an hour, that is, a flying time of 5 hours. However, if it was possible to send a Mosquito with a 4,000lb bomb there and back in under 5 hours, it was far less risky than sending a four-engine heavy bomber, though with more bombs, which would take about 8 hours to get there and back. Therefore it was decided to send us to Berlin with each aircraft carrying a 4,000lb bomb. On 13 April we went there and back in four hours 15 minutes, showing it could be done. Subsequently, I made twelve further trips to Berlin but never in such a short time. Apart from the second trip on 18 April, when my radar was unserviceable and, far more important, so were my wing tanks carrying a total of 100 gallons of petrol. I just scraped in over the English coast and landed after 4 hours 5 minutes’ flying time. On the first trip we had more or less gone straight there and straight back, so that it could be done in minimum time, but it would have been a disaster to have kept to the same route on every occasion. Other trips took from 4 hours 30 minutes to 4 hours 40 minutes, which left very little spare petrol.

Since the beginning of 1944 617 Squadron of ‘Dam Buster’ fame (now commanded by Wing Commander Leonard Cheshire,
DSO
*
DFC
) had successfully employed the tactic of marking and destroying small industrial targets at night using flares dropped by a Lancaster in a shallow dive at low level. Obviously the Lanc had limitations in this role, so Air Marshal the Honorable Ralph Cochrane, urged on by Cheshire, allocated a Mosquito to 617. The squadron’s first Mosquito sortie was on 5/6 April when Cheshire and his navigator Flying Officer Pat Kelly marked an aircraft factory at Toulouse on his third pass with two red-spot flares from a height of 800-1,000ft. Cheshire used this aircraft (ML976/N) on 10/11 April to mark a signals depot at St. Cyr during a dive from 5,000 to 1,000ft. These successes led to 617 Squadron receiving four FB.VIs/XVIs for marking purposes. Benny Goodman recalls:

The brilliant AOC of 5 Group, Air Marshal the Hon Ralph Cochrane, was quick to appreciate that if a single aircraft could mark a target accurately for a squadron then it should be possible for a squadron of properly trained crews to mark targets with similar accuracy for the whole Group. The Lancaster was a splendid aircraft but it was vulnerable to light flak at low level; a more manoeuvrable aircraft was required for the operations Cochrane had in mind. Leonard Cheshire was aware of the limitations of the Lancaster and he had already decided that the best aircraft for low-level marking was the Mosquito. He briefed the AC on his ideas and this led to the meeting at Bomber Command HQ, which resulted in the redeployment of 627 Squadron from Oakington to Woodhall Spa and 83 and 97 Lancaster Squadrons from their respective Pathfinder bases to Coningsby. No.5 Group was about to receive its own PFF force and 8 Group was no longer to enjoy its hitherto unchallenged monopoly over pathfinder tactics. No hint of these momentous events reached the crews of 627 Squadron ‘in the trenches’ at Oakington. We had, of course, heard of Leonard Cheshire, but he belonged to 5 Group, the Independent Air Force, as it was known in Bomber Command. We were too busy attending to daily grind in 8 Group to concern ourselves unduly with what the glamour boys of a rival Group were doing.

Bill Hickox remembers:

My flying Log Book reveals in its cold and unremarkable way that in early April Bill Hickox and I went to Cologne, Essen, Hanover and, on 12/13 April, Osnabrück. The BBC had sent one of their top broadcasters, the Canadian, Stuart Macpherson, to cover the flight. He came to debriefing to meet the returning crews and the broadcast went something like this: ‘Here are the crews just back from “Arznabruck”. Here with me is the Squadron Commander, who wears the ribbons of the DSO and DFC, and his Navigator, who is an Australian’. Perhaps that is why soon afterwards several of us were awarded DFCs or DFMs. Sadly, all good things come to an end. After that last flight our complacency was rudely shattered when we were called to a meeting addressed by a somewhat emotional Don Bennett. He informed us that we were being taken from him, together with his two best Lancaster squadrons and sent up to 5 Group, where Leonard Cheshire had demonstrated a new technique of dive-bombing marking. We were to go to Woodhall Spa to do the marking for 5 Group, while the Lancs went to Coningsby as backers-up. Consequently, on 14 April we positioned our aircraft [DZ454 G-George] up to Woodhall Spa, where it soon became apparent that we were very much the poor relations of the famous Dambusters. While they lorded it in Petwood House in Woodhall we were relegated to a batch of Nissen huts on the far side of the airfield. There, the only amenity, apart from our own messes, was a tiny one-roomed ale house down the road: the beloved ‘Bluebell Inn’ run by a little old lady. We even had to go to Coningsby for briefing and debriefing.
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Benny Goodman continues:

After landing, we were formed into a single line and the Station Commander arrived with what I can best describe as a bevy of brass. It was the AOC with his principal staff officers. He moved along the line with Wing Commander Roy Elliott, our CO, who introduced us individually to the great man. Within a few minutes I found myself looking into the cold eyes of a tall, rather ascetic man, who abruptly welcomed me to 5 Group and moved on along the line. Why had he taken the trouble to meet us? Such a thing was unheard of in bomber circles. We all felt somewhat uneasy. Obviously, something was up and it promised to be bloody dangerous. Next day the whole squadron journeyed by bus to Coningsby and was directed to the station cinema. Here were assembled all crewmembers of 83 and 97 Lancaster PFF Squadrons, our own Squadron, the AOC and his entourage and Leonard Cheshire. The AOC opened the meeting by saying that 617 Squadron had made a number of successful attacks on important pinpoint targets and it was now intended to repeat these on a wider scale. The Lancaster pathfinder squadrons were to identify the target areas on H
2
S [a terrain identifying radar] and were to lay a carpet of flares over a given target, under which 627 Squadron would locate and mark the precise aiming point. No.5 Group Lancaster bombers would then destroy the target. So that was it: we were to become low-level visual markers and it did sound dangerous.

Cheshire now took the stand and explained carefully how the low-level marking business was done. What the Lancasters had to do was lay a concentrated carpet of hooded flares, the light from which would be directed downwards onto the target, making it as bright as day. A small number of Mosquitoes, four or possibly six, would orbit, find the aiming point and then mark it in a shallow dive with 500lb spot-fires. Marker Leader would assess the position of the spot-fires in relation to the aiming point and would pass this information to a ‘Master of Ceremonies’ in one of the pathfinder Lancasters. The MC would then take over and direct the Main Force Lancasters in their attack on the target.

On returning to Woodhall, the CO called the Flight Commanders to his office and an intensive programme of dive-bombing at Wainfleet Bombing Range was worked out. Although Leonard Cheshire had said we must fly low for the best results it was decided to try dropping smoke bombs from various levels. Attempts were made to dive bomb from 15,000ft and, when this failed, from progressively lower heights. In the end we found it was as Cheshire had said. To get a smoke marker close to the target in the Wash we had to come down to around 2,000ft and then dive directly at the blob in the sea; down, down, until it was held in the middle of the windscreen. Then ‘Bomb away’. This time however, it was not Master Hickox who did the releasing of the bomb. I had a button on the control column and merely had to press it with my right thumb when I judged that the correct moment had arrived. It was entirely a matter of practice and within a very short time the crews of 627 Squadron could plop their markers right alongside the Wainfleet target. The question now was, could we do this under battle conditions?

We did not know that the plans for the invasion of France, Operation Overlord, required the destruction of the French railway system leading to the landing area. The best way of doing this was by employing heavy bombers, but grave doubts existed at the highest level as to the accuracy with which this could be done. Winston Churchill was adamant that French lives must not be lost needlessly and eventually it was agreed that 5 Group should undertake a mass attack on a marshalling yard in the Paris area to prove the case one way or the other. Juvisy was selected as the target and the marshalling yard was attacked on the night of 18/19 April by 202 Lancasters led by Leonard Cheshire and a small force of Mosquitoes from 627 Squadron participating as ‘makey-learns’. One of our pilots, Jim Marshallsay, was not detailed for the trip but thumbed a ride in a 617 Squadron Lancaster. The attack on Juvisy was a bombing classic. The railway yards were marked at each end with red spot-fires and the heavy bombers laid their cargoes between the target indicators. The bombing was concentrated, the yards were put out of action, few French lives were lost and all but one Lancaster returned safely to base. The railway yards were so badly damaged that they were not brought back into service until 1947.

The first major test for the new 5 Group marking method took place on the night of 20/21 April against a railway target at La Chapelle just north of Paris. It involved not only 617 Squadron’s low-level Mosquito markers, three of which marked the target with phosphorous bombs and acted as backers-up, but also the three Pathfinder squadrons recently transferred from 8 Group as well. A few 8 Group Mosquitoes also dropped markers by Oboe to identify the target location prior to the main marking effort.
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Six of the 247 attacking Lancasters were lost but despite a few difficulties with marking the bombing was extremely accurate and concentrated. Benny Goodman continues:

The real test of the new tactics had still to be made against targets in Germany. No.5 Group was therefore unleashed against three of these targets in quick succession: Brunswick on 22/23 April, Munich two nights later; and Schweinfurt on 26/27 April.
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Speaking for myself, I found the business of marking a German target no worse than marking anywhere else. The point was that enemy AA defences in Germany were almost exclusively of the heavy variety, for use against relatively high-flying aircraft. There was not much light flak; this was concentrated in France and the Low Countries. Consequently, when the Mosquitoes of 627 Squadron circled Brunswick on 22 April, there was not much opposition from the ground. The aiming point was a large park and we plonked our four spot-flares into it with the greatest of ease. So far as Brunswick and Munich were concerned, considerable damage was done.
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In the case of Munich, 90 per cent of the bombs fell in the right place, doing more damage in one night that had been achieved by Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force in the preceding four years. The flexibility and superiority of the new system was clearly revealed.
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Bill Hickox
DFC
adds:
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We were briefed to go to Brunswick ‘Fire Watching’, that is, arriving over the target about half an hour after the Main Force and reporting back on the results. It should be pointed out that, while at Oakington, our procedure had always been to climb straight up to 25,000ft and perform the whole flight at that level. Naturally we did the same on this night and on arrival over the target, which was burning nicely, we added our contribution to the flames and then returned to base. We obviously got back before the Main Force, as all the hierarchy were waiting for us at debriefing, including the AOC, Cochrane and the base Commander, ‘Razor’ Sharp, who asked how it had gone. “Excellent,” we said. “Massive fires everywhere.” “What height did you come down to?” he asked. “25,000ft” replied ‘Benny. I thought that for a moment the poor man would have apoplexy. “You mean you didn’t come down?” he roared. “You’ll do the same thing again and you won’t go above 1,000ft all the way there and back” So it came to pass. The target was Munich and for some reason we operated out of Wyton. Anyway off we went, but being so low we rapidly ran out of Gee cover and so I was unable to get a very accurate wind. We could hardly miss the target, however and dropped our bombs and got away again without too much trouble, so that on our way home we thought that maybe this low-level operation wasn’t so bad after all. Not being too certain of our position, I was vainly trying to detect a blip on the Gee screen through all the jamming, when suddenly all hell broke loose. We had obviously blundered into the Pas de Calais light-flak belt. Benny promptly shoved the stick forward and took us right down onto the deck. We were surrounded by multi-coloured tracers and searchlights were shining on us through the trees. At least it meant Benny could see any obstacles in the way! After what seemed an age, we finally managed to escape from this trap, apparently unscathed. However, some minutes later we hit the coast, slap over a port. My first thought was that it must be Dieppe, in which case we’d have no chance of getting through there alive! In the event we flashed through the harbour entrance without another shot being fired. It was several minutes later that I managed, at last, to obtain a Gee fix, which showed that the port must, in fact, have been Le Treport!