Mountain of the Dead (16 page)
There is no question that the trip by the Dyatlov group had political overtones. They were making their trip in honour of the 21st Communist Party Congress and while none of them were highly connected within the Communist Party, they were nevertheless considered to be good examples of the young communist ideal. After it became apparent to relatives and friends in Sverdlovsk that something was seriously wrong and no word had been heard from the group, concerned relatives started to make complaints to the Communist Party authorities in Sverdlovsk, and through them to more senior officials in Moscow. It has been said that the Premier Nikita Khrushchev himself gave an order that no effort was to be spared in finding the missing group. Accordingly, this would probably explain why four specialists in this type of search and rescue operations were sent from Moscow at very short notice to assist.
However, a theory was put forward in September 2011 by Alexander Gulikov. The underlying theme of this theory, once again, is set against the background of the Soviet Union and the way it was run in 1959. What was happening during that time seems almost incomprehensible to someone in the current day, looking back and wondering why something that would seem perhaps not so unusual today, would be taken as treasonable behaviour in those times. The theory involves a power fight between some of the top Communist Party bosses in Moscow.
During that period, the 21st Communist Party Congress was taking place in Moscow. When major events such as a Party Congress were held, orders were usually issued by respective ministries (the Interior, the Navy, the KGB, etc) to place them on what was known as an enhanced service mode, when it was strictly prohibited for any military hardware to leave its location, any personnel training connected with the taking out of military hardware is cancelled, soldiers cannot go on leave, neither can officers go on leave, and commanders are on round-the-clock duty.
During the 21st Communist Party Congress in Moscow, military officers who were friendly with at least one of the top Moscow bosses had gone hunting in the valley of the River Auspia. The group also had Mansi hunters to act as beaters. (A group of Mansi beaters would act together to flush out wildlife and game towards the line of approaching hunters.) The return from the hunt was planned for 1 February 1959. For their return they used a military helicopter, which on the face of it did not seem too great a crime for military officers even though they were using it for personal reasons and it was in contravention of an order that forbade the use of such equipment. However, it is suggested that the KGB were fully aware of what was happening and a plan was conceived and put into action under instructions from certain party bosses in Moscow in order to discredit another party boss.
A working plan of the operation was thoroughly developed, and personnel were appointed to supervise the operation. A camera was prepared with a special film and a system of recording the date and time of every shot. The camera was sealed in the presence of the supervisor of the operation. With such a system, the shots could be acknowledged as evidence only with the seal being intact. Also, clothes were prepared and marked with radio isotopes. The operator, who would take the photographs, had to wrap the camera in those clothes and leave them with the camera in an agreed place once he had finished his task. It is suggested that such a place may have been near the Dyatlov storage shed. After that, the camera had to be taken away as soon as possible. The clothes marked with radio isotopes were to help with detecting the location of the camera. The operator for the camera was appointed: Semyon Zolotarev. In Gulikov’s opinion, this was not a man called Zolotarev at all. He feels that ‘Zolotarev’s’ biography is extremely vague and tangled. Also the confusion with finalising the eventual list of the group leaving on the Dyatlov group hike is connected with the appearance of this person. He was a stranger in the group. Gulikov does not know if he was a career officer of the KGB. It may be that he was not, but he may have been useful to them. Gulikov points out (as many others have done) the fact of Zolotarev’s burial at a prestigious cemetery in Sverdlovsk, separately from the rest of the Dyatlov group.
Gulikov also feels that there was an effort to crack down on misuse of equipment, as well as the attempt to discredit someone by linking him with using his friends in high places (i.e. a top Moscow party boss) to do what he wanted with military equipment, in this case personal hunting with friends. The prime objective, though, was to discredit the Moscow party boss rather than the high-ranking military officer who was misusing military equipment.
Zolotarev would not have known the real reasons why he was taking the photographs. However, Gulikov’s premise is that Zolotarev was spotted taking photos. This observation of him started a chain of events leading to the elimination of the whole group and this explains why there was so much secrecy in the course of the investigation and the large number of senior officials from different services who had made their appearance at the pass during the course of rescue operations.
The operation began with ensuring that the Dyatlov group appeared in the Taiga by a certain date when the helicopter would be there. In Gulikov’s opinion, information about the date of the helicopter flight was brought to the second severny by a Mansi hunter. The group had started making good progress but after Yudin had left to return and the group had left the second severny, further movement was surprisingly slow. Zina Kolmogorova wrote in her diary for 30 January about ‘slowly getting up’ in the morning. They resumed their journey only at about 10 a.m. or even later. There was no need for them to hurry as they knew they were making good time. Also, Mansi trails were everywhere in the area as they (the Mansi) were preparing the hunt for the military officers. On 31 January the Dyatlov group left the ski track and moved up to the edge of the forest, moving away from the Auspia and wading through virgin snow, then they returned back to the river valley. This manoeuvre was evidently going around something. The ‘something’ was the military officers; Igor Dyatlov writes about this in the group’s diary (‘the move away from the Auspia and back again’).
The supposition is that Zolotarev was seen taking photographs as the helicopter was in the air. As the helicopter returned to Ivdel, Zolotarev (and maybe one more person – possibly Dyatlov) quickly returned back to the group. The group then packed everything and in great haste moved to another, less convenient place, making a camp at the foot of Kholat Syakhl in the hope they would not be found. Zolotarev did not hide the camera with the isotope-marked clothes, his task was to leave those things near the shed.
On their return, the officers realised that photos have been taken of their illegal use of the helicopter. They send trusted men back in the helicopter to find the group and do whatever it took to bring the cameras back.
These men found the tourists’ camp on the mountain slope on 1 February, at some distance from the place where the group had been noticed earlier. The helicopter landed either at the River Lozva from where they went to the tent following the ski trail, or nearer, on the slope. Even though the instructions were to do without bloodshed, they probably met with resistance by the group (who did not understand what was happening, except for Zolotarev and probably Dyatlov) and a fight broke out. The military men were well versed in unarmed combat and knew how to kill without leaving external marks.
The military men could not have known that the operation involving the taking of photographs was under the control of the KGB. Zolotarev would have felt assured of the strength of the organisation behind him and did not want to give them the camera. Events probably got out of hand very quickly and when the military men saw that they had overdone things, their decision was to leave no one alive.
Gulikov estimates that at about 6–7 a.m. the next day (2 February), these men returned and, using their broad skis, they cleared up leaving no tracks in the soft snow. They found the dead bodies, but not all in one place. It was then that they searched out the bodies of Dyatlov and the other two, Krivonischenko and Doroshenko, under the cedar. They found Dubinina and Zolotarev still alive and killed them by pressing on the carotid artery with the use of
obmotki
(puttees), then threw them down the snow hole (the shelter it was believed they had tried to build). One of these puttees was later found near the cedar and another one in the gulley.
The military officers and their men, along with the helicopter crew, felt they were in deep trouble. The issue of the illegal use of the helicopter was now about to be disclosed. On top of this, all the members of the Dyatlov group were dead. It was therefore in the interests of everybody concerned (the various services and ministries) to hush up the whole story. The situation with regard to the power struggle in Moscow was shifted to the backburner. The party leaders did not want the story to become known to the general public and, worst of all, to be leaked to the foreign press. The top military leaders wanted to find the camera but they didn’t know where it was. The KGB wanted to find the camera, but without the interference of the military.
Gulikov goes on to state some points: the resulting investigation was protracted. Gulikov felt that Lev Ivanov (the lead investigator on the case) had by the conclusion of the case known how the Dyatlov group had been eliminated and who had killed them. However, he was given a categorical order to close the case, and he wrote a considered and bland conclusion that allowed him to do so. Tempalov’s Mansi version was discarded. The criminal version was completely excluded.
To complete Gulikov’s theory: the camera found on Zolotarev in May by the military was taken to Sverdlovsk, what happened to it after it was examined is unknown. There was no compromising material in the camera regarding the Dyatlov group, but the illegal use of a military helicopter came out.
To summarise, Gulikov notes (as many others have done) the absurd conclusions of the investigation, the complete dropping of facts so clearly pointing to a criminal act and, finally at the end, the territory was closed to tourists for a number of years. Gulikov also points to the lack of evidence of an avalanche, a failed missile launch and no blast damage anywhere at the scene, and when the spring thaw started, there were no dead birds or animals from any blast. He also mentions the evidence of multiple unidentified footprints.
Finally, he felt that the answer to the mystery and conclusive proof of his theory lies in the Ural Military District archives where there must be information about what had happened in 1959. Also there would be information in the archives of the KGB (now the FSB) and that the Russian Ministry of Defence must have internal investigation material on the use of military equipment for personal purposes, with respective conclusions and proposals of sanctions. It must be said here that the use of a military helicopter for a short private flight in 1959 would be small change compared with what happened after the break-up of the USSR when nearly everything seemed to be up for grabs and whole large transport aircraft seemed to disappear into thin air. Nonetheless, there still may be information on such a helicopter flight if the material can be accessed.
Finally, Alexander Gulikov is of the opinion that it would be worthwhile to test out the avalanche theory under the same conditions at the pass, in winter if possible.
Another source who strongly disputed the official version of events and also disputed the place where the deaths took place is Gennady Kisilov. At the time of writing (2012), he was an old age pensioner who lived in the closed city of Novouralsk, where prior to his retirement he worked at a large chemical factory that processed weapons-grade plutonium. He gathered together a group of individuals who set about thoroughly investigating the deaths of the Dyatlov group.
What Kisilov did was to go through the whole investigation from start to finish. This included a complete analysis of all the documents (it must be stressed here that these were the documents that are currently available as opposed to any other documents which may be withheld) of the criminal case, the transcripts of the interrogations of rescuers and relatives of the hikers, and all published material that covered the incident in the mass media. The new facts he brought to light may not be regarded as indisputable, but he made a serious and determined, as well as an unbiased, attempt to try and get to the bottom of the story. As well as conducting his own investigations, what emerged from his digging were a number of interpretations of the facts which changed what he felt was a ‘vicious circle’ surrounding the theories in the public arena in the last twenty years in the search for a solution to the mystery. He felt that the ‘vicious circle’, as he named it, was the concentration only on the official theories relating to the deaths (i.e. avalanche, wild animals, escaped prisoners, etc). The following is a summary of the main points raised by Kisilov.
Kisilov first focused on what he called the ‘DIEs’ (Dyatlov Incident Experts), people who relied solely on the statement of Lev Ivanov, the man initially in charge of the case. This statement by Ivanov is dated 28 May 1959 on the termination of the criminal case into the Dyatlov group deaths. Kisilov’s in-depth analysis of this document threw up very few truthful assertions. He also pointed out a number of witness statements that were contradictory and his opinion was that overall the document simply could not be relied on to be used as a guide to what had really happened. He said that a first brief overview of the documents gave a number of indications of how the presence of ‘outsiders’ (i.e. the search parties) on the search scene (the slopes of Kholat Syakhl and surrounding vicinity) basically created so much confusion and chaos that it would have been impossible to work out exactly what had happened at the tent before the arrival of the other search parties. For instance, not a single footprint in the snow had been properly identified with any of the Dyatlov group’s footprints. No such task had been assigned to anyone during the course of the investigation. To summarise: the tent was spotted and members of the search party started trampling around the scene and moving around it as well as moving up and down the mountain where the other tracks were. Despite this confusion, it should have been possible to differentiate between the older and the newer tracks, but with more and more additional movement around the scene, many of the tracks were obliterated. In fairness to the search parties, they expected to still find the members of the Dyatlov group alive at this point. The question must be asked as to why there was a definitive statement made regarding the tracks only of nine people. Kisilov considered the mention in the documents of ‘8 to 9 pairs of footprints’
2
to be irrelevant; he felt that this particular detail should be of no consequence and therefore ignored completely.
