Nicholas and Alexandra (45 page)

Kiev military district in the Ukraine had standing orders to be ready within forty-eight hours to repel an invasion from the West. Izvolsky left his post in St. Petersburg to become Russian Ambassador to France, where vengefully he worked night and day to strengthen the alliance. In 1914, when war came, Alexander Izvolsky boasted happily in Paris, "This is my war! My war!"

Nicholas recognized that the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was the feared second challenge to Russia. For years, he had faced the fact that Russia could not back down again. But against this resolution he had balanced a hope that the challenge would not come until Russia was ready.

In 1911, Nicholas stressed this point in an interview with his new Ambassador to Bulgaria, Nekliudov. "The Tsar," Nekliudov later recalled, "after an intentional pause, stepping back and fixing me with a penetrating stare, said, 'Listen to me, Nekliudov, do not for one instant lose sight of the fact that we cannot go to war. I do not wish for war; as a rule I shall do all in my power to preserve for my people the benefits of peace. But at this moment of all moments everything that might lead to war must be avoided. It would be out of the question for us to face a war for five or six years—in fact until 1917—although if the most vital interests and the honor of Russia were at stake we might, if it were absolutely necessary, accept a challenge in 1915; but not a moment sooner in any circumstances or under any pretext whatsoever.' "

With Russia's unpreparedness in mind, the Tsar hoped desperately that this new crisis could be negotiated. He instructed Sazonov to play for time. Sazonov's first move, accordingly, was a plea that the limit on the Austrian ultimatum be extended beyond forty-eight hours. Vienna, determined to let nothing prevent its destruction of Serbia, refused. Next, Sazonov attempted to persuade Austria's ally Germany to mediate the Balkan quarrel. The German government refused, declaring that the matter was an issue solely between Austria and Serbia and that all other states, including Russia, should stand aside. Sazonov then asked Sir Edward Grey to mediate. Grey agreed, and proposed a conference of ambassadors in London. Sazanov hurriedly accepted Grey's proposal, but the German government refused. Finally, in reply to Serbia's appeals for aid, Sazonov advised the Serbian Premier, Pashich, to accept all the Austrian demands which did not actually compromise Serbian independence.

The Serbs, no less anxious to avoid a military showdown than their

Russian patron, agreed, and replied to the Austrian ultimatum in extravagantly conciliatory terms. So humble was their reply, in fact, that it took Vienna entirely by surprise. Count Berchtold was aghast and didn't know what to do with the document. Accordingly, for two days, July 26 and July 27, he hid it. When the German Ambassador in Vienna asked to see it, he was told that he would have to wait because of the pile-up of paperwork in the Austrian Foreign Ministry. By July 28, however, Berchtold and his colleagues had reached a decision. Austria, rejecting the Serb reply, issued a declaration of war. At 5 a.m. the following morning, July 29, Austro-Hungarian artillery began hurling shells across the Danube into Belgrade, the Serbian capital. The bombardment continued all day, in disregard of the white flags fluttering from Belgrade rooftops. In St. Petersburg, Tsar Nicholas gave the order to mobilize all Russian military districts along the Austrian frontier.

How fast and how far the war was to spread now depended on the reaction of Germany. Despite the urgent demands of the Russian General Staff for general mobilization, Nicholas had permitted only partial mobilization against Austria. The long frontier with Germany running through Poland and East Prussia still slumbered in peace. The Tsar believed, as he had said to Paléologue, that the Kaiser did not want war.

Predictably, the Kaiser's views had changed several times during the crisis. He first assumed that the cringing Slavs could be bullied into backing down before the shining Teutons. In October 1913, William had spoken of just such a situation to Count Berchtold, the Austrian Chancellor: "If His Majesty the Emperor Franz Joseph makes a demand, the Serbian government must obey," said William. "If not, Belgrade must be bombarded and occupied until his wish is fulfilled. And rest assured that I am behind you and ready to draw the sword wherever your action requires."

As he spoke, William rested his hand on the hilt of his ceremonial sword. Berchtold was suitably impressed. After Franz Ferdinand's assassination, the Kaiser's militancy appeared to increase. "Now or never," he scribbled on the margin of a telegram from Vienna. "It is time to settle accounts with the Serbs and the sooner the better." "We could reckon on Germany's full support," cabled Count Szogyeny, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, after a talk with the Kaiser. "His Majesty [the Kaiser] said . . . Austria must judge what is to be done to clear up her relations with Serbia. Whatever Austria's decision may

turn out to be, Austria can count with certainly upon it that Germany-will stand by her friend and ally." Having given his pledge, William cheerfully left for Kiel to board the
Hohenzollern
for a cruise through the Norwegian fjords.

Wreathed in his own bluster, the Kaiser miscalculated the reactions of each of Germany's three major antagonists. According to Sazonov's estimate: "The authorities in Berlin were not convinced that Russia would care to risk a war in order to preserve her position in the Balkans. ... In any case, they scarcely believed her capable of carrying on a war. Nor did they entertain a very high opinion of France as a military power. As for the possibility of England siding with their enemies, no one in Germany ever thought of it; the warnings of the German Ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky, were derided, and he was indulgently referred to as 'good old Lichnowsky' at the Berlin Foreign Office."

The wisdom of presenting Austria-Hungary with exactly this kind of
carte blanche
to determine the fate of Germany had often been questioned in Berlin. As late as May 1914, the German Ambassador to Vienna wrote to Berlin wondering "whether it really pays to bind ourselves so tightly to this phantasm of a state which is cracking in every direction." The dominant view in Berlin, however, was expressed in a résumé from the German Foreign Ministry to the German Embassy in London summarizing the factors determining German policy:

"Austria is now going to come to a reckoning with Serbia. . . . We have not at the present time forced Austria to her decision. But neither should we attempt to stay her hand. If we should do that, Austria would have the right to reproach us with having deprived her of her last chance of political rehabilitation. And then the process of her wasting away and of her internal decay would be still further accelerated. Her standing in the Balkans would be gone forever. . . . The maintenance of Austria, and in fact of the most powerful Austria possible is a necessity for us. . . . That she cannot be maintained forever I willingly admit. But in the meanwhile we may be able to arrange other combinations."

The Kaiser's endorsement of this position was significantly reinforced by the reports he was getting from his elderly Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Pourtalès. Pourtalès, the dean of the St. Petersburg diplomatic corps, had spent seven years in his post. He was enormously fond of Russia. But he knew that, in July 1914, a million and a half Russian workers were out on strike; he had seen with his own eyes the barricades erected in the streets of the capital. Citing

these factors, he repeatedly assured his sovereign that Russia could not go to war. On July 28, Pourtalès lunched at the British Embassy with his British colleague, Sir George Buchanan. Over cigars, Pourtalès expressed his views on Russia's weakness, declaring that he was regularly forwarding these views to Berlin. Appalled, Buchanan grasped his guest by the shoulders and said, "Count Pourtalès, Russia means it." Nevertheless, as late as July 31, the Kaiser was speaking confidently of the "mood of a sick Tom-cat" which, his Ambassador had assured him, infected the Russian court and army.

To the end, William expected to bluff his way. On July 28, back from his cruise, he saw the abject Serb reply to Austria's ultimatum. His expectations seemed brilliantly confirmed. "A capitulation of the most humiliating character," he exulted. "Now that Serbia has given in, all grounds for war have disappeared." When, that same night, Austria declared war on Serbia, William was astonished and frustrated. Nevertheless, the war was still only an affair in the Balkans. Unless Russia moved, Germany need not become involved. With this in mind, William personally telegraphed the Tsar:

It is with the gravest concern that I hear of the impression which the action of Austria against Serbia is creating in your country. The unscrupulous agitation that has been going on in Serbia for years has resulted in the outrageous crime to which Archduke Franz Ferdinand fell victim. You will doubtless agree with me that we both, you and me, have a common interest, as well as all Sovereigns, to insist that all the persons morally responsible for this dastardly murder should receive their deserved punishment. In this, politics play no part at all.

On the other hand, I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your government to face the drift of public opinion. Therefore, with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that may still arise. Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin.

Willy

The Kaiser's telegram crossed a message to him from the Tsar:

Am glad you are back. In this most serious moment I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared on a weak country. The indignation in Russia, shared fully by me, is enor-

mous. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by pressure brought upon me, and forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war, I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far.

Nicky

The "pressure" on Nicholas to which he referred in his telegram came from the Russian General Staff, which was insisting on full mobilization. Sazonov, once he had heard that the Austrians were firing on Belgrade, had abandoned his protests and endorsed the generals' request.

On the 29th, WilUam replied to the Tsar's telegram:

It would be quite possible for Russia to remain a spectator of the Austro-Serbian conflict, without involving Europe in the most horrible war she ever witnessed. I think a direct understanding between your government and Vienna possible and desirable and as I already telegraphed you, my government is continuing its exertions to promote it. Of course, military measures on the part of Russia which would be looked upon by Austria as threatening, would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid, and jeopardize my position as mediator which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and help.

Willy

Nicholas replied, suggesting that the dispute be sent to the Hague.

I thank you for your conciliatory and friendly telegram, whereas the communications of your Ambassador to my Minister today have been in a very different tone. Please clear up this difference. The Austro-Serbian problem must be submitted to the Hague Conference. I trust to your wisdom and friendship.

Nicholas

On the morning of the 30th, Nicholas wired the Kaiser an explanation of Russia's partial mobilization:

The military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago for reasons of defense on account of Austria's preparations. I hope with all my heart that these measures won't interfere with your part as mediator which I greatly value. We need your strong pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with us.

Nicky

The Tsar's telegram announcing that Russia had mobilized against Austria put the Kaiser into a rage. "And these measures are for defense against Austria which is no way attacking him!!! I cannot agree to any more mediation since the Tsar who requested it has at the same time secretly mobilized behind my back." After reading Nicholas's plea; "We need your strong pressure on Austria . . . ," William scribbled: "No, there is no thought of anything of that sort!!!"

On the afternoon of July 30, Sazonov telephoned Tsarskoe Selo to ask for an immediate interview. Nicholas came to the telephone and, suspecting the purpose, reluctantly asked his Foreign Minister to come to the palace at three p.m. When the two men met, Sazonov sadly told his sovereign, "I don't think Your Majesty can postpone the order for general mobilization." He added that, in his opinion, general war was unavoidable. Nicholas, pale and speaking in a choked voice, replied, "Think of the responsibility you are advising me to take. Remember, it would mean sending hundreds of thousands of Russian people to their deaths." Sazonov pointed out that everything had been done to avoid war. Germany and Austria, he declared, were "determined to increase their power by enslaving our natural allies in the Balkans, destroying our influence there, and reducing Russia to a pitiful dependence on the arbitrary will of the Central Powers." "The Tsar," Sazonov wrote later, "remained silent and his face showed the traces of a terrible inner struggle. At last, speaking with difficulty, he said, 'You are right. There is nothing left for us to do but
get
ready for an attack upon us. Give . . . my order for [general] mobilization.'"

Before news of Russia's general mobilization reached Berlin, two more telegrams passed between Potsdam and Tsarskoe Selo. First, Nicholas cabled to the Kaiser:

It is technically impossible for me to suspend my military preparations. But as long as conversations with Austria are not broken off, my troops will refrain from taking the offensive anyway, I give you my word of honor on that.

Nicky

William replied:

I have gone to the utmost limits of the possible in my efforts to save peace. It is not I who will bear the responsibility for the terrible disaster which now threatens the civilized world. You and you alone can still avert it. My friendship for you and your empire which my grandfather bequeathed to me on his deathbed is still sacred to me and I have been loyal to Russia when she was in