Authors: Japanese Reaping the Whirlwind: Personal Accounts of the German,Italian Experiences of WW II
Nigel Cawthorne (2 page)
As they rolled on towards Odessa, all they saw was burning vehicles and infantrymen fleeing to the sea. But they were running out of ammunition.
It was becoming hard for me to think clearly. I felt sick – I felt lousy. All I wanted to do was to get the hell out of Russia, Odessa, and everything to do with it, and lie on a nice soft bed and sleep. Had we won the battle or not? And when the hell were the
Das Reich
boys going to arrive? If they didn’t get there soon, there just wouldn’t be any of us left.
I braced my body against the side of the tank and asked Dita how many shots we had left. ‘Another ten, that’s all,’ he told me. Sea Rose 3 had only another three salvos, so that settled it. None of us could afford to stay kicking around the highway any longer.
‘Sea Rose 3,’ I called. ‘You and I will speed right to the turn-off. Now or never or we will have to bluff it out. I’ll go in front spraying the right-hand side, and you follow about 20m behind spraying the left-hand side. Leave yourself one shot.
Meanwhile Sea Rose 2 was to head back to the forest to find out what had happened to Sea Rose 5.
While we were among them the Russians could not fire for fear of blowing each other up, so all they could do was scatter – all except for one Russian officer. We drove the tank straight at him but he did not budge. Alone on the empty road, he stood waiting unflinching for the moment when our tank would roll over him. I never felt so much for a Russian before. Just before we reached him, we turned and drove past him and down the bridge road. I did not look behind but I knew he would still be there. As soon as we turned, Dita swung his gun around and loosed off our final shell. Then we raced for the river at top speed.
By this time the infantry lines had re-formed:
They were positioned to the south-west in a half-moon arc, but there was not just one row. They were everywhere, like ants. Our low machine-gun was still intact and firing, so they shifted in a hurry. Then, to our right, we discovered an anti-tank gun facing the river. As they hadn’t fired they must think we were Russians. Cursing that we had used our last shell, we blasted at the men behind the gun with machine-gun fire. ‘Sea Rose 3?’ I called. ‘Have you still got that one shell?’
‘As ordered, yes.’
‘Then blast that darned gun out of existence.’
Sea Rose 2 then reported that it had found Sea Rose 5 ‘a red mass of fire’. Von Konrat concluded that it must have got ahead of the tanks, or that it had been caught by a gun they had missed – but he consoled himself with the thought that his men might have survived:
Maybe the boys had managed to get out and save themselves. But even if a quarter of the Russians in that arc of infantry had been anything like their officer who stood on the road, they would have eaten not only them, but all of us, steel and men.
When von Konrat returned to the German lines, he told his commanding officer of his high-speed attack across the field.
‘I saw that,’ said Major Horst, ‘and I nearly died laughing too. Those Ruskies must have used up half the ammunition in Odessa lighting up the sky like fairyland for you – while you did exhibition dancing underneath.’
Von Konrat agreed that it had been fun.
The Red Army surrendered in their hundreds of thousands, but then the Germans had to face Russia’s greatest soldier, ‘General Winter’. On the eastern front, infantry commander General Gustav Hoehne felt that his forces were ill-prepared:
Western Europeans will be hard put to imagine the masses of powdered snow that, during the most severe part of winter 1941–42, buried western Russia beneath a blanket averaging 1.2m in depth … During 1941–42 even Germans accustomed to the rigours of the eastern climate faced a situation in which all lessons of the eastern winters of World War I, and all experiences gained in the bitter East Prussian winters were useless.
During January 1942 the Russians had succeeded in encircling a German force of about seven divisions that had its easternmost elements on the high ground around Valdai. Thrusting south along both banks of the Lovat River (a tributary of Lake Ilmen), the Soviets had established themselves between Staraya Russa and Koholm. The solidly frozen Lovat served the Russians as a road. During the winter, frozen rivers are the best roads in Russia … The deep snows protected the encircled German troops around Demyansk from annihilation. Even the Russian infantry were unable to launch an attack through those snows. Russian ski troops got nowhere. The Germans were supplied by the Luftwaffe. This means of supply, however, proved inadequate and, starting late in February, German forces assembled west of Staraya Russa to relieve the encircled forces at Demyansk.
The movement was effected by rail. The transport I travelled on arrived at Volot, about 30km west of Staraya Russa, on a clear winter afternoon. We could feel the cold, which was intense but not too unpleasant. Yet, all of a sudden, the men noticed the symptoms of frostbite on each other’s face. The mercury registered –35°C. While detraining, the sun went down; before complete darkness set in the sky turned a deep blue, like blue-black ink, and poured its colour over the virgin snow. With the disappearance of the sun a light breeze started up, hardly noticeable but incessant … Paths for sleighs and vehicles were laboriously shovelled through the snowfields, only to have long stretches buried again within a matter of hours by the evening wind. To make matters worse, we no sooner had detrained than marching troops and supply columns caused traffic jams. All of which adds up to the following lesson: prior to detraining large troop units, a detailed map of winter roads must be procured, for even the primitive Russian road network cannot be kept altogether clear of snow … The winter roads frequently do not follow the course of regular streets and roads.
The countryside was only sparsely settled; one must remember that the Russian peasant usually owns a single house rather than a group of farm buildings. Billets therefore became so scarce that troops had to be quartered even in houses occupied by Russian civilians. Their eviction would have meant certain death in that temperature. The German soldier did not do such things. The upshot was numerous cases of typhus, a disease transmitted by lice. Lice are found in many Russian homes.
Despite the weather, the Germans fought on. Two divisions of German riflemen, supported by twenty tanks and assault guns, were to attack across enemy-held territory in an attempt to reach the westernmost salient of the encircled German troops. Hoehne was with them:
The southern division had to traverse more than 2km of snow-blanketed plain, offering no cover whatever, in order to reach the enemy lines. That feat would have required hours, and merely the job of struggling through the powdery snow would have drained the infantrymen of all their physical strength. An attack conducted in this manner held no prospect of success, even if it were aimed at weak enemy forces. Tanks, for that matter, were likewise unable to manoeuvre in the powdery snow.
A page was therefore borrowed from the way the Russians had cut off Demyansk in their attack up the Lovat River. It was decided to launch an attack from the north, up the frozen Polizt River …
Conditions were more favourable for the division to the north. It had to aim at reaching two points that marked the beginning of Russian winter roads … Even in Germany the surfaces of heavily travelled roads occasionally crack, once the thaw follows a severe winter. The phenomenon is caused by the fact that heavy traffic deprives a road of the snow blanket that otherwise would protect it from the cold. The Russians close improved [paved] roads as soon as the winter freeze sets in and establish winter roads either alongside the regular right of way or simply straight through the countryside.
Snow was compressed by tanks, and water was poured on to give the road a smooth surface of ice. Snow fences also had to be built to stop the wind drifting snow across the road. There were other difficulties:
The infantry was equipped as follows: cotton-padded winter uniform (which unfortunately had not yet been available at the beginning of 1942); felt boots; and two small hand sleds per squad, loaded with blankets, two shelter halves per man, some dry wood and some boughs. In addition, each platoon had two small trench stoves … Platoon tents were pitched; dug into the snow, they did not protrude above its surface. The floors of the tents were covered with boughs, over which the second shelter halves were spread for protection from the cold ground. A stove was set up at each end of every tent, and fires were started. The temperature in the tents was not uncomfortable … The pack animals were simply sheltered in pits dug into the snow alongside the winter roads. So long as the animals are protected from the wind, they can withstand temperatures even below –30°C … In the deep snow of the winter in question, any calibre smaller than 150mm was completely ineffective because the snow stopped the shell fragments. This was particularly true of mortar shells … Contrary to expectations, the mountain howitzer of the Jäger [Rifle] divisions proved to be highly effective, even though its calibre was only 75mm. By a great stroke of luck, eight per cent of the ammunition brought up for these pieces were armed with combination fuses. Most of the field fortifications which the Russian infantry had built into the snow were not splinterproof.
After one attack in February failed, Hoehne and his men tried again:
On the clear, frosty morning of 21 March the two divisions of Group Seydlitz went over to the attack. According to plan, the right division succeeded in cleaning out the stubbornly defended southern part of Ivanovskoye and rolled up the enemy positions west and east of the Polizt.
Then things began to go wrong:
Because of the dense underbrush the snow was so deep that the forest could not be used as flank protection … Enemy nests of resistance that had formed around battery positions could not be eliminated in the deep snow. Partly sparse and partly dense shrubbery, low in height and in most instances as thick as a man’s finger, had permitted the snow to pile up so high that the infantry sank into it up to their armpits. Without very thorough and careful artillery preparation, a continuation of the attack was out of the question. Aviation could not be used because of the difficulty in recognizing the front lines, nor could tanks be committed, since the Russians had failed to build a winter road to Invanovskoye from the east …
A winter road in the direction of the Russian battery positions was begun at once. The entire engineer battalion, a sizeable unit to start with, was reinforced by approximately one thousand men for the purposes of this project. Nevertheless, building the winter road took almost twenty-four hours …
The left division likewise effected the penetration into the enemy position according to plan. After enemy resistance had been broken, the attack towards the east was continued at once … The left regimental combat team thrust almost to the Staraya Russa–Ramsuhevo highway, but could not get possession of it. Here the attack stopped dead in its tracks. The right combat team pushed far beyond the enemy position … In the forest east of Svinushovo the attack slowed down because of the deeper snow and the increased enemy resistance … In hard fighting the combat team reached a point about halfway between Svinushovo and Bol’gorby. The woods, however, became more and more dense, so that on 23 March this attack also bogged down.
The failure of a Russian counterattack – they were little better than the Germans at manoeuvring in snow – allowed the German offensive to resume. Now it was a race to advance down the winter roads before the thaw set in.
On 4 April the mercury began to rise and the daytime registered temperatures above freezing. As a result, the infantry had much more easy going in the snow. Nevertheless, the onset of the thaw was one of the reasons for the failure of the attack. The few, largely obsolescent German tanks had become damaged and were out of action. Russian armour, on the other hand, began to move now that the snow had hardened somewhat. German anti-tank artillery could not be set up. For that, the snow was still too deep.
After a week, the attack had to be called off. The Russians counterattacked, moving through the forest where not even their tanks could be spotted by German bombers.
Winter warfare in Russia requires heavy tanks, like the German Tiger, that can move through the deepest snow. Under those conditions the tank is superior to the assault gun, because the tank’s artillery piece is farther off the ground and can be rotated with the turret above the level of the snow …
But spring was on its way, and improving weather conditions favoured the Germans. They took the village of Vazvy, but the battle was far from over.
In the depths of the forest, the enemy had established several lines of defence. The Russians are masters in the construction of shell-proof wooden field fortifications. About 3km southeast of Yazvy the attack of the division bogged down.
So the German spearhead swung to the northeast and, after bitter fighting, broke through.
Now the snow began to melt with a vengeance. The water in the woods was knee-deep … But the weather brought one advantage: the enemy evacuated the woods south of the Yazvy–Ramushevo highway, and withdrew to the high ground of Ramushevo. On the west bank of the Lovat he held only one small bridgehead adjacent to the village. Thereby the threat to the southern flank of the attacking forces had, at least temporarily, been removed. Now the infantryman could protect himself against the water. The forest provided sufficient cover to permit the hasty construction of simple wooden shelters. In the meantime, reconnaissance was conducted for the continuation of the attack. After all, our encircled comrades were waiting to be freed. Every man knew what was at stake.
Lucky indeed was he who found a large bomb crater. Most Russian swamps are the result of an impermeable layer of clay, usually only shallow. Large bomb craters were frequently deep enough to penetrate the clay. As a rule, they did not fill up with water and, as long as they were not located within large inundated areas, their edges were often the only patches of dry ground. There infantrymen sat, there and on islands either provided by nature or man-made from tree trunks. The ground below the water was still frozen. Wide, shallow streams ran through every field and forest. The flood waters had washed out every bridge. Heavily travelled roads were covered with a 1m layer of mud.
