Nixon's Secret (87 page)

   How he obtained FBI field reports, sat in on interviews, and obtained prosecutorial insights—and then improperly shared that information with Watergate defense counsel.

   How he held back and then destroyed possible personally incriminating materials from Hunt’s safe—and only fessed up to having done so after having pleaded guilty to single felony.

   How he came to so mischaracterize his first meeting with President Nixon, on September 15, 1972, when he was describing it in his Ervin Committee testimony.

   How he secretly removed campaign funds for personal use on his honeymoon.

   How he acted as “chief desk officer” during the cover-up, apparently vastly exceeding the scope of his mission of behalf of his client, the president.

   How he stoutly and consistently resisted any White House disclosure, saying it would harm Watergate defendants, when it appears that he was more concerned with disclosure of his own role in the criminal cover-up.

   How he encouraged Egil Krogh to deny knowledge of Plumber operations in his grand jury appearance, which resulted in Krogh’s being indicted for perjury.

   How his own recollections, as told to prosecutors, changed so dramatically during the course of his April 1973 meetings.

   How his lawyer negotiated with federal prosecutors and with Ervin Committee staff for immunity, setting one off against the other, even as Dean maintained that his only interest was in telling the truth.

   How he came to spend no time whatsoever in prison, even though sentenced to a term of one to four years for his role in the Watergate scandal.

Selective usage:
Dean has arranged his transcriptions into four categories, corresponding to the four parts of his book (xxiii):

I. Covering Up (35 tapes)

II. Containing (158 tapes)

III. Unraveling (110 tapes)

IV. The Nixon Defense (669 tapes)

But the book contains specific footnoted references to only 503 of these conversations. The implication is that fully half of his alleged Watergate-related tapes are missing entirely or are unworthy of any discussion. There are additional technical problems. For example, footnotes identifying at least three of the early conversations appear to be missing (see, for example, p. 32).

In addition, the extensive use of supposedly full transcriptions fades as one progresses through book. There is the appearance of great detail at the outset, but these condensations are reduced to bare allusions to embarrassing fragments as the book progresses. This is particularly true in the fourth and final section of the book.

Dean also gilds the lily. He constantly characterizes actions and statements of others in pejorative terms: “feigning surprise,” “claimed,” “asserted,” (see, for example, pp. 312, 398, 406, and 433). It is the same with Dean’s use of the introductory term “surely” (p. 596). This near-constant pejorative characterization of statements by others raises questions about the accuracy of Dean’s supposed transcriptions, especially where they cannot be independently verified. In essence, Dean is spinning virtually every conversation. In contrast, his own statements are always presented as properly phrased and unquestionably true.

B. Helpful Admissions

Nonetheless, there is any number of very helpful admissions scattered throughout the 719 pages of Dean’s book. For example, he asserts that:

•     
No Advance Knowledge:
No one on the White House staff knew of the Watergate break-in in advance:

   “No doubt [Nixon] was trying to reach for doubters that he had no direct connection with the Watergate break-in, which I am confident was true.” (p. 8)