Occupied City (11 page)

1. A great deal of work has been done in infectious diseases. If half of the Jap claims are true – and I am going to have chance to check – then there is a tremendous amount of investigation to do.
   

2. For the past two or three years, Miyagawa himself (he seems to be top dog in the field) has worked on a method for large-scale preservation of biological materials
   at room temperature.
   He claims to have perfected this method and has tested the following substances after one year of preservation (with no loss of potency):
   

Next week I am taking a trip with him to investigate the apparatus and to meet his colleague, a physicist. Naturally, as a medical officer representing the Surgeon, I am interested in blood components and in drugs which may be of therapeutic value.

I also have appointments at the Army Medical College and certain other installations. On the whole I am impressed with potentialities here and elsewhere and feel that I can say a definite start has been made.

No mention of several vaccines and certain epidemiological observations have been made because I wish to check protocols and laboratory findings.

However, as a result of my status with the committee it is also apparent that the present and the immediate future will be the productive periods. Dr Moreland plans to leave Japan in five or six weeks and it will be necessary for me to carry out my principal investigations during this time. Colonel Copthorne is in agreement with me that my mission will probably be completed shortly after this committee is dissolved.

I plan to return to the United States when my work is brought to an end, which should be sometime in November.

Sincerely, Lt. Col. Murray Thompson.

*

My dearest Peggy
,

I hope this letter finds you & the children all well. Thank you so very much for your last letters and parcel. I cannot tell you how much it meant to me to read all your news of home and the children
.

I am well, so do not worry about me. I have been working hard since my last letter & I hope now my work here is almost done
.
Initially, however, I was worried that I would not be able to complete my report as I was receiving little or no cooperation from the Japs. They connived & they lied to keep me in the dark. They gave me nothing & they told me nothing. I could not help blaming Naitō for this state of affairs. To be very honest, Peggy, I felt despondent
.

However, the General summoned me to his office & advised me to call their bluff. As always, it was good advice. I returned to my own office & I told Naito that I had lost face with the General & that he was sending me home as I was a total failure as an inquirer. I told Naitō that the General had ordered a much tougher investigator to be sent here to replace me as the General felt I had been too kind to him (Naitō) because I had given rations to him & his family. I also told Naitō that the General said it was now time for the Soviets to be involved. Well, you should have seen Naitō’sface drop!

The next morning Naitō was waiting for me with a handwritten document marked, PRIVATE (SECRET) INFORMATION FOR COLONEL THOMPSON’S EYES ONLY. Naitō said he now felt it was his duty to tell me all he knew about BW to help my ‘sincere investigation as a fellow scientist’
.

I was elated as I knew the General’s advice & my bluff had paid off but, naturally, I still played it cool with Naitō (you have to, with all of them). I severely rebuked him for not giving me this information sooner. But Naitō claimed he had wanted to tell me all this from Day One but felt he could not do so without the permission of the higher officers of Jap HQ
.

I must say, Naitō did seem very scared & he repeatedly begged me to burn the pages he had given me after I had read them & never to use his name when speaking to the men he had listed. He claimed he would be killed if anyone discovered he had given me this information. I believed him but, then again, he may well have been acting (they are
all
very, very good actors)
.

I still had one question for Naitō (the only question that really matters to me) & so I asked him then & there, ‘Were Allied prisoners ever used as experimental guinea pigs?’

Naitō vowed to me, ‘on the lives of his children, on the souls of his parents’, that no Allied prisoners were ever used as experimental guinea pigs. Again, I believed him & so I wrote in my own hand at the end of his document, ‘I have asked Or Naitō whether prisoners were ever used as experimental guinea pigs. He
vows that this has not been the case’ and I signed it, Dr M. Thompson, Lt. Col
.

I then took the document directly to the General himself. I must admit it was one of the most exciting moments of my life because this document was the breakthrough we needed. It was dynamite. The General & all his top men (Willoughby & Compton) were equally delighted with the document & my bluff. Of course, I knew now the hard work would really begin &, even though we had the names we needed (thanks to Naitō), there was still no guarantee that if we found these men they would talk to me. We were also worried about the Soviets scaring them all away. But I had a plan & I suggested to the General that we tell Naitō that no one involved in BW would be prosecuted as a war criminal, as long as they told us everything we needed to know. I felt this was the only way to make them all come out of hiding & start talking. The General & all the other guys agreed with me that this was the best way & the General himself said (& I quote), ‘Well, Tommy, you’re the man in charge of the scientific aspects of this investigation. If you feel you cannot get all the information, we’re not given to torture, then offer him (Naitō) that promise as coming from General MacArthur himself – and get that data!’ I must admit I felt very proud of myself!

So I immediately put the deal on the table to Naitō & I swear the Jap had tears of gratitude in his eyes as he thanked me
.

Well, after all that, it has been plain sailing. I have been able to speak to all their top men & to get all their information
.

As I write to you today, my report is being typed up. Once it has been checked & submitted, I believe I will be able to return home to you all, via Manila. Of course, I will wire you with my exact arrival as soon as it is confirmed through channels
.

So, until that happy day, kiss George & Emily for me, and start dusting down the bunting as I will see you all soon!!!

With all my love, Murray
.

*

Dear Colonel Worthley,

I am enclosing my finished report and I would like to take this opportunity to supply further background details about my investigation and how much of the information was gained.

On October 4, I received handwritten information from Lt. Col. Naitō, a Japanese medical officer. It was written in very poor English, difficult to understand, but I immediately realized these twelve pages were dynamite because the document lays out the organization of the Bóeki Kyüsuibü (Water Purification Unit) and admits that it had been engaged in BW. It also ties Ishii with the Unit and with BW and it even seems to tie in the Emperor (though Naitō denies it, of course).

Colonel Naitō stated that he was divulging this information, which was considered by the Japs as secret, only because he felt that the information would be developed later and that by an effort on their part to be truthful we would be more lenient with them. My request for the military to supply us with information on BW, according to Naitō, created consternation among the higher officials of the General Headquarters of the Japanese army. After much discussion and debate, it was decided by the General Staff to furnish us with the information requested. Naitō indicated that the chief of the Bureau of Medicine of the Japanese army and the chief of the Section of Sanitation and other technical personnel were in favor of furnishing us with all details. On the other hand, the members of the General Staff, comparable to our own OPD, were opposed to giving the information.

To summarize, Naitō stated that the Japanese army had an organization for BW, both defensive and offensive. The offensive operations were under ‘Second Section of War Operation’ under the General Staff. The research and defensive work was under the Bureau of Medical Affairs and known as ‘Section of Sanitation’. Three organizations figured prominently in the actual work. Foremost of these was the installation at Harbin, Manchuria, under the jurisdiction of the Kwantung Army. The other two were under the China Army in Nanking and at the Army Medical College here in Tokyo.

The main research work at Harbin was under the direction of Lt. Gen. Shirō Ishii and apparently was conducted between the years 1936 and 1945 (there is some likelihood that Ishii will be apprehended shortly).

Colonel Naitō stated that the reason for planning offensive research was because the Japs expected that Soviet Russia might attack Japan with
BW, especially in Manchuria. He states that there was some BW sabotage (inoculating horses with anthrax) in the northern part of Manchuria during 1944 or 1945 while the Japs were building the Peiangcheng-Heiho railroad. Further, he stated that Japan should be prepared for revenge in case the enemy used illegal warfare.

Naitō advised that the Emperor did not like the preparation for chemical warfare by the Japanese army or navy. Because of this the scale of research for chemical warfare was not permitted to be large. Since the General Staff was cognizant of the Emperor’s feeling on chemical warfare they insisted that the work on biological warfare should not refer to offensive preparations. They therefore referred to all work on BW as being purely defensive.

Naitō stated that General Headquarters made no attempt to begin active BW and did not plan to unless the enemy initiated this type of warfare. As an afterthought he stated that the circumstances during the last period of the war became such that the Japs were unable to start BW.

The following agents were listed by Naitō as having been studied: Plague, cholera, dysentery, salmonellas and anthrax. He stated that none of the filterable viruses were studied because of, ‘the difficulty to get them in mass’!

Colonel Naitō fears that all the experimental records at Harbin may have been burnt at the beginning of Russia’s sudden invasion. He stated, however, that if we succeed in securing one of the key personnel of the Harbin installation, it should be possible to obtain information concerning the work carried on there.

The following studies were made by the Army Medical College in Tokyo:

Comment:
I asked Naitō whether prisoners were ever used as experimental ‘guinea pigs’. Naitō ‘vows’ that this was never done.

Finally, it is gratifying to note, as you will see in my report, that our intelligence on Jap BW activities collected during the war was accurate insofar as the defensive organization was concerned.

I now plan to return to the United States and I look forward to seeing you again on your next visit to Camp Detrick.

Sincerely, Lt. Col. Murray Thompson.

DOCUMENT INSERT, ATTACHED TO LETTER:

SECRET

REPORT
OF
SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE SURVEY IN JAPAN

September and October 1945

VOLUME V

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
   

2. CONCLUSIONS
   

SUMMARY: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)

1. Responsible officers of both the army and navy have freely admitted to an interest in defensive BW.
   

2. Naval officers maintain that offensive BW was not investigated.
   

3. Information has been obtained that from 1936 to 1945 the Japanese army fostered offensive BW, probably on a large scale. This was apparently done without the knowledge (and possibly contrary to the wishes) of the Emperor. If this was the case, reluctance to give information relative to offensive BW is partially explained.
   

4. BW seems to have been largely a military activity, with civilian talent excluded in all but minor roles.
   

5. The initial stimulus for Japanese participation in BW seems to have been twofold:
   

   • a) The influence of Lt. Gen. Shirō Ishii.
     

   • b) The conviction that the Russians had practiced BW in Manchuria in 1935, and that they might use it again (the Chinese were similarly accused).
     

6. The principal BW center was situated in Pingfan, near Harbin, Manchuria. This was a large self-sufficient installation with a garrison of 3,000 by 1939-40 (reduced to 1,500 in 1945).
   

7. Intensive efforts were extended to develop BW into a practical weapon, at least eight types of special bombs being tested for large-scale dissemination of bacteria.
   

8. The most thoroughly investigated munition was the Uji type-50 bomb. More than 2,000 of these bombs were used in field trials. The Ha bomb, too, was exploded experimentally. Note that whereas the Uji bomb was an all-purpose munition, the Ha bomb was constructed and produced with only one purpose in mind – the dispersion of anthrax spores. The immediate effect was gained by shrapnel bursts with secondary considerations given to ground contamination. The statement has been made that a scratch wound from a single piece of shrapnel was sufficient to produce illness and death in 50-90% of the horses, and in 90-100% of the sheep exposed in experiments. More than 500 sheep were used in such field trials and estimates of horses similarly expended vary from 100 to 200.
   

9. Employing static techniques and drop tests from planes, approximately 4,000 bombs were used in field trials at Pingfan.
   

10. By 1939, definite progress had been made, but the Japanese at no time were in a position to use BW as a weapon. However, their advances in certain bomb types was such as to warrant the closest scrutiny of the Japanese work.
    

11. Japanese offensive BW was characterized by a curious mixture of foresight, energy, ingenuity and at the same time, lack of imagination with surprisingly amateurish approaches to some aspects of the work.
    

12. Organisms which were considered as possible candidates for BW, and which were tested in the laboratory or in the field included: all types of gastrointestinal bacterial pathogens, P. pestis (plague), B. anthracis (anthrax) and M. malleomyces (glanders).
    

13. Japanese defensive BW stresses:
    

    • a) Organizations of fixed and mobile preventive medicine units (with emphasis on water purification).
      

    • b) An accelerated vaccine-production program.
      

    • c) A system of BW education of medical officers in all echelons (BW Defensive Intelligence Institute).
      

14. The principal reasons for the Japanese failure were:
    

    • a) Limited or improper selection of BW agents.
      

    • b) Denial (even prohibition) of cooperated scientific effort.
      

    • c)
      Lack of cooperation of the various elements of the army (e.g. ordnance).
      

    • d) Exclusion of civilian scientists, thus denying the project the best technical talent in the Empire.
      

    • e) A policy of retrenchment at a crucial point in the development of the project.