Offa and the Mercian Wars (2 page)

In order to understand the nature of military campaigning in the Mercian Age it is necessary to build up a picture of the sort of country over which these campaigns took place. It is likely that people were very aware of the distinction between wild and cultivated landscapes – a distinction which drives the plot in Beowulf, for example, in which the halls of men are constantly threatened by monsters from the woods and marshes. However, even in the seventh and eighth centuries there can have been little if any true wilderness in England, except perhaps in the Fens of East Anglia where Saint Guthlac sought refuge from the world amidst the demon-haunted marshes.

The bears, wild cattle and bison which Offa's contemporary, the Frankish emperor Charlemagne, hunted in the forests beyond the Rhine had long ago disappeared from the British Isles, probably by the end of the Bronze Age. Wolves were still widespread in Anglo-Saxon times, though perhaps even then not that common, and there are hints that their activities may sometimes have been a political issue, or even a cause of conflict. According to William of Malmesbury, in the tenth century the English king Edgar imposed a tribute on the princes of North Wales of 300 wolf skins annually; this was paid for three years, but ceased after that because the Welsh could find no more wolves in their territory. No doubt the pelts had some value in trade, but historians have always considered this a rather strange demand when Edgar could have insisted on cattle, silver or other more obviously useful goods. It has been suggested that the king was interested in the pelts as clothing for his troops, or even a kind of uniform for his bodyguard, but we have no other evidence for Anglo-Saxon warriors dressed in wolf skins. Another possible explanation is that the mountainous Welsh terrain provided a refuge for the predators which had already been driven out of most of lowland England. The Welsh herdsmen, who raised mainly cattle and horses, may not have considered the wolves to be enough of a threat to be worth hunting down, whereas to the English, dependent on their more vulnerable flocks of sheep, their presence would have been intolerable. Perhaps Edgar's subjects had complained of the damage done by ‘Welsh' wolves raiding across the border in search of easy prey, obliging him to force his neighbours to address the problem. It is even possible that similar considerations had applied two centuries earlier in the reign of Offa, whose kingdom already relied heavily on the wool trade, and that a secondary purpose of his famous dyke (discussed in more detail on pages 136 to 140) was the control of four-legged raiders as well as human ones.

Most of the settlements identified by archaeologists from the period between AD 500 and 700 were situated on or near river banks, more than half of them being within 500 metres of a permanent source of water. However, the villages were less permanent than in later centuries, and many of them were apparently moved or abandoned – either temporarily or permanently – at some time during the seventh and eighth centuries. This may of course have been the result of political insecurity and chronic warfare, but there is also some evidence that the climate around this time was relatively unstable, with alternating droughts and floods and several severe winters (Arnold). For example the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle mentions a ‘great mortality of birds' in 671, presumably the result of extreme cold, as well as the notorious ‘big winter' of 763. Archaeological discoveries suggest that sheep were the commonest livestock, followed by cattle. The latter were used not just for milk and meat but to pull ploughs, as horses were very rare in agricultural communities. Most agricultural land was used for grain crops, mainly barley and oats, with wheaten bread probably remaining a scarce luxury food.

As discussed below (pages 28 to 29), modern research has disproved the theory that the Anglo-Saxons took over an abandoned and mostly forested landscape, and it has been estimated that the proportion of wooded country in the first millennium AD was already less than 20 per cent (Rackham). It was, however, much less evenly distributed than it is today. In the later Middle Ages there seems to have been a dramatic contrast between what Professor Rackham calls ‘Ancient Countryside', which retained its pre-Roman and Roman patchwork of small fields, pasturelands, hedgerows and woods, and the ‘Planned Countryside' characterised by huge, open arable fields, lacking natural obstacles and parcelled out among its cultivators in parallel and more or less regular strips. The true ‘open field' system was probably a development of the tenth and eleventh centuries, but Rackham has detected signs that the difference between the two landscapes may go back much further. Place names referring to woods and clearings are much more common in Ancient Countryside, for example, and the features mentioned as boundary markers in charters from the eighth century onwards show a similar pattern. Especially in the Planned Countryside most woods were probably managed for timber, though less thoroughly than in Roman times, and so were by no means impassable to large bodies of men (Brooks). There is evidence that they were routinely surrounded by banks and ditches, probably intended to keep livestock from straying and wild pigs out of the fields, and no doubt some of these banks have subsequently been mistaken for military earthworks. On the other hand they could have been useful as instant defensive lines for outnumbered armies. Contemporary written sources do not appear to mention this tactic, however, and on the whole it seems that wooded areas were regarded as unsuitable for military operations.

Rackham suggests that the contrast between the two types of landscape may have been as dramatic as that between the Normandy ‘bocage' and the open plains of Champagne in France today. If so, it must have had a significant influence on the conduct of warfare. The ‘open country' formed a rough triangle with its points on the English coast at Great Yarmouth in Norfolk, Portland Bill in Dorset, and the mouth of the River Tees in North Yorkshire. Its boundaries were of course irregular, following local vagaries of terrain, and there were no doubt isolated patches of woodland within it. Conversely the ‘wooded country' was typically a mixture of clearings, coppices and lightly wooded pasture. There may have been a more or less continuous belt of such close terrain running south-westwards across the country from the Humber to the Lower Severn, incorporating what were to become the Forests of Sherwood and Arden, and the escarpment of the Cotswolds further south (Hooke, 1985). This must have been a considerable barrier to armies moving between the kingdoms of Wessex and the Hwicce.

It is also noteworthy that the Mercian heartland around Tamworth lies very close to the boundary between Rackham's two landscapes. To the west and south-west lay the Forest of Arden and the hills, heaths and scattered hamlets of Cannock Chase and the Birmingham Plateau, while marching eastwards a Mercian army would soon have found itself in a rolling agricultural countryside with long lines of sight and little or no cover. Perhaps this partly explains the concentration of recorded battles in the corridor east of the southern Pennines and along the Berkshire and Wiltshire Downs, where the terrain lends itself to rapid manoeuvre and armies would have found it relatively easy to locate each other.

Rivers were the most important strategic features in the landscape, and are referred to repeatedly in the campaign accounts which survive. Guy Halsall (in Hawkes) has shown that the great majority of the identifiable battle sites of the Mercian Age are located either at ancient burial mounds or similar well-known sites of obvious cultural significance, or at river crossings. It is quite likely, as he suggests, that the former were chosen as pre-arranged rendezvous, but it is less certain that this also applied to the river crossings. Given that settlements, and therefore supplies of food, were concentrated near rivers, and that fording them must often have been a protracted operation, it seems probable that any army in the field would have spent more time near river banks than away from them. The places where an army could cross easily would have been well known to the local ruler, and it would have been a logical move to await an invader on your own side of the river as he struggled to reform his troops after the crossing.

The actual bank of a watercourse would not, however, normally have been a suitable spot for a battle. Before they were deepened and straightened for navigation and drainage purposes, the courses of rivers and streams were less well defined than they are today, with numerous small meanders and extensive marshy floodplains spreading into the countryside on either bank, and it must have been very difficult to find firm ground there on which to deploy. Other factors would also deter a defender from simply lining up his men along a river bank. Such a locality would be uncomfortable and unhealthy in wet weather, and might even be dangerous if sudden flooding was a possibility. And an invader whose passage was blocked in this way would probably not try to force his way across, but would instead leave a detachment behind to pin the defenders in place while he found an uncontested crossing up or downstream, which would automatically place him on the flank of the defenders and force them to withdraw.

At Maldon in 991 Ealdorman Byrhtnoth is said to have deliberately pulled back and allowed the Vikings to cross the River Blackwater, as the only way of bringing them to battle. Furthermore, an enemy who was allowed to cross and then obliged to fight with his back to the river would find it very difficult to retreat if he was defeated, as happened to Penda at the Winwaed in 654. For all these reasons, battles described as being fought on rivers are likely to have taken place not at the crossings themselves, but on the slightly higher ground beyond.

Waterways can of course be arteries of communication as well as obstacles, but there is little evidence for their use as such in this period. Even the Vikings travelled across the country mainly on stolen horses. In central England only the Rivers Severn, Trent and Thames were large and reliable enough to be viable military routes. In Offa's reign the monastery at Breedon-on-the-Hill near Burton on Trent was charged with providing hospitality for ‘envoys from across the sea', which suggests that the main route into Mercia for foreign diplomats and traders was via the Humber estuary and the River Trent, which flows some five miles north of Breedon. On the other hand Nennius refers to two main rivers of Britain, the Thames and the Severn, ‘on which ships once travelled', implying that they no longer did so in his day, and perhaps had never done on other rivers. Many smaller streams which might otherwise have been adequate for navigation were obstructed by fish weirs. These were apparently an Anglo-Saxon invention, which consisted of lines of wooden traps placed across the current to catch migrating fish. Rackham describes these devices as being placed between an island and one bank, leaving the other side of the island open, but there is evidence that in places they proliferated to the extent that they became a hindrance to shipping and even obstructed the flow of water. In the eleventh century Edward the Confessor had to order the destruction of many of these weirs, which were blocking rivers as big as the Thames, Severn, Trent and Yorkshire Ouse.

Another factor which tended to force military operations to follow certain routes was the existence of a road network. As discussed below (page 29) the Roman transport system had by no means disappeared, and most of their major roads remained in use. There was also an extensive network of smaller local roads, and nearly one in eight of the features mentioned in the charters is a road or path (Rackham). Many of these are referred to as a ‘herepath', or ‘army path'. Rackham, however, considers that the identifiable ‘army paths' do not constitute a deliberately planned strategic road system, and are unlikely to have been constructed specifically for military movements. It is noteworthy that although labour services were required by the Mercian kings from at least the eighth century for the purposes of building and repairing bridges and fortifications, road work was not included in these obligations, although local communities may have been expected to maintain the routes through their own neighbourhoods. Probably the term ‘herepath' merely indicates a through route wide enough to be used by an army – or which had been used by one within living memory – in contrast to a lane used only by local people. It is worth remembering in this context that in the laws of King Ine, laid down in early eighth-century Wessex, a ‘here' meant any armed force of thirty-five men or more.

Other place name evidence suggests that, after the Romans left, many of their bridges were initially neglected – the common name Stratford implies a ford on a Roman street, at a place where there would originally have been a bridge – but that Anglo-Saxon rulers were soon repairing them and ordering the construction of new ones. In Mercia King Aethelbald appears to have introduced an obligation on landowners in 749 to supply labour for work on bridges as well as fortresses. A sixth of the river crossings mentioned in charters between the seventh and tenth centuries were bridges, many of which crossed substantial water features. At Fambridge in Essex the River Crouch is a quarter of a mile wide, and although no bridge survives today, the name clearly implies its former existence (Rackham). A wooden causeway across the Thames marshes at Oxford has been dated to the reigns of Offa or his successor Coenwulf, and tree ring evidence has produced a date for the bridge at Cromwell, on the Trent near Newark, of between 740 and 750 (Brooks).