One Tribe at a Time: The Paper that Changed the War in Afghanistan (2 page)

So here are my answers to those questions. What do I consider my greatest military accomplishment? That I and the men I have trained and fought with have won twenty awards for valor. Twenty. That is a truly remarkable number. I had a great ODA (Operational Detachment Alpha) 316 in Afghanistan as part of the 3rd Special Forces Group. We fought together for several years
in Afghanistan. We fought in the Konar and Helmand Provinces in early 2003 and again in 2004.

I then spent two years on a Special Projects team before returning to Iraq as the first American combat advisor for an Iraqi National Police Quick Reaction Force (QRF) battalion. Our mission was to kill and capture terrorists anywhere in the country. I won a Silver Star and the Iraqi National Police Medal of Honor while fighting alongside my Iraqi brothers in 2006 and 2007 when Iraq was the most dangerous place on earth.

I spent the next two years as an unconventional warfare (UW) instructor in the final phase of Special Forces training. After much red tape I was overjoyed to receive orders to return to Afghanistan in the summer of 2009 to once again spend time with the Afghan people and fight the Taliban. That is when I began writing this
paper. A few days before leaving, I was informed that I would not be returning—I would be going to the 1st Armored Division to work on a transition team for a return trip to Iraq.

My experiences since 9/11 have been incredible. I have fought with great warriors against worthy enemies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We fought with exceptional bravery and courage at every turn, but we always fought smartly and were always prepared for the challenges we faced.

This paper represents only a small portion of what ODA 316 accomplished in Afghanistan. It’s my story of the tribal engagement between myself and Malik Noor Afzhal, my team and the rest of his tribe.

We must work first and forever with the tribes, for they are the most important military, political and cultural unit in that country. The tribes are self-contained
fighting units who will fight to the death for their tribal family’s honor and respect. Their intelligence and battlefield assessments are infallible. Their loyalty to family and friends is beyond question.

My unit and I became family members with Malik Noor Afzhal’s tribe. This is my story of what we accomplished as a family in mutual respect and purpose. I’m offering our experience as a blueprint for success.

There is no doubt it could be done again.

Major Jim Gant
United States Army Special Forces

We demonstrated month in and month out that a small effective fighting force could unite with an Afghan tribe, become trusted and respected brothers-in-arms with their leaders and families, and make a difference in the US effort in Afghanistan. In doing so, we discovered what I believe to be the seed of enduring success in that country.

The following are issues beyond the scope of this paper that would have to be addressed and dealt with to accomplish the goals set forth in these pages. I cite them in this space, up front, so that the reader understands that I am aware of them and of their importance and difficulty. I will not attempt to address these issues in this paper. The time and research required are simply beyond my pay grade. By themselves, these issues demand papers or even books.

Beyond the strategy itself, what has to happen for a Tribal Engagement Strategy (TES) to work?

1. A strategy of tribal engagement will require a complete shift at the highest levels of our military organization—and the ability to push these changes down to group/brigade and battalion commanders. I believe Secretary Gates, General Petraeus and General McChrystal are flexible and forceful enough to embrace a strategy of this type. My fear is that the farther down the “food-chain” it travels, the more it might be resisted by ground commanders.
   

What specific tactical changes need to happen?

• Command and Control of the Tribal Engagement Teams
  (TETs) would have to be streamlined dramatically. “One radio call could get an answer.”
  
• The CONOP approval process
  (used to get missions approved from higher
  headquarters has to be streamlined. Some missions might have to be conducted with no approval, due to the time-sensitive nature of the opportunity. The TETs would need special “trust and approval.”
  
• The risk-averse nature
  of our current method of operating would have to change. American soldiers would die. Some of them alone, with no support. Some may simply disappear. Everyone has to understand that from the outset.
  
• TETs must be allowed to be on their own
  , grow beards, wear local garb, and interact with the tribesmen at all levels. They must be allowed to be what they are: “American tribesmen.”
  
• Use of OPFUND (money) needs to be streamlined.
  The TETs will need special trust to do what is needed
  with money allocated to help the tribe. Money and guns equal the ultimate power.
  
• Rules of Engagement (ROE) must change.
  Using the TETs will become a very intense, personal fight. If they need to drop bombs or pursue an enemy, they must be able to do so. The teams will always fight alongside Tribal Security Forces (TSFs), and no missions will be conducted unilaterally. There will always be an Afghan face on any mission.
  

2. Identifying, attracting and training American personnel who could perform this type of mission would be a daunting task.

3. The strategic challenge of Pakistan as a sanctuary, recruiting base and source of funding and military expertise would have to be addressed. The United States
cannot afford to destabilize Pakistan any more than it already is. However, a TES (Tribal Engagement Strategy) could positively influence this situation. Most Taliban funding, recruitment and training takes place in Pakistan. Not to mention the safe haven it provides.

4. The lack of a viable judicial system. The current government-led judicial system is corrupt, slow and there are too few judges deemed legitimate by the populace to properly impose any rule of law in the vast and largely rural areas of Afghanistan. The Taliban has moved into many of these areas and gained footholds by dispensing justice, adjudicating disputes and acting as judges. It will take decades to improve this situation.

5. The warlord issue in Afghanistan. Do we fight them? Pay them? Co-opt them?
Use them as surrogates? Advise, assist and train them like we would do with the tribes? The warlords can definitely be used in a very effective surrogate role, in support of our objectives. We also need to understand that some fighters whom the US has labeled as “warlords” are really “environmentally-induced leaders” who fill a power vacuum of one type or another and that they would be very receptive to and even desirous of US assistance.

6. The opium problem. The tie between opium and the funding of the Taliban is a fact. However, at the tactical level, it would be a mistake for US forces to get involved in this issue. To do so would make enemies out of a population that is simply struggling to feed its families, clans and tribes. The COIN (counterinsurgency) forces should not be made responsible for the opium issue.
That would be counterproductive for the troops on the ground.

A strategy of tribal engagement will require a complete paradigm shift at the highest levels of our military organization.

So…what is the answer? My hope is that you will find it as you read through this paper.

You get a much different perspective on what this war means when you’re in a tribal village. You look down at the children and see the hope and trust and anticipation in their eyes. It puts a little more fire in your belly to do something that really matters.

Afghanistan. I feel like I was born there. The greatest days of my entire life were spent in the Pesch Valley and Musa Qalay and with the great “Sitting Bull” (a tribal leader in the Konar Valley) who you will meet later in these pages.

I love the people and the rich history of Afghanistan. They will give you their last bite of food in the morning and then try
and kill you in the evening. A people who, despite their great poverty, are as happy as any American I have ever met. A people who will fight and die for the sake of honor. A great friend and a worthy enemy.

I have been asked by several people inside and outside of the military, “Who is your audience for this paper? What are you trying to accomplish?”

The answer is that I have been trying to get back to Afghanistan for several years, to Konar Province, to my old stomping grounds. In June of 2008 I received orders to return there on a transition team. I started this paper as an individual “IPb” or Intelligence Preparation of the battlefield. It began as my attempt to “wrap my brain around” the tribal issues that I knew my team and I would have to face.

I am writing this paper to help myself and possibly others determine how to
best utilize the most powerful aspect of Afghan society—the tribes and the tribal system—not only to help the United States accomplish its strategic goals, but to help the Afghan people achieve peace, stability and good governance.

Afghan tribes always have and always will resist any type of foreign intervention in their affairs. This includes a central government located in Kabul, which to them is a million miles away from their problems, a million miles away from their security.

“Democracy” only has a chance to be cultivated at the local level by a small group of men—Tribal Engagement Teams—who are willing to dedicate their lives to the Afghan people and cause.

At a time when the outcome of the war in Afghanistan hangs in the balance, when high ranking military officers are asking for
more troops, I believe the “light footprint” approach put forth in this paper will not only work, but will help to ease the need for larger and larger numbers of US soldiers being deployed to Afghanistan.

The central cultural fact about Afghanistan is that it is constituted of tribes. Not individuals, not Western-style citizens—but tribes and tribesmen. It is my deep belief—and the thesis of this paper—that the answer to the problems that face the Afghan people, as well as other future threats to US security in the region, will be found in understanding and then helping the tribal system of Afghanistan to flourish.

I firmly believe that a relatively small number of special officers and noncommissioned officers could maintain influence on large portions of Afghanistan by advising, assisting, training and leading local tribal
security forces (Arbakai) and building strong relationships with the tribes they live alongside.

One Tribe at a Time
reflects what I believe to be the one strategy that can help both the US and the people of Afghanistan by working directly with their centuries-old tribal system. We can only do this by giving top priority to the most important political, social and military force in Afghanistan—the tribes. We must engage these tribes at a close and personal level with a much deeper cultural understanding than we have ever had before.

When we gain the respect and trust of one tribe, in one area, a domino effect will spread throughout the region and beyond. One tribe will eventually become twenty-five or even fifty tribes. This can only have a long-term positive effect on the current situation. It is, however, not without pitfalls and difficulty.

But it can and must be done.