Operation Mercury (10 page)

That the lack of a major arterial road to the south coast was a considerable weakness, was scarcely a revelation. The Axis's success in Greece had placed the great harbours of the north coast within reach of the German bombers. For any re-supply to be effected from Egypt by sea would expose the British ships to the gauntlet of air attack, at a time when the RAF was so seriously depleted. Souda Bay had become a maritime graveyard with over 50,000 tons of Allied shipping already lost. Even with the inestimable boon of hindsight it is possible to see that had Sphakia been turned into a viable small supply harbour, with the steep mountain road to Askifou completed to a reasonable standard, the risk to the ships would have been considerably diminished.

Most disturbing was the lack of air cover. An observer wrote of the doomed flight of the final Hurricane to take off from Maleme, instantly swallowed by a horde of marauding Messerschmitts. Desperate as the odds were the situation had been considerably exacerbated by the poor siting of AA batteries and the failure to construct fighter pens and smaller, satellite airstrips under the sheltering lee of the high hills.

In his report Wilkinson did not spare the Air Force: ‘...the attitude of the RAF beggars description'. Unconvinced by ‘excuses', he draws a most unfavourable comparison with the Luftwaffe, citing their apparent ability to carve out temporary airfields within hours of their arrival. Most tellingly he points out that, whilst prior to the Greek debacle Crete may have been an inconsequential backwater, the evacuation from the mainland put the island in the strategic forefront. Lastly Wilkinson castigated the Navy for the poor state of preparation at Souda Bay, citing the lack of any foam firefighting apparatus.

Upon assessing the burden of his command, Freyberg sent an urgent signal to Wavell wherein he complained the force he had available was inadequate and that he needed support both at sea and from the air. He pointed out that much of his troops' heavy equipment, particularly artillery, had been abandoned in the course of the Greek fiasco. Even entrenching tools were in pitifully short supply, as indeed was just about everything else. At the same time he wrote in a very similar vein to the home government.

The C.-in-C., having conferred with Admiral Cunningham, responded in a positive tone, giving assurance that the Navy would not let the defenders down – this was in spite of the Admiral's misgivings that, at such short notice, the island could be evacuated. Wavell, throughout, was not convinced of German intentions by sea. Neither he nor Cunningham believed the Axis could amass sufficient vessels for such an undertaking.

Churchill, in London, also perceived the greatest threat lay more toward the skies than the clear, blue waters of the Mediterranean. When the Prime Minister wrote to his counterpart in New Zealand he emphasised the nature of the airborne threat, at the same time persisting in the Homeric view that the able-bodied Kiwis would relish a straight fight with an enemy, who lacked the decisive support of tanks and heavy guns, ‘on which he so largely relies'.

Part of the difficulty lay in Freyberg's own mercurial temperament. He certainly lacked faith in his own capabilities and yet was motivated by an admirable sense of duty. His mood swung from almost feverish optimism to deep despair. This may, at least in part, explain
²⁸
that when he wrote to Churchill on 5 May his tone was far more bullish: ‘…cannot understand nervousness; am not in the least anxious about airborne attack; have made my dispositions and feel can cope adequately with the troops at my disposal.'
²⁹

Was it simply the case that, having been entrusted with his mission by Churchill, Freyberg simply felt he could not pass the challenge. The effect of the Prime Minister's charisma should not be overlooked. If the politician admired the soldier then the soldier was bound to do his utmost to conform to the image he had inspired. There were few men of whom Churchill would write:

Stirring stuff but it betrays the great man's romantic weakness of assuming that a strong heart and a just cause can overcome all odds. Modern warfare is not that accommodating; it is, in part, an industrial process, weight of men, matériel, supply and above all air power will generally decide the issue. Both men fell into the same trap, Churchill elevated the hero and the hero had to conform, whatever his professional misgivings.

Supply was an immediate problem. German bombing had made Souda too hot a landfall in daylight hours and ships had to be unloaded in darkness. Damaged ships lay lifeless in the water and their precious cargoes, needed to supply such a swollen garrison, had to be manhandled. In the first three weeks of May, immediately prior to the attack, some 27,000 tons of munitions were embarked for Crete but only a pitiful percentage, some 3,000 tons, reached the dockside.

The situation did begin to improve somewhat when Major Torr took over responsibility, backed by contingents of Australian volunteers, from engineering units and 2/2nd Field Regiment.
³¹
The increased energy and efficiency had an effect, some Bren carriers, apparently lost on a half submerged wreck, were ingeniously salvaged and made operational. A frantic nightly run by fast destroyers, speeding into Souda, unloading and dashing back to Alexandria under the sheltering blanket of darkness, also eased the crisis.

Additional arms in the shape of a motley collection of French and captured Italian 75-mm and 100-mm guns, a battery of mountain guns, 3.7-in howitzers, together with assorted armour, sixteen light and half a dozen infantry tanks were obtained.
³²
The MNBDO were a considerable addition in themselves, apart from the 2,200 marines, they were fully equipped with light and heavy AA guns, searchlights and some formidable 4-in naval guns. A brace of fresh contingents which, like MNBDO, had not been exposed to the debacle in Greece, 2nd Leicester and 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, came ashore.

Admiral Cunningham, whatever his reservations about the safety of his fleet exposed in open waters to an enemy with full control of the skies, had pulled together two ‘heavy' flotillas and seven ‘light'. The battlecruisers with their massive 15-in guns stalked the western approaches to deter any intervention by the Italian Navy, while the squadrons prowled the coast ready to pounce on any invader. In total the fleet comprised four battleships, nineteen cruisers and forty-three destroyers. Such a concentration of sea power virtually doomed any attempted landing to certain destruction. Churchill, writing to Mr. Fraser in New Zealand felt the odds were now even:

This schoolboy romanticism has been dismissed as patronising but this is probably an injustice; it more reflects the Prime Minister's enthusiasm for a good clean fight, chivalric warfare with cold steel to the fore. In the event the New Zealanders more than justified his confidence in their martial spirit.

Freyberg was faced with the reverse of the tactical dilemma which had earlier confronted Student. The coastline was long, the airstrips widely separated. Should he therefore protect each of his strategic assets in force, thus spreading his resources and exposing them to defeat in detail, or should he rather thin out the defenders and build up a strong reserve, available to be rushed to the contact in sufficient strength to re-take any bridgehead the enemy might win?

Again, like his German opponent he opted for a compromise, splitting his troops into three principal contingents, each charged with the security of a vital sector but leaving the final deployment in each case to local commanders. Like their General many of the officers involved, brave and dedicated soldiers, were veterans of trench warfare and commenced ‘digging in' and wiring their, predominantly linear, positions. This gave Freyberg great comfort and he wrote in a more confident frame to Wavell after his tour of inspection on 13/14 May.

In the vulnerable west of the island, the Maleme/Galatos sector, he deployed the New Zealand Division; 4 Brigade under Brigadier Inglis comprising 18th, 19th and 20th (NZ) battalions and the 5th commanded by Hargest – 21st, 22nd, 23rd (NZ) and 28th (Maori) battalions. Brigadier Howard Kippenberger led the newly created 10 Brigade (NZ Divisional Cavalry Detachment and Composite Battalion).

Weston remained in command of his MNBDO dug in around Souda and supported by a pair of composite Australian battalions, together with 2/2nd Field Artillery (deployed as infantry). Freyburg's ‘Creforce' HQ was near Chania, the administrative capital and the Force Reserve – 1st Royal Welch Fusiliers, (14 Brigade), 1st Ranger Battalion (9th Battalion KRRC) and the Northumberland Hussars (Noodles) was nearby.

Moving eastwards along the long ribbon of the north coast, the Rethymnon/Georgioupolis sector was held by Brigadier Vasey's 19 Australian Brigade. This comprised 2/1st, 2/7th, 2/8th and 2/11th Battalions, all infantry; three batteries of guns from 2/3rd Field Regiment together with units of field engineers and machine gunners.

The 14 Brigade, commanded by Chappel, was deployed around Heraklion and his forces included the 2nd Black Watch, 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and the Australian 2/4th Infantry Battalion, (part of 19 Brigade).

This left only the Greek contingents. There was a tendency to regard these as distinctly second rate formations; they were badly armed and equipped but they were to show that there was nothing lacking in their fighting spirit. They, together with ad hoc groups of local irregulars, would make a significant contribution to the defence. The Germans would be shocked and on numerous occasions discomfited by the ferocity of the local response, being accustomed to a more servile reception. It was easy to forget that the Cretans had a long and proud tradition of offering fierce and unbending resistance to the invader.

General Freyberg, whatever his other failings, was quick to appreciate the fighting qualities of the Cretans; theirs was a spirit to which this lion of a man could respond – simple, courageous, fiercely independent and resolute. He realised that local bands of guerrillas or andartes could harass and decimate an invader; their lack of training and arms amply compensated by centuries of resistance, and intimate knowledge of the difficult terrain.

There was a tendency amongst both British and dominion officers to write off all the Greek units as equally unreliable. This was grossly unjust. Many were indeed crammed with raw recruits and not all would perform well. Kippenberger was particularly dismissive and, in some units, morale was undoubtedly low. The erratic provision of arms, which was miserly and random, was hardly calculated to stiffen anyone's resolve. The men drew their rifles from a central depot housed in Chania where they faced an eclectic choice of mainly outdated weapons with, at best, a few rounds apiece, frequently of the wrong calibre!

Colonel, later Brigadier, Guy Salisbury-Jones was given the job of liaison officer with the Greeks, and their eight battalions comprised a total of some 9,000 effectives. Of these Freyberg now deployed the 1, 6 and 8 Regiments in the far, western sector, the 2 Regiment in Souda/Chania, with the 4th and 5th together with the paramilitary gendarmes in the Retymnon/Georgioupolis sector. The remainder, 3 and 7 Regiments and a Garrison Battalion remained at Heraklion.

The New Zealand Division was under the command of Brigadier General Puttick who shared part of his sector with elements of the MNBDO under Weston, disgruntled at his replacement by Freyberg, but who had responsibility for some AA and coastal defence emplacements. Weston's semi-independent fiefdom did not make for smooth coordination. Force Reserve was not under Freyberg's direct command but was to be ‘administered by sector commanders' – a rather woolly arrangement that was to have serious consequences.

Defence of the vital Maleme sector was designated by Puttick to Hargest's 5 Brigade; Kippenberger's 10th (less the 20th Battalion) was guarding Galatos and Prison Valley. The 20th, based on the fringes of Chania, was kept in hand as a distinct divisional reserve, not to be deployed without Puttick's acquiescence. Brigadier Hargest's dispositions around Maleme itself were to be crucial to the outcome of the forthcoming battle.

The 21st and 23rd were deployed on the high ground around Kondomari with his HQ further east at Platanias, some distance from the vital airstrip. A deep gully, the Sfakoriako, divided these units wired in positions from Maleme. His engineering battalion straddled the coast road by the bridge at Modhion and the crack Maoris further back at Platanias.

The vital bastion of Hill 107, which overlooked the airfield, was to be defended by the 22nd battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew VC, and itself dispersed to a degree that only a single rifle company occupied the summit. A major failing of the defensive enceinte was that no troops were stationed west of the dry Tavronitis riverbed and the iron bridge which spanned the arid watercourse remained unguarded. D Company's extreme right lay against the banks as did the slit trenches of C Company's No. 15 Platoon. The remaining platoons were dug in around the field itself. Worse, an improvised sprawl of tents and hutments, home to the RAF and other non-combatant personnel, crowded the line of fire.