Operation Storm: Japan's Top Secret Submarines and Its Plan to Change the Course of World War II (7 page)

BOOK: Operation Storm: Japan's Top Secret Submarines and Its Plan to Change the Course of World War II
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“Nothing detected, sir!”
32

“Blow main ballast!”
33
Nishino commanded. “
Kyusoku fujyo!
[Rapid surface!] Prepare the deck gun!”
34

The main ballast tanks were vented, and the bow and stern planesmen spun their wheels so quickly, the
I-17
leaped out of the water like a breaching whale. Once the bridge cleared the waves, the hatch was opened, and Shimada’s gun crew dashed on deck. The sub was equipped with a 5.5-inch deck gun,
35
the same kind Japanese battleships used for their secondary battery.
36
Shells were kept on deck in a magazine, and though many were required to sink a ship, it would take only a few to set an oil field ablaze.

As the sun hung low in the sky, a crewman manhandled a shell into the gun breech. Then the pointer and trainer rotated the gun toward the shore. Once they were satisfied they’d lined up with the tank farm, the head gunner announced, “Mark, set!”

When the sub was almost abreast of the oil field, Nishino gave the order.

“Commence firing!”

It was 7:10
P.M
.
37
when the first shot fired at the U.S. mainland since the War of 1812 was sent on its way. It was Washington’s Birthday, and Roosevelt was giving a fireside chat at the time. The radio broadcast had begun promptly at seven o’clock, and though the purpose of the talk was to calm nervous Americans, local residents would find themselves in need of further reassurance once the
I-17
began her attack.

Shimada’s first shot fell short, crashing into the sea. The trainer and azimuth-setter made adjustments, and the second shot landed on the beach, sending a dozen refinery workers scurrying for cover.
38
Further adjustments were made, but the trajectory was too high. One shell overshot the tank farm, burying itself in the hillside.
39
Another landed farther inland.
40

The sub’s rocking motion made a nearly flat trajectory difficult to achieve. But not all the shells missed their target. One ricocheted off a wooden pier and crashed into a pump house.
41
Another landed near the aviation fuel tank.
42

Nambu was in the radio room when the shelling began, but it was impossible to stay once the deck gun sounded. Unable to stem his curiosity, he climbed into the conning tower and craned his neck out the bridge hatch.
43
The cannon fire was deafening.

The gun crews were doing a superb job as one volley after another arced toward the oil field. Nambu was sure at least one shell hit an oil tank.
44
Then again, it was hard to see everything.

Ten-year-old J. J. Hollister was at home with his family listening to Roosevelt’s broadcast when he heard the first cannon report. Running outside, he saw a muzzle flash, followed by an eerie whistling noise as a shell landed near his house with a startling thump.
45

Mrs. George Heaney was first to phone the police.
46
Bob Miller, an oil worker, also called to report that the refinery was being shelled.
47
Lawrence Wheeler, owner of Wheeler’s Inn on nearby Highway 1, knew something was wrong when he felt his restaurant shake. Rushing outside to determine the cause, he was soon joined by his customers
48
and kitchen staff.
49
Wheeler’s wife reported that the shell craters were so evenly spaced, it looked like a giant had walked up the beach.
50
Somewhere a siren began blaring.

Nishino kept the
I-17
running parallel to the coast as Shimada’s men worked with precision.
51
Firing a shell every 30 to 60 seconds, the trainer and pointer continually adjusted their settings. The gun was targeting the refinery, but the hoped-for flames would have started more easily had they been using incendiaries. Surprisingly, they’d brought none.
52

Backlit by the setting sun, the gun crew glowed a hellish red.
53
As the light faded, it soon became difficult to see. An evening mist settled on the mountains, and the coastal mustard fields were lost in darkness.
54
When Nishino gave the command to cease firing, the attack had lasted less than 30 minutes.

The gun crew quickly anchored their cannons, gathered their equipment, and disappeared down the bridge hatch. When two of the crew passed the radio room, they were buttonholed by the communications officer.

“What did we hit?”

“I don’t know,” one of them responded. “I had no time to confirm anything.”

The radio officer celebrated anyway. “We’re the first to bombard America!”
55

Nambu knew the easy part was over. It was escaping that would be difficult.
56

U.S. air patrols were already looking for them. The Santa Barbara Channel wasn’t deep enough for the
I-17
to submerge, but coastal fog rolled in, providing much-needed cover. Fortunately, the
I-17
’s engine had been repaired, so Nishino called for 16 knots.

The
I-17
’s crew didn’t relax until they’d submerged into the Pacific. Meanwhile Nambu thought about the chaos they had caused.
57
Though they’d sink another two ships during their patrol, nothing compared to being the first Japanese submarine to shell the U.S. mainland.

Nambu’s parents would have been proud.

R
EPERCUSSIONS OF THE
Ellwood attack

were far reaching and not just because it inspired the Steven Spielberg film
1941
starring John Belushi and Dan Aykroyd. The psychological impact of the bombardment caused many Californians to fear a Japanese invasion. This was exactly what Yamamoto had intended, though it was nothing compared to the fear he hoped to sow once the
I-400
s were complete.

U.S. historians would eventually pooh-pooh the attack, but 17 shells
a
were a small price for tying up U.S. Navy ships, manpower, and dollars. For the next three years, precious U.S. resources would be diverted to protecting the west coast, which was exactly what the Japanese intended. No ship could travel from San Francisco to Los Angeles, let alone Hawaii, without being escorted by a naval vessel. Not until 1945 was the Pacific coast considered safe enough that escorts were dispensed with.

The
I-17
’s message was swift and fast acting. The first widespread panic took place 32 hours later, when a remarkable story unfolded in the skies over Los Angeles.
58

Just before two o’clock on the morning of February 25, U.S. air defense radar picked up a mysterious sea contact heading toward Los Angeles. When the contact was determined to be “unidentified aircraft,” a yellow alert was issued. At 2:25
A.M.
, air raid sirens began sounding throughout the city. It was the second time that night that sirens had sounded, demonstrating just how on edge Los Angeles was. But when a red alert was declared at 2:30, people took it seriously. Ten thousand air raid wardens flooded the streets. By 2:32, antiaircraft guns were manned and ready as searchlights swept the skies. A citywide blackout went into effect from Santa Monica to Long Beach, which included radio silence.
59
Clearly, this was no drill.

The first antiaircraft (AA) guns opened fire at 3:16
A.M
.
60
As the sound of AA flak filled the night, more batteries joined in. Pretty soon everyone was cutting loose. Some people saw Japanese planes; others saw bombs or parachutes.
61
A coastal artillery colonel spotted “twenty-five planes flying at 12,000 feet.”
62
Another report sighted parachute flares over Santa Monica.
63
Twenty minutes later the 37th Coast Artillery headquarters in downtown L.A. received news that the Douglas Aircraft plant in Long Beach “had been bombed.”
64

Air raid wardens ran through the chilly night demanding people take cover.
65
As yellow tracer bullets raced into the sky, they were joined by sparkling ack-ack fire. AA debris began raining down on Santa Monica and Long Beach, and word spread that an enemy plane had crashed at 185th and Vermont.
66

The Long Beach chief of police was on top of the local civic center using high-powered binoculars to report inbound planes heading toward Redondo Beach.
67
A reporter for the
Herald Examiner
saw 25 silvery planes in V formation moving slowly across the sky.
68
Other reports indicated the city was on fire.

An hour later it was all over.

By the time the skies cleared, more than 1,400 rounds of antiaircraft ordnance had been expended.
69
Unexploded shells and shrapnel fell in a 40-mile arc up and down the coast,
70
some of it landing on cars and rooftops.
71
A three-inch AA shell exploded in the backyard of Mr. and Mrs. Hugh Landis, blowing out their living room windows,
72
and shrapnel peppered the newly constructed bombers at the North American Aviation plant in Inglewood.
73
None of it hit an enemy plane, though.

The next morning the
Los Angeles Times
used four-inch headlines to tell the story:

L.A. AREA RAIDED!

JAP PLANES PERIL SANTA MONICA, SEAL BEACH, EL SEGUNDO, REDONDO, LONG BEACH, HERMOSA, SIGNAL HILL.
74

But it wasn’t Jap planes that menaced Los Angeles. It was Americans.

Five people died during the confusion, two of them struck by cars during the blackout
75
and three felled by heart attacks.
76
Sgt. Henry B. Ayers was one of the casualties. A 60-year-old California State guardsman, Ayers had a heart attack while driving an army truck full of ammunition.
77

Most of the destruction was confined to AA shells damaging property. Of greater satisfaction was the efficient manner in which civilian defense officials swung into action only moments after being alerted. The only problem was, there’d been no attack.

Everything returned to normal when the all-clear sounded five hours later. Though newspapers reported employees were late for work the next day, the most unusual sight was people picking up shrapnel for souvenirs.

The day after the scare Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson said that as many as 15 aircraft, “possibly piloted by enemy agents,” had flown over Los Angeles.

Navy Secretary Frank Knox disagreed. “As far as I know the whole raid was a false alarm … attributed to jittery nerves,” he said.
78

A congressional hearing was called, and even President Roosevelt raised an eyebrow over the comedy of errors.

There’s no firm evidence of what triggered the SNAFU (situation normal, all fouled up), though it might have been faulty radar, which was still in its infancy. Whatever happened, confusion was probably amplified by searchlights illuminating AA bursts, which caused people to think they were seeing enemy planes.

As for what triggered the shooting in the first place, it’s anybody’s guess. One theory says that an AA battery using a weather balloon to measure wind conditions accidentally drew fire.
b
Others claim it was UFOs.

If Nambu and the
I-17
had been ordered to create jitters along the west coast, they more than succeeded. Radio Tokyo reinforced the point when, on March 3, it broadcast: “Sensible Americans know the submarine shelling of the Pacific coast was a warning to the nation that the paradise created by George Washington is on the verge of destruction.”
79
The English may have been fractured, but the intent was clear.

After torpedoing an American tanker,
c
the
I-17
sailed home to Yokosuka.
80
The sub had performed well, and Nambu was pleased. He was even more pleased when he received orders in Japan directing him to enter submarine school as a “class A” student. It was the moment he’d been waiting for.

Nambu was to become a sub captain.

*
Interestingly, both the SS
Samoa
and the SS
Larry Doheny
escaped the
I-17
, though neither Captain Nishino nor Nambu realized it at the time. Nevertheless, fate caught up with the SS
Larry Doheny
on the evening of October 5, 1942, when the
I-25
sank her while she was en route from Long Beach, California, to Portland, Oregon. As a result, the total number of ships actually sunk by the
I-17
on her first war patrol was one.


It was not unusual for both Japanese and U.S. sub commanders to mistakenly conclude that a torpedoed target had sunk. After the war, when shipping records were more closely scrutinized, sinkings by both sides were reduced to better reflect reality.


According to Zenji Orita, a Sixth Fleet conference in January 1942 summed up the results as “17 sinkings and 3 ships damaged.” Specific breakdowns were as follows: “SubRon 1 was credited with 11 ships sunk and 2 damaged; SubRon 2 was credited with 4 sunk and 1 damaged; SubRon 3 was credited with 2 ships sunk.” See Zenji Orita with Joseph D. Harrington,
I-Boat Captain: How Japan’s Submarines Almost Defeated the U. S. Navy in the Pacific!
(Canoga Park, Calif.: Major Books, 1976), p. 45. However, once again these numbers proved to be inflated. The actual number of ships sunk was considerably less.

§
Under interrogation, Japan’s secretary of the Naval Ministry said: “You ask why we didn’t shell some coastal U.S. city rather than … [the Santa Barbara] oil tanks. At Santa Barbara, it was our decision to shell oil tanks because we felt them important war assets. So it was with Fort Stevens. We didn’t use these attacks to terrorize your people, but to strike war blows.”


When I interviewed Admiral Nambu about the attack on the Ellwood oil refinery, I asked whether it had been his first visit to the United States. “No,” he replied. “No?” I responded. “When was your first visit?” “Pearl Harbor.” He smiled. I was soon to learn, it wasn’t as a tourist.

a
In his memoir, Nambu says they fired 17 shells. However Sato, in his history of the
I-400
submarines, quotes Nambu as saying 12 shells were fired.

b
Donald Young believes the cause may have been a weather balloon. As he explains, “With 3-inch guns ranging as high as 25,000 feet, it was necessary to keep anti-aircraft gunners up to date on current wind conditions in order to make any adjustments before any shooting started. This information was gathered periodically by releasing meteorological balloons and then tracking them … At 3 a.m. on the morning of the raid, the 203rd launched two balloons, one from its headquarters on the Sawtelle Veterans Hospital grounds in Westwood and the other from Battery D, located on the Douglas Aircraft plant site in Santa Monica. So that the balloons could be tracked at night, a candle placed inside a simple highball glass was suspended under each balloon, whose silver color would reflect the light enough to be tracked to heights usually well above 25,000 feet.… According to [the officer in charge of the meteorological operations at Sawtelle, Lt. John E.] Moore, ‘Our balloon continued up the coast, and the guns continued firing into the night. The next day the newspapers proclaimed “Japs Bomb Los Angeles.” ’ ” Donald J. Young, “Phantom Japanese Raid on Los Angeles During World War II,”
World War II
, September 2003; online at
http://www.historynet.com/phantom-japanese-raid-on-los-angeles-during-world-war-ii.htm
.

c
Though Captain Nishino heard the torpedo explode, the
William H. Berg
was not sunk and escaped.

BOOK: Operation Storm: Japan's Top Secret Submarines and Its Plan to Change the Course of World War II
13.86Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
ads

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