Ortona (39 page)

At about 1430 hours, the Canadians captured the manor house. Then they pushed on through a small scattering of buildings nearby, trying to reach the final objective of Cider Crossroads little more than 1,000 yards farther on. Although they came close, Triquet realized he could never hold the exposed ground. He wisely retreated to the manor house. With the tall, shell- and bullet-pocked structure forming the centre, the men established a circular perimeter that had the infantry on the outside and one tank pointing each direction. There were only fourteen Van Doos. Between them they had five Bren guns, five Thompson submachine guns, and a rapidly dwindling supply of ammunition. They were desperately thirsty. There was no water. The manor house's well was outside the perimeter and covered by snipers. Two men had died trying to refill their canteens there.
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Drawing on his knowledge of French generalship, Triquet told his men, “Ils ne passeront pas.” World War I General Henri Philippe Pétain had uttered this battle cry at Verdun, where the French army had made a determined, bloody stand credited with saving France from German conquest.

At dusk, Triquet, Donald, and Smith gathered near Smith's tank to discuss defensive plans. Triquet's orderly had just walked up with a tin of food and urged his commander to please eat something, when a shell came apparently out of nowhere and exploded nearby. Donald was cut almost in two. He died instantly.
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The orderly, his stomach ripped open, also fell. He cried out, “I'm hit, Captain,” and
died seconds later.
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Neither Smith nor Triquet was touched. The RCHA had just lost its fourth FOO in four days. Another FOO would be captured, killed, or wounded each day for three more days — the heaviest rate of FOO casualties the regiment suffered in the war.

As midnight approached, Triquet heard noise coming from The Gully. He yelled the password and demanded that whoever was coming out of the depths halt and give the countersign. “Don't worry, Paul,” a voice called out. Triquet recognized it as Captain Oliva Garceau's. ‘D' Company had managed to creep through the enemy lines from its position inside the West Nova Scotia Regiment's perimeter to reinforce Triquet.
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Soon after, Captain Andre Arnoldi brought ‘B' company along the highway by the same route Triquet and Smith had taken. Lieutenant Colonel Bernatchez moved up with the last company and his headquarters a short time later. The Van Doos dug in, creating a defensive island around Casa Berardi. The old building's cellar and stables had ceilings supported by massive gothic-style gables. Its upper storeys were also stoutly constructed, so that it was relatively immune to the effects of artillery or other German fire. Bernatchez made the stables and cellars the battalion's aid posts.

Shortly before Triquet's company was reinforced, a single Mark IV tank had roared out of the west, barrelled past the manor house before anybody could react, and disappeared into the gathering darkness heading hell-bent for leather toward Ortona. It was the last German vehicle to travel unmolested along the Ortona-Orsogna lateral road. After six days of fighting, The Gully was turned and the lateral highway closed.
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The Germans recognized the import of failing to prevent Casa Berardi's capture. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring grumbled to Tenth Army commander General der Panzertruppen Joachim Lemelsen, “For two months now I have not been able to exercise proper command because everything evaporates between my fingers and runs down like water from the mountains.” Lemelsen responded, “This whole thing must be blamed on the complete failure of 90th Panzer Grenadier Division.” Kesselring agreed. “It is that outfit's own fault,” he said. Drawing hope from the arrival of 1st Parachute
Division's General Richard Heidrich, Lemelsen said, “Wherever Heidrich is, everything goes all right. . . . The enemy advancing along the coast was flatly thrown back by Heidrich; others let themselves be simply overrun.”
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The decision was made to relieve Generalleutnant Karl Hans Lungershausen as commander of the 90th Panzer Grenadiers, and replace him with the colourful cavalry officer Generalleutnant Ernst-Günther Baade. Independently wealthy, Baade was a brilliant if eccentric soldier. In the interwar years, he had been a renowned international horse rider. Rather than wear a proper military uniform, Baade preferred a Scottish khaki kilt, lacking a sporran, worn over his riding breeches. Suspended in a holster slung around his neck, he always carried a large pistol. Baade had overseen the masterful withdrawal of German troops from Sicily across the Strait of Messina. He was a commander who fought from a forward command post, where he would not be irritated by staff officers and clerks. Lemelsen's slight hope was that together, Baade and Heidrich could rescue the desperate situation around Ortona.

Tenth Army chief of staff Generalmajor Fritz Wentzell said in another phone conversation, “Intention of the Canadians will be to take Ortona. They could not get through on the coast and now they are trying further along the main road to Orsogna. When they have crossed it they will wheel around and press on towards Ortona. The Korps is trying to prevent this with the last available forces. New decisions cannot be made in this situation, one must try to throw in everything to prevent the Canadians from succeeding.”
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In the 76th Panzer Korps' war diary, the December 14 notation read gloomily: “Enemy will bring up further forces and tanks and, in the exploitation of today's success, presumably will take Ortona.”
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T
HE
Royal 22e Regiment's capture of Casa Berardi was the only noteworthy progress made by 1st Canadian Infantry Division on December 14. The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, which had put two companies across The Gully on December 13, was unable to retain its grip in the face of a determined counterattack by the 1st Parachute Division. In the evening, the Hasty P's withdrew to the southern lip of The Gully and dug in.
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The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry sent one company to clear a house on the right flank being used by the Germans as an observation post. ‘A' Company, commanded by Captain J.B. Hunt — an officer cross-posted from the Royal Canadian Regiment to the PPCLI when he returned to the division from a bout of jaundice and there was no spot in the RCR for him — was to receive covering fire from the mortar company. This fire, however, fell on the company instead of on the enemy. Despite heavy casualties, the attacking force pushed ahead until Hunt was killed when a bullet hit him between the eyes. Facing heavy fire from an estimated four machine guns positioned around the house, the surviving elements of the company withdrew.
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The Carleton and York Regiment spent the day on the defensive, finally throwing back another of the 90th Panzer Grenadiers' suicidal counterattacks in the late afternoon. As for the West Nova Scotia Regiment, it was too broken by casualties to do more than hold in place. The Gully remained a formidable barrier to any advance on Ortona. It was obvious that victory could be achieved only by capitalizing on the Van Doos' success at Casa Berardi.

Surprisingly, Major General Chris Vokes and his staff were less than jubilant over the Van Doos' achievement. Although Vokes quickly cited Captain Paul Triquet for the first Victoria Cross awarded to a Canadian in Italy and Major Herschell Smith for a Military Cross, he was hard-pressed to follow up the attack's success. Once again, Vokes had allowed himself to be caught with no available reinforcements to push through Casa Berardi in a race for Ortona. Only two of his nine regiments were unengaged. These were 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade's 48th Highlanders of Canada and the Royal Canadian Regiment. The RCR was still licking the wounds that had left the regiment in tatters after the battle to breach the Moro River line. The 48th Highlanders were in good shape, but were blocking the track that passed through La Torre to San Leonardo, far out on the division's left flank.

Vokes stared at his situation map, seeking a solution that would break the enemy line at The Gully once and for all. His decision-making was probably little enhanced by the arrival at his headquarters of General Montgomery and his entourage. Montgomery had come to receive a personal report from Vokes on the delay. When Montgomery left, Vokes decided he had to act. Trouble was that all he had immediately available was another squadron of Ontario Tanks. But maybe that would suffice. Vokes decided that a strong tank force inserted at Casa Berardi could dominate The Gully positions, enabling continued frontal attacks to shatter the German line at The Gully once and for all.
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Instead of shifting any of the regiments already engaged against the front of The Gully, then, Vokes opted to continue with piecemeal frontal assaults. The only difference this time was that the Van Doos and the tanks could bring pressure against the German right flank and slowly push it in to Cider Crossroads and perhaps beyond. Even if the Van Doos proved unable to advance against the Germans, the
tanks might be able to direct fire down much of the length of the enemy positions dug in to the reverse slope of The Gully. The safe haven the Germans had enjoyed would no longer be secure from the devastating effect of 75-millimetre gunfire.

The task of carrying out the frontal assault was handed to the Carleton and York Regiment, which, of all the battalions facing The Gully, had so far suffered the lightest casualties. It was also one of the regiments closest to Casa Berardi. Vokes ordered the attack made at 0730 hours on December 15, following the usual pre-attack artillery barrage.
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Ever workmanlike in his approach, Vokes perhaps failed to appreciate that mounting attacks in precisely the same manner and at the same time for several days running stripped away any chance of catching the Germans by surprise. The artillery bombardment would tell the paratroopers and Panzer Grenadiers precisely where to look for the attackers. Vokes still seemed not to appreciate that the weight of the artillery was largely nullified by both the mud, which soaked up much of the explosive force of the shells, and the safe haven The Gully's reverse slope provided. When the artillery lifted, the Germans would be there and waiting for the Carleton and York companies.

Vokes did realize the attack was likely to fail. If it did, he intended it to be his last frontal assault on The Gully. Instead, he would finally outflank the obstacle by a deep-penetration attack on the left flank that built upon the success of December 14. To prepare for this event, he ordered the 48th Highlanders and the RCR withdrawn from the forward lines so they could have a brief rest and resupply before embarking on a major engagement.

The battalions of 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade moved to cover the points in the line vacated by 1 CIB. The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada moved to La Torre. The Loyal Edmonton Regiment shifted somewhat to the right and the PPCLI to the left, to cover their own front and that previously held by the RCR. This reorganization meant fully committing 2 CIB. Already seriously short of manpower, the battalions had to thin their lines so much that they would be hard-pressed to contain a major German attack. Vokes was gambling that the Germans had no intention of switching to the offensive from their defensive posture.
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To add more punch to the Canadian line, Vokes offered 2 CIB's
battalion commanders barbed wire and mines. The Seaforths' commander, Syd Thomson, who had been promoted to acting lieutenant colonel, accepted the wire and erected a barrier with it along the front at La Torre. He refused the mines because of the physical difficulty of bringing them up with only mules as transport. The appearance of the wire in front of the Seaforth position made the battlefield bear an even more haunting resemblance to a World War I No Man's Land.

PPCLI commander Lieutenant Colonel Cameron Ware refused both mines and wire. He could see little use in the wire and told Vokes that “the enemy had already mined our area for us.”
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The Loyal Edmontons also declined the offer. Their front was teeming with mines and booby traps left behind by the Germans.

The RCR gladly withdrew from its position. The soldiers had been dug in at the northern edge of the Moro River valley, in front of the road that ran from San Donato to San Leonardo. This was the same area where the battalion had taken its mauling during the Moro River battle. This road was now known to the Canadians as Royal Canadian Avenue. Much of their time had been spent burying the dead left from the battle, both Canadian and German. Cleaning up around Sterlin Castle had proven the most difficult task. They found many of their comrades lying in slit trenches, rifles still gripped in their hands and pressed to their shoulders. The men looked eerily calm. Most had been killed by bullet wounds to the head, as had the dead Germans scattered throughout the surrounding groves and vineyards. On both sides, the rifle marksmanship displayed during the long day's fight at Sterlin Castle had been chillingly deadly.