Paul Revere's Ride (83 page)

20
. Phinney,
Battle at Lexington,
19; Sylvanus Wood, Deposition, June 17, 1826, Ripley,
Battle of Concord,
53—54; Paul Revere thought that the militia numbered “fifty or sixty”; Tourtellot
(Lexington and Concord,
128—29) estimated that 70 militia and 100 spectators were present—altogether nearly 25 percent of the town’s population; French reckoned the number of spectators at “not more than forty”
(Day of Concord and Lexington,
108—9).

21
. “Them are the very words that Captain Parker said,” swore William Munroe in 1822
(Report of the Committee on Historical Monuments and Tablets
[n.p., 1884]). Parker’s threat to shoot men who ran was heard by two men, Robert Douglass and Joseph Underwood, and separately reported in their depositions; Phinney,
History of the Battle at Lexington,
39; Ripley,
History of the Fight at Concord;
Coburn,
The Battle of April 19, 1775, 63n.

This raises a question of conduct and motive in Captain Parker. Why did he muster his company on the Green? The sequence of events compounds the question. Parker mustered his men, consulted with them, dismissed them, mustered them again, ordered them not to fire unless fired upon, warned them that he himself would shoot them if they ran, and then ordered them to disperse when the Regulars formed a line of battle. Six hypotheses come to mind.

(1.) He might have wished to provoke an incident in which the Regulars appeared as the aggressors.

(2.) He did not wish to start a fight, but was unwilling to run away from one: “If they want to have a war let it begin here!”

(3.) He may have intended to make a demonstration of symbolic resistance, to vindicate the honor of his town, but only to the point of actual fighting, and not beyond, and lost control of the event.

(4.) Not knowing if Hancock and Adams had left the parsonage, and thinking that their arrest was one of the objects of the expedition, he mustered his men at the north corner of the Green, very near the Bedford Road, either to block the British troops or to turn them in another direction.

(5.) He changed his purposes with changing circumstances.

(6.) He was severely ill, very tired, deeply confused, and not thinking coherently.

The sixth hypothesis is clearly mistaken. It is true that Parker was terminally ill, and according to one member of his family had not slept the night before, but there is not the slightest hint of confusion in many narratives and depositions. The fifth begs the question. The first goes too far, in my judgment, and the third not far enough. This leaves the second and fourth, which in combination are the most plausible explanations.

22
. See below, p. 282.

23
. Clarke, “Narrative of the Events of April 19.” Captain Parker also observed that “immediately said troops made their appearance and rushed furiously.” See John Parker, Deposition; also William Draper, Deposition.

24
. Galvin writes, “Pitcairn let his column go to the right and galloped around to the left of the meetinghouse, thus momentarily separating himself from his men. He was never able to regain full control of them” (Galvin,
Minute Men,
135). Ralph Earl’s drawing of the fight at Lexington, based on interviews with survivors soon after the event, clearly shows this division, with three companies moving to the right (north) of the meetinghouse, and the rest of the column marching to the left.

25
. William Draper: “The regular troops made an huzza, and ran towards Captain Parker’s company”; Thomas Rice Willard: “The officers made an huzza, and the private soldiers succeeded them”; Thomas Fessenden: “The Regulars kept huzzaing”; Depositions, April 23, 25, 1775,
AA4,
II, 490-501.

26
. The distance between British troops and the American militia was variously estimated at “five or six” or “eight to ten” rods, that is, between 82.5 and 165 feet. The dimensions of the Common, and the judgment of Jonas Clarke, recorded shortly afterward, support the smaller estimates. The words used by the British officers were also remembered differently. One of them was heard to say, “Damn you, why don’t you lay down your arms?” Clarke, “Narrative of the Events of April 19.”

27
. John Robbins, Deposition, April 24, 1775,
AA4,
II, 491.

28
. Clarke, “Narrative of of the Events of April 19”; 62 depositions collected from American eyewitnesses all testified that Parker’s militia was dispersing before it was fired upon.

29
. Revere’s three accounts of the battle add different details. All are combined here.

30
. One of the most careful British accounts was by Lt. Frederick Mackenzie of the 23rd Welch Fusiliers. He was not present at Lexington in the morning, but marched there with Percy later in the day. Mackenzie spoke with “an officer of one of the Flank companies,” who told him that “shots were immediately fired; but from which side could not be ascertained, each party imputing it to the other. Our troops immediately rushed forward, and the Rebels were dispersed, 8 of them killed, and several wounded. One Soldier was wounded, and Major Pitcairn’s horse was wounded.” Mackenzie,
Diary,
I, 24.

31
. On that field of confusion, two facts are clear enough. It was almost universally agreed that the first shot did not come from Captain Parker’s militia or the British infantry. Parker himself testified that the British troops “fired upon and killed eight of our party, without receiving any provocation.” In another deposition, thirty-three Lexington militiamen testified that “not a gun was fired by any person in our Company on the Regulars, to our knowledge, before they fired on us.” Altogether, fifty surviving members of the Lexington company swore under oath that none of their company fired first. By general (if not universal) agreement on both sides, it is also clear that the first shot did not come from the rank and file of the British Regulars. Two eyewitnesses, Benjamin Tidd and Joseph Abbott, testifed in their depositions that the first shots were “a few guns which we took to be pistols, from some of the regulars who were mounted on horses.” Many honorable British soldiers insisted that none of the light infantry companies fired first.

32
.
Barker,
British at Boston,
32; Pitcairn to Gage, April 25,1775. American eyewitnesses agreed on some of these facts, but not upon the sequence. Lexington militiaman Nathan Munroe willingly testified that he himself “got over the wall into Buckman’s land, about six rods from the British, and then turned and fired at them,” but he insisted that this happened after the Regulars had fired at him. Nathan Munroe, Deposition, Dec. 22, 1824, Phinney,
Battle at Lexington,
38; Sabin, “April 19, 1775,” II, 7.

33
. At least one American, Sergeant William Munroe, also saw somebody (later identified as Lexington man Solomon Brown) fire from the back door of the Buckman Tavern, then reload and fire again from the front. Munroe testified many years later, that this happened after the first shots had been fired. According to a Lexington legend, the man who fired at the Regulars from the Tavern was Solomon Brown. The story is told that innkeeper John Buckman drove Brown out of the tavern, in fear that the Regulars would burn it to the ground, but not before the Regulars returned fire, leaving a bullet hole in the front door that still may be seen today. If this happened at all, it must have been after the first shot. William Munroe, Deposition March 7,1825; Phinney,
Lexington,
34; Sabin, “April 19, 1775,” II, 7; Willard D. Brown,
The Story of Buckman Tavern,
14—15. The authenticity of the bullet hole is also very doubtful.

34
. Sutherland wrote after the action, “Major Pitcairn, Major Mitchell, Capts. Lumm, Cochrane, Mr. Thorne of the 4th Regiment, Mr. Adair of the Marines, Captain Parsons of the l0th and Lieutenant Gould and Barker of the 4th I believe will pretty nearly agree in most particulars of the above.” This may be taken as a list of British officers who were engaged on Lexington Green. Three were on foot with the light infantry of the 4th and the l0th Foot when they deployed in front of Parker’s line: Gould, Barker, of the Fourth; and Parsons of the l0th. Four others were mostly members of Mitchell’s patrol: Mitchell himself, Lumm, Cochrane, and Thorne. Pitcairn commanded the advanced column, and Adair had been put in the van. Also with the two companies were Captain Nesbit Balfour of the 4th, Lieutenant Waldron Kelly, and Ensign Jeremy Lister of the l0th (a volunteer replacing Lt. Hamilton at the last minute).

35
. Sanderson, Deposition, Dec. 17, 1824, Phinney,
Battle at Lexington,
31-33; Sutherland to Kemble, April 27, 1775.

36
. Fessenden, Deposition, April 23, 1775, AAq, 11,495-96; Barker, British in Boston, 32. On Sutherland, see the next chapter, below. Sutherland is an interesting character. He tells us that he joined the expedition as a volunteer, and appears to have been hungry for action. His accounts of the battle are exceptionally full and descriptive, but also differ from those of other officers. He tended to be more hostile to the Americans, more strongly assertive that the militia fired the first shots at Lexington, and also Concord where no other British officer concurred with him, more manipulative of facts, more defensive about the British conduct, and more self-serving. Sutherland appears to have been one of the few junior officers who was ordered by Gage’s staff to make a report of his actions; one wonders if Gage had his own suspicions. A distinct possibility is that Sutherland was the man who fired the first shot, perhaps by inadvertence when he was having trouble with his horse. It is the author’s experience that riders who have the most trouble controlling their horses are those least able to control themselves. This is merely a hypothesis. but thc reader will 11utt. Sutherland’s behavior at Concord’s North Bridge.

37
. This hypothesis of several “first shots,” nearly simultaneous, has not been suggested or supported by any other major published history of the event, but it makes a maximum fit with virtually all of the evidence.

38
. J. A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford, 1981), 141.

39
. John Munroe, Deposition, Dec. 28, 1824, Phinney, Battle at Lexzngton, 36-37.

40
. The British muskets had no rear sights; only a bayonet lug near the muzzlew, which disappeared when bayonets were mounted. British infantry were trained to fire with their heads erect, not bent along the musket. One officer observed in 1757, “Any commander that desires his men to hold up their heads when they fire… was never a marksman
himself; and in such case, you may set Blind men a Firing as a man that can see.” George Grant, The New Highland Military Discipline (1757; rpt. Ottawa, 1967); quoted in Houlding, Fit for Service, 279-80.

41
. Timothy Smith, Deposition, April 23, 1775; Thomas Fessenden, Deposition, April 25, 1775; AA4, II, 494, 496.

42
. William Gordon, “An Account of the Commencement of Hostilities Between Great Britain and America,” May 17, 1775,
AA4,
II, 40.

43
. John Munroe, Deposition, Dec. 28, 1824, Phinney,
Battle at Lexington,
35.

44
.
Ibid.

45
.
Ibid.;
Ebenezer Munroe, Deposition, April 2, 1825, Phinney,
Battle at Lexington,
37; the remains of John Munroe’s shortened musket may be seen today in the Munroe Tavern, Lexington.

46
. Kehoe, “We Were There!” typescript, I, 134-41,Watertown Public Library.

47
. Sabin, “April 19, 1775,” II, 15, 18; Lister wrote, “We had but one man wounded of our company in the leg his name was Johnson.” No soldier of this name was on the muster roll of the light infantry company as of April 19, 1775, but Private Thomas Johnston was listed as transferring from another company in the 10th Foot to the light infantry company, effective April 24. One wonders if, like Lister, Private Johnston marched as a volunteer replacement. If so, he was a hard-luck soldier, the only man hit at Lexington, and mortally wounded at Bunker Hill. He died on June 23, 1775. Cf. Lister, Narrative; Muster Roll, 10th Foot, WO12/2750, PRO.

48
. William Munroe, Deposition, March 7, 1825.

49
. Ebenezer Munroe, Deposition, April 2, 1825, Phinney,
Battle of Lexington,
37.

50
. The drum call was not the tattoo, as some secondary accounts surmise.

51
. Gould, Deposition; Sutherland to Kemble, April 27, 1775; Barker,
The British in Boston,
32.

52
. Lt. Col. Francis Smith to Major Robert Donkin, Oct. 8, 1775, Gage Papers, WCL, published in part in French,
General Gage’s Informers,
61; Sabin, “April 19, 1775,” II, 12—13.

53
. Mackenzie,
Diary,
I, 32.

14.
The Battle

1
. Thaddeus Blood, “Statement on the Battle of April 19, 1775,”
Boston Daily Advertiser,
April 20, 1886; ms., CFPL.