Pearl Harbor (22 page)

She stated that Congress would have a full report the next day. Although she never mentioned that the president would be asking for a declaration of war, she hinted at it, saying the nation would “be ready for action.” For months, there had been anticipation that the enemy would strike. “That is all over now and there is no more uncertainty. We know that we are ready to face it now.” The first lady expressed confidence that the nation would pull through the crisis. “Whatever is asked of us, I am sure we can accomplish it: we are the free and unconquerable people of the USA.”
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13

“1861”

L
IKE MOST MEMBERS of the cabinet, Labor Secretary Frances Perkins was away from Washington on December 7. She had traveled to New York, where she had isolated herself in a hotel room to finish writing an important report. White House operators tracked her down in the afternoon and told her she was required to attend an emergency meeting at 8:00 p.m. Initially, the harried operators did not say what the meeting was about. “What's the matter, Hacky,” she asked the operator, “why the cabinet meeting tonight?' “Just the war, what's in the paper,” the operator said hastily before hanging up to make her next call.
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Perkins called for a plane reservation and then rushed to the airport. Although she was a member of the president's inner circle, she still knew little about what had taken place. On the way to the airport, she asked the taxi driver what he knew. “They said on the radio there was shooting somewhere,” he said.

At the airport, Perkins met Vice President Henry Wallace, who was in New York, and Postmaster General Frank Walker. They were also in the dark. No one had expected a Japanese attack. On the short plane ride to Washington, the three officials speculated about what might have happened. Since they were on a commercial flight, and surrounded by other passengers, the three administration members spoke in hushed tones. They recalled that FDR had discussed with them a few days earlier that a large Japanese fleet was at sea, but the speculation at the time was that
it was headed for Singapore. Roosevelt had also raised the possibility that the fleet was moving north to cut the Russian supply lines. They, however, were not aware of any imminent direct threat to the United States.
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Upon arrival in Washington, Perkins, Wallace, and Walker went together directly to the White House, where they were ushered to FDR's private second-floor study. Roosevelt sat silently behind his desk. He nodded when they walked in, but Perkins noticed “there was none of the usual cordial, personal greeting.” He “could not muster a smile.” She described him as “calm, not agitated.” Attorney General Francis Biddle, who had arrived at the last minute from Cleveland, described FDR as “deeply shaken, graver than I had ever seen him.”
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According to a memorandum that Hopkins wrote about the day's events, the cabinet met “promptly” at 8:30 p.m. “All members were present,” he noted. “They formed a ring completely around the President, who sat at his desk.” Hopkins described FDR's mood as “very solemn.” According to Perkins, Early sat near the president and showed him the latest dispatches. Knox and Stimson, both looking tired and tense, were scanning the same dispatches. “New information kept coming in every few minutes,” she recalled.
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Roosevelt put down the papers, looked up at the cabinet, and began addressing them in a low voice. He began by declaring this meeting the most important cabinet meeting since 1861—a reference to the critical early days of the Civil War. “You all know what's happened,” he said quietly. A cabinet member spoke up. “Mr. President, several of us have just arrived by plane. We don't know anything except a scare headline, ‘Japs Attack Pearl Harbor.' Could you tell us more?”
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“The attack began at one o'clock,” Roosevelt explained. “We don't know very much yet.” According to a detailed diary entry by Agriculture Secretary Claude Wickard, FDR placed blame for the attack on Germany. There was, FDR said, “no question but that the Japanese had been told by the Germans a few weeks ago that they were winning the war and that they would soon dominate Africa as well as Europe. They were going to isolate England and were also going to completely dominate
the situation in the Far East. The Japs had been told if they wanted to be cut in on the spoils they would have to come in the war now.” Roosevelt told the group that he believed Japan's motive behind the attack was to aid Germany by bringing “about the transfer of American naval vessels from the Atlantic to the Pacific.” He was determined to prevent this from happening.
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Roosevelt's forced effort to link the Japanese attack to Hitler's ambitions in Europe revealed a great deal about his thinking on Sunday evening. Roosevelt viewed the attack on Pearl Harbor as an extension of the war in Europe. He could not accept that the Japanese were capable of executing such a dramatic and devastating strike without the direct training and supervision of German military planners. The initial report that two of the planes used in the attack had swastikas painted on them no doubt reinforced this perception. For the past decade, Japan had made abundantly clear that its territorial ambitions in the Pacific were separate from events in Europe. FDR, however, insisted on seeing the Japanese as German puppets. In part, this misjudgment reflected his indifference to events in the Pacific and his refusal to understand the underlying reasons for Japan's actions. At the same time, however, it served his larger strategic goal of keeping the nation focused on the war in Europe.

The president provided his team with an up-to-date report on the damage that had been inflicted but warned them to keep the information confidential. He told them that he was not going to be as open with the congressional leaders, who were already gathering outside the room, and would not share the detailed damage reports with them. He also planned to be vague about the message that would be delivered the next day.

He proceeded to tell his cabinet that both Guam and Wake Island were under attack and would soon fall into enemy hands. At Pearl Harbor, a large number of aircraft had been destroyed, and six of seven battleships had been damaged—some very severely. According to Perkins, “the President could hardly bring himself to describe the devastation.”
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As the president recited the damage reports, Wickard noticed that Knox “had lost his air of bravado” and that Stimson “was very sober.”
According to Perkins, FDR twice asked Knox during the cabinet meeting, “Find out, for God's sake, why those ships were tied up in rows.”
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The cabinet was horrified by the reports of destruction. Wickard said he “was shocked at the news,” and “so were other members of the Cabinet.” Many members could not understand how Japan could have caught the U.S. Army and Navy forces on the island so unprepared. “It seems to me extraordinary,” Biddle observed, “that we should have been so unprepared as apparently is the situation.” Unwilling to accept that the military commanders had been grossly negligent, they assumed that the Japanese bombers had employed some brilliant new tactical maneuver. Biddle noted that it “is supposed that the Japanese airplanes flew at a great height of 25,000 feet perhaps, and dropped suddenly so that they might not be intercepted by pursuit planes.”
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Frances Perkins remarked that while FDR was clearly in anguish over the loss of life in Hawaii, his “surprise was not as great as the surprise of the rest of us.” She sensed a feeling of relief that “all conflicts which have harassed him for so many weeks or months, were ended.” The change in his demeanor was striking. “A great change had come over the President since we had seen him on Friday,” she recalled. “Then he had been tense, worried, trying to be optimistic as usual, but it was evident that he was carrying an awful burden of decision.” It was not clear what the United States would do if the Japanese struck British ports. “But one was conscious that night of December 7, 1941, that in spite of the terrible blow to his pride, to his faith in the navy and its ships, and to his confidence in the American intelligence service, and in spite of the horror that war had actually been brought to us, he had, nevertheless, a much calmer air. His terrible moral problem had been resolved by the event,” Perkins recalled.
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A
fter Roosevelt had briefed the cabinet on the attacks, a spirited debate arose over the message that Roosevelt planned to present to Congress the next day. The president read the brief draft that he had
dictated to Tully earlier that afternoon. “The message was short,” Wickard noted, “and merely stated how Japan had attacked while still carrying on peace negotiations. It ended by stating that he was asking Congress to declare that a state of war had existed since Japan's attack.”
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Since talking with Roosevelt about his war message that afternoon, Hull became even more convinced that FDR needed to give a longer address to Congress. He enlisted Henry Stimson for support. Hull said that “he thought the most important war in 500 years deserved more than a short statement.” Stimson jumped in, adding that “Germany had inspired and planned this whole affair and that the President should so state in his message.” Hull pressed Roosevelt for a detailed address that would establish the history of “Japan's lawless conduct” and connect the attack on Pearl Harbor to the Nazis. Stimson agreed. “I pointed out,” he recorded in his diary, “that we knew from the interceptions and other evidence that Germany had pushed Japan into this and that Germany was the real actor, and I advocated the view that we should ask for a declaration of war against Germany also.”
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Stimson complained that the president's message “was not one of broad statesmanship. It really represented only the justified indignation of the country at Japan's treachery in this surprise attack and not the full measure of the grievances we have against her as a confirmed law breaker and aggressor. I was afraid that to base it wholly on indignation at the surprise attack would look weak.”
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Roosevelt had clearly made up his mind to keep his address brief and focus solely on the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. “Secretary Hull had seemed to think it should have been a longer statement,” Biddle noted, “but the President thought not as a matter of timing in journalism.” There were also important strategic considerations. He likely feared that giving a longer message would require providing more details about the destruction at Pearl Harbor. More important, he understood better than his seasoned foreign policy team that focusing too much attention on the Pacific would limit his ability to lead the nation to war in Europe. Finally, he rejected the pleas to include Germany and
Italy in the declaration because he was acutely sensitive to public opinion, and polls continued to show a conflict with Japan was more popular than one with Germany. “I seem to be conscious of a still lingering distinction in some quarters of the public between war with Japan and war with Germany,” FDR told British ambassador Halifax the following day. FDR likely believed that Hitler would solve his problem for him soon enough by declaring war on the United States.
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Stimson remained unconvinced and “urged on him the importance of a declaration of war against Germany before the indignation of the people was over.” Roosevelt replied that he planned to keep his address to Congress brief and then present a full case to the American people in a radio address two days later. Stimson relented but noted in his diary that “the feeling among the cabinet was quite strong in support of Hull's view that the message should be broader.”
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As the meeting came to an end, Wickard could not help but admire Roosevelt's poise and strength. “Through it all the president was calm and deliberate. I could not help but admire his clear statements of the situation. He evidently realizes the seriousness of the situation and perhaps gets much comfort out of the fact that today's action will unite the American people. I don't know anybody in the United States who can come close to measuring up to his foresight and acumen in this critical hour.” Biddle made a similar observation: “The President is his usual calm self, but most of us were deeply shocked at the terrific loss.”
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W
hile Roosevelt was meeting with his cabinet, the White House switchboard received a call from Marguerite “Missy” LeHand. It was a reminder that, even in a time of crisis, presidents have delicate private moments.

Eleanor had recruited the blue-eyed LeHand to work for her husband in 1921. Over the next few years, she made herself indispensable and became a fixture at his side. Between 1925 and 1928, FDR spent 116 of 208 weeks away from home, trying to regain use of his legs.
Eleanor was with him for only 4 of those weeks. Missy was with him for 110—all but 6 weeks.

Missy provided FDR with the warmth and affection that Eleanor could not. She knew everything about him: his likes and dislikes, his mood swings, his favorite food and drinks. She knew when to press a point and when to back off. To everyone else, he was Mr. Roosevelt, the Boss, or, later, Mr. President. To Missy, he was simply “F. D.”—an endearing and informal name no one else would use. Raymond Moley noted, “Missy was as close to being a wife as he ever had—or could have.” They spent most weekends together and often dined together alone. She sat with him while he worked on his stamp collection. She laughed at his jokes and pretended to enjoy his stories, which he repeated many times, as if she was always hearing them for the first time.
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