Political Speeches (Oxford World's Classics) (41 page)

[22] In one respect, however, a victory abroad is preferable to one at home: foreign enemies either are crushed and turned into subjects or are admitted
*
and consider themselves bound by ties of gratitude. But once citizens have been corrupted by some kind of lunacy and have become traitors to their country, you may be able to stop them destroying the state, but you can never constrain them by force or conciliate them by kindness. It is obvious to me, therefore, that the war that I have undertaken against traitors must be unending. I trust, however, that with your help and that of all loyal citizens, and with the recollection of the terrible dangers to which we have been exposed—a recollection which will always be retained not only among our own people who have themselves been saved, but in the minds and conversation of people of all nations—I and those who are with me shall easily drive back the forces that assault us. Certainly, there is no force that is strong enough to subvert and undermine the bond between yourselves and the Roman equestrians, and the absolute unanimity that exists among all loyal citizens.

[23] Since that is how the matter stands, instead of a command, instead of an army, instead of the province I have given up,
*
instead of a triumph and the other marks of honour that I have forfeited in order to keep guard over Rome and your own safety, instead of the new friends and clients that I would have acquired in a province (although in my work at Rome I devote just as much effort to maintaining my existing connections as I do to acquiring new ones), instead of all these benefits that would otherwise come to me, and in return for the exceptional efforts I have made on your behalf, and in
return also for this conscientiousness with which, as you can see, I have protected the country, I ask you for nothing whatsoever—except that you hold on to the memory of this moment and of my whole consulship. As long as that memory remains fixed in your minds, I shall feel that I am defended by the strongest of walls. But if the power of traitors deceives and triumphs over my hopes, then I commend my little son
*
to you: he will surely receive the protection necessary to ensure not just his survival, but his standing in the state—just so long as you remember that his father was a man who saved Rome at his own unique personal cost.

[24] Therefore on the survival of yourselves and the Roman people, on your wives and children, on your altars and hearths, on your shrines and temples, on the houses and homes of all of the city, on your dominion and freedom, on the safety of Italy, and on the entire state you must now make your decision carefully, as you have begun to do, and courageously. You have a consul who will not hesitate to obey whatever you decree, and who will defend your decision, and answer for it personally, for the rest of his days.

In
In Catilinam
IV we saw a free exchange of views taking place in the senate in a free republic, with Cicero presiding as consul.
Pro Marcello
was also delivered in the senate—but we have moved forward in time to 46
BC
. In that year, the free republic had fallen, and Caesar was dictator for ten years. The republicans, led by Pompey, had been defeated at Pharsalus (9 August 48), and Pompey was dead. Most of the surviving republicans had then either made their peace with Caesar or gone on to suffer defeat at Thapsus (6 February 46). Cato, true to his Stoic principles, had committed suicide rather than submit to a tyrant—thus winning for himself eternal glory as a republican martyr. The senate was packed with Caesar’s supporters, and pardoned Pompeians were careful what they said. Cicero himself, pardoned in 47 after a year’s anxious wait, attended the senate only in order not to appear to be refusing to recognize its legitimacy, and did not speak. (His main preoccupation during this period was not politics, but literature: he completed the
Brutus
, a history of Roman oratory, early in 46, and the
Orator
, a discussion of oratorical style, by about September of the same year.) He had not spoken in public for nearly six years, since his successful prosecution of his enemy Titus Munatius Plancus Bursa (a tribune of 52) in, probably, January 51. The speech
Pro Marcello
, delivered in the senate in mid-September of 46, was the speech in which he finally broke his silence.

Pro Marcello
is a speech of thanks to Caesar for agreeing to pardon his most die-hard republican enemy, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, the consul of 51. It is in fact misnamed: the title
Pro Marcello
(‘For Marcellus’) leads one to expect a forensic speech, a defence of Marcellus in a court of law. Instead this is an epideictic (display) speech, a speech in praise of Caesar (technically, a panegyric), and would more correctly be called
De Marcello
(‘On Marcellus’), the title it is given by two Latin writers of the fourth century
AD
, Arusianus Messius and Servius. But the manuscripts of the speech call it
Pro Marcello
, and scholars (with one recent exception) have not seen fit, or dared, to alter that title. We do not know what title, if any, Cicero gave it.

Marcus Claudius Marcellus, although not a patrician, belonged to one of Rome’s most noble and aristocratic families. The most famous member of that family had been the Marcus Claudius Marcellus who held the consulship five times, won the
spolia opima
(‘spoils of honour’) in 222
BC
for killing a Gallic chief in single combat, and went on in 211 to capture Syracuse from the Carthaginians after a two-and-a-half-year siege. The
family maintained its distinction in our period too: the subject of this speech held the consulship in 51, his cousin Gaius Marcellus held it in 50, and his (Marcus’) brother Gaius Marcellus held it in 49. The consul of 50 was married to Octavian’s sister Octavia; their son Marcus Marcellus was to be Augustus’ successor of choice before dying in 23
BC
and being immortalized by Virgil in the
Aeneid
.

Little is known, however, of the early career of our Marcellus. Twelve years younger than Cicero, he held the quaestorship in 64, and supported him during the Catilinarian conspiracy. We know of his involvement in four court cases in the 50s, always on the same side as Cicero: in 56, when he supported Titus Annius Milo against Publius Clodius Pulcher; in 54, when he spoke for Marcus Aemilius Scaurus (Cicero’s
Pro Scauro
survives); and in 52, when he supported Milo after the murder of Clodius, both in the preliminary summons of Milo’s slaves and in Milo’s actual trial. In the
Brutus
(248–50), the interlocutor Brutus is made to speak highly of Marcellus’ oratory, emphasizing its similarity to that of Cicero himself; since the
Brutus
otherwise deals, with the sole exception of Caesar, only with orators no longer living, Marcellus’ inclusion in that work is, like that of Caesar, an exceptional compliment.

In 51, then, Marcellus held the consulship. His colleague was Cicero’s close friend Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the brilliant jurist who is patronized so entertainingly in
Pro Murena
(63
BC
), and whose obituary is the
Ninth Philippic
(43
BC
). Sulpicius had had a long wait for the consulship (his first attempt had been in 63); in the election, he had defeated Cato, his partner in the Murena trial.

In 51, Caesar was coming to the end of his conquest of Gaul, and at Rome the most pressing political issue was whether and under what circumstances he could be induced to give up his command, which he had held since 58. The ‘first triumvirate’ had come to an end in 53 with the death of Crassus. That left just two men dominating the political scene, Pompey and Caesar; but they had become estranged, with Pompey increasingly (since his third consulship in 52) siding with the senate. Caesar was vulnerable to prosecution, since the laws of his consulship in 59 had been passed by violence; but he was exempt from prosecution so long as he held an official command. His aim was therefore to hold on to his command in Gaul until he had fully settled the new province, and then step straight from his command to a second consulship (to enable him to do this, a ‘law of the ten tribunes’ in 52 had given him permission to stand for the consulship in absence; but a later law in the same year had left its status doubtful). Caesar’s enemies, on the other hand, were determined to prevent him from having his way by removing him from his command at the earliest opportunity, and then prosecuting him. These men, who were
generally the most hardline of republicans (and who included aristocrats like the Marcelli), saw Pompey as a means of countering him, but would have preferred ideally to be rid of both men—then the supremacy of the senate would be assured. Cicero, by contrast, like the vast majority of senators, was prepared to appease Caesar in order to prevent the very real danger of civil war. The date at which Caesar’s command was supposed to end is uncertain, and may never have been made explicit (this has been one of the big questions of Roman historical scholarship). But a law had been passed in Pompey’s second consulship in 55 to the effect that the question of a successor to Caesar should not be raised in the senate before 1 March 50 (alternatively, the law may have specified that as the terminal date of his command).

On becoming consul, Marcellus announced that he intended to raise the question of a successor to Caesar in Gaul. But his colleague Sulpicius opposed such provocation. Then Marcellus went further. One of the laws passed during Caesar’s consulship in 59 had set up a colony of Roman citizens at Novum Comum (modern Como) in Transpadane Gaul. In order to make the point that he did not recognize the law—or, more importantly, the
lex Vatinia
of the same year under which Caesar had been appointed to his Gallic command—Marcellus had a citizen of the place flogged (a punishment which could not legally be inflicted on Roman citizens), telling him to go and show his wounds to Caesar. (There was some doubt as to whether or not the man was an ex-magistrate of his town, as he may have claimed; if he was, then the punishment was illegal even if the claim of the people of Novum Comum to Roman citizenship was not valid.) In a letter to his friend Atticus, Cicero called Marcellus’ action ‘ugly’ (
Att
. 5.11.2). The threatened debate on the question of a successor to Caesar finally took place after much delay at the end of September, and it was decided to put the matter on the senate’s agenda for the following 1 March. If Caesar were removed from his command on that day, it would then be impossible for him to step straight from his command to a consulship.

When 1 March came, the proposed debate was vetoed. Meanwhile, the new consul Gaius Marcellus continued his cousin’s policy of active hostility to Caesar. In December, a proposal that Caesar and Pompey
should each give up their commands (Pompey had a command in Spain, which he governed through legates) was approved by the senate by a large majority (370 to 22), but not acted upon. The consul Marcellus then tried and failed to have Caesar declared a public enemy, after which both consuls went to Pompey and formally instructed him to take command of the forces of the state. On 1 January 49—the day on which Marcellus’ brother Gaius became consul—a proposal arrived from Caesar that he and Pompey should each give up their commands simultaneously: if this were not accepted, Caesar would resort to force. The proposal was not put to a vote; instead, Pompey’s father-in-law, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica, proposed that if Caesar did not lay down his arms by a certain date, he should be declared a public enemy. This proposal was carried but then vetoed; and on 7 January the hard-liners persuaded the senate to pass the emergency decree (
senatus consultum ultimum
or ‘SCU’). On 10 or 11 January Caesar then crossed the frontier of his province, the Rubicon, and invaded Italy.

Once the Civil War had begun, those who were not committed to Caesar had to consider what they should do. Cicero, who had returned to Rome from his governorship of Cilicia only at the beginning of 49—too late to try to prevent the war—delayed in Italy until June, before reluctantly deciding to join Pompey in Greece. Gaius Marcellus, the consul of 50, remained in Italy, and succeeded in obtaining Caesar’s pardon. The brothers Marcus and Gaius, on the other hand, both joined Pompey—more out of fear of Caesar than commitment to his opponent (
Att
. 9.1.4). Gaius, the consul of 49, was put in command of the Rhodian section of Pompey’s fleet, but seems to have died by the time of Pharsalus. After Pharsalus, Cicero (who was not present at the battle) returned to Italy to wait for Caesar’s pardon, but Marcus Marcellus would do nothing so humiliating. Instead, he retired to Mytilene, on the island of Lesbos, where he took lessons from Cratippus of Pergamum, a leading Peripatetic philosopher. (Pompey also visited Mytilene after Pharsalus, and complained to Cratippus at the turn fortune had taken.)

To the surprise of many, no doubt, the policy Caesar chose to adopt towards his enemies was one of clemency (
clementia
). There were no proscriptions. Generally speaking, Caesar wanted those of his former opponents who were not sworn enemies to return to Rome and take their place in his senate. When he pardoned Cicero in September 47, he showed him conspicuous public respect. Then while he was away fighting the republicans in Africa, Cicero found himself treated with the greatest civility by Caesar’s friends, who took lessons from him in oratory and invited him to their dinner parties; and they undertook to put in a good word for him on Caesar’s return in July 46. While Cicero had no liking for dictators (he had lived through the Sullan period), by 46 this dictatorship was proving on the whole to be benevolent and even enlightened—greatly preferable, in fact, to whatever might have been expected had the republicans succeeding in recovering Italy.

Throughout this period Cicero corresponded with republican exiles, encouraging them to ask for Caesar’s pardon and return to Rome, as he himself had done; among other considerations, their return would help to
justify his own early submission to Caesar. In the summer of 46 he wrote three such letters to Marcellus, using every conceivable argument to try to persuade him to return (
Fam
. 4.7, 4.8, 4.9). Then at a meeting of the senate in mid-September, Caesar’s father-in-law, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (the consul of 58 whom Cicero had attacked in his invective
In Pisonem
of 55
BC
), happened to mention Marcellus’ name (not necessarily in connection with his restoration). At the mention of the name, Marcellus’ cousin Gaius, the consul of 50, threw himself at Caesar’s feet, and the entire senate rose and approached the dictator in supplication. Caesar responded by criticizing Marcellus’ bitterness towards him and contrasting it with the fair-mindedness and good sense shown by Marcellus’ colleague Sulpicius (who, like Cicero, had reluctantly supported Pompey and obtained Caesar’s pardon, and was now serving as governor of Achaea). But then he unexpectedly declared that he would not refuse the senate’s request: apart from anything else, he said, to refuse it would augur ill for his future relations with them. The senators were invited in order of seniority to express their opinion (why this was necessary is unclear, unless Caesar simply wished to hear himself praised); all except one expressed thanks to the dictator for what he had done. The dissentient was Lucius Volcacius Tullus, the consul of 66, who was evidently hoping to ingratiate himself with Caesar by showing spite towards his enemy. When it was Cicero’s turn to be called, he was so struck by Caesar’s magnanimity and the senate’s solicitude that he decided to break his long silence, and gave an impromptu speech of thanks to Caesar. Our source for these events is
Fam
. 4.4, a letter which Cicero wrote to Sulpicius in Greece soon afterwards: in this letter he says that he had felt that he was witnessing ‘some semblance of reviving constitutional freedom’, and that he had decided that he would henceforward make speeches from time to time, just often enough to keep Caesar satisfied with him. (One scholar has suggested that the pardon of Marcellus was stage-managed by Caesar; that is not impossible, but seems unlikely from Cicero’s account.) Afterwards Cicero wrote up and published the speech he had given—our
Pro Marcello
. We should not automatically assume that he revised it when he wrote it up, since he was well capable of producing a perfect speech without advance preparation and then remembering what he had said (alternatively, his words may have been taken down as he spoke). In the letter to Sulpicius he says that his speech in the senate was a long one, and so there is at any rate no reason to think that he expanded what he had said for publication (as for example the younger Pliny would much later do with his
Panegyricus
).