Quentin Tarantino and Philosophy (11 page)

Hobbes (1588-1679), for instance, says that the natural law frowns upon vengeance.

Thus one is tempted to conclude that Hobbes doesn’t think vengeance is morally justified. But such a conclusion would be hasty. Later Hobbes admits that if someone doesn’t repent for his wrongs, nature doesn’t demand forgiving mercy.

And presumably, like Jules, he wouldn’t let admitting wrongdoing qualify as repentance. And more importantly, since Hobbes didn’t view the natural law as morally binding (it only describes what is prudent for one to do) whether or not vengeance is in accordance with the natural law is irrelevant to vengeance’s morality.
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Thus it seems that Hobbes leaves the question open.

John Locke (1632-1704) suggests that one should not seek vengeance on an abusive tyrant.

So at first glance it seems that Locke would suggest that revenge is never justified; if it is not justified when a tyrant is subjecting you to “all the miseries of want and oppression,” then it would seem never to be. But once we read further, we realize that such actions are not off limits because they are acts of revenge, but because they inappropriately cross social barriers. Such actions

Locke is not condemning revenge but the punishment of superiors. (Like Bushido, Locke would condemn the Bride’s revenge on Bill.) But he leaves open the question of punishing—taking revenge upon—your equals.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) argued that resentment (clearly an emotion that fuels revenge) tends to poison one from within. Thus one might think that Nietzsche would argue that revenge is never morally justified. However, such a conclusion is hasty. As Murphy points out,
⁴³
Nietzsche is suggesting that resentment is not in your self-interest because, given the laws of society, it is usually repressed and thus acts as a poison. Given that fact, it seems unjustified to conclude that Nietzsche condemned
expressed resentment
in the form of revenge; if you can get away with it—like O-Ren and Beatrix—expressed resentment will not poison. So, it seems, Nietzsche too leaves open the question of revenge’s moral justification.

The only classical philosopher I know of who explicitly speaks against revenge is Socrates (469-399 B.C.E.), who suggests
that desires for vengeance and harming one’s enemies are immoral. But he never actually presents a satisfactory argument to this effect; he merely relies on his “intuition” that “true moral goodness is incapable of doing intentional injury to others.”
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So it seems, if we are to
show
that revenge is not morally justified, we need to go beyond the classical philosophers and seek out contemporary arguments.

Some might argue against the moral justification of revenge by pointing out that “two wrongs don’t make a right.” Those who offer up this “saying” as an argument against the moral justification of revenge, however, would be begging the question: that is, they would simply be assuming the truth of what they are trying to prove. To assume that vengeance is “answering wrong with wrong” is to assume, without argument, that vengeance is wrong. If vengeance is morally permissible, then a wrong followed by vengeance is not a case of “two wrongs” but a case of “a wrong and a right.” Thus, a separate argument against revenge needs to be put forth.

To do so, some might argue that we are not morally qualified to enact revenge; only God knows the intent of the wrongdoer and only he is without sin and thus morally worthy of “casting the first stone.”
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But that perfect knowledge and moral character is required to qualify one to enact revenge is, at the least, unclear.
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It seems that we can be “sure enough” about an offender’s intentions and as long as we haven’t done something just as bad as the offender, we are not being hypocritical by punishing them. (Even though O-Ren is not completely without sin, the fact that she has never killed anyone’s parents in cold blood entails that she is not a hypocrite for punishing Boss Matsumoto.) So this argument seems wanting.

Some argue against revenge by suggesting that it does no good
.
After all, even though O-Ren isn’t a hypocrite, killing Boss Matsumoto doesn’t bring her parents back. But, although it is true that seeking revenge doesn’t “undo” the offense, it is far from clear that revenge accomplishes “no good” at all. The offender does get what she or he is due (thus justice is accomplished)
and the victim gets satisfaction and perhaps even peace of mind. If a desire for revenge possesses a person it might harm more than it benefits—and if that is the case, revenge is unadvisable—but it’s hardly obvious that revenge does no good
at all.

If universal pacifism—the position that
all
actions of violence are wrong—is true, then clearly vengeance would be morally unjustified. But many don’t find universal pacifism plausible. It entails that even actions of self-defense, both personal and social, are morally unjustified; and this means that Alabama in
True Romance
should not have defended herself against the hit man Virgil, and that we should not have opposed Hitler with force. Most find this implausible and in the same way that we can offer of up an argument for self-defense, it seems that we can offer up an argument for revenge: It seems perfectly clear that
we have a moral obligation
not
to harm people who have not wronged us
. However, what could this possibly mean but that, when one does wrong us, the obligation not to harm them has been lifted? Why even bother to point out that we have an obligation not to harm others who don’t wrong us, if we still have such an obligation even after they harm us? Wouldn’t we then just have an obligation not to harm in any circumstance? And isn’t that just pacifism? Thus it seems that, if one wrongs us, we are morally permitted to seek revenge; the obligation not to harm has been lifted.
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Given that we have found no convincing argument against it, and have seen a convincing argument for it, it seems that revenge can be justified.

I can tell you with no ego, this is my finest sword. If on your journey, you should encounter God, God will be cut.

—Hattori Hanzo,
Kill Bill Volume 1

So, it seems, western philosophy makes room for Tarantinian revenge. But perhaps Tarantino goes too far. fter all, with revenge, there is no limit to the punishment’s severity and its severity is determined by the avenger alone; this entails that the punishment could end up being much worse than the offender’s original crime. In
Pulp Fiction
, Lance tells Vincent that punishment for keying someone’s car should be death. “No trial, no jury, straight to execution.” In
Jackie Brown
, Louis kills Melanie in the parking lot of the Del Amo Mall because she won’t stop bugging him. (The final straw is her making fun of him for forgetting where he parked.) And such actions seem wrong.

I tend to agree, and would suggest that revenge that “oversteps its bounds” in this way is not morally justified. So I offer my defense of revenge with this caveat: not all acts of revenge are morally justified, but revenge can be morally justified if the inflicted punishment reflects the original crime—in other words, if the punishment is “due.” But Tarantino’s films offer this caveat as well. I don’t think that the above examples are portrayed as praiseworthy. Notice also that, in
Pulp Fiction
, when it is suspected that Marsellus Wallace dropped Antwan Rockamore (a.k.a. Tony Rocky Horror) down four stories into a greenhouse for giving his wife a foot massage—even though Vincent suggests that Tony was “playing with matches” and should have expected to get burned (PF)—both Jules and Vincent acknowledge that he went too far.

Even though “undue punishment” is frowned upon, one might complain that Tarantino’s view seems to suggest that under certain circumstances the killing of innocents is morally justified. After all, Tarantino suggests through the voice of Hattori Hanzo:

This quote is often attributed to Rinzai, “a ninth-century Chinese monk who developed a school of Buddhism that focused on ‘sudden enlightenment’”
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and would seem to suggest the killing of innocents is justified if innocents stand in the way of due punishment. But I don’t think that Tarantino’s view really takes things that far (nor does the quote entail that one should). Beatrix does take this advice to heart when she fights the Crazy 88s, but this is only because the Crazy 88s are not innocent; they are sworn protectors of O-Ren. If they had simply refused to protect O-Ren she would have not touched them. (In fact, in the movie she offers this way out to Go Go, and in the original script she makes the same offer to Mr. Barrell—O’Ren’s #2 who doesn’t appear in the film—and he takes it!) But the most convincing evidence that Tarantino’s films don’t promote the killing of innocents in the name of vengeance is seen in the scene that precedes the above quote where Beatrix kills Vernita.

Since “due” punishment would entail the killing of innocents, Beatrix refuses it. Beatrix knows that this is, morally, going too far and settles for only killing Vernita. So it seems that there is room for Tarantino’s view; it is not only logically coherent, but I think it is defensible. As long as the punishment administered fits the crime and doesn’t kill innocents, revenge is morally permitted.

Some may be appalled that I am defending such a view but to them I say three things:

Of course, the majority sharing the view doesn’t make it right; but I think it does entail that one can’t be appalled at its defense.

RACHEL ROBISON

 

 

Beatrix Kiddo (codename: Black Mamba), the main character of Quentin Tarantino’s
Kill Bill
series, goes on a “roaring rampage of revenge” to kill everyone who was involved in her attempted murder.

Are the actions of the Deadly Viper Assassination Squad morally okay? Is Beatrix’s revenge morally okay? Let’s see how several different ethical theories would answer these questions. Most of these theories will conclude that the Squads actions are morally impermissible. Yet I believe that the Deadly Viper Assassination Squad operates according to a bastardization of virtue ethics. Looked at in this way, their actions may actually turn out to be permissible.

One way of analyzing whether an action is permissible or impermissible is to look at the consequences that result from that action. One of the most popular theories of this kind is
utilitarianism
. This type of theory is advocated by philosophers like John Stuart Mill
⁵⁰
and Jeremy Bentham.
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From this point of view, the only thing with intrinsic value (the only thing that is valuable for its own sake) is happiness. So in order to make the right moral decision, an agent should perform whatever action
promotes the greatest amount of overall happiness or (in those cases where there is no net happiness) prevents the greatest amount of overall unhappiness.